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THE NECESSARY MORAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: 
A GEWIRTHIAN CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY INCLUSIVE 
POSITIVISM 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
How does law possess the normative force it requires to direct our actions? This seemingly 
innocuous question is of central importance to the philosophy of law and, by extension, of the 
very concept of law itself, and it is hoped that this thesis will make a contribution which can 
further our capacity to provide a satisfactory answer.  
 
The argument put forward will be one coming from the Natural Law tradition, in that it 
claims that the normative force of law has a necessary connection to morality. In order to be 
successful in this enterprise, two things will need to be demonstrated. Firstly, a commitment to 
the concept of moral truths is required; secondly, these moral truths must be identifiable through 
human reason. It will be argued that these conditions are met by Alan Gewirth’s Principle of 
Generic Consistency, which attempts to locate the existence of universally applicable moral 
norms through a dialectically necessary argument grounded in the truism of noumenal agency. 
Such an argument, if correct, will demonstrate that a universalised instrumental reason 
necessarily serves as a categorical imperative to bind all agents to adhere to its absolute and 
exclusionary requirements against behaviour that would be non-compliant. 
 
This has implications for legal theory, in that positive law is a product of human, and therefore 
agential, activity. If the PGC applies to all agential behaviour, a circumstance might arise in 
which a rule claiming the status of law might contradict its requirements. This thesis argues 
that, in such circumstances, the PGC requires agents to deny the normative force claimed by 
the non-compliant rule, thus demonstrating that (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ). Contemporary 
positivist theories will then be critiqued against this claim to establish the extent to which they 
overcome the necessary link between law and morality thus established. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
The Necessary Moral Foundation of 
Law:  
A Gewirthian Critique of 
Contemporary Inclusive Positivism 
 
________ 
 
Joshua Jowitt 
 
________ 
 
A Thesis submitted for the Degree 
of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
________ 
 
Durham Law School 
Durham University 
January 2018 
 
4 
 
Contents 
 
 
Abstract        1 
Title Page        3 
Contents        4 
Copyright Declaration       8 
Acknowledgements       9 
Dedication        10 
 
Chapter One: Legal Positivism vs Natural Law – An Overview  
 1 Introduction      11  
 2 The Classical Positivism of John Austin  12 
  2.1  Identifying True Law    13 
  2.2  The Moral Aspect of Law   15 
  2.3  Where Law and Morals Meet   17 
 3 Classical Natural Law     21 
  3.1  Classical Origins of Natural Law Theory 22 
  3.2  St. Thomas Aquinas    23 
  3.3  Early-Modern Natural Law Theory  27 
 4 The Cotemporary Debate    29 
  4.1  The Normativity of Law   29 
4.2  Shapiro’s Planning Thesis: An Example of 
 Contemporary Positivism   31 
4.3  A Natural Law Response to Shapiro  37 
4.4  More than a Word Game?   39 
 5 Conclusion      42 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Chapter Two: The Centrality of Normativity to the Concept of Law 
1 Introduction      43 
2 Meaning and Status of Normativity   44 
2.1  An Agreed Referent    46 
2.2  Normativity, Agency and Law   53 
 3 Normativity in Positivist Theory   60 
  3.1  Exclusive Legal Positivism   62 
  3.2  Inclusive Legal Positivism    66 
 4 Conclusion      71 
 
Chapter Three: The Gewirthian Solution 
 1 Introduction      73 
 2 The Dialectical Necessity of Morality   75 
  2.1  The Workings of the Principle of Generic  
Consistency     76 
  2.2  Universal Morality in a Pluralistic World 81 
  2.3  From Moral Principle to Foundation of a  
Legal System     84 
 3 Identifiability in Kantian Personhood   94 
  3.1  The Centrality of Practical Reason  95 
  3.2  Kant and Law     99  
  3.3  Preliminary Objections   103 
 4 Conclusion      105 
 
Chapter Four: Defending the Necessary Connection 
 1 Introduction      106 
 2 Philosophical Criticisms of the PGC   107 
  2.1  Bernard Williams    108 
  2.2  Nietzsche     115 
  2.3  Other arguments from Scepticism  118 
  2.4  Enoch      122 
 3 Objections from Classical Positivism   127 
6 
 
  3.1  Hans Kelsen     129 
   3.1.1 The Pure Theory of Law  129 
   3.1.2 The Basic Norm   133 
   3.1.3 Problems of Definition  135 
  3.2 H.L.A. Hart and the Secondary Rule of  
Recognition     137 
   3.2.1 The Purpose of the Doctrine  138 
   3.2.2 Morality and Law in Hart  141 
   3.2.3 A Circular Definition   146 
 4 Conclusion      148 
 
Chapter Five: Reasons, Law and all that Raz 
 1 Introduction      150 
 2 Raz on Reasons     154 
  2.1 On the Nature of Reasons   154 
   2.1.1 Reasons founded on false belief 156 
   2.1.2 Differing types of Reasons  159 
   2.1.3 Exclusionary Reasons   164 
  2.2 Normativity and Reasoning   169 
  2.3 Resolving Conflicts within Reasons for  
Action      178 
   2.3.1 Reasons based on Morality  180 
   2.3.2 Reasons based on Personal Interest 185 
   2.3.3 Reasons based on the Recognition  
of Authority    187 
   2.3.4 Incommensurability Revisited  190 
 3 Raz on Law      195 
  3.1 On the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning 198 
   3.1.1 The Nature of Legal Authority  199 
   3.1.2 Legal Reasoning   205 
  3.2 The Importance of Points of View  208 
7 
 
  3.3 Legal Normativity    210 
   3.3.1 Legal Normativity from the PGC 211 
3.3.2 PGC Compliant Normativity and the  
Sources Thesis    217 
  3.4  Systemic Functionality    222 
  3.5 An Obligation to Obey the Law?  229 
  4 Conclusion     232 
 
Chapter Six: Accepting the Trojan Horse - The Necessary Collapse of 
Inclusive Legal Positivism 
 1 Introduction      235 
 2 David Lyons and Formalism    237 
  2.1 Formalism Explored    239 
  2.2 The Minimal Separation Thesis  242 
 3 Incorporationism and Jules Coleman   246 
  3.1 Positive Positivism and the Conventionality  
Thesis      248 
  3.2 Wrongfulness and Law as Economic Rights 258 
  3.3 Legal Authority and the Practical Difference  
Thesis      263 
 4 The Moderate Incorporationism of Matthew Kramer 270 
  4.1 Kramer’s Rejection of Ethical Rationalism 271 
  4.2 Implications for Kramer’s Theory of Law 277 
 5 Conclusion      288 
 
Conclusion        290 
 
Bibliography        299 
 
  
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would first like to thank my supervisory team, Professor Deryck Beyleveld and Professor 
Shaun Pattinson, for their patience and guidance over the course of this project. I would also 
like to thank my family, whose support has seen me through to the end. 
 
My gratitude also goes out to the academic communities I have been part of during this work; 
University College, Durham Law School and latterly Newcastle Law School. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my friends, old and new, for having put up with me for the last 
few years. You should all be relieved that I might now finally shut up about Alan Gewirth’s 
Principle of Generic Consistency. Special mention to the MFC for some truly wonderful 
memories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents, without whose unfaltering love and support I would be nothing. 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter One 
 
 
Legal Positivism vs Natural Law – An Overview 
 
 
‘Jurisprudence matters because law matters, and law matters because it figures in our practical 
lives – in our determinations of what we ought to do and why.’ 1 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
Central to any theoretical study of the normative force of law is the ongoing 
debate between Legal Positivists on the one hand and Non-Positivists on the 
other. Legal Positivists would have us believe that there exists no necessary 
connection between the normative force exerted upon us by law and the 
normative power of morality; non-positivists would hold that such a connection 
is not only necessary, but axiomatic to the nature of law itself. The purpose of 
thesis is to defend a theory of natural law that identifies the Principle of Generic 
Consistency proposed by Alan Gewirth2 as the ultimate source of legal 
normativity against contemporary inclusive positivism, a purpose that 
necessitates an opening discussion to establish the classical positions taken in 
debates between Positivism and Natural Law theory.  
This chapter aims to present foundational theories in both of these broad 
schools of thought. I will begin by discussing the Positivism of John Austin, 
before establishing why I believe any Positivist theory grounded in his work to 
be deficient due its failure to identify a suitably compelling explanation as to the 
normative grounding force of any legal system. From this I will explore the 
Natural Law theory proposed by Thomas Aquinas, and its impact and influence 
on subsequent non-Positivist theories. It is worth establishing at the beginning 
of this work that I am aware of the Janus-faced character of Natural Law theory 
                                                          
1 Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (OUP 
2001) 70 
2 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago University Press 1978) 
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as highlighted by A.P.d’Entrèves; that it is viewed as both a historical product of 
the Western Civilisation from which it can trace its development and 
terminology, in addition to being considered an exclusively philosophical 
doctrine which should be viewed as central to human knowledge and therefore 
universal in its application.3 I will then move from this initial exploration of the 
schools to the contemporary debate as to the normative force of law, exploring 
more recent attempts at grounding Law’s normative force in Positivism before 
establishing the reasons for which I believe these attempts are doomed to failure. 
I will also explore the extent to which the Positivist/Non-Positivist debate has 
been historically characterised as a semantic disagreement over the meaning of 
the word ‘law itself’. Such observations have been common throughout history; 
David Hume observed in 1751 that ‘The word natural is commonly taken in so 
many senses, and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute 
whether justice be natural or not.’ 4 But I believe these observations to 
oversimplify what is a genuine disagreement, something I hope will be 
established in s.4 of this chapter. Once this has been established, I am in a 
position to suggest that the problems present in contemporary positivist theories 
can be rectified by reference to a moral content which should be recognised as 
necessarily present within the concept of Law itself. This being established, the 
remainder of this thesis will explore the extent to which Alan Gewirth’s Principle 
of Generic Consistency can provide this moral core when faced with recent 
developments within Positivism. 
 
2 The Classical Positivism of John Austin 
 
In his collection of lectures published in 1832 under the heading The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined, John Austin set his intellect towards defining the scope 
of what law and legal philosophy should concern itself with: ‘The matter of 
jurisprudence is positive law: law, simply and strictly so called: or law set by 
                                                          
3 Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, Natural Law; An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (first pub 1951, 
Hutchinson & Co., 1970) 14 
4 David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals ( first pub 1751, Oxford University 
Press 1988) 308 
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political superiors to political inferiors.’5 Whilst this limitation may initially 
appear to leave open the possibility that law and morality should be linked 
(should they be deliberately integrated by political superiors within whose 
responsibility the creation of law, for Austin, necessarily lies), any such link is 
starkly rejected towards the end of Lecture V, when Austin holds firmly that: 
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. 
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not 
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry…Now, to 
say that human laws which conflict with Divine law are not binding, that 
is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense.6 
It is clear that even laws which could be considered as morally wrong could still 
be enforced by political superiors; they would retain the power of law to control 
our actions, rendering any discussion of their moral validity ancillary. The 
binding force of law upon us as individuals rests in its instructive nature; ‘Every 
law or rule... is a command. Or, rather, laws or rules, properly so called, are a 
species of commands.’7 Commands are necessarily correlative with a duty; when 
such commands are made a duty is imposed, and a failure to comply with the 
duty legitimises the imposition of a compliance-encouraging sanction.8  
Here, for Austin, rests the origin of law’s normative force. Yet this simplification 
hides some nuances which deserve expansion. This section will firstly explore 
Austin’s differentiation between certain classes of law, and their relevance to the 
science of Jurisprudence. I will then move on to consider Austin’s observations 
on those situations in which moral and legal obligations may coincide, before 
exposing the contradictions inherent within Austin’s examination. 
 
2.1  Identifying True Law 
 
For Austin, it is inherent within the very definition of Law that true law, law 
properly so called, be set by political superiors to political inferiors. Yet this is 
                                                          
5 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (first published 1832, Wilfrid  E. Rumble ed. 
Cambridge University Press 1995) 18 
6 ibid 157-158 
7 ibid 21 
8 ibid 22 
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not the only species of Human Law whose existence he recognises. In addition 
to such command-based theories of law, we have a second type of Human Law 
which is set by those who are not politically superior to ourselves. Examples 
given by Austin here include standards of behaviour or action which impose 
obligations on us by custom or the necessity of social conformity, such as 
honour or fashion. Although we may refer to these obligations with legal 
terminology, such as an honour code or the laws of fashion, 9 they are to be seen as 
different to law properly so called because they do not emanate from those who 
are politically superior who would be in a position to impose a compliance-
inducing sanction in the event of non-compliance. 10 They are more properly 
referred to as positive moral rules improperly so called. 
Austin appears to suggest that our failure to adequately distinguish these two 
types of Human Law arises from a mere linguistic confusion; whether or not an 
obligation is created by a Human Law properly so called or from something 
which closely resembles, but is different to true law, can be determined by 
reference to the criteria above. For example, the laws of motion would fall into the 
latter camp, as:   
We say that the movements of lifeless bodies are determined by certain 
laws: though, since the bodies are lifeless and have no desires or 
aversions, they cannot be touched by aught which in the least resembles 
a sanction, and cannot be subject to aught which in the least resembles 
an obligation.11  
Yet, by Austin’s own concession, within this definition of law necessarily 
emanating from a political superior, we should also exclude International Law 
from the purview of Jurisprudence;12 this would strike the modern reader as an 
odd exclusion to make, one which arbitrarily and artificially limits the definition 
of law to a concept much smaller than that to which we would recognise as 
complete and comprehensive. We must therefore examine the reasons why 
                                                          
9ibid 123 
10 ibid 125 
11 ibid 149 
12 ibid 19 - 20 
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Austin has delineated his definition at this point, and ask ourselves whether we 
truly believe that he is justified in doing so. 
 
2.2  The Moral Aspect of Law 
 
As Austin’s words contained in the quotation to be found in the introduction to 
s.2 demonstrates, Austin holds that the question the merit or demerit of a law is 
an utterly different question from that which asks whether a law exists. As I have 
summarised in s.2.1, the existence of Law for Austin rests on the existence of a 
command, supported by a sanction, issued by a political superior. Any 
comparison to be made between this law and an assumed standard, such as 
morality, is not a question of the validity or applicability of that law.  
Austin concedes that the ‘science of ethics’ has two branches; positive law 
(legislation) and positive morality (morals).13 Yet despite their similarities, he 
insists upon the stark and absolute separation of the two questions. This is 
partially due to his belief in the difficulty posed by attempts to identify an 
objective moral standard against which the law’s merit or demerit may be 
compared. This is something he holds as self-evident: 
The respective moral sentiments of different ages and nations, and of 
different men in the same age and nation, have differed to infinity. This 
proposition is so notoriously true, and to every instructed mind the facts 
upon which it rests are so familiar, that I should hardly treat my hearers 
with due respect if I attempt to establish it by proof.14 
When Austin therefore comments that ‘There is no broad sun destined to 
illumine the world, but every single man must walk by his own candle.’15 he rests 
his positivism on what he holds to be the inescapable fact of moral pluralism. 
As no objective and universal moral standard can be said to exist, it would make 
a nonsense of the concept of Law to hold that such a standard would be a central 
to it. 
                                                          
13 ibid 113 
14 ibid 89 - 90 
15 ibid 90 
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This is not to say that positive moral rules properly so called cannot exist. Such 
rules should merely be distinguished from law as they can be distinguished on 
two criteria: 
1. They are imperative law or rules set by men to men.  
2. They are not set by men as political superiors, nor are they set by men 
as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.16 
Furthermore, such positive moral rules should in turn be separated from Divine 
Law. Austin holds that such law is worthy of being described as law proper, ‘as 
they are commands express or tacit, and therefore emanate from a certain source.’17 
This is a law whose moral content Austin perceives as objective and universal, 
but whose content differs from the positive morality extant in contemporary 
discourse that the two should not be conflated. 18 It is therefore positive morality, 
as opposed to the Law of God, which we should distance ourselves from when 
attempting to locate Law’s normative force.  
This is not to say that the two cannot ever coincide. It is merely that, should 
such an overlap occur, it should not be seen as essential to the character of the 
positive law proposed. Austin gives the distinction made between crimes able to 
be described as ‘mala in se’ and ‘mala quia prohibita’ as indicative of this overlap: 
For, through the frequent confusion...of positive law and positive 
morality, a portion of positive morality, as well as of positive law, is 
embraced by the law natural of modern writers on jurisprudence, and by 
the equivalent jus gentium of the classical Roman jurists. 19 
Any feelings we have to obey the law because it complies with our own moral 
standards are therefore completely coincidental and should be discarded from 
our enquiry. We are presented with a scenario to help elucidate this statement; 
we feel remorse should we kill an individual during the course of robbing them, 
but would not feel the same remorse should we kill a robber during the course 
of being robbed. Austin suggests that we should feel equal remorse for both 
killings if the act of killing itself were the source of our moral guilt; the fact that 
                                                          
16 ibid 119 
17 ibid 118 
18 ibid 11 
19 ibid 92 
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we do not is because the law of England makes a distinction between the two 
scenarios, thus exonerating us from our remorse as our nation’s popular morality 
‘accords with the law.’ 20  
It is unusual that Austin should make this statement without any serious attempt 
to ground it in ethical language; the suggestion that it is the law that determines 
whether or not we should feel morally guilty for our actions appears to question 
beg significantly. To take another example from English law and the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, Austin appears to suggest here that should 
Parliament pass a law which commanded that all blue eyed babies be executed 
at birth, the very fact that this law was passed by appropriate legislative 
procedure should be enough to exonerate us from our guilt should we be tasked 
with enforcing that statute. I would argue that many would not agree with this 
statement, thus demonstrating that Austin’s claim lacks sufficient exploration of 
the issues which it purports to dismiss. It therefore follows that whenever we 
make a value judgement as to the validity of human law in enquiring whether 
‘the law agrees with or differs from a something to which we tacitly refer it as to 
a measure or test.’,21 we are asking ourselves whether we see the law in question 
as imposing a valid moral obligation upon ourselves. Austin’s claim that 
‘[Jurisprudence] is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, 
as considered without regard to their goodness or badness.’22 can therefore be 
seen as an unhelpful simplification. 
 
2.3  Where Law and Morals Meet 
 
This claim that Austin is simplifying the analysis he wishes to make can be 
supported by a deeper exploration of his own characterisation of Law properly 
so called. He defines Law simply as:  
                                                          
20 ibid 84 
21 ibid 113 
22 ibid 112 
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…a command which obliges a person or persons…In language more 
popular but less distinct and precise, a law is a command which obliges 
a person or persons to a course of conduct. 23 
He goes on to acknowledge that law and morality may overlap, but the fact that 
this is not always the case should be seen as indicative of the fact that the two 
ought not to be confused: 
The body or aggregate of laws which may be styled the law of God, the 
body or aggregate of laws which may be styled positive law, and the body 
or aggregate of laws which may be styled positive morality, sometimes 
coincide, sometimes do not coincide, and sometimes conflict.24 
Therefore, should an individual commit an act which violates one or more of 
these species of law thus identified by Austin, the wrongs committed should be 
delineated within each species rather than being collated into a whole: 
The murderer commits a crime, or he violates a positive law: he commits 
a conventional immorality, or he violates a so called law which general 
opinion has established: he commits a sin, or he violates the law of 
God.25 
Yet Austin goes on to make suggestions which muddy the clear waters he 
attempts to impose between his species, particularly those of positive law and 
positive morality. For example, as established in s.2.2 of this chapter, Austin 
holds that the societal fact of moral pluralism renders impossible any attempt at 
locating a universally objective moral standard against which the moral validity 
of law should be judged. It may therefore strike the reader as surprising that he 
goes on to claim that ‘The killing which is styled murder is forbidden by the 
positive law of every political society.’26  
Note here that Austin does not claim most political societies, but every. If this is 
indeed the case, several questions follow. Why is it the case that murder is 
forbidden by the positive law of every political society? What feature is it of this 
crime in particular that has led to the situation whereby it is universally 
                                                          
23 ibid 29 
24 ibid 138 
25 ibid 138 
26 ibid 138 
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criminalised? And does it follow that, if murder is prohibited in every political 
society, that this is because the popular morality of every political society also 
prohibits murder in the way Austin suggests is true with the example he provides 
of killing a robber in self-defence? Does Austin here unintentionally endorse a 
universal moral standard in the prohibition of murder? He would, of course, 
deny such a conclusion – but the question remains unanswered in his work; if 
this is a universal moral standard which is universally recognised within law, 
might law itself possess an irreducible moral core?  
This open question is one which will hopefully be addressed through the course 
of this work, but limitations of space prevent me from addressing it in more 
detail here. Instead, I will address yet another blurring between positive law and 
positive morality which Austin introduces in his work. It can be found in a 
margin note, and concerns the nature of what most legal scholars would initially 
identify as laws but whose status he disputes due to the definition he has 
adopted:  
In strictness, declaratory laws, laws repealing laws, and laws of imperfect 
obligation (in the sense of the Roman jurists), ought to be classed 
respectively with laws metaphorical or figurative, and laws of positive 
morality.27 
He concedes however that, as these concepts are closely connected to positive 
law: 
[They] are an appropriate subject of jurisprudence. Consequently, I treat 
these as improper laws of anomalous or eccentric sorts, and exclude 
them from the classes of laws to which they in strictness belong.28 
It is not initially obvious why Austin is prepared to discard his definitions in 
order to make allowances for these ‘anomalous or eccentric’ laws by excluding 
them from the classes where they ought to reside; by doing so, it could be argued 
that he partially delegitimises his attempt to create a watertight definition in 
declaring the subject of jurisprudence to be limited to positive law. Why is it that 
these should be appropriate subjects of jurisprudence, but questions aimed at 
                                                          
27 ibid 156 
28 ibid 157 
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exploring the overlap between positive law and positive morality should be 
excluded?  
Austin gives no answer to this question beyond his earlier insistence on the 
impossibility of locating a universal and objective morality against which legal 
validity might be judged – and, as has been highlighted above, this denial is itself 
questionable given Austin’s identification of murder as a wrong universally 
prohibited by law. To not ask why this might be the case would be to limit our 
discussion arbitrarily. Indeed, it is suggested that Austin’s arbitrary exclusion of 
moral discourse within his concept of legality is founded on a frequent yet 
unacknowledged conflation of the concepts of collective and critical morality.29 
For if Austin holds the impossibility of locating a test for a universal principle 
of ethics as the prime reason for the failure of any theory of Natural Law,30 he 
appears to be defining morality as being dependent on the practice of its 
principles – thus endorsing a collective standard. Yet in recognising that the 
existence of God given standards which can be codified to become positive law 
once ‘clothed with human sanctions’31 necessitates the recognition of an order 
of jus gentium, he acknowledges an objective and universal standard of critical 
morality which is capable of generating higher order norms ‘obtaining at all times 
and obtaining at all places’.32 In thus acknowledging that such higher order 
norms are applicable universally, Austin recognises that critical moral standards 
operate at the level of practical reason and could override positive law should 
they provide a superior reason for compliance. They therefore operate as reasons 
for action despite the fact that they are not issued by men to men as political 
superiors,33 thus demonstrating that Austin’s claim that an order from a political 
superior is necessary for a rule to possess exclusionary force is false. By 
extension, such a claim can no longer stand as a definitional feature of law. 
 
                                                          
29 Collective Morality would be the empirically observable moral standards of a political 
community, whereas critical morality refers to a philosophically verifiable standard of moral truth 
independent of whether or not it is observed.  
30 Austin refers to the incommensurability of standards of Theistic morality, of utilitarian 
morality and of subjective preference as leading to difficulties in assessing the moral validity of 
a positive law. Austin (n 5) 112-113 
31 ibid 115 
32 ibid 
33 ibid 119 
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Should this be the case, then a necessary link between law and morality has been 
inadvertently acknowledged; that positive law which conflicts with standards 
required by jus gentium is incapable of guiding human action.  Austin may here 
counter that religious pluralism serves as evidence that such a standard is 
incapable of being demonstrably proven as necessary, and thus such a necessary 
connection is conceptually impossible to demonstrate. This thesis will go on to 
argue that the writings of Alan Gewirth, to be introduced in Chapter Three, are 
capable of generating such an objective standard. For the time being however, 
having established that Austinian Positivism actively acknowledges the existence 
of an overriding moral reason against compliance with the positive law in 
standards of jus gentium, this thesis moves on to an exploration of the evolution 
of Natural Law thought with the hope of highlighting deficiencies in this school 
of thought which may also be addressed through Gewirth’s writing. 
 
3 Classical Natural Law 
 
As was addressed in the introduction to this chapter, the term ‘Natural Law’ is 
often used to describe two distinct phenomena; it may be held to refer equally 
to a historical product of Western Civilisation from which it both originates and 
traces its development, or as a distinct philosophical doctrine which is both 
central to human knowledge and universal in its application. 34 For the purposes 
of this piece, I will adopt the definition of Natural Law proposed by d’Entrèves: 
Perhaps the best description of natural law is that it provides a name for 
the point of intersection between law and morals. Whether such a point 
of intersection exists is therefore the ultimate test of the validity of all 
natural law thinking.35 
The primary purpose of the following section will therefore be to trace the 
evolution of such thinking throughout history. I will begin by briefly expounding 
classical positions before moving into the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, arguably 
one of the most prominent proponents of Natural Law thinking. I will end by 
                                                          
34 d’Entrèves (n 3) 14 
35ibid 111 
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discussing early modern Natural Law, and the move away from God in theories 
of Natural Law.  
 
3.1  Classical Origins of Natural Law Theory. 
 
D’Entrèves invites us to believe that ‘It is best to begin by reducing [Natural 
Law] to its simplest expression. Natural Law goes back to God.’ 36 Indeed, in 
including an extensive quote from Cicero in his work, he makes an extensive 
nod to this origin: 
True Law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its 
commands and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions... We cannot 
be freed from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need not look 
outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will 
not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and 
in the future, but one eternal and interchangeable law will be valid for all 
nations and for all times, and there will be one master and one ruler, that 
is, God, over us all, for He is author of this law, its promulgator, and its 
enforcing judge.37 
According to this definition, True Law should align with divine will for action. 
It is universal and unchangeable through time, in accordance with the law of 
God and His plans for our existence. Neither should it be viewed as exclusive 
to humanity; Ulpian argued that law should be viewed as that: 
[W]hich nature has taught all animals... But we shall disregard so general 
an acceptation and consider the meaning of it essentially in relation to 
matters which are proper to the human race alone.38 
What both of these definitions hold centrally is that the content of Natural Law 
has been handed down in order to shape humanity for the better. It is this 
aspirational morality that lent itself to the morality of scholars writing in the 
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Judaeo-Christian tradition, most notably St. Thomas Aquinas, whose 
contributions to the field of Natural Law deserve extensive comment in any 
introductory piece to the field.  
 
3.2  St. Thomas Aquinas 
 
Any exploration of Thomist Natural Law Theory should begin with three 
clarifying notes essential to a full comprehension of both the breadth and 
ultimate limitations of Aquinas’ thought: 
i) Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas argues that politics and political 
life more broadly are morally positive attributes in and of 
themselves, in accordance with God’s intentions for man. 
ii) He is necessarily a product of his time, and combines the feudal 
hierarchical views (for example, at no point does he argue that 
popular consent is required for legitimate governance39) of his 
contemporary society with more community oriented and 
egalitarian views which we may recognise as being vital to a 
morally compliant Natural Law today. 
iii) From these starting points, he develops a logically coherent 
theory of Natural Law.40 
It is the latter of these aspects of his writing that I will concern myself in this 
piece.  
Sigmund has concisely summarised Aquinas’ view of law as ‘an ordination of 
reason for the common good promulgated by one who is in charge of the 
community.’ – although it is worth noting here that ‘reason’ here means more 
than ‘rationality’; it should be seen as a teleological and goal-oriented standard.41 
To a certain extent then, Austin and Aquinas agree in their assertion that law is 
necessarily promulgated by a political superior. They would also agree that law 
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is designed to encourage or discourage certain behaviour; Aquinas thus 
characterises law: 
Law is a kind of direction or measure for human activity through which 
a person is led to do something or held back. The word comes from 
‘ligando’, because it is binding on how we should act.42 
The two also share the belief in several species of law. Where they diverge is that 
Aquinas holds them to be hierarchical in nature. Foremost lies Eternal Law, ‘the 
rational governance of everything on the part of God as ruler of the universe’; 
next lies Natural Law, ‘the participation in the Eternal Law by rational creatures’; 
and lastly comes Human Law. 43 It is worth here remarking that, for Aquinas, 
Human Law necessarily requires some flexibility in its adherence to Natural Law; 
evils can and ought to be tolerated to a certain extent ‘so as not to prevent other 
goods from occurring or to avoid some worse evil.’ 44 
 
From here on, the two diverge. Firstly, Aquinas is careful to limit the extent to 
which a political sovereign is able to exercise his legislative power:   
… [L]aw is nothing but a dictate of practical reason issued by a sovereign 
who governs a complete community.45 
Placing practical reason (in the teleological, aspirational sense outlined above) as 
a limitation on legislative sovereignty therefore presupposes that legislation 
which does not meet this standard is somehow deficient, and would fail to meet 
the definition of law: 
A tyrannical law is not according to reason, and therefore is not 
straightforwardly a law, but rather a sort of crooked law.46 
Aquinas holds this is because: 
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Every law aims at this, to be obeyed by its subjects. It is plain, therefore, 
that leading its subjects into the virtue appropriate to their condition is 
a proper function of law.47 
He then draws on St. Augustine to conclude that: 
Augustine observes that there never seems to have been a law that was not just: 
Hence a command has the force of law to the extent that it is just. In 
human matters we call something ‘just’ from its being right according to 
the rule of reason. The first rule of reason is natural law, as appears from 
what is stated. Hence in so far as it derives from this, every law laid down 
by men has the force of law in that it flows from natural law. If on any 
head it is at variance with natural law, it will not be law, but spoilt law.48 
Tyrannical law would necessarily fail to meet this standard, and should not be 
viewed as law because of this failure to grain popular obedience without 
coercion. In making this claim, Aquinas clearly locates the source of legal 
normativity within practical reason; rules which are incapable of providing 
absolute and exclusionary for compliance are incapable of guiding our actions, 
and therefore lack the necessary ability of law to do just this. This is clearly a 
conclusion which Austin would reject, and demonstrates a significant divergence 
in thought despite their similar starting points. Yet as was demonstrated at the 
end of s.2 of this chapter, Austin inadvertently makes a similar claim through his 
recognition of jus gentium – thus casting his presumed hostility into doubt. 
Secondly comes Aquinas’ more community oriented approach to legislation49; 
he holds that law is fundamentally a community project, and that ‘making law 
belongs either to the whole people or to the public personage who has the 
responsibility for the whole people.’50 To this extent, should it be possible for 
Human Law to coincide with the moral requirements of Natural Law, the two 
should coincide. For this to be possible, we should enquire as to the moral 
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content behind Natural Law. For Aquinas, this content ultimately ‘derives from 
reflection on actions performed by human agents.’ 51: 
Human beings differ from irrational creatures in this, that they have 
dominion over their actions. That is why only those actions over which 
a human being has dominion are called human. But it is thanks to reason 
and will that Human Beings have dominion over their acts: free will is 
said to be the faculty of reason and will.52 
This emphasis on the action-based nature for morality is important, and will 
form a central part of the main body of this thesis as the work progresses. It 
follows from this observation that, regardless of subjective concerns, all human 
beings are in theory equally rational, it may be possible to identify a ‘true’ version 
of Natural Law compliant with an objective and universal morality even if it is 
not automatically accepted by all who would be exposed to it:  
So then in questions of theory, truth is the same for everybody, both as 
to principles and to conclusions, though admittedly all do not recognise 
truth in the conclusions, but only in those principles which are called 
‘common conceptions.’53 
In response to the question on how Natural Law can be the same for all even if 
all do not recognise it as such, Aquinas adds: 
So then it is evident that with respect to general principles of theory and 
practice what is right is the same for all and is equally recognised. With 
respect to specific conclusions of theory the truth is the same for all, 
though all do not equally recognise it: for instance some are not aware 
that the angles of a triangle together equal two right angles.54 
It is with this principle of universal truth in mind that he progresses to refer back 
to our ability as agents to judge whether or not our own positive laws are just or 
unjust; ‘If they are just, they have binding force in the court of conscience from 
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the Eternal Law from which they derive.’55 Aquinas is here referring to the 
Eternal Law of God, and rational creatures’ participation within it. Yet here, a 
criticism familiar from Austin should be addressed – namely that the fact of 
religious pluralism casts into doubt the validity of the Eternal Law to which 
Aquinas refers. To address this concern, a clarification is necessary; the Eternal 
Law to which Aquinas refers here is one of practical rationality. Something can 
be said to belong to the natural and eternal law if man is inclined to it according 
to his nature.56 Moral principles therefore exist in practical reason as ‘intellect by 
its nature bids us to act according to reason.’57 Aquinas therefore holds that the 
definition of legality must be located not in an abstract conception of theistic 
morality, but at the realm of practical reason and the moral principles which are 
of necessity also located there. This thesis then, to some extent, aims to develop 
this concept with reference to Gewirthian theory; Chapter three will explore the 
extent to which his writings refer to necessary constraints which are rationally 
identifiable from our noumenal agency, and which must therefore necessarily 
feature in any conception of practical reason. With the unavoidable fact of 
human agency at its core, Natural Law Theory is able to move on from its theist 
origins into a universal philosophical doctrine independent of the divine. 
 
 
3.3  Early-Modern Natural Law Theory 
 
Should a theory of Natural Law aim to prove the moral validity of a human 
positive law with reference to a universal standard, the task is rendered difficult 
by the reliance on a theological origin of that standard. Such a point was 
recognised by theorists who wrote in a post Thomist world, particularly during 
the upheavals occurring within Europe during the course of the reformation 
during which the hegemony of Catholic thought was brought into question. It is 
into this climate that a movement towards a more philosophically rigorous form 
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of Natural Law emerged, albeit one which builds on Aquinas’ indisputable 
observation that: 
Reason gets its motive force from the will, as we have shown. For it is 
because a person wills an end that his reason effectively governs 
arrangements to bring it about.58 
A more subtle shift emerged around this period; a move away from the content 
of Natural Law being one concerned with Law and towards one which held all 
individuals as possessing inalienable rights.59 The logic internal within such a 
shift holds that the recognition of universal and inalienable rights will lead 
automatically to the universal adoption of morally good law. 60  
This is the logic upon which Grotius based his writings; ‘If natural law consists 
in a set of rules which are absolutely valid, its treatment must be based upon an 
internal coherence and necessity.’61 Should a system of rules be recognised as 
internally coherent and necessary, they would remain absolutely valid even 
should God not exist.62 Natural Law theory emerging post Aquinas can therefore 
be characterised thusly: 
If law is not merely a command, if it does not proceed only from the 
will, law is the outcome of reason. Natural law is a plea for 
reasonableness in action. But it is also an assertion that only inasmuch 
as action can be measured in terms of reason does it properly come 
under the heading of law.63 
It is upon this foundation of ethical rationalism that the acceptable theories of 
Natural Law progressed throughout the Enlightenment and to the present day. 
Space precludes me from spending more time discussing such key theories here, 
but more attention will be paid Kantian thought in particular as this thesis 
progresses.  
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4 The Contemporary Debate 
 
 
It is upon the foundations laid by the Orthodox Positivism and Non-Positivism 
of Austin and Aquinas respectively that contemporary thinkers still establish 
their battle-lines. It will not come as a surprise however to learn that the nuances 
contained within the arguments laid down by both sides of the debate have 
become more sophisticated. Yet despite this, it is still possible to summarise both 
positions clearly and succinctly. For example, the positivist idea that Law and 
Morality, despite sharing common features, should be clearly demarcated 
because they are aimed at different recipients: 
Ubi societas ibi ius.64 Law presupposes society. Morals do not. Moral 
experience is essentially a matter for the individual. Legal experience is 
tied to the notion of a community.65 
Natural Law can be equally summarised: 
The theory of natural law is the outcome of a very old conviction, which 
goes back to the sources of our civilisation: the conviction that the 
purpose of law is not only to make men obedient, but to help them to 
be virtuous.66 
It is upon these foundations that the continued search for an acceptable 
explanation of the normative force which law exerts upon as individuals is 
pursued.  
 
4.1  The Normativity of Law 
 
 
It may be asked why thinkers have devoted so much time and energy into their 
search for this elusive normative foundation, given that many have tried and 
seemingly as many have failed. The answer lies within law itself as a social 
phenomenon – many would argue that law is clearly more than merely an 
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expression of sovereign authority backed by threat, whereas as many would hold 
equally strongly that to claim that a necessary connection between law and 
morality exists is to equally misunderstand both concepts. Yet it is indisputable 
that, within the law, a specific logical exercise is taking place: 
Given the nature of a legal system, the officials in that system are subject 
to distinctive constraints of rationality. There is, in this sense, an inner 
rationality of law.67 
It therefore seems that the quest for the normative foundation of law is central 
to any theory which seeks to explain it as a distinct social mechanism. Such an 
observation led Hart to claim that any theory which suppresses law’s normative 
claims ‘fails to mark and explain the crucial distinction between mere regularities 
of human behaviour and rule-governed behaviour.’68 This claim was named ‘The 
Normativity Thesis’ by Postema: 
We understand law only if we understand how it is that laws give 
members of a community, officials and law-subjects alike, reasons for 
acting. Thus an adequate general theory of law must give a satisfactory 
account of the normative (reason-giving) character of law.69 
This characterisation of law as inherently concerned with providing a valid 
reason for choosing to act in a certain way returns us to examine the notion of 
agency as a potential source of the normative basis of law. This is a starting point 
which is acceptable to both positivists and non-positivists alike, as agency is an 
unavoidable fact. We, as participants in a society, make choices in order to 
pursue our ends, and it is these choices which the Law seeks to constrain. Our 
capacity to make choices is an unavoidable choice of our condition; as Korsgaard 
rightly identifies, ‘Human beings are condemned to choice and action.’70 – meaning 
we cannot escape our capacities as rationally autonomous agents. Put more 
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succinctly, ‘…[S]elf Constitution through action is our essential function as 
rational agents.’71 
Central to our conception of ourselves as rational unified agents, for Korsgaard, 
is a requirement that we universalise our reasons for action with a Categorical 
Imperative;72 a Categorical Imperative, should it be identifiable, is therefore the 
constitutive standard of rational unified agents.73 This leads us to the realisation 
that, if our agency is inescapable and moral normativity is indeed constitutively 
linked to our agency, our ‘moral identity is therefore inescapable.’ 74 By extension, 
if our conduct is morally constrained with reference to a Categorical Imperative, 
it would be contradictory to the very nature of a rule constraining action should 
a legal rule diverge from the moral requirements thus established. This strand of 
argument is typical of current Natural Law arguments which attempt to ground 
the normative force of law in a moral code derivable from agency, and is one 
which I will adopt in the main body of this thesis with my defence of Alan 
Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency75 as a supreme constitutional principle as 
a normative standard against which the validity of law can be judged. Yet 
positivism has not disappeared from contemporary debate. I will highlight one 
recent theory in the next section of this chapter in order to demonstrate the 
direction of contemporary positivism. Once this foundation has been laid, I will 
then spend much more time in later chapters discussing why I believe recent 
developments in positivism fail to dismiss the fundamental link between law and 
Gewirthian morality which emerged in Law as a Moral Judgment.76 
 
4.2 Shapiro’s Planning Thesis: An Example of 
Contemporary Positivism. 
 
In the middle of the Twentieth Century, some scholars began to dismiss 
positivism on its own terms. Rather than achieving its separation of law and 
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morality in an effective way, it was a victim of its own logic and a product of the 
social system from which it emerged: 
As a reflection of a particular historical situation, the success of legal 
positivism is bound up with a contingent fact, the fact that the modern 
state has assumed a monopoly of law and the making of law.77 
This has led much contemporary positivism down a very similar route to where 
Natural Law theory finds itself, in theories grounded in the unavoidable agency 
of those participants within a political society – one such theory can be found in 
Shapiro’s Planning Thesis. This is grounded in what Shapiro holds to be the 
unavoidable fact of plan positivism, a concept he explains early in his thesis by 
paraphrasing John Austin in order to make his Positivism as apparent as 
possible: 
[P]ositivism is trivially and uncontroversially true in the case of plans: 
the existence of a plan is one thing, its merits or demerits quite 
another.78 
He adds that: 
... [T]he existence of legal authority can only be determined 
sociologically: the question of whether a body has legal power is never 
one of moral legitimacy; it is a question of whether the relevant officials 
of that system accept a plan that authorises and requires deference to 
that body... [T]he creation and the persistence of the fundamental rules 
of law is grounded in the authority that all individuals possess to adopt 
plans.79 
Shapiro thereby adopts a contractarian foundation to his positivism; individuals 
who are members of a society are bound by the laws which its officials produce 
through their ability to endorse and live by the plans established by those officials 
in their capacity as legal superiors. With regards to the ability of an individual to 
be a participant in this society, Shapiro limits his scope to those agents who are 
able to formulate the concept of a plan and then act upon it: 
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It is plausible to suppose that dogs, cats and mice act purposively insofar 
as they have desires and that they act on those desires in light of their 
beliefs. But they probably do not plan since they lack both the need and 
capacity to do so.80 
So how can the normative force of law be derived from the existence of a plan 
in this way? Shapiro spends time defining the terminology which he uses 
throughout his paper in order to demonstrate how he crosses this normative 
bridge. Firstly, he defines plans as ‘… [A]bstract propositional entities that 
require, permit or authorise agents to act, or not to act, in certain ways under 
certain conditions.’81 Norms, he defines as something which: 
… [C]an be characterised as an abstract object that functions as a guide 
for conduct and a standard for evaluation. In keeping with this 
characterisation, plans too are norms. They are guides for conduct, 
insofar as their function is to pick out courses of action that are required, 
permitted or authorised under certain circumstances.82 
He then explains where he believes the two concepts converge: 
... [A] plan is a special kind of norm: first, it has a typical structure; 
namely, it is partial, composite and nested; secondly, it is created by a 
certain kind of process, namely, one that is incremental, purposive and 
disposes subjects to comply with the norms created.83 
For Shapiro, the adoption of a shared planning mechanism is essential for any 
conception of the shared agency which is unavoidable in a social setting. 
Following Korsgaard, if individuals are condemned to choice and action, society 
is equally condemned to shared choices to pursue shared action. Planning is 
therefore essential, as are hierarchical structures which create institutional plans 
and enforces so as to ensure ‘that alienated [members of a society] end up acting 
in the same way as non-alienated ones.’ 84 The fact that a plan has been adopted 
on their behalf is not of itself, however, the source of the obligation of the 
alienated to comply. From a moral point of view, it is not inconceivable that they 
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ought not to comply with a given course of action. Yet, for Shapiro, the fact that 
an individual accepts a shared plan which establishes a hierarchy binds them, 
from the point of view of instrumental rationality, to follow the plans which 
emerge from that hierarchy.85 The consensual nature of the emergence of the 
hierarchy permits it to impose sanctions on those who do not comply with the 
aims of the shared plan: 
If members of the community are less ‘cooperative’, legal authorities can 
dispose them to comply through various forms of intimidation. When 
these threats are strong and credible enough, even those who do not 
accept the law’s moral authority will nevertheless be motivated to follow 
the adopted plans. 86  
The plan to which coercion is being applied however does still not need to be in 
compliance with any identifiable moral code: 
... [T]he existence of the shared plan does not depend on any moral facts 
obtaining. The shared plan can be morally obnoxious... Nevertheless, if 
the social facts obtain for plan sharing, then the shared plan will exist.87  
Shapiro then brings his argument full circle, resting the separation of plans, and 
by extension law, and morality with reference to what he believes is the 
undeniable truth of ‘plan-positivism’: 
Plan positivists believe that the existence and context of plans never 
depends on moral facts. Plan positivism is uncontroversially true.... 
Terrorist plots, for example, exist even though they shall not be carried 
out from the moral point of view.88  
This insistence on the consensual emergence of law through a series of planning 
decisions designed at streamlining a society and making it more efficient, for 
Shapiro, explains the normative force of law – agreement of those who submit 
to its authority. Yet this argument does have its flaws, which I will briefly address 
here in order to demonstrate why the continued case for a Natural Law based 
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theory of law’s normative force survives such contractarian positivism, and can 
indeed be seen to be superior in its exploration of the issues concerned.   
Firstly, on the issue of those who are able to formulate plans or possess the 
ability to follow them; Shapiro that this category would be limited who possess 
the need and capacity to do so. By this definition, Shapiro excludes many from 
his theory who we would not necessarily wish to do so – children, the mentally 
ill or dementia sufferers, for example, arguably do not possess the capacity to 
formulate an effective plan. They would therefore be excluded from the legal 
altogether, yet this does not seem like an appropriate state of affairs. Similarly, it 
might be argued that crows or other intelligent animals who possess the capacity 
to create tools in order to pursue legitimate ends are indeed using their foresight 
to plan a course of action through which to better attain their end. They may 
then be included within this definition of a planner by Shapiro, and therefore be 
subject to law. The fact that they would be covered by this definition but a small 
child would not, in the absence of further justification, borders on the absurd. 
The summary of his position, that ‘[L]egal authority is a good because we are 
planning agents’89, is therefore shown to be deficient.  
Secondly, Shapiro fails to address how a morally obnoxious plan could be 
adopted and maintained through the exercise of group agency should threats 
under the guise of legitimate sanctions be the only mechanism by which the 
plans are enforced. If a man in Shapiro’s thought-experiment of the Cooks’ 
Islands is instructed to buy butter but would prefer margarine, but buys butter 
anyway, his reason for action must be reliant on the special status of authority: 
 Legitimate authority is a good thing. 
 I ought to obey the authority’s commands. 
 The planners have asked me to buy butter. 
 The planners are the authority. 
 I ought to obey the planners’ commands. 
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 Conclusion: I ought to buy butter.90 
Yet agents rarely agree to be bound to follow principles which they themselves 
do not see a good reason for following; why should an individual submit 
themselves to such a demand? Shapiro’s assertion that we should do so because 
it increases the ability of ourselves as individuals to survive91 does not seem to 
grasp the normative argument at stake. To have practical force on the actions of 
individual agents, reasons emerging from a legal point of view necessarily should 
be more than theoretical; practical reasons are required. 92 Our own survival, for 
Shapiro, is a good in itself; yet if this is accepted we are faced with a paradox: 
‘How can [authority] coordinate the different goals and ends of the community 
in a good way without purporting to do good?’93 And, since agents would not 
rationally consent to behaving according to a norm or rule which is external to 
them,94 the motivation for following the legal norms presented must necessarily 
be grounded in an internalisation and acceptance of the plan to be pursued as a 
good in itself. 
Thirdly, he gives us no convincing reason as to why individuals should feel 
normatively bound to follow plans which individual agents perceive to be 
immoral. He claims that an effective system of sanctions should exist to coerce 
individuals into compliance, but if we accept this then it is difficult to see how 
the legal system which emerges could in anyway be distinguished from a mere 
threat issued from a position of power. His system would be the proverbial 
gunman writ large. He also makes no real attempt to relate his grounding of 
normativity to this reason of avoiding punishment, instead locating in an 
assumed agreement. This observation exposes another problem with his theory, 
that he:  
… [D]enies that the principle aim of law is to solve the problem of bad 
character. In his theory, law is basically a social planning mechanism.95 
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By placing the normative basis of law on such an agreement towards social 
planning, Shapiro maintains a definition of law aimed at guiding conduct without 
making reference to moral concepts of the good. Yet, as has been shown, such 
an abstraction would be difficult to enforce against agents if they did not 
themselves internalise the end pursued as complying with a conception of the 
good which would be acceptable to themselves. A moral aspect is therefore 
unintentionally introduced here, which means that Shapiro’s conclusion rests on 
whether or not the plans pursued are themselves moral.  
 
4.3  A Natural Law Response to Shapiro 
 
This observation raises issues which will be dealt with in much greater detail in 
the main body of this thesis, but which I will again touch upon here with regards 
to thinkers other than Gewirth. Foremost upon these is the observation that a 
moral standard can only pass normative authority to law if it itself already 
possesses a form of normative authority. 96 We are therefore tasked to identify a 
universal and objective moral principle against which the normative validity of 
law can be judged. 
This thesis will progress in thought which may be broadly described as Kantian 
in origin. Central to the argument based around agency will be the idea of a 
Categorical Imperative, which provides in us reasons for valuing other beings 
which are analogous to the reasons for which we value ourselves. As expressed 
by Roversi, ‘I value X insofar as I value myself and X is like me.’ 97 - although this 
is a line of argument he himself believes can never provide a sound normative 
reason for action. I will spend this section of this chapter demonstrating why I 
believe this argument to be false. 
Central to this argument of universalising values we see in ourselves is our own 
status as agents. Let us assume that there are certain conditions which are 
essential for us to properly undertake our agency.98 These conditions can be held 
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as essential with reference to what, in Kantian Terminology, is often referred to 
as the Instrumental Principle; ‘Whoever wills the ends also wills (insofar as reason 
has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it 
that are within his power.’99 Put more succinctly, ‘If you intend to E and judge 
that M-ing is a necessary means to E, you should intend to M.’ 100 
This in itself does not create a normative obligation to follow whatever means 
may get us to the end we desire; for example, if a baby is crying and we desire 
that the crying should cease, we would not be normatively justified in sharpening 
a knife to more easily stab the baby to death.101 Such a principle should therefore 
be modified in order to avoid the confusion of is and ought made apparent by 
this extreme example. For Korsgaard, this may take the lines of something like 
this: 
If we allow reason a role in determining ends, then the instrumental 
principle will be formulated in this way: ‘if you have a reason to pursue an 
end then you have a reason to take the means to the end’. But if we do 
not allow reason a role in determining ends, then the instrumental 
principle has to go something like this: ‘if you are going to pursue an end, 
then you have a reason to take the means to that end.102 
Such a modified Instrumental Principle therefore lays the ground work for the 
reciprocity which is essential for the operation of Gewirth’s work.103 Yet many 
readers may ask what difference these semantic shifts make to a successful 
attempt to locate a normative foundation of law. The Positivist theory of Shapiro 
and the Natural Law response highlighted above both take their starting point 
as the unescapable nature of human agency. To what extent then can the 
disagreement between Positivist and Non-Positivist theories be merely 
characterised as one revolving around terminology rather than being a genuine 
disagreement as to the fundamental nature of law? 
                                                          
99 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (first published 1785, Mary Gregor tr, 
Cambridge University Press 1998) §417  
100 Schaubroeck (n 88) 117 
101 ibid 118 
102 Christine Korsgaard, ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.’ In Garrett Cullity and Berys 
Gaut (eds) Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford University Press 1997) 223 
103 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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4.4  More than a Word Game? 
 
That the disagreement outlined above is merely a linguistic disagreement is the 
viewpoint of many in the legal world. Respected scholar Glanville Williams holds 
that the disagreement as to ‘what is law?’ is indeed purely semantic; and because 
it is not a real problem, we are faced with the reality that the problem will never 
be satisfactorily solved.104  
This could be said to be because, in everyday parlance, the word law can mean 
several different things; so much is covered within the word – both thought and 
action – we cannot presume that a definition is easily discoverable: 
Any attempt to define the word leads us into a maze of metaphysical 
literature, perhaps larger than has ever surrounded any other symbol in 
the history of the world.105 
Such linguistic confusion can be said to arise from our tendency as human beings 
to attempt to objectify what are, in effect, mere abstractions:  
As soon as we realise that bird or law are simply mental abstractions from 
the raw material of the universe, and that they do not exist by themselves 
separately anywhere, we realize that the idea of a true definition is a 
superstition.106 
From this observation, it holds that no definition can ever be true or untrue, as 
there is no objective starting point from which the facts of the existence of a 
concept can be checked.107 As such, for Williams, there is no such thing as ‘an 
intrinsically ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ meaning of a word’ as words are merely a 
‘symbol for an idea [which] may vary with the person who uses the word.’ 108 
Therefore, the closest thing to a proper meaning for a word or concept which it 
is possible to identify is its usual meaning. By extension,  
                                                          
104 Glanville Williams, ‘Chapter IX; The Controversy Concerning the Word ‘Law’.’ in Pater 
Laslett (ed), Philosophy, Politics and Society, (Basil Blackwell 1970) 134  
105 Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government, (Yale University Press 1935) 216 
106 Williams (n 97) 151 
107 ibid 151 
108 ibid 136 
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…a person who uses a word in an unusual meaning must state clearly 
the meaning in which he is using it, on pain of being misunderstood if 
he does not.109 
Yet it is clear from examining that the literature discussed to date, and will 
become clearer as more sources are discussed throughout the body of this thesis, 
that there is no such fundamental disagreement over what the subject of 
jurisprudence is. When theorists from both Natural Law and Positivist traditions 
use the word ‘law’, the same core concept is under scrutiny. What under debate 
is the normative content of the concept itself – does a necessary connection exist 
between law and morality, or is any connection merely contingent on the will of 
the sovereign? Austin’s following observation as to the misapplication of the 
word law therefore seems to be a deliberate attempt to obfuscate his terminology 
to further his own end: 
We say that the movements of lifeless bodies are determined by certain 
laws: though, since the bodies are lifeless and have no desires or 
aversions, they cannot be touched by aught which in the least resembles 
a sanction, and cannot be subject to aught which in the least resembles 
an obligation.110 
Similarly, Austin’s suggestion that International Law is not true law falls foul of 
this same observation. His thought did persevere well into the Twentieth 
Century before being further dismissed: 
Le droit international est-il vraiment du droit? Cette question a 
préoccupé des juristes-philosophes et certains d’entre eux ont douté que 
le droit international fût du droit, puisqu’il ignore le législateur et le 
gendarme : les règles de droit n’y sont édictées par voie d’autorité (elles 
sont consenties, non imposées) et les sanctions n’y existent encore que 
d’une manière inorganique et rudimentaire.111 
                                                          
109 ibid 136 
110 Austin (n 5) 149 
111 Charles Rousseau, Principles Généraux du Droit International Public (Éditions A. Pedone 1944) 6 
My Translation: ‘Is International Law truly Law? This question has long preoccupied legal 
philosophers, and some amongst them have doubted that International Law is law as it lacks 
both legislator and policeman: International Legal Rules are neither declared from a position of 
authority (they are consented to, not imposed) and their enforcement mechanisms only exist in 
an artificial and rudimentary form.’ 
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… 
On peut observer en effet : 
1o Que l’existence du droit est indépendante de celle du législateur, car c’est 
le droit coutumier qui apparaît ordinairement en premier lieu. 
2o Que l’existence d’une sanction directe matérielle et organisée n’est pas une 
condition de l’existence d’une règle de droit.112 
Such semantic disagreements can therefore be seen to be ancillary to the true 
question as to what constitutes ‘law’; namely whether or not a normative reason 
for obedience can be located: 
…[I]nternational lawyers saw that the word ‘law’ is not only a symbol 
for a reference; it also evokes a powerful emotional response. The word 
‘law’ stimulates in us the attitude of obedience to authoritative rules that 
we have come through our upbringing to associate with the idea of 
municipal law. Change the word for some other and the magic 
evaporated.113 
In defending a theory of Natural Law, this thesis commits itself to the strong 
claim that law is backed by a decisive reason for compliance114 – conformity with 
the moral imperative contained within the PGC115 – and holds that any rule 
which does not possess this necessary characteristic cannot be called ‘law’. It 
thus places itself in opposition to Positivist theories, which would not commit 
themselves to this claim. In doing so, it opens itself to the frequent positivist 
assertion that it is concerned with what law ought to be, rather than the real 
object of jurisprudence – namely, what law actually is. Yet this allegation is 
misguided; it is not, Murphy claims, inconsistent to argue that a fake diamond is 
not a diamond. By extension, in suggesting that the same cannot be true of a 
‘fake law’ which lacks the necessary decisive reason for compliance: 
                                                          
112 Charles Rousseau, Principles Généraux du Droit International Public (Éditions A. Pedone 1944) 7 
My Translation: ‘We may see then: 1) The existence of law is independent from the existence of 
a legislator, as customary law usually precedes a legal system. 2) The existence of an organised, 
direct and material sanction is not a precondition for the existence of a legal rule.’ 
113 Williams (n 97) 143 
114 Mark Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (2006 CUP) 10 
115 The nature of this connection will be established in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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The objection assumes that the natural law theorist is interested in 
asserting a connection between the law’s existence and the desirability of 
its existence. The connections between a would-be rule’s prescriptive 
force and the desirability of its existence are contingent. There is no way 
to transform the objection so that it applies to a recognizable version of 
the natural law view.116 
 
5 Conclusion. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been broad, and as a piece it has undoubtedly 
raised more questions than I am, at this point, able to answer. Yet one thing 
should be clear; the search for the normative foundation of legal obligation is 
both long in its history and far from over. It is not enough to merely dismiss the 
search as a linguistic tussle, but instead we must view that a central difference 
between Positivism and Non-Positivism is the way in which they present the 
origins of the claim to authority made by law.117 The nexus of disagreement 
between the two schools has been located in Natural Law’s claim that the 
provision of a decisive reason for action is a necessary feature of law. It is 
therefore this claim that the remainder of this thesis will aim to support, with 
reference to the moral writings of Alan Gewirth.  
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Chapter Two 
 
 
The Centrality of Normativity to the Concept of Law 
 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
In his 1998 Clarendon Lecture, Jules Coleman asked the central question of 
exactly what the purpose of Jurisprudence is – what questions is it seeking to 
answer? He claimed that these could be summarised in three main enquiries. 
Firstly, how law can make claims on our conduct purely by its status as law – in 
other words, can legal authority ever be explained without circular reference to 
a higher legal authority? Secondly, in what way can law purport to govern our 
conduct in a distinct manner? And thirdly, in what way do legal reasons become 
moral or otherwise legitimate authorities?1  
The second of these questions identified by Coleman, once adequately 
expanded, highlights the centrality of normativity to the concept of Law. It is 
axiomatic that the purpose of Law is to control our behaviour as individuals – 
put another way, to create reasons for action. Coleman suggests that this 
terminology is often confused – we should recognise that X being a reason for 
A to act and X being a reason on which A acts are different concepts. He gives 
the example of a promise to meet; if A promises to meet B, forgets that he had 
done so but then meets B for a different reason, then the initial promise to meet 
remains a reason for acting despite not being the reason why I did act. Reasons 
on which I ultimately act are therefore motivational or otherwise causal in a way 
in which a general reason to act need not be, and can therefore be seen to warrant 
or justify action by providing a normative reason for basis for my ultimate action. 
In purporting to create a ground for action, Law therefore aims to be the reason 
                                                          
1 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 70-72 
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for which I ultimately act – and therefore makes a normative claim on my 
actions.2  
It is for this reason that this thesis will ultimately focus on normative theories of 
Law, aiming to show that Natural Law arguments that provide a normative 
grounding for action in morality are superior to normative positivist accounts. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain in more detail exactly why I choose to 
dismiss non-normative positivism. Firstly, I will aim to explore further the 
meaning and status of normativity more broadly within legal discourse, 
establishing why philosophy of language imposes a single normative meaning on 
the concept of ‘law’ itself that precludes linguistic differentiation within 
jurisprudential discussion. It will then consider how theories that originate 
within the school of External Positivism which preclude moral content within 
legal reasoning cannot adequately account for the genesis of such a normative 
obligation. Lastly, Internal Positivism will be introduced. Such theories allow for 
the contingent existence of morality within a theory of law, but hold it to be 
neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion of validity. Some preliminary critiques 
of such positions will be established, and it will be suggested that the necessary 
moral core provided by a theory of Natural Law can provide solutions to the 
gaps that are located.  
  
2 Meaning and Status of Normativity 
 
If we were to accept the traditional positivist definition of law as a series of 
commands as outlined in the previous chapter, it is worth pointing out that this 
contains several background assumptions. Firstly, if the aim of law is accepted 
as being to guide conduct through the medium of command, this does not entail 
that laws as a concept necessarily have a single dominant function; this can 
fluctuate according to the purposes of the law in question. This leads us to the 
assumption that law and any normative force it possesses does not exhaust the 
field of enquiry with regards to the binding force which law attempts to exert 
upon us. This is because strong assumptions are made as to the subjects against 
                                                          
2 ibid 
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whom law is addressed in any command based model of operation, namely that 
they are both free and intelligent, and therefore are able to understand the 
behavioural limitations the law in question seeks to impose.3 In order to discuss 
the centrality of normativity to law therefore, these assumptions need to be 
justified. 
Such a traditional positivist account of legal authority also appears to rely heavily 
on two competing definitions of what law actually means as a historical 
normative concept - many, for example, would argue that Natural Law theories 
of normativity currently operating in the English language emerge from a 
problem with the translation and subsequent conflation of the Latin terms ‘lex’ 
and ‘ius’ into the single English word ‘Law’.4 It is from this unavoidable 
conflation of terminology that Natural Law theory mistakenly emerges.5     
The first section of this chapter will argue that this analysis is mistaken. It will 
examine theories which concern the normativity of language itself, drawing 
heavily on Wittgenstein’s writings on the very possibility of private 
interpretations of words and meaning. Of central importance will be his 
observation that it is ‘…[N]ot possible to obey a rule “privately”: otherwise 
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.’ 6 It will 
be suggested that the problem posed by linguistic indeterminacy can be solved 
with the use of an effective agreed referent to which all parties to a conceptual 
dispute are able to agree. The remaining analysis within the chapter will seek to 
determine whether such a referent possesses a normative meaning and, if so, 
what this normative meaning is. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Gerald J Postema, ‘Law as Command: The Model of Command in Modern Jurisprudence’ in 
Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds), Social, Political and Legal Philosophy (Blackwell 2001) 475 
4 ibid 478 - 479 
5 Such critics would claim that ‘lex’ – law – is the subject of modern jurisprudential enquiry. 
‘Ius’(or ‘Jus’) as a term contains a conception of justice or fairness which is the subject of inquiry 
for Natural Law theories and Legal Idealists. For such critics, the two are entirely separate 
concepts which have been mistakenly conflated in one word in English by an unavoidable 
linguistic constraint. 
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe tr, 3rd edn, Blackwell 1953) 
69, §202 
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2.1 An Agreed Referent 
 
 
The central tenet of this thesis, as previously addressed, is to analyse recent 
Inclusive Positivism against a theory of Natural Law underpinned by the moral 
philosophy of Alan Gewirth and expanded upon by Beyleveld and Brownsword. 
In order to do so, an agreed starting point as to the meaning of the word ‘law’ 
must be agreed upon in order to ensure that the ethical claims being made are 
addressing character of the same social phenomenon as that being discussed by 
Positivist theorists. For Allan Gibbard, such a settled normative meaning of a 
given word is essential, it axiomatically concerns the objective meaning of ethical 
statements.7 Should we accept this as axiomatic, then it follows that any theory 
of Law which is built from ethical statements will also necessarily require an 
exploration of the normativity of meaning in order to be accepted by those who 
would be disinclined to agree that law and morality are necessarily connected. 
 
Firstly, the linguistic confusion around the word ‘normative’ should be 
addressed – as it is often held that ‘the term “normative” has no single meaning 
in the academic fields that employ it.’ 8 Gibbard suggests that ‘Shallowly…we 
might try saying that normative judgements are “ought” judgements.’9 He 
continues: 
‘Ought’ judgements, or many of them, have seemed in some way special 
or problematic. Normative judgements are judgements are judgements 
that are special in this way, whatever this way turns out to be. This gives 
us a characterization of normativity that is fairly light in its commitments: 
the only presupposition it builds into that term is that there be something 
important and characteristic and puzzling about the bulk of ‘ought’ 
judgements. If there isn’t, after all, it’s not much use having a special 
term ‘normative’ – except, perhaps, to explain away the impression that 
                                                          
7 Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity (Oxford University Press 2012) 7 
8 ibid  
9 ibid 
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there is. If there is, the term invites us to identify what this special 
characteristic is.10 
The question this section will seek to address, then, is whether or not there is a 
normative ‘ought’ meaning behind the term ‘law’, whereby we ought to accept 
one subject of discussion at the expense of others available to us.  
 
Saul Kripke argues that such meaning with regards to any intention or future 
action is definitionally normative rather than descriptive;11 in arguing this, he 
discusses and ultimately seeks to dismiss the paradox of meaning identified by 
Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations: 
[N]o course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course 
of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
any action can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be 
made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor 
conflict here.12 
Put more simply, Wittgenstein is here suggesting that we can never be truly 
certain what we mean by a word used to express a given concept unless, when 
we use the word in question, we actively consider every possible meaning of the 
word and settle on one objective meaning. Since it is arguably impossible to do 
this, it is impossible to ever truly state that we know the objective meaning of 
any word when we engage in any form of communication. Were this true, our 
investigation as to the nature would be impossible to complete.  
 
Kripke argues that the falsity of this claim can be demonstrated clearly in 
conceptual disciplines such as mathematics. He gives the example of addition, 
asking whether there is a correct answer to the question ‘What is 68 plus 57?” 
Whilst we expect the answer to this question to be 125, this is dependent on 
both the questioner and respondent having a shared understanding as to the 
meaning of the word ‘plus’ as referring to the process of addition. He asks us to 
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12 Wittgenstein (n 6) 69, §201 
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contemplate an individual who, instead of understanding ‘plus’ as meaning 
‘addition’, instead understands it as referring to the process of ‘quaddition’ 
designated by the symbol ⨁ and summarised in the following formula:   
 
                                              13 
 
 
 
As, in our initial question ‘What is 68 plus 57’ both x and y are above 57, 
quaddition would require its adherents to give the answer ‘5’. Would they be 
incorrect in answering thus upon hearing the word ‘plus’? If we were to answer 
yes to this question, then we ought next to ask ourselves how we can conclude 
that such an answer is indeed incorrect. Again, we must look to the shared 
understanding – or in this case, the lack of shared understanding – as to the 
meaning of the word ‘plus’. The dispute Kripke identifies here is analogous to 
that between Natural Lawyers and Legal Positivists; does the word ‘law’ require 
one to account for a necessary connection with moral norms, or one that is at 
most contingent on sovereign will?  
 
Two different origins of any such shared understanding are proposed; those 
resting on Brain Function (Fb) and those resting on a Community Function (Fc). 
These are demonstrable by a situation where we ask a speaker to present the 
statement ‘68 plus 57 =125’ to a community who accepts the operations of 
quaddition shown in the above formula. If any shared understanding of meaning 
rests on the interpretation of the concept by a given community, Fc, then our 
community of quaddition would tell him to reject the statement as the correct 
answer would be five. If, however, our speaker were to insist that their initial 
statement were correct, they would be relying on Fb. In doing this, he relies on 
ascribing a particular ‘correct’ understanding of the word ‘plus’ in the face of 
unanimous community opposition; he therefore claims that any ascription of 
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meaning contains an ‘ought’, and is therefore normative in character.14 Applying 
this to dispute under consideration in this thesis, whether or not the concept of 
law is axiomatically connected to morality, we can then see clearly that 
differentiation between Fc and Fb as the source of meaning is of central 
importance. If there is indeed a correct, normative meaning contained within the 
word law, then we need to demonstrate that it can be found in Fb and not Fc. 
 
Toddington correctly identifies that this may be easier said than done; it might 
be simple to define natural phenomena such as mathematics, but social 
phenomena such as law,  founded on abstract theoretical suppositions, are 
fundamentally more difficult to pin down.15 It is not immediately obvious why 
this should be the case, however. Meaning facts which concern states of affairs 
are as inherently natural as other facts; the controversy still revolves around 
determining what the state of affairs is, and therefore remains a normative 
question.16 Any attempt must necessarily focus on the function of the 
phenomenon as a principle determinant of the object under consideration.17 In 
doing so, it must allow for a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the focal case 
of the phenomenon, whilst simultaneously ruling out all which cannot be 
countenanced as a possible candidate. 18 In placing emphasis on a focal rather 
than conceptual definition of the subject of jurisprudential enquiry, Natural 
Lawyers ought to be content in that a Positivist cannot accuse them of being 
concerned with what law ought to be rather than what it is, whilst Positivists can 
rest assured that they cannot be accused of relying on a similar straw man. From 
this, a conceptual analysis can be constructed which allows a settled discussion 
of the social practice of law.19   
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17 Toddington (n 15) 58; Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law 
(Hart 2009) 23, 43 
18 Toddington (n 15) 65 
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In order to effectively answer questions around the nature of law, it is therefore 
essential that the subject of the enquiry can be agreed upon. It is therefore 
essential that a definition of law can be located which is acceptable to both 
Positivists and Natural Lawyers,20 and which does not presuppose central tenets 
of either viewpoint. Without this, it would be impossible for a meaningful 
enquiry to take place given that the starting point of the enquiry would be what 
was ultimately under dispute. Beyleveld and Brownsword make this point clearly, 
when they claim that it is necessary that any jurisprudential enquiry ‘…specify 
the concept which is necessary for knowledge…of a connotation agreed 
between disputants to be possible.’ 21 Our intellectual enquiry can only be 
successful if we can demonstrate that the phenomenon under dispute actually 
conforms to a ‘nomological scheme’.22 Put differently, the semantic label given 
to focus of an enquiry must be agreed upon by those who disagree as to its 
precise meaning in order for any conclusion to be acceptable. This is a concept 
which has become known as an agreed referent.  
 
Contenders for such a focal referent have been proposed by Capps, who 
suggests that ‘[I]t is widely accepted and probably logically necessary that law is 
a social institution which in some way affects the practical reasoning if agents.’ 
23, and by Fuller, who holds that ‘[L]aw is a purposive enterprise which provides 
an institutional framework for unifying our community’s judgments and 
stabilising and structuring our social relations.’24 This thesis agrees with 
Beyleveld and Brownsword that an appropriate agreed referent for an enquiry 
into the concept of law is as follows: 
Law…refers to ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules’,… the choice of this referent is a stipulation and we can only have 
a genuine debate with those who are prepared to accept this starting 
                                                          
20 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment (Sweet and Maxwell 
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point. Disagreement over the concept of law is to be viewed in terms of 
different ways of conceptualizing this referent.25 
 
The contention that law is ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules’ is an appropriate referent in that it makes no reference to 
normative source of the rules specified by law, merely that law is an attempt to 
resolve disputes with reference to norms.26 One point of note in adopting this 
referent however should be its location of law as being within the realm of 
practical reason. Should law seek to subject human conduct to rules, an attempt 
is being made to guide our action. Law therefore necessarily claims to provide a 
reason for compliance with its demand which overrides all other reasons for 
non-compliance with the law in question. Any normative claims which arise 
from law cannot be separated from the deliberative rationality within which 
decisions on how to act are formed. Such a statement is axiomatic in the nature 
of normativity, and ought not throw into doubt the independence of law as a 
normative framework. The statement is made succinctly by Capps: 
[L]aw is autonomous in the sense of it being a set of distinctive general 
norms which are established to stabilise social relationships within a 
community, but it is not autonomous in the sense that it must be 
isolated from broader concerns of practical reasonableness if it is to 
fulfil this function.27 
In proposing this agreed referent, Beyleveld and Brownsword have proposed an 
acceptable starting point for jurisprudential enquiry for all parties, regardless of 
their preferences. In doing this, they have therefore arrived at a definition of 
‘law’ which is grounded in Fb and not Fc.  They have done this by prioritising the 
focal aspect of the referent, thus emphasising the non-semantic properties of the 
concept of law to explain its overall development as an idea.28   
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A difficulty arises when, having completed this logical reasoning as to the 
possibility of meaning, we return to Wittgenstein’s initial problem of linguistic 
certainty. For again, he would likely argue that it is impossible for us to consider 
every possible meaning of a term which is available to us every time we speak, 
and it is thus impossible for us to conceptualise a truth-conditional account of 
the normative meaning of our words. Any debate between Positivists and 
Natural Lawyers is therefore impossible, as there is no way of knowing that both 
parties are referring to the same concept during the course of their debate. To 
counter this, we must look further into the problem thus presented; should any 
disagreement over the meaning of the words in question occur, then what exactly 
are we basing the disagreement upon? It would be incorrect to claim this would 
be on the present meaning of the words as being used when the disagreement 
occurs. Rather, any disagreement would centre around whether or not our 
current usage accords with past usage of the same terms.29  
 
Such meaning-scepticism can be refuted only by considering how an agent 
would actually use any categorical assertion that an individual is following a given 
rule – for example, that by ‘law’ he means the agreed referent given above. 
Following this, we introduce the conditional assertion that ‘if an individual were 
to follow such-and-such a rule, he must do so-and-so on a given occasion.’30 Yet 
this problem is neatly sidestepped by Beyleveld and Brownsword in proposing 
the agreed referent above; by giving parties to the dispute as to the meaning of 
the term a focal referent on which they can agree, they allow for a plurality of 
conceptions whilst excluding all non-plausible candidates from consideration. Fb 
is therefore attained by consensus as to the core function of the term which is 
under dispute.  
 
The aim of this section has been to demonstrate that disputes as to the necessary 
features of concepts such as law are ones which are impossible to resolve 
without an agreement as to the meaning of the terminology used within the 
dispute. Here, it is of central importance that the word ‘law’ should be defined 
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in a way which is objective and acceptable to all parties to the dispute. It has 
been noted that law is fundamentally a means by which our action is guided, and 
therefore possesses a normative element. The remainder of this chapter will 
attempt to further narrow our search for the normative element of law. 
 
2.2  Normativity, Agency and Law. 
 
As has been suggested above, central to the concept of normativity is a further 
conception of agency; without an agent against whom a normative claim could 
potentially be made, no normative claim is possible. Such a claim will be 
expanded here, particularly with reference to a Kantian conception of action 
upon which the normative claim of Law might be founded. This section will aim 
to show that Law is inescapably part of the framework of practical reason against 
which normativity necessarily makes claims. Such a necessary link can be 
demonstrated by the shared terminology between conceptions of Law and those 
of Practical Reason; both concern themselves with ideas of obligation, of 
permission, endowments and rights. Rationality and coherence are as equally 
central to legal principles as they are to those of practical reason generally; even 
legal practice itself is oriented entirely towards finding a rational way in which to 
deal with a practical problem. 31 
Central to such a notion is a conception of the will as the only possible non-
contingent provider of moral worth. If we take this as true, then it must also be 
recognised that not every exercise of the will is unconditionally good; it is 
possible that an agent might choose to undertake a particular action which is not 
in accordance with a guiding moral principle which is ultimately discernible from 
the will. It is from this observation that the legal idea of a duty arises, one which 
– again – appears normatively indistinguishable from the concept of a moral 
duty to act in a certain way. In this sense, duty becomes fundamentally 
intertwined with the broader concept of the will. 32 Such a conclusion can be 
seen in Kant’s moral theories; as summarised by Bertea, in Kant’s framework 
practical reason is a unified concept which ‘ultimately depends on the same 
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grounds for its normativity, meaning that practical reason carries normative 
force by virtue of its linkage with humanity understood as the rational power to 
decide for oneself the ends worthy of pursuit.’ 33 It is therefore impossible, from 
a Kantian perspective, to have a legal obligation without reference to a 
corresponding moral obligation, as both ultimately rest on the same normative 
requirements imposed on any way in which an agent employs their practical 
reason. Such requirements are imposed on any action which can be said to be 
undertaken voluntarily as opposed to involuntarily; it can therefore impose 
requirements to act in a certain way for action, but not reaction; on internal 
inclination but not external circumstances; on stimulus, but not response. For 
‘[W]hat makes someone a human agent is a capacity not only for reaction (which 
is wanton and can go any which way) but also for conduct framed in view of one 
or more principles into which are embedded principles providing guidance.’ 34 
Based on this agential understanding of the subject, the first principle of action 
which is required for a normative requirement to be imposable on that action is 
an ability to reflect and then act upon a given stimulus or set of stimuli. This 
autonomy leads to an ability within the actor to self-determine their actions both 
negatively, in that they are able to act independently of externally imposed 
standards, but also positively, in that they possess the capacity to select or devise 
standards of conduct of their own making or consensual acceptance.35 Put more 
succinctly: 
 [H]uman agency is the capacity to act on models established by reflective, 
rational and autonomous choice; and human agents are subjects capable of 
acting on self-imposed reasons, reasons they have worked out for 
themselves exercising their capacity for reflection.36 
From this observation, we are able to clearly pinpoint the correlative connection 
between the reasons an agent uses when making a decision on how to act in a 
given circumstance and the respective normative force these reasons exert upon 
the agent during the decision making process. For it is the normative force that 
a particular reason exerts on an agent that provides them with a purpose for 
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choosing that particular course of action over any alternative. Without the 
metaphorical crossroads which an agent must traverse when choosing one 
course of action over the alternatives, no normative force can persuade the agent 
to prefer a particular act over another. Normativity therefore requires agency in 
order to be meaningful as it is inescapably linked with the very idea of reasons 
for action. As Bertea again summarises, ‘Normativity could not emerge but for 
a constituting act on the part of human agents, and in this sense the normativity 
of objects is said to depend on fundamental features of human agents.37’ 
In light of this conclusion, we must next ask what practical agency itself entails. 
It can be separated into two interconnected facets: 
On the one hand, the minimally necessary self-conception exists before 
and beyond the agent as a deep conception enjoying a good measure of 
independence from this or that agent, which is to say that the conception 
is only marginally dependent on one’s inclinations, and it cannot be 
disposed of without loss of one’s practical identity, for its constituent 
features cannot be given up without thereby giving up one’s distinctive 
existence as a human agent. At the same time, however, the minimally 
necessary self-conception is the outcome of the capacity for self-
reflection that enables human agents to move about in the practical 
sphere in specific ways and makes each individual capable of recognising 
herself as such.38 
Given both the deep and minimal definitions of a self-conception of agency 
identified by Bertea necessarily entail reference back to the decision maker 
themselves, they necessarily can be seen as constitutive of the very fact of agency 
itself.39 Following from this, if the act of making decisions based on reasons is 
definitionally necessary for agency, then it becomes instantly apparent that the 
opportunity for normativity to provide reasons to guide an agents’ conduct is 
also definitionally built into the idea of practical reason itself.  
This may appear to be a fairly asinine observation, yet its implications for the 
legal sphere cannot be understated;  a connective chain has been identified which 
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ties together the disparate concepts of agency, of practical identity and of 
practical reason. If normativity is necessarily present whenever an agent chooses 
a particular course of action over another, it can be said to be present in the very 
idea of agency itself. This normative necessity is carried through to the idea of 
practical reason by being the model which guides agents within the practical 
sphere of action. In light of this transfer, it follows that normativity therefore is 
able to exert its force on every agential action which is itself found within the 
domain of practical reason – including, for our purposes, legal obligations.40 This 
jump is not a controversial one; in that it is a means of regulating agential 
behaviour and providing reasons for adhering to a particular framework of social 
interaction more broadly, law is necessarily concerned with agency.41 
A common counter to this necessary connection between agency and law is that 
any attempt to characterise agency in this way is meaningless. It is simply too 
abstract; individuals in the real world do not see themselves as complying with 
such a definition. We do not exist as machines acting according to the demands 
placed upon us by practical reason. Instead, individuals necessarily see 
themselves as embedded within certain social and cultural practices, and it is 
these practices which more often guide our actions than an appeal to the 
machine-like practical reason employed by such theories of agency. Therefore, 
in order to have any meaningful existence, definitions of agency must make 
reference to these social and cultural practices which, more often than not, are 
the true guides of our behaviour.42 
Such an observation may have its appeal, yet it appears to operate on a 
misunderstanding of what is necessary for agency and what may be considered as 
contingent influences on how an agent makes their decisions. Bare agency itself 
requires the three essentials of reflectivity, rationality and autonomy as discussed 
above. I will consider this necessary definition in more detail with the 
introduction of Gewirth’s theories in Chapter Three, yet for the moment this 
observation will suffice to rebut the argument of culturally grounded agency. For 
the bare agency identified through these three necessary components is itself 
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enough to guide an individual’s actions; it may be characterised as partial or 
deficient, but it cannot be said to provide an incomplete explanation of agential 
action. Should other considerations play a role in the decision making process, 
these considerations should therefore be characterised as additional and 
contingent; whist they can play a role in the decision making process, they need 
not necessarily do so.43 More importantly, if these culturally or socially grounded 
reasons for action serve so as to actively counter the autonomy, rationality and 
reflectivity of those against whom they are directed, they then actively undermine 
the bare agency of those same subjects.44 It is therefore impossible for them to 
exert any meaningful normative demand on an agent, given the necessary link 
between agency and normativity identified in the preceding paragraphs.   
Given then that a bare conception of agency is required for normativity and a 
connecting chain between the concepts of agency and practical reason is 
identifiable, a normative element is apparent in any action governed by practical 
reason – including within the realm of law. Our attention must now turn to the 
extent to which this normative requirement is necessary with the very concept 
of law itself. The first observation to make in this line of enquiry is one which 
would be equally acceptable to both legal positivists and natural lawyers; it is 
impossible to see a law as existing in isolation. Law is necessarily systemic in 
nature, and individual laws need to be seen in light of the system of which they 
form a part. From this observation, it should be taken as equally axiomatic that 
the normative force possessed by a single law can also not be seen in isolation. 
The normativity of individual laws can therefore not be separated from the 
normative force exerted by the system they comprise; they should instead be 
viewed as necessarily linked.45 
This claim appears to run contrary to the popular positivist viewpoint that legal 
claims are predominantly subjectivist. Such a claim would hold that legal claims 
are claims made by particular subjects or procedures against a particular 
individual, as opposed to being inherent in ‘statements, acts, institutions, 
practices and procedures of law’.46 Such a subjectivist claim however can be seen 
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to be idealistic; it can be dismissed in that it doesn’t account for the persistence 
of certain legal standards throughout various independently created legal 
systems. Such a persistence can, however, be explained by the existence of a 
necessary moral core inherent within the concept of law itself.  
A positivist may seek to counter this dismissal by introducing reductivity to the 
normative definition so observed; any normative arrangement which may be 
identifiable within the concept of law itself can be reduced to a simple series of 
facts. Such a reduction strips such normative connections of their guiding force, 
in that if a normative claim can be stated in terms of facts then the norm itself 
belongs not to the category of ‘ought’ but of ‘is’.47 Nothing then separates these 
‘normative’ claims from those claims which may be exerted legislator and 
subject.48 
Several means of countering this claim are available to those who would hold 
that a normative ‘ought’ is axiomatic to the concept of ‘law’, building on the 
normative content of the word itself established in earlier in this chapter.49 
Firstly, a foundationalist response is available. Such a claim would take the form 
of the observation that the normative claims made by law go beyond, and indeed 
transcend individual experiences and instead should be seen as resting on a 
universal and objective truth which is identifiable through logocentric reasoning 
based on an external point of reference. Such a claim may reignite an earlier level 
of scepticism however, in that it may be viewed as too abstract to therefore 
possess meaning – how can it be possible to transcend personal experience 
whilst retaining any viable content? Such an objection is fairly strong in that we 
have already drawn a necessary connection between the normative foundation 
of legal claims and the realm of practical reason, and therefore to agential 
decision making – if this claim has been accepted as correct, then it seems 
difficult to then attempt to locate this normative force in a source external to the 
agent. For expediency, it shall have to suffice at this point in the chapter to note 
that a response to this sceptical challenge can be found in Alan Gewirth’s 
Principle of Generic Consistency (hereafter PGC); the PGC creates a universally 
acceptable instrumental reason for compliance with its moral requirements that, 
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rather than being located externally from the agent, are instead constructed 
through a dialectically necessary argument proceeding from the very fact of 
agency itself, and can therefore withstand the challenge posed. The point will, 
however, be expressed in further detail towards the end of this chapter. 
A second response to the reductivist claim can be its acceptance; we may wish 
to concede that normativity, law and obligations can be directly equated with the 
concepts of factuality, power and sanction respectively. It could be said however 
that this would be to mischaracterise the concept of normativity itself, and strip 
the term of any meaningful properties. On a realistic level these terms are simply 
not used interchangeably, particularly within the legal sphere – if they were, then 
no dispute between positivists and natural lawyers would exist. The very fact that 
this debate is ongoing could therefore be seen as evidence that to concede the 
point is to oversimplify the question being posed. 
Lastly, we may seek to look further into the concept of authority itself in order 
to demonstrate that the reductionist argument is flawed. The essence of the 
reductionist claim is that authority itself rests on, and therefore is synonymous 
with, the idea of force. This claim appears to miss the point of the normative 
question however, as the term ‘authority’ entails an element of legitimacy within 
it. If this were not the case, we would use the words ‘threat’ or ‘force’ 
interchangeably with ‘authority’, which we do not. Authority can therefore be 
better synonymised with the idea of ‘legitimate force’; this then begs the question 
of where and how the force gains its legitimacy, which takes us back to the 
original normative question the reductionist sought to answer.  
The failure of the reductionist argument therefore leaves us with the realisation 
that legal normativity is both a fact which cannot be excluded entirely from the 
very concept of law, and that it possesses a meta-ethical component. For in 
addition to possessing an action-guiding aspect, this aspect must be legitimate. 
Its categorical, compulsory or unqualified status therefore requires expansion in 
a purely legal context. Bertea again makes this argument extremely succinctly 
when he notes that ‘[W]e need to explain not just the capacity of the law to guide 
action but the categorical and unqualified demands corresponding to the 
practical guidance provided by the law.50’ For Natural Lawyers, the normative 
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foundation which provides the legitimacy of these demands is necessary within 
the very idea of law itself. For positivists however, normativity poses several 
problems for identifying the concept of law. The next section of this chapter will 
provide us with a brief introduction to some of the ways in which positivism 
seeks to address the issue. 
 
3 Normativity in Positivist Theory 
 
 
As has been claimed in the previous definitional chapter, Legal Positivism has 
traditionally been defined negatively with reference to Natural Law. Whereas the 
latter holds the link between law and morality to be conceptually necessary, the 
former argues that it is not. It is therefore a fairly broad theoretical heading in 
that it covers any ideas which do not conceptually link law with morality. Such 
theories generally hold, then, that the authoritative claim made by law is one 
which rests entirely on social facts and that these social facts should simply be 
accepted; where these facts gain their authority is not a question with which legal 
philosophers should engage themselves.51 
If we were to instead seek a definition of Positivism which does not make 
reference to merely an absence of morality, then Ronald Dworkin provides us 
with four main tenets which we may look for in a system in order to identify 
whether it may qualify as law according to the positivist tradition. Firstly, a Rule 
of Recognition must be present whose purpose is to identify which criteria are 
both necessary and sufficient for the existence of Law. Secondly, the system 
proposed by the theory must operate so that every norm within it takes the form 
of a rule; Dworkin refers to this simply as the Model of Rules. Thirdly, it must 
subscribe what is commonly referred to as the ‘Seperability Thesis’, which holds 
that substantive merit or moral value cannot, of itself, be sufficient for legal 
validity. This is grounded on the similar idea of the ‘Practical Difference Thesis’, 
which holds that legal validity requires additional criteria to moral validity, 
otherwise there is no meaningful distinction between the terms as motivations 
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for action. Put by Coleman, ‘[L]aw must be able to make a practical difference 
as law: that is, a difference in the reasons for action that apply to those to whom 
the law is directed.’52 Law must therefore be seen creating norms distinct from 
moral norms, otherwise our motivation for acting according to the law would 
not be meaningfully different to our reasons for acting morally; the two must 
therefore be seen as different phenomena. Lastly, Dworkin holds that Positivist 
Theories must subscribe to what he calls the Discretion Thesis, in that judges 
must be granted limited legislative powers in so called ‘hard’ cases in which the 
law is unclear. Dworkin would argue that, should we see moral principles as 
binding legal sources, then each of these four criteria are undermined.53 
Regardless of whether we seek to define Positivism in positive or negative terms, 
it is uncontroversial to categorise it as being ultimately concerned with the 
criteria for legal validity, and not why these criteria for legal validity are ultimately 
valid themselves. For positivists, this is a separate enquiry. 54 Broadly speaking, 
positivist theories can be split into two encompassing types, which will here be 
discussed in turn. Firstly, Exclusive Legal Positivism will be addressed. This 
branch of positivism holds that can be no link whatsoever between moral 
reasoning and legal validity. Secondly, Inclusive – or Incorporationist – Legal 
Positivism will introduced; this branch holds that moral reasoning can form a 
part of legal validity, but that it does not have to. Any link between the two is 
therefore contingent as opposed to necessary. The purpose of this section is to 
introduce the central normative positions taken by each of these two branches 
of positivism, but without introducing or critiquing specific examples of this 
stage. This will, instead, take place later in this thesis. The myriad writings of 
Joseph Raz, widely categorised as the most influential contemporary exponent 
of Exclusive Positivism, will be examined in Chapter 5. This will be followed by 
three examples of contemporary inclusive positivist theories, those of Lyons, 
Coleman and Kramer respectively, which will be critiqued in Chapter 6. 
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3.1  Exclusive Legal Positivism 
 
 
‘[E]xclusive legal positivists…have maintained that the legality of a norm must 
depend on its social source, and any appearances to the contrary must be 
explained in some other way.’55 In this line, Jules Coleman succinctly establishes 
the central tenet of exclusive positivism – the complete exclusion of moral 
reasoning from any attempt to locate the source of valid legal norms. If we are 
to define law by reference to conventional sources, then normativity – insofar as 
it is a moral concept as opposed to a legal one – should be completely excluded 
from the discussion.56  
Exclusive positivists justify this on what can be broadly characterised as an 
appeal to legal realism. Such theories hold that the inclusion of moral principles 
in a discussion of legal normativity, even on a contingent basis and therefore in 
a way which is compatible with inclusive positivism, is to conflate two separate 
ideas; what the law is, and what the law should be. Since jurisprudence is the study 
of what law is, we should not consider moral norms in our search; to do this is 
to ask what the law should be, which is a different enquiry. Jurisprudence therefore 
ought not to concern itself with moral reasoning of any kind, as to do so would 
be to go beyond its purview.57 To include moral norms in legal reasoning is to 
provide a further reason as to why the population may seek to follow a given 
law, but is not connected with a search for what the law actually is.  
In Kelsenian language, to conflate these two enquiries is to confuse the validity 
of a given law with its efficacy. Bertea makes an attempt to distinguish these two 
different properties of a given law using language more fitting for the present 
enquiry, claiming that ‘Validity differs from efficacy by its being primarily 
meaning-related, as opposed to primarily nature-related or society related...’58 Yet 
to separate these two acceptability-features of a given piece of legislation raises 
definitional problems which it is difficult for an Exclusive Positivist to 
overcome. Firstly, we should remember that a central claim of exclusive 
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positivism is that legal validity itself also ultimately rests purely on social facts. 
They would therefore find Bertea’s definition difficult to accept in that it claims 
that both validity and efficacy should be judged in this way; to attribute some 
additional inherent meaning to validity above this is to introduce an arbitrary and 
ultimately fallacious distinction.  
The second problem Bertea’s definition raises for Exclusive Positivists arises 
from a reliance on empirical assessment; if efficacy is ultimately a social fact, 
empirical assessment becomes the only way in which to accurately assess the 
efficacy of a given law. This should be a stand-alone assessment which is 
different from the validity of a law. Yet to rely on an empirical assessment in this 
way tells us nothing of why a particular legal norm is viewed as possessing 
efficacy; it merely informs us whether or not people do see it as something which 
they feel bound to follow. If the purpose of jurisprudence is to explain how a 
legal system comes into being as a normative concept in itself, it is important to 
distinguish how an individual’s motivation to follow a given norm as law is 
different from how a person might follow a norm under a threat of violence 
should non-compliance occur. Law should provide a motivation for action 
beyond that of a mere threat, but to end our enquiry at an empirical assessment 
of whether a law possesses efficacy does not allow us to assess this distinction. 
Such a distinction might be ascertained by asking what motivates an individual 
to view a given law as possessing efficacy, but this would be an enquiry which is 
prohibited by exclusive positivism. It is this second observation which provides 
the reason for which this thesis will focus primarily on inclusive, or 
incorporationist, positivism; such exclusive positivism cannot provide a reason 
for why efficacy exists with reference to either an individual law or a legal system, 
as it arbitrarily limits the jurisprudential enquiry so as to exclude questions of 
validity. Efficacy can therefore be said to contribute to the existence of a norm, 
but the level of efficacy possessed by a given law cannot be the ultimate arbiter 
of whether or not that particularly law should be seen as producing a valid norm. 
We are required to consider validity in order to justify efficacy. 
Such a concession is made by Kelsen in his original theory outlining the 
difference between legal validity and efficacy when he claims that ‘minimum 
effectiveness [in that those to whom a legal rule is addressed choose to be bound 
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by it] is a condition of validity.’ 59 An exclusive positivist may here claim that 
such a concession is compatible with his theory, in so far that it does not make 
reference to a moral reason for why a law possesses validity which grants it 
efficacy. Yet Dworkin provides a reasonably clear example of how it is 
impossible to completely exclude morality from legal deliberation. He suggests 
that if, in the course of their deliberation, a judge’s application of the Common 
Law could be interpreted as legislation, then it is impossible to suggest that they 
would not incorporate moral concepts such as justice and fairness within the 
deliberative process for which they have exercised this discretion.60 This 
observation categorically undermines the central claim of exclusive positivism, 
but remains compatible with an inclusive positivism which holds that morality, 
although a potential contributing factor to arbitration, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient in order to produce a legal outcome. For example, were a judge to 
borrow law from another jurisdiction in his deliberation, this would not result in 
a claim that the whole of the donor country’s law has become part of that of the 
adopting jurisdiction; in the same way, morality can contribute to the 
development of law but cannot be its sole point of reference with regards to 
validity and efficacy.61 
Many exclusive positivists would dispute the extension of efficacy in this way as 
a conflation of two different questions. Efficacy, for the purposes of 
jurisprudence, is a social fact describing the extent to which a particular law is 
followed by those against whom it is directed; in other words, whether a legal 
system possesses authority. To ask whether a system is valid is to ask whether 
this authority is legitimate – something which is irrelevant for the purposes of 
efficacy. For even if a legal system does not possess legitimate authority, it will 
still claim that it does so – and it is the claim of legitimate authority which is 
therefore a norm-creating reason for action under law regardless of efficacy.62  
To understand the ramifications of this claim for our present enquiry, we are 
required to explore in slightly more detail the nature of a norm itself. If we accept 
that norms are fundamentally grounded in practical reason as outlined in Section 
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2.2 of this chapter – an uncontroversial claim given that rules, by necessity, are 
reasons as to why we should undertake action of a given type -  then we are able 
to differentiate two different species of norms which possess subtly different 
scopes of application. The first would be first order norms – those which 
provide us a basic reason for action. Such exclusions are necessarily exclusive in 
that they are a directive to both behave in a certain way and to disregard 
alternative reasons for acting. An exclusion such as this requires that such 
reasons should be viewed as reasons in their own right, independent of any 
deliberation as to their validity or justification.63 Second order norms differ; they 
employ rationality and reason in order to justify why a particular first-order norm 
should be accepted and be viewed as valid, and can either impose positive or 
negative restrictions on our action.64 In order for exclusive positivism to provide 
a reason for the existence of law, it must therefore be viewed as a first-order 
norm thus described; if it provides only second-order norms, then exclusive 
positivism is definitionally insufficient. With this observation in mind, the 
following description can assist us:  
Legal systems, understood as structures for the exercise of authority, 
claim to issue provisions of a certain kind, that is, provisions capable of 
excluding and pre-empting all those reasons that do not emanate from 
them. Laws are accordingly regarded as directives purporting to provide 
content-independent protected reasons for action, namely, as directives 
that, independently of their content, carry both a prescription to act in a 
certain way and an instruction excluding courses of conduct based on 
depended reasons.65  
If we were to be presented with a directive which claimed to be law but clearly 
was not, it would not possess a stand-alone reason which required us to adhere 
to it. A minimum level of content is therefore required in order to provide a 
justification for why a law can be viewed as such, and therefore followed as such. 
It is clear then that the concept of law belongs to the family of second-order 
norms, and, subsequently, cannot be identified purely by reference to exclusive 
positivism alone. Even many prominent exclusive positivists fail to address how 
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this characterisation be avoided; Joseph Raz, for example, characterises the 
normative nature of law as follows: 
I. Normativity is essential to the broader concept of law and 
therefore to its definition. 
II. The normative force of law takes the form of a claim to 
legitimate authority. 
III. It generates a content-independent reason to act, which: 
IV. Incorporates exclusionary content; and 
V. Has a moral nature in that it is generally addressed to all.66 
The claim to content independence proposed in category III does not sit 
comfortably with the claim of legitimate authority contained in category II, to 
the point where these can be reasonably viewed as irreconcilable. It can therefore 
be demonstrated that exclusionary positivist theories which build on a 
dichotomy between what law is and ought to be; between lex and ius; can be viewed 
as mischaracterising or as misunderstanding of the normative claim made by law. 
Whilst significant scholarship has been undertaken on the topic, scholarship 
which I am unable to address in full throughout the thesis, this section has 
attempted to highlight some key flaws with the standpoint in order to justify the 
focus of this thesis on Inclusive Positivism. If we view law as possessing 
authority which is legitimised in some sense of the word, then we recognise that 
the relationship between form and substance in the legal context is 
fundamentally inclusionary, and that justifications are therefore to be recognised 
as an essential component of any legal directive which is grounded upon them.  
 
3.2  Inclusive Legal Positivism 
 
Central to Inclusive Positivism is the claim that any authority cannot be entirely 
exclusionary; if the contents of a directive stray too far from the purpose for its 
introduction, the authority which issued it will be unable to enforce it. When 
individuals assess whether or not a law exerts a valid force, they undertake an 
assessment of whether these two positions are still sufficiently in alignment for 
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the norm to be considered valid. Such a position is frequently criticised; 
opponents such as Raz suggest that such a balancing exercise is fictitious in the 
extreme. Not only is it not the case that individuals weigh up the substantive 
merits of every single directive-giving law which is designed to guide their actions 
as and when they are presented with such a direction, but to organise a legal 
system on the subjective judgement of the substantive merits of each individual 
interaction with the law is neither a reasonable nor a desirable way in which to 
organise a legal system. Raz therefore concludes that the authority of a given law 
or a legal system cannot be limited by substantive reasons which might be 
required to justify its existence.67 
Whilst such a criticism is valid, it mischaracterises the claim frequently made by 
inclusive positivists. Individuals often do make value judgements based on the 
substantive merits of individual legal choices; if this were not the case, then the 
Kelsenian distinction between efficacy and validity explored above becomes 
meaningless. Secondly, if individuals do make substantive judgements against a 
pre-existing standard, it does not follow that such a criterion of validity be 
subjective in nature. It is conceivable that a functioning legal system might exist 
whose criterion of validity are an objectively observable benchmark which is 
uniformly applicable to all substantive judgements which need to be made; if 
these criteria can be identified, the criticisms identified above fail.  
Should we wish to identify features of inclusive positivism essential for the 
purposes of this thesis, the following definition would be useful; ‘Inclusive Legal 
Positivists maintain that there is no inconsistency between the core 
commitments of positivism and the existence of moral criteria of legality.’ 68 
Phrased differently, the central tenet of legal positivism is that law is valid if it is 
followed conventionally by officials because it meets the criteria for validity as 
required by something Hart would label a ‘secondary rule of recognition.’ What 
this criterion of validity is remains entirely content independent; it may contain 
moral reasoning, but such reasoning only becomes legal reasoning if it is 
followed by the officials charged with identifying the law.69   
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This thesis is directed towards a Natural Law rebuttal of the second aspect of 
this claim. It will argue that a moral component is not merely permissible for 
officials to identify the law, but that conformity with an objectively identifiable 
moral standard is necessary for legal validity. Such a claim goes beyond the 
requirement of inclusive positivism, but is founded within a logical fallacy arising 
from a Hartian conception of the secondary rule of recognition. This will be 
expounded upon in significantly more detail in Chapter Four of this thesis; for 
the present time, it will be simply stated that Hart’s Rule of Recognition is 
presented as both content independent and peremptory. As such, it forecloses 
meritory deliberation of itself, and becomes a first-order norm as described 
above; it is simply required that its validity be accepted on its own sake.70 This 
argument is unconvincing in itself for the same reason as exclusive positivism 
was previously dismissed; there is no reason as to why such a rule should be 
accepted unless a reason for its acceptance can itself be justified. Chapter Three 
of this thesis will suggest that the moral writings of Alan Gewirth, as developed 
by Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, can provide this reason in a 
rationally acceptable natural law theory. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this section it holds that inclusive positivist 
theories of law distinguish content of and grounds for legal sources in a way in 
which the natural law theory to be developed would reject. Inclusive positivism 
holds that the grounds need necessarily be a social fact, and that – although this 
fact may be moral in content – this is only required if allowed by the Rule of 
Recognition.71 External positivists may counter that to permit moral reasoning 
in this way defeats the purpose of a Rule of Recognition – to provide or force a 
consensus and agreement on a particular dispute of the basis of law. The fact of 
social pluralism has rendered morality too contentious a foundation upon which 
to ground a universally applicable criterion of recognition, so to incorporate a 
moral component in a Rule of Recognition would result in the perpetuation of 
the very disagreement which the Rule is designed to avoid.72 This criticism again, 
however, fails to consider the possibility of a universally acceptable moral 
standard which may be thus incorporated into a Rule of Recognition; were such 
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a principle to be identified, the criticism would fail. Inclusive Positivism is 
therefore able to resist such an external criticism. 
A final criticism which may be levelled against Inclusive Positivism from an 
External perspective is that, should Inclusive Positivism hold that morality may 
form the basis of legal reasoning, any resultant test would fail the Practical 
Difference Theory. This viewpoint requires that a legal norm must necessarily 
provide guidance founded on a different basis than that which already exists 
within moral reasoning; unless it can do this, there is no practical difference 
between legal and moral reasoning which can identify a specific reason for action 
as legal in origin.73 Such a claim is founded in the very idea of a reason for action 
itself. If a claim is made that a rational individual views themselves as constrained 
by the demands of the moral restrains of right reason as when they act, as 
permitted by inclusive positivism, the following dilemma arises: 
a) If law were to require an outcome different to that which may be 
permitted by right reason, then to follow the law is to be irrational. 
b) Yet if law were to require the demands of the moral restraints 
imposed by right reason, then it would require identical forms of 
action. As such a requirement adds no additional reason, it cannot 
be viewed as different; it therefore cannot be viewed as a separate 
legal norm separate to one derived from morality. It thus fails the 
requirements of the Practical Difference theory.74 
Yet such an assessment ignores the fact that many legal requirements do 
expressly rest upon moral principles, and can therefore again be dismissed as 
fictitious. An attempt to circumvent this inclusion can be found in an appeal by 
Raz to the related, yet separate notion of practical authority as follows. If such 
to submit to an authority’s assessment of what the ‘demands of right reason’ 
might require would produce a better outcome than would making an 
assessment for ourselves, then it becomes rational to submit the authority rather 
than follow our own judgements. This ‘Normal Justification Thesis’ therefore 
permits a moral reason for action which remains normatively grounded in a 
separate species of legal authority; any moral force which is transferred into the 
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legal sphere by this service conception is gained whilst retaining the required 
content-independence of the Rule of Recognition within the legal system.75 
This explanation as to the permissibility of the inclusion of moral reasoning 
within a given legal system is problematic however, and does not convincingly 
explain the moral content found, and accepted, within legal systems. Firstly, the 
concession is dismissed by many Exclusive Positivists themselves as it can be 
characterised as resting on a presumption that all laws are prescriptive in nature. 
The criticism claims that this is not a true characterisation of how the law 
imposes obligations in that not all law allows for such appeals to practical reason; 
many provide us with a stark imperative, requiring standards of behaviour more 
akin to a ‘must’ than a mere ‘ought’.76 Such imperatives do not lend themselves 
well to the balancing of outcomes which Raz lays out in his Normal Justification 
Thesis. Secondly, a critic of Raz’s theory may equally claim that, in relying on a 
balancing of outcomes in order to find a more preferable result, the existence of 
a criterion of how a given outcome may be assessed as preferable is presumed. 
Yet despite relying on this presumption, Raz makes no attempt to identify what 
such a criterion might be. We therefore return to the criticism levelled at 
Exclusive Positivism above; it cannot give adequate justificatory reasoning as to 
why we should submit our actions to the restrictions placed upon them by law. 
In attempting to justify the incorporation of morality into the law in this way 
however, Raz does take a step in the right direction; namely, through the 
adoption of an internal viewpoint. The capacity of individuals to choose one of 
multiple possible courses of action based on the desirability of the outcome is a 
fundamental aspect of our behaviour, as is the adoption of a particular practice 
as a norm. This process of choice and adoption of a particular limitation on our 
actions is an undeniable feature of the naissance of a legal system. Embracing 
the internal point of view in such a way is the equivalent of endorsing both a 
particular pattern of behaviour and the practices which result in them.77 The 
question posed to jurisprudence then can be phrased as follows: Is it possible to 
identify the motivational factor which causes individuals to adopt and endorse a 
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particular pattern of behaviour as the basis of a legal system? Such a factor must 
emerge from the internal point of view and must be one which is capable of 
generating categorically binding norms of conduct upon those against whom it 
is addressed.  
 
4 Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has, again, been purposefully broad in its scope, and has had as its 
objective to explain to the reader why the remainder of the thesis has chosen to 
focus on the debate of inclusive normative positivism as opposed to non-
normative positivism. It has firstly attempted to demonstrate, with reference to 
the philosophy of language, that legal philosophers necessarily consider the same 
subject when making their enquiries. Arguments that the meaning of language 
employed within jurisprudence is open to debate has been explored with 
reference to Wittgenstein and Kripke, and this claim has been shown to be 
fallacious. Words can be seen to possess a clear normative meaning, and to 
misconstrue that meaning is to engage in semantics at the expense of rational 
legal argument.  
Having demonstrated the existence of a linguistic normativity which is contained 
within the meaning of the word ‘law’, this chapter introduced the idea that 
Exclusive Legal Positivism is incapable of convincingly explaining the origin of 
the normative force which motivates the subjects of law to confirm to the 
requirements of a rule which claims to be legal in nature. It has then moved to 
introduce a how Inclusive Positivism attempts to circumvent this problem. As 
has previously been mentioned, specific examples of these theories will be 
assessed in detail for the extent to which they fulfil their objectives later in this 
thesis.  Yet based on these preliminary observations it seems evident that a more 
persuasive means of explaining legal normativity is required. This normative 
basis must provide an explanation of why individuals feel obliged to follow a 
legal rule, why they should feel bound to accept the deliberative functioning of 
their Rule of Recognition and why officials within the system would also accept 
this secondary rule. In this sense, the normative basis should be capable of 
explaining the linked concepts of validity and efficacy to all against whom it is 
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addressed. It is the position of this thesis that such a normative basis can be 
found in the PGC provided by Alan Gewirth, and therefore in Natural Law. The 
following chapter will establish why the PGC should be seen as such a principle, 
grounding it firmly in a Kantian ideal of the person. 
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Chapter Three 
The Gewirthian Solution. 
 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
Should a given individual be transplanted from the early twentieth century to the 
present day, they would in all likelihood be amazed at just how much society had 
progressed. Technological advancements in areas such as transport, 
communications and entertainment which we take for granted appear almost 
unimaginable when viewed from the perspective of a mind formed by the 
nineteenth century. Yet, should our individual be actively engaged in 
jurisprudence they may find the landscape of the early twenty-first century 
remarkably familiar, still dominated as it is between the two schools of Natural 
Law and Legal Positivism and their competing justifications for the normative 
force of law. Although terminologies may have changed and new modified 
theories might have emerged on each side, the same concern – a satisfactory 
explanation of the relationship between law and morality – is still under rigorous 
debate. 
This is problematic, for, as our technological capacities have increased, so have 
the means by which we are able to detrimentally interfere with one another’s 
existence. Yet the theoretical reasoning underlying the operation of our legal 
systems – the very means by which human interaction is regulated by the state 
and other bodies – has remained static. This theory is grounded on the 
assumption that, for a large part, this is the result of a failure to identify a truly 
universal moral code as opposed to one grounded in the subjective terms of a 
particular era or geographical location, one which could be rationally accepted 
by all people regardless of their subjective viewpoints. The issue was put 
succinctly by American philosopher Alan Gewirth in the preface of his 1978 
book ‘Reason and Morality’: 
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In a century where the evils that man can do to man have reached 
unparalleled extremes  of barbarism and tragedy, the philosophic 
concern with rational justification in ethics is  more than a quest for 
certainty. It is also an attempt to make coherent sense of persons’ 
deepest concerns about the principles that should govern the ways they 
treat one another.1 
The extent to which a moral theory such as that proposed by Gewirth is 
genuinely of use to a theory relating to the normative foundation of law is 
debatable; as Torben Spaak identifies, in the real world it is the case that law 
‘necessarily claims to trump moral and other reasons for action’.2 In addition, it 
is rarely the case that, in courtroom situations where a conflict arises between 
law and morals, judges – in their capacity as legal officials – will recognise the 
latter as legally relevant.3 We have come across the problem identified in the 
abstract of this thesis, that it is impossible that (RL x, Φ & RM x, - Φ), and it 
appears the positivist assumption that that the law claims exclusionary authority 
over moral concerns is the most commonly accepted solution.  
This thesis will argue against this position, suggesting that Gewirth’s moral 
theory is directly relevant to identifying a rational normative grounding for any 
successful legal system. It will therefore aim to demonstrate the dialectical 
necessity of the statement (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ) if the PGC can be 
demonstrated to be necessarily linked to the concept of law. Such a link has been 
sketched in the previous chapter, which attempted to establish the linguistic 
necessity of a unified theory of norms; the problem we are thus faced with is the 
common problem faced by all theories of natural law. In order for such theories 
to be successful, two requirements must be met: 
1) We must accept the doctrine of moral realism; and 
2) Moral truths must be identifiable by human reason. 
This chapter will attempt to demonstrate that these two requirements can be 
provided by the PGC. It will begin by arguing Gewirth’s Principle of Generic 
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Consistency, developed in his 1978 ‘Reason and Morality’4 and significantly 
expanded upon in subsequent works, is capable of meeting the first in that it 
establishes a dialectically necessary argument by which all agents are committed 
to recognising a principle of moral permissibility. It will then move on to address 
the second requirement, demonstrating that these arguments are grounded in a 
sound conception of reason which rests on Kant’s conception of the Categorical 
Imperative.  
 
2 The Dialectical Necessity of Morality 
 
A large part of the positivist denial that law and morality are concepts which are 
necessarily linked is in part based upon theorists’ belief that it is impossible to 
identify a truly objective and universal set of moral values which would be 
acceptable to all individuals regardless of their subjective considerations. Alan 
Gewirth, in formulating his PGC, attempts to overcome this problem by 
grounding a supreme moral principle on a purely rational basis. In doing so he 
is directly confronting intuitionist morality with its claims of moral self-evidency, 
and conventionalist morality’s claims that certain principles underlying the 
morality of a given culture can be used to elucidate upon specific moral rules 
and judgements.5 He instead views and defines morality as unique in guiding 
action in that it imposes requirements which take precedence over all other 
modes of guiding action, including legal obligations and even self-interest: 
…[A] morality is a set of categorically obligatory requirements for action 
that are addressed at least in part to every actual or prospective agent, 
and that are concerned with furthering the interests, especially the most 
important interests, of persons other  than or in addition to the agent 
or the speaker. The requirements are categorically obligatory in that 
compliance with them is mandatory for the conduct of every person to 
whom they are addressed regardless of whether he wants to accept them 
or their results, and regardless also of the requirements of any other 
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institutions such as law or etiquette, whose obligatoriness may itself be 
doubtful or variable.6 
It is this other-regarding concern applying to all agents which forms the basis of 
the PGC, the workings of which are explored in more detail below. This section 
will attempt to demonstrate that, far from being contingent to the operation of 
law, only a categorically binding and dialectically necessary moral principle such 
as the PGC can provide the normative grounding necessary for a legal system to 
successfully claim authority over those to whom it is addressed. 
 
2.1 The workings of the Principle of Generic 
Consistency 
 
Gewirth believes that, unlike the scientific method favoured by Kelsen, moral 
judgements cannot rely on empirical facts or observations to check their truth 
and objectivity without question-begging moral rightness or the correctness of 
the moral judgement in question. He calls this problem that of ‘the 
correspondence correlate’ or of ‘the independent variable’; are there any 
independent variables against which the correctness of moral judgements can be 
correctly determined? 7 Gewirth argues that any attempt to locate such an 
independent variable should be grounded in something which is universally 
possessed by any individual against whom such a moral principle is addressed. 
He argues that the very idea of action (and the noumenal agency required for its 
pursuit) should therefore be seen as a potential source of moral principle, as the 
concept of action possesses two generic features relevant for moral discourse: 
a) Voluntariness: Conduct must be externally sourced (i.e.: not caused by 
reflex or disease) an not caused by either direct or indirect compulsion; 
and 
b) Purposiveness: Actors have goals which constitute their reason for 
acting. 8 
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Such a grounding in the fact of agency9 forms the beginning of a sequence of 
logically progressive statements which create a dialectically necessary morality 
applicable to all agents – the PGC. Such a dialectically necessary method starts 
with the descriptive statement ‘I do X for purpose E.’ 10 as demonstrated by the 
features of agency discussed above, and expanded upon by Beyleveld in order 
to more clearly demonstrate the progression of the argument: 
 Stage 1 (RM 22-63): A PPA11 claims by definition: 
i) I do (or intend to do) X voluntarily for some purpose E  
 By virtue of making this claim, the PPA rationally must 
 consider that (claim) in the logical sequence. 
ii) E is good; 
iii) My freedom and wellbeing are generically necessary 
conditions of my agency 
iv) My freedom and wellbeing are necessary goods. 
Stage 2 (RM 63 – 103): By virtue of having to accept (iv), a PPA must 
accept: 
v) I (even if no one else) have a claim right (but not    
necessarily a moral one) to my freedom and wellbeing. 
 
Stage 3 (RM 104-98, esp. 104-28): By having to accept v) on the basis of 
i), the PPA must accept: 
ix) Other PPAs (PPAOs) have a (moral) claim right to their 
freedom and wellbeing. 
 If this is the case, then every PPA must claim, by virtue of being a 
 PPA, 
xiii) Every PPA has a (moral) claim right to its freedom and 
wellbeing, 
                                                          
9 The centrality of the capacity, or agency, of the individual to the operation of law is recognised 
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 Which is a statement of the PGC.12 
This argument requires some unpacking in order to ensure that any ambiguities 
are removed. Firstly, that statement i) entails statement ii); statement ii) is to be 
read as ‘because I think E is good’, which is not the same as claiming that E is 
objectively good. This differential, made from the internal viewpoint of the 
agent, 13 lends the argument dialectic rather than assetoric character. Secondly, 
the voluntariness of statement i) entails statements iii) and iv), holding that 
agents necessarily make an evaluative judgement about the goodness of freedom 
and wellbeing required for them to pursue E. As these conditions are necessary 
for E to be successfully pursued, a deontic judgement is made which claims 
rights to freedom and wellbeing; as all agents necessarily must make this claim 
by the very fact of their agency, rights to freedom and wellbeing must be 
universal amongst all agents.14 The bare minimum this form must take is that 
agents must expect that others should refrain from interference in their rights;15 
if an agent therefore makes claim rights to freedom and wellbeing, as they are 
logically committed to doing, they are also logically committed to recognising a 
supreme principle of morality – namely against action which harms the freedom 
and wellbeing of an agent.16 To do otherwise would be to condone non-
consensual interference in an agent’s own rights, which they are logically 
precluded from doing. 
 
It should be noted however that at this stage in Gewirth’s argument, the ‘right’ 
and ‘ought’ are not in and of themselves moral claims. They may have other 
normative foundations, such as pragmatism or aesthetics; for until consideration 
of others’ interests outside the agent, without the principle of reciprocity and 
interaction, no moral principle is brought into play. 17 It may be asked then, why 
such claims to freedom and wellbeing should be classified as rights at all; why 
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not rather see them as egoistic demands? Gewirth suggests that is because rights, 
unlike demands, require certain criteria be fulfilled which are supplied by the 
PGC as laid out by Beyleveld above: 
a) Rights claims must be grounded in a valid, legitimate and justifiable 
claim based on entitlement. 
b) Such entitlement must be grounded in valid rules or other 
identifiable reasons. 
c) Rights claims require a community to be addressed towards which 
understands the legitimacy of the rules or reasons upon which the 
rights claim is based; 
d) Such a community must be both legal and political in nature. 18 
 
The initial rights-claim therefore exists because the goods of freedom and 
wellbeing are not necessary for a specific act (E), but are required for action 
itself. It is therefore impossible to waive these specific rights and remain an 
agent; since non-interference is therefore necessary for action itself, such goods 
must be claimed as rights.19 
 
It is therefore suggested that the PGC established by Gewirth, with its two meta 
rights of freedom and wellbeing for all agents, can provide the normative 
foundation of law. It does so based on the dialectically necessary argument thus 
presented, in that the PGC has demonstrated itself to be categorically binding 
on all agents by the necessary fact of their bare agency. Any attempt by agents 
to deny that they are bound to accept the PGC as imposing an absolute and 
exclusionary limitation on their action fails for two interlinked reasons: 
1) Should an agent seek to deny that they are bound to respect the 
rights of other agents as per the PGC, the result of their doing so is 
that they deny the importance of their own agential rights. 
2) This claim is a logical contradiction in that they are making a claim 
to their agential rights in the very act of denying their importance.  
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3) All agents are bound to respect the conditions of the PGC in order 
to avoid contradicting themselves by their actions. 
It follows that only law that produces outcomes which would not contradict the 
rights enjoyed by agents should be seen as morally valid, and therefore capable 
of being accepted by the population as deserving to be respected and followed. 
For example, in any interaction between agent X and recipient Y, X participates 
voluntarily and it is therefore up to him to decide whether to pursue coerced or 
uncoerced interaction with Y. 20 However, in recognising his own ability to 
choose whether to participate in a transaction, X must also recognise that all 
recipients – including Y – also have a choice in whether or not they wish to 
participate. Should X take it upon themselves to remove the choice from Y, this 
does not remove the acknowledgement that the choice exists; it therefore 
contradicts their rights to freedom and wellbeing, and goes against the 
requirements of the PGC 21 and should not form the basis of any law which 
seeks to maximise its efficacy amongst those against whom it is directed.  
 
The PGC may therefore be formulated simply as follows; ‘Act in accord with 
the generic rights of your recipients as well as those of yourself.’ To deny this 
principle is a logical contradiction, as you claim rights which you possess by 
virtue of your agency, whilst simultaneously claiming that those rights are not 
enjoyed by those who also possess that same agency. This makes Gewirth’s 
argument categorical, as it is impossible for an agent to shift the conditions of 
their own agency: 
If A has π → A has ε BECAUSE of S, B has π → B has ε IS ALSO 
VALID in S. 
 A = Me, π = being a PPA22, ε = claim right to F&W, B = PPAO23 
PPAO → π => ≡ PPAO → ε from internal viewpoint of PPA ∴ PPAO 
dialectically possesses ε 24 
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2.2  Universal Morality in a Pluralistic World 
 
A common mistake made by those who seek to dismiss the PGC is to assume 
that Gewirth attempts to prove a categorical imperative. This is not his task; he 
rather seeks to show that a PPA contradicts themselves if they choose not to act 
in accordance with the PGC. 25 It is admittedly similar to other supreme moral 
principles such as the categorical imperative expounded by Kant, but differs 
from this in two main ways. Firstly, it focuses on generic but specific rights rather 
than the Kant’s open-ended indeterminism.26 Secondly, it avoids the difficulty 
of relativism and associated critiques by proceeding from the cognitive 
standpoint of the agent.27 The PGC is therefore universalisable based on the 
logic that if a Predicate (P) belongs to a Subject (S) because of a Quality (Q), all 
S who have Q possess P.28 Therefore, all S who are PPAs possess generic rights 
to freedom and wellbeing. Such a statement is dialectically necessary in that it is 
relative to what all agents must logically accept for themselves,29 and universal in 
that all human beings are capable of rational autonomy and are therefore PPAs.30  
 
It may be argued that the argument that being a PPA is enough to claim generic 
rights – something Gewirth refers to as the Argument for the Sufficiency of 
Agency31 - when coupled with the observation that all human beings are capable 
of rational autonomy and are therefore PPAs, blurs the universalisation claimed 
by Gewirth into an objective claim rather than auniversally applicable 
instrumental reason. This will make many sceptical of such claims, as it is often 
difficult to persuade individuals of objective morality in a morally pluralist world.  
 
In order to address this critique, Gewirth argues that it is important to distinguish 
positive from normative morality. Positive morality concerns itself with rules or 
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directives held as categorically obligatory, and is often found in customary ways 
of acting which are empirically identifiable. By contrast, normative morality 
concerns moral precepts, rules or principles that are valid and ought to be upheld 
as categorically obligatory. Unlike customary positive moralities, normative 
precepts exist independently of personal belief and are rationally identifiable 
through reason. Certain standards of moral rightness, such as the PGC, are 
simply universally valid; no alternative or mutually valid principles of what is 
genuinely morally right can coexist with its dialectical necessity.32 To insist on 
cultural pluralism in light of normative morality entails one of two arguments. 
Firstly, one may argue that normative morality cannot exist; the only standards 
are a series of positive moralities – a line taken by both Kelsen and Hart. This is 
countered by Gewirth with the observation that such a view is simplistic and 
ignores pluralism within cultures,33 along with a reiteration of the dialectical 
nature of the universalisation which takes place within the PGC: 
The argument depends on the recognition that action is the universal and 
necessary context of all moralities and indeed of all practice. For all 
positive moralities and other practical precepts, amid their vast 
differences of specific contents, are concerned, directly or indirectly, 
with telling persons how they ought to act, especially toward one 
another. In addition, all persons are actual, prospective or potential 
agents, and no person can reject for herself the whole context of agency, 
except, perhaps, by committing suicide; and even then the steps she takes 
to achieve this purpose would themselves be actions. The general 
context of action thus transcends the differences of the various positive 
cultures and moralities.34 
Secondly, it may be countered that this appeal to the ‘rational’ is itself culturally 
grounded in Western morality. Any universalisation therefore is culturally 
grounded, rather than truly universal. To this, Gewirth would respond that any 
‘objective’ morality may only be identified through deduction and induction, and 
would be empirically ineluctable. Appeals to other forms of reasoning, such as 
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religious faith, are themselves only justifiable by reference to deduction and 
induction. These principles of induction and deduction may themselves be 
justified by myth or faith, but such justification must itself operate on a level of 
induction or deduction. Gewirth therefore feels able to conclude that ‘rational 
moral knowledge is epistemically relevant to cultural pluralism, but not 
conversely.’35 
 
Lastly, the PGC may be criticised as being grounded in Western values of 
Individualism. The terminology of ‘rights’ emerged in fourteenth century 
Europe, and the adoption of such terminology ignores the existence of societies 
and philosophies whose focus is more communitarian in nature. Gewirth may 
return with the observation that this presumes the non-existence of any 
normative morality, which again suggests a misunderstanding of the operation 
of the PGC on the behalf of those who argue it. 36 Secondly, the concepts of 
rights and agency clearly predate the fourteenth century even if the specific 
terminology does not. 37 Lastly, societies are made from the choices and acts of 
individuals acting together; the whole point of rights is to protect them from 
undue persecution from the community as a whole – to criticise rights as 
individualistic therefore misses the point. 38  
 
There are many more such critiques which may be raised regarding the extent to 
which it is ever possible to rationally identify a supreme moral principle, but 
limitations of space mean I am unable to discuss them here – they will, however, 
be introduced in some detail in the next chapter. The issues I included in this 
discussion have been chosen as they are directly pertinent to the direct workings 
of the PGC itself.  
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2.3 From Moral Principle to the Foundation of 
a Legal System 
 
The previous sub-section has attempted to demonstrate that the PGC operates 
as a universally applicable principle of instrumental reasoning, acting similarly to 
a categorical imperative to bind all agents to act in accordance with its 
requirements at pain of contradicting their own agency. We must now turn to 
address the implications of such a principle for the notion of legality. This will 
be addressed in three stages. Firstly, the necessary link between legality and the 
PGC will be demonstrated with reference to the agreed referent identified in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. Secondly, the connection between the PGC and 
legality will be identified within the scope of a Rule of Recognition. Lastly, the 
extent to which PGC compliant law can be seen to be compatible with legal 
pluralism, the Rule of Law and adjudicatory principles will be addressed in order 
to demonstrate the practical applicability of the theoretical connection.   
 
In order to firstly ascertain the relevance of the PGC to the concept of law, let 
us first return to a discussion at the beginning of Chapter Two and remind 
ourselves of the agreed referent for the concept of law which forms the basis of 
this enquiry. As has been addressed, such a referent must allow for a plurality of 
realistic conceptions whilst excluding any non-plausible interpretations of the 
term in order to be acceptable to all parties within jurisprudential dispute.39 The 
referent that this thesis believes meets this criterion is identified by Beyleveld 
and Brownsword, who hold that Law is ‘the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules’.40 This referent notes that law has a 
normative element in that it aims to guide human conduct yet remains silent as 
to the source of the normative claim made by legal rules, thus being acceptable 
as a starting point for an enquiry attempting to locate this source of normativity.  
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The starting point for such an enquiry should be to unpack a necessary feature 
of the referent; if the purpose of law is to subject human conduct to the 
governance of rules, then the rule in question must be capable of succeeding in 
the enterprise of guiding action in order to meet the criterion. Any rule 
attempting to guide human action must therefore give the agent to whom it is 
addressed adequate reason for compliance with its requirements in order to be 
successful and, by extension, meet the criteria contained within the referent. In 
thus requiring a reason for compliance, we can see clearly that law operates at 
the level of practical rationality and instrumental reason. This statement locates 
the success of a rule in becoming law at the level of practical rationality, thus 
necessitating that the referent operates on the same normative plane as the PGC. 
Since the PGC operates as a categorical imperative which all agents are required 
to follow, it is therefore an absolute and exclusionary reason not to behave in a 
non-compliant manner. Since a rule must be capable of providing a reason to be 
followed in order to possess the criterion necessary to be described as law, it 
follows that a rule which is not PGC compliant is incapable of meeting this 
success criterion and therefore cannot be described as law in a meaningful sense 
of the term. All law must therefore be PGC compliant if it is to succeed in 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.  This is necessary given 
that the PGC is presupposed by all practical reason; if law belongs to the 
deliberative stage of practical reasoning, as is necessitated by the referent above, 
it follows that the PGC is the supreme principle of all practical, moral and legal 
reason.41  
Reference to the PGC is therefore necessary to ascertain the legal status of a 
rule.42 It follows that the PGC must be incorporated within any test for the legal 
validity of a given norm, what Hart might refer to as the ‘Rule of Recognition’. 
This thesis endorses the Rule of Recognition proposed by Beyleveld and 
Brownsword: 
For us, a rule is legally valid only if there is an act moral right to posit the 
rule for attempted enforcement. There is only an act moral right where: 
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i) There is authority under the [Principle of Generic 
Consistency] to posit the rule for attempted 
enforcement; and 
ii) The norm prescribed by the rule involves no substantive 
violation of the PGC’s act morality.43 
This Rule of Recognition contains two distinct components, both of which are 
necessary for the legal validity of a given norm. The first criterion is aimed at 
legal officials, and the second at the agent to whom a rule which claims legal 
validity is addressed. The implications of each of these criteria for legal validity 
will be considered in turn.  
 
Firstly, in addressing the legitimacy of the role of legal officials in a legal system, 
our first criterion governs when an official is capable of possessing the authority 
to issue a binding legal norm. Beyleveld and Brownsword consider three 
categories of how this claimed authority can be exercised: where the act of the 
authorised agent is PGC compliant, where the act of the authorised agent is 
based on a sincere attempt to successfully apply the PGC, and where the act of 
the authorised agent is not based on a serious attempt to apply the PGC. These 
are referred to as theoretical authority, practical authority and an abuse of 
authority respectively.44 In order to possess legitimate authority to create a legal 
norm, the official in question must therefore possess either theoretical or 
practical authority45 – any action which does not ought to be considered ultra 
vires, and incapable of generating binding legal norms. 46 
 
In this sense, the PGC acts as a limitation on the ability of officials to create legal 
norms. This is a feature which exists in many legal systems, and ought not to be 
dismissed as undue moral limitation on the ability of a legislator to create positive 
norms. Many legal systems possess constitutional provisions or Bills of Rights 
which limit the authority possessed by officials to create law – the PGC is 
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therefore acting in a similar capacity in requiring this first criterion of legality,47  
in that it 
[S]ubjects legal officials to the regime of a particular role-morality – 
the morality of subjective agent moral rights. And, secondly, the 
specific force of practical authority hinges on the distinction between 
subjective and objective agent moral rights and the idea of rational 
defensibility in particular.48 
In doing this, the first criterion identified here allows a community to legitimately 
propose rules necessary for social cohesion with an omnilateral voice capable of 
possessing authority to guide action.49 Law is therefore able to legitimately guide 
society in a way which allows cohesion through the enforcement of morally 
permissible standards, and allows a legitimate means by which disputes as to 
these standards can be resolved.50 
 
Next we will consider our second criterion, which requires that the norm in 
question itself involves no substantive breach of the PGC. It thus limits the 
substantive content of legal rules to those which are compliant with the 
requirements of the PGC. Yet a critic my here object that to substantively limit 
the content of legal norms is to ignore the fact of legal pluralism; that the content 
of legal systems does vary between systems, thus precluding a settled substantive 
content for legal norms. Such an argument is misplaced for two reasons. Firstly, 
it presupposes a positivist notion of legal validity in that it appears to hold that 
a law becomes law by dint of its being passed by a relevant body. Such a starting 
point is at odds with the agreed referent this thesis endorses, which makes no 
reference to the source of the normative force possessed by a given rule. 
Secondly, the PGC compliant Rule of Recognition suggested above does not 
serve to set a required content for a legal system, but to provide a test by which 
some rules are necessarily excluded from the realm of legal normativity should 
their substantive requirements be non-compliant with the PGC. It is instead a 
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test for permissibility, and the scope of norms which may be permitted through 
compliance with the PGC remains broad. Beyleveld and Brownsword address 
this point when they identify three types of rule which can allow for rational and 
not unreasonable disagreement, whilst retaining the force of law: 
1. A choice of rule where the PGC allows multiple outcomes, but one 
must be chosen – such as a decision as to which side of the road to 
drive on; 
2. A rule where the PGC gives different weight to different generic 
conditions of action and, by extension, the generic rights they 
generate, but where the extent to which these rights are affected is 
uncertain and disputed; or 
3. A rule which requires a complex application of the PGC which may 
give rise to reasonable doubt about the veracity of the PGC-
compliance of the rule. 51 
Another reason as to why legal pluralism is not just possible but unavoidable 
within a legal system governed by a PGC compliant Rule of Recognition can be 
found in the fact that the application of the PGC is necessarily context specific; 
it is a general principle rather than a context bound rule, meaning that the 
permissibility of an action is dependent on the circumstances in which it takes 
place. The example is given of a Society A, in which food is scarce, and Society 
B, where food is plentiful. A rule which allows citizens to retain crop production 
which is surplus to their requirements would be permissible in Society B, but not 
in Society A – where a result of the rule would be the starvation of citizens who 
are unable to feed themselves.52 These examples serve to demonstrate that the 
PGC serves to answer the question of whether a rule is legally permissible; since 
permissibility is not the same as prohibition, it is a fallacy to suggest that the 
PGC does not accurately describe the nature of law due to its proscriptive nature. 
This can be seen through the fact that the PGC does allow for reasonable 
pluralism with regards to the substantive content of a legal system, provided that 
the rules in question do not breach the substantive content of the PGC.53  
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This connection may seem to be too neat for some to be acceptable as a 
meaningful connection between law and morality. In order to circumvent this 
objection, this section will continue to address the connection with reference to 
the concept of the Rule of Law. The Rule of Recognition identified above serves 
to protect the Rule of Law in both its procedural and substantive conceptions 
in the first and second criteria contained within it respectively. The former, 
according to Beyleveld and Brownsword, would allow for the procedural 
concerns addressed by Lon Fuller’s eight desiderate of law to be addressed:54  
[T]he PGC encourages the development of a supportive context for 
action. It is essential, therefore, that official action be congruent with the 
public framework of rules if citizens are to be able to plan on a rational 
basis. Reliance upon the rules must be protected, and expectations 
engendered by the rules must not be frustrated by perverse official 
administration.55 
The second criterion addresses substantive Rule of Law concerns in providing 
that the Generic Conditions of Agency of all agents within a political community 
are protected by the substantive limitations on the content of a rule proscribed 
by the PGC. Thus, congruity is reached between the governors and the governed 
with regards to subjects’ expectations as to the nature of officials’ conduct.56  
 
These PGC compliant elements of the Rule of Law would, of course, need to 
be upheld by a functioning system of adjudication. Such a system is necessary in 
a society where complex applications of the PGC may not always give a concrete 
answer,57 or where rapidly developing technology requires regular regulatory 
updates to ensure the PGC compatibility of the relevant legislation.58 It is first 
worth noting that, as is required of all officials by the first criterion of legality 
above, a judge must act in compliance with the PGC in order to give his 
judgments the legal authority they necessarily claim. Judges are therefore under 
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an obligation to make serious attempts to apply the law correctly in order for 
their judgments to possess normative force.59  They must make a sincere and 
serious attempt to locate the facts and apply the PGC correctly, expend a 
reasonable amount of time doing so, 60 and observe other relevant procedural 
conditions for judging such as publishing a clear and intelligible decision based 
on ‘a sincere and serious attempt at reasonable justification’. 61 This adjudicatory 
framework would be ensured through the adoption of such widely accepted legal 
maxims as audi alteram partem and nem iudex in causa sua.62 A key feature of this 
mode of judicial adjudication should at this stage be stated explicitly. The 
necessity of incorporating the PGC into any definition of legality demonstrated 
above requires us to abandon the orthodox position that judges should be 
precluded from moral interpretation of the law. The opposite is instead 
obligatory; in order for judgments to possess normative force within the realm 
of deliberative rationality, judges must assess the extent to which the rule 
claiming legal status is itself PGC compliant. Moral judgment is therefore an 
essential part of any legal deliberation should it be the case that morality 
necessarily defines the scope of the ‘legal’. 63 
 
The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that the agreed referent 
introduced as the subject of our enquiry in Chapter Two of this thesis 
necessitates that the law operates on the level of practical reason. As the PGC 
also operates at this level, its operation as a categorical imperative requires legal 
rules to be compliant with its requirements in order to possess the authority they 
require to guide our action. The PGC therefore necessarily forms part of a Rule 
of Recognition which exists to test the legal status of a proposed rule. Legal 
obligations are therefore moral obligations, and legal rights are moral rights.64 A 
necessary link between law and morality has therefore been demonstrated. The 
remainder of this section will address some possible criticisms of the connection 
which has been established. 
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An initial objection which should be addressed here is the observation that, 
should the PGC be necessary to a Rule of Recognition, a system may arise which 
appears close to utilitarianism in its nature. If all mankind are PPAs, a single PPA 
must consider all mankind in ascertaining the moral perceptibility of an action – 
and if all mankind is to be considered, what is the difference between the PGC 
and Utilitarianism?65 Gewirth would identify the following differences: 
a) The PGC prescribes an objective and identifiable end through a 
dialectically necessary method; there is no room for subjective 
value judgements on utility. 
b) The PGC is more limited; an objective limit exists to the duties 
which correlate with positive rights. 
c) The PGC imposes duties to help those who cannot help 
themselves, rather than legitimising action merely to maximise 
benefit to the community. 
d) Conflicts of rights legitimised by the PGC are not solved by 
appeal to utility maximisation, but by a cost-benefit analysis on 
which right best promotes the equal agency of all PPAs; those 
which are more essential to agency take priority. 
e) The purpose of the PGC is to ensure necessary conditions of 
agency are available to all PPAs rather than the majority; it is 
distributive, not aggregative.66 
We can therefore see then that, unlike utilitarian theories of morality or material 
deontologies, the PGC is self-justifying due to inconsistencies created by an 
infringement of distributive mutuality in violating the generic rights of others 
whilst relying on one’s own to do so. The PGC therefore does not ask an agent 
to apply generic rights to recipients, but render them in proportion with his 
own.67 As such, we can see that the equality of generic rights requires ‘at least 
mutual abstention from coercion and harm.’,68 a principle which, as our 
discussion of Kelsen in Chapter Four establishes, we find in many legal systems.  
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Should the PGC be adopted within a viable Rule of Recognition, its effects may 
be more easily identifiable in some spheres of law than in others. For example, 
criminal law can be seen as clearly necessary to uphold the rights of all members 
of society. It also provides punishments through retributive justice whose 
primary purpose is to redress inequalities which emerge from criminal activity 
(equality being non-interference in others’ basic rights).69 Similarly, legal defences 
against criminal charges may also be legitimised by reference to the PGC – for 
example violence may be used in self-defence if no other means of protecting 
rights exits, as this is not an infliction of harm but an attempt to restore the 
equilibrium of non-harm.70 The PGC can also be used to justify civil unrest and 
disobedience should a law be rationally proven to be morally wrong by reference 
back to itself.71 
 
But as the PGC can provide both positive and negative rights, it may also 
produce positive and negative legal obligations in its role within a Rule of 
Recognition. The purposiveness in the statement ‘I do X for purpose E’ requires 
three types of good, thus requiring law to impose both positive and negative 
duties on those to whom the PGC would be directed in its role as a Basic Norm: 
a. Basic Goods, which provide basic wellbeing required for action. 
These include life, physical integrity (including requisite food, 
shelter and the like), mental equilibrium and personal confidence 
that one’s ends may be achieved. 
b. Nonsubstantive Goods, which require that an agent’s purpose 
fulfilment is not lowered by ensuring agents retain and do not 
lose what they already possess and see as a good.  
c. Additive Goods, whose aim is the amelioration of purpose 
fulfilment by allowing action whose aim is to increase the goods 
attained.72 
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Since PPAs logically must hold that PPAOs have a duty not to interfere in their 
freedom and wellbeing, a substantive principle of practical rationality (∝) 
emerges which must form the underpinning of any law permitted with reference 
to the PGC:  
My subjective viewpoint on practical reasonableness (SPR) for my 
purposes (or, more strictly, my SPR for PPAO’s purposes, in consistency 
with my SPR for my purposes) must impose at least a prima-facie other-
referring duty (a duty on PPAO) to at least refrain from interference with 
my freedom and wellbeing. 73 
Such a formulation, according to Beyleveld, can be universalised through a series 
of logical stages α2 – α4
74
 to lead to the final substantive principle of practical 
rationality, α5: ‘The SPR for its purposes of every PPA must specify that all PPAs 
have prima facie rights to their freedom and wellbeing.’75 
Such a principle underpinning the PGC’s operation as an indicator of the 
normative foundation of law can be used to justify both positive rights and, to 
continue this analogy, legal entitlements. This is not the same as to claim that 
everybody possesses absolute needs need or possess absolute obligations to fulfil 
the correlative duty; it merely holds that all should be treated appropriately when 
in true need, and a duty to act when they are in a position to do so at no 
substantial loss to themselves. The PGC may also serve to shift this burden 
predominantly upon the state itself, which would be in a better position to 
undertake such legal obligations than a collection of individuals.76 Should a 
proposed legal rule therefore fail to pass the test of moral permissibility provided 
by the PGC, it should be rejected as lacking the authority necessary to direct the 
actions of those to whom it is addressed. Since the ability to direct the actions 
of its subjects is axiomatic to the concept of law, a non-PGC compliant rule is 
therefore incapable of meeting the necessary function of a legal rule, and cannot 
be called law in any meaningful sense of the word. It is only with PGC 
compliance that a legal norm can justifiably coerce individuals into compliance.77 
                                                          
73 Beyleveld (n 12) 51-52 
74 ibid 51-54 
75 ibid 55 
76 Gewirth, (n 29) Ch. 2 
77 Alan Gewirth, ‘The Basis and Content of Human Rights’ in J. Roland Pennock and John W 
Chapman (eds), Human Rights – Nomos XXIII (New York University Press 1981) 139 
94 
 
3 Identifiability in Kantian Personhood 
 
In abstracting personhood to a conception of bare agency, Gewirth attempts to 
engage in a project of universalisation to provide a moral concept which will be 
acceptable to all. He acknowledges that this is necessary for any conception of 
rights which can function as universal norms: 
For human rights to exist there must be valid moral criteria or principles 
that justify all humans, qua humans, have the rights and hence also the 
correlative duties.78 
He believes that such a principle can only be located in the idea of action given 
that moral claims necessarily ‘consist directly or indirectly in precepts about how 
persons ought to act toward one another’, yet must be mind-independent in 
order to be true rights.79 These two features are present in the dialectically 
necessary argument which he presents, which must logically be accepted by all 
agents on pain of contradiction. The Generic Conditions of Agency he identifies 
are described thus: 
[F]reedom consists in controlling one’s own behaviour by one’s 
unforced choice while having knowledge of relevant circumstances, and 
well-being consists in having the other general abilities and conditions 
required for agency. 80 
This leads us to Gewirth’s formulation of his principle, ‘Act in accord with the generic 
rights of your recipients as well as yourself.’81 This acceptance of this statement is 
Dialectically Necessary for all agents as: 
Simply by virtue of being actual or prospective agents who have certain 
needs of agency, persons have moral rights to freedom and well-being. 
Since all humans are such agents having such needs, the generic moral 
rights to freedom and well-being are human rights.82 
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Thus phrased, Gewirth’s principle should be viewed as acting as a categorical 
imperative on action. It is a synthetic a priori principle, a characteristic which 
renders it similar in both scope and foundation to the conception of the 
Categorical Imperative provided by Kant in his ethical writings. Beyleveld 
suggests that it is not a true Categorical Imperative in the sense that it only 
applies to agents who value their own agency, yet the dialectically necessary 
argument requires that all agents are required to accept it.83 The logical 
implications of these descriptions are, however, almost congruent for the 
purposes of the law. In order to further establish how the PGC is able to 
function as a Categorical Imperative and be a necessary feature of legal validity, 
we should examine the Kantian conception of the person upon which such an 
imperative ultimately exists. This section will therefore begin by detailing how, 
for Kant, a Categorical Imperative attains its own normative force. It will then 
address the implications of such normative force on legal systems, before 
concluding with a rebuttal of some preliminary objections. Throughout the 
section, references will be made to the implications of the PGC on the discussion 
at hand as the issues arise.   
 
 
3.1  The Centrality of Practical Reason 
 
Kant, like Gewirth, believed that the authority of morality must depend on 
features that are inherent within rational agents.84 Most famously, his Categorical 
Imperative from the Formula of Universal Law provides a test against which the 
permissibility of actions is to be assessed: 
Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it become a universal law.85 
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Both men therefore commit themselves to the claim that practical reasoning is 
itself capable of providing the foundation of moral norms. For Kant, the 
connection he identifies is – to some extent – axiomatic. He states that ‘One 
must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law: this is as 
such the canon of judging it morally.’86 Yet such a statement is far from 
controversial. Hegel criticised moral formulae in the abstract as nothing but 
empty formalism, as such principles removed any recognition of the features 
which are essential to full personhood. 87 Mill similarly felt that any deduction 
reached from an abstract maxim ‘fails, almost grotesquely’ if the only 
consequence of non-compliance were the fact of contradiction of the will.88 Kant 
would rebut such considerations, claiming that the Categorical Imperative does 
the heavy work for him in providing substantive moral verdicts from formal 
deliberative procedure.89 Kant is therefore committed to claiming that 
deliberative procedures and practical rationality are capable of producing moral 
norms which possess three features: 
1) Inescapability, in that their application does not depend on their 
being convergent with the agent’s own interests; 
2) Authority, in that their being requirements of reason renders non-
compliance prima facie irrational; and 
3) Supremacy, in that they operate to exclude all non-compliant 
conduct on the ground of irrational contradiction. 90 
We can see that Gewirth, in casting the PGC in practical rationality, must also 
commit himself to the same claims. So how can practical rationality be capable 
of creating such norms which can counter the criticisms put forward by, 
amongst others, Mill and Hegel? This is the question to which we will now turn. 
 
Korsgaard identifies three principles as being essential to any understanding of 
practical reason. The first of these is Kant’s instrumental reason, which holds 
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that an agent has a reason to perform an action which will allow him to attain 
his ends. Such reasoning is usually given the label of a hypothetical imperative, 
in that it follows that if I want E, I have a reason to X. Secondly is the Principle 
of Prudence, which is connected to self interest in that I have a reason to do 
what is in my best interest. Such reasoning can also be construed as a 
hypothetical imperative, in that if E is in my best interests then I have a reason 
to X. Lastly are moral principles, which operate as categorical imperatives which 
declare that whatever my E, I must X. 91  The PGC operates on a similar logic to 
the latter in that, whatever my E, I must comply with its requirements though 
my very ability to do X. Moral principles are therefore located at the deliberative 
stage in that they place restrictions on other reasons which I might possess; 
practical reason is therefore an appropriate place to look for normativity.  
 
A rationalist such as Gewirth would here conclude that the normativity of any 
instrumental principle comes from its logical necessity, in that it is a necessary 
or logical truth that an agent should agree to its precepts.92 The PGC, being 
logically necessary, can also produce normative claims. Korsgaard suggests that 
this statement itself contains a concrete conception of practical rationality: ‘[T]o 
be rational is to deliberately conform one’s will to certain rational truths, or 
truths about reasons, which exist independently of the will.’ Yet this claim, for 
Korsgaard, is circular and does not provide us with any real justification as to 
why we should follow the guide of our will.93 Yet this criticism is aimed at the 
idea of instrumental rationality generally; the PGC can survive the attack in that 
compliance with its requirements is dialectically necessary for all agents, thus 
providing the justification Korsgaard requires for adherence to the rationalist 
principles. The dialectical necessity of the PGC thus provides the normative 
foundation Korsgaard believes is required for an instrumentally rational reason 
to exert authority over our decisions.94 This is a justification Korsgaard ought to 
accept. The PGC operates as a synthetic a priori principle which provides an 
instrumental reason for compliance, in that to act contrary is to deny ones agency 
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and thus commit oneself to a paradox. If an imperative requires a synthetic 
proposition to provide means upon which it can operate,95 the PGC has met this 
requirement. It might be objected that this account can only hold if the reasoning 
has a decisive influence on action,96 yet the dialectical necessity of the PGC also 
allows it to rebut this sceptical claim. 
 
Korsgaard may once more object that this justification of moral reasoning does 
not support a coherent account of rationality. Rationalism is presented as 
holding that facts exist external to an agent about what there is a reason to do, 
and that to be rational is to ensure our conduct is in conformity with these 
reasons. Yet rationalism, for Korsgaard, is incapable of giving us a reason to 
comply with these reasons.97 The claim that to do what is right according to these 
external facts itself needs supporting, thus – Korsgaard believes – creating an 
infinite regress which fails to address why external claims should be internalised 
by an agent.98 Such a characterisation of the PGC can again be dismissed, as the 
dialectical necessity of the argument requires all agents to internalise the principle 
on pain of contradiction of their own agential status. Since to even attempt to 
reject our agential status requires us to use our same status as agents, the PGC 
not only provides a reason why it should be internalised, but exceeds 
Korsgaard’s criticism and provides an inescapable obligation to do so.  
 
The above categorisation of the PGC an inescapable instrumental reason is  
 with Korsgaard’s claim that the reflective nature of human consciousness is the 
source of, and thus is necessarily central to the solution to, normative 
problems:99  
 
If the problem is that morality might not survive reflection, then the 
solution is that it might. If we find upon reflecting on the true moral 
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theory that we still are inclined to endorse the claims that morality 
makes on us, then morality will be normative.’ 100  
The necessity of the internalisation of the PGC therefore allows the moral 
principles which stem from it to be normative in the same way as Korsgaard 
believes her interpretation of Kantian ethics also possesses normativity. For she 
holds that normative questions must be answered in a way which addresses the 
agent who asks the question,101 which the PGC obliges agents to do every time 
they act. Thus, the PGC complies with Korsgaard’s assertion that ‘[T]he 
reflective endorsement test is not merely a way of justifying morality. It is morality 
itself.’  and can therefore be viewed as imposing legitimate moral constraints on 
action.102 
 
3.2  Kant and Law 
 
Having explored the ability of the PGC to generate norms in line with Kantian 
conceptions of practical rationality, we may now proceed to ask what 
implications this might have on our understanding of law. A useful place to begin 
the discussion would therefore be to discuss Kant’s own ideas of legal 
obligations. In distinguishing between natural and juridical law103 Kant has been 
characterised as some authors as belonging in the positivist tradition; 104  this is 
a conclusion which will be rejected as misunderstanding the implications of a 
rationally justifiable Categorical Imperative on all forms of action.  
 
Our discussion will nonetheless begin with the claim, grounded as it is in a literal 
reading of the Metaphysics of Morals, that Kant firmly distinguishes between 
natural and juridical law. This thesis rejects the categorisation as misplaced; Kant 
actually states something more subtle, that juridical law itself contains both 
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positive and natural in origin.105 Kant holds that knowledge of natural law is 
necessary for judicial science and, when combined with empirical knowledge of 
the requirements of positive law, subsequent inquiries can be appropriately 
classed as jurisprudence.106 Far from being a proto-positivist, Kant instead claims 
that a true knowledge of positive law is itself impossible without a firm 
grounding in the requirements of morality.    
 
Kant holds that this necessary connection derives from the fact that action itself 
contains a law, in that unconditional practical principles are necessary regardless 
of the individual ends possessed by an agent.107 Actions falling under this 
principle are therefore good intrinsically in that all agents must see them as so; 
for our purposes, it is worth noting that Kant appears to be describing here what 
Gewirth would call the ‘Generic Conditions of Agency’, namely freedom and 
wellbeing. Moral laws designed to protect these goods are also characterisable as 
unconditional practical principles in this sense, as action itself is intrinsically 
necessary for all ends and so should itself be seen as a good.108 If moral laws 
definitionally take the form of a categorical imperative, 109 then we must conclude 
that judicial laws are necessarily normatively inferior to the moral law. 110 We 
have here sketched out an argument which is remarkably similar in form to the 
PGC; we should therefore see that Kantian conceptions of law as incorporating 
the Universal Principle of Right mirror those of the dialectical necessity of PGC 
compliant law: 
 Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice 
of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law.111 
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This, for Kant, leads into the following claim: 
[I]t cannot be required that this principle of all maxims be itself in turn 
my maxim, that is, it cannot be required that I make it the maxim of my 
action; for anyone can be free so long as I do not impair his freedom by 
my external action, even though I am quite indifferent to his freedom or 
would like in my heart to infringe upon it. That I make it my maxim to 
act rightly is a demand that ethics makes on me.112 
Kant thus claims that juridical laws cannot possess any obligation independently 
in that they concern purely external relations between the choices of separate 
agents. It is only when they are internalised through rational deliberation, as 
discussed in the previous section, that they are capable of possessing normative 
force. Since the process of internalisation requires the juridical rule in question 
to be in conformity with the PGC in order to be accepted by the agent as 
possessing normative character, the rule cannot possess normative force unless 
it is PGC compliant.  
 
It is this concept of right, in conformity with the moral law, that Kant grounds 
legal normativity.113 Once seen alongside the dialectically necessary requirements 
of the PGC, the law must necessarily possess moral permissibility in order to 
possess normative character. The necessary link between law and morality has 
therefore been demonstrated. Purely positivist law without reference to moral 
normativity would be empty, leading us to the conclusion that formal 
considerations such as a demonstrable categorical imperative necessarily 
generate substantive normative conclusions. 114 This conclusion itself again relies 
on the centrality of practical reason previously discussed; the ‘function of 
[which] is to order concepts so as to give them the greatest possible unity 
combined with the widest possible application.’115  For without reason, concepts 
would be unable to be applied to the world; they would exist ‘[I]solated and 
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separated from one another (by an empty intervening space)’116 Since law itself 
is not a physical object but is itself a concept, it is not unreasonable to claim that  
‘The idea of reason runs through the whole length of law as a single fiber that 
connects each part with every other part, not as an overlapping of fiber twisted 
on fiber.’117 The concept of reason here is necessarily a practical one, as the 
purpose of the law is its application; and Kant’s conception here appears to be 
once more grounded in the idea of agency. The PGC is therefore again 
applicable within the scope of practical reasoning Kant identifies: 
 
A faculty of choice, that is, merely animal (arbitrium brutum) which 
cannot be determined other than through sensible impulses, i.e.: 
pathologically. However, one which can be determined 
independently of sensory impulses, thus through motives that can 
only be represented by reason, is called free choice (arbitruim 
liberum), and everything that is connected with this, whether as 
ground or consequence, is called practical.118 
 
Agency, and the necessary grounds and limitations upon which it operates, is 
therefore centrally important to the causality of concepts.119 Any obligations 
which arise from the necessary grounds of agency, such as those imposed by the 
PGC, must therefore be intrinsically obligatory by the very nature of practical 
reason; furthermore, such normative obligations are necessarily internal to the 
activity in order to provide a binding obligation.120 It is therefore essential to see 
law as operating within a unified conception of normativity centred on practical 
reasoning, and thus necessary to see claims to bindingness as being true only to 
the extent that such claims are PGC compliant.  
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3.3 Preliminary Objections 
 
Chapter four of this thesis is tasked with an in-depth rebuttal of some criticisms 
that might be made of this conclusion, criticisms which might be directed at 
either the validity of the PGC itself or its necessary application to law. Yet it 
would be worthwhile to also address some preliminary concerns here, as they 
have been alluded to throughout this section. The first of these will be the 
ascription of the label ‘moral’ to the restrictions imposed by the PGC on both 
our actions and, subsequently, the substantive content of law. Sidgwick famously 
described reliance on a categorical imperative as being nothing but empty 
formalism, and held that any reliance on its principles were more logical than 
moral: 
[I]f a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) 
for someone else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the 
two cases, other than the fact that I and he are different persons.121 
 
This claim can be rebutted with reference to the scope of Kant’s, and by 
extension Gewirth’s claims. For these categorically imperative claims are not just 
based on the characterisation of their content as logical, but as necessary: 
Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, i.e. as the ground 
of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that the command: 
thou shalt not lie, does not just hold for human beings only. As if other 
rational beings did not have to heed it; and so with all remaining actual 
moral laws; hence that the ground of the obligation here must not be 
sought in the nature of the human being, or in the circumstances of the 
world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason, 
and that any other prescription that is founded on principles of mere 
experience…can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral 
law.’122 
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It is therefore incorrect to ascribe this as simply a logical constraint on action, as 
this ignores the fact that the necessity of the obligation thus created imbues it 
with normative force. In reducing this normative force to one of logic, Sidgwick 
mischaracterises the rational internalisation of the obligations which is necessary 
for normativity to arise. We can therefore reject the reduction.  
 
A second objection would be at the centrality of formalism to Kant’s project. As 
has been alluded to previously, Hegel and Mill are highly sceptical of the extent 
to which an abstracted conception of agency thus described is capable of 
generating normative claims.  Again, this scepticism can be dismissed. We could 
firstly claim that such claims would apply only to die-hard individualists who 
would reject the ability of any and all authority to impose limits on their 
actions.123 As we have shown that such a rejection of the PGC would involve 
agential contradiction, it would therefore be an irrational standpoint to take and 
cannot rebut the dialectical necessity of the argument thus presented. Yet even 
were we to grant the objection of abstraction, it can be seen to miss the point. 
For, as Weinrib claims: ‘Reason neither detaches the will from acting nor 
precludes the act's having a particular content; its role is rather to imbue that act 
with the significance of freedom.’ Since action is the focus of obligations, and 
action is itself an abstract concept which does not need a specific location in a 
specific conception of the self, it is not objectionable to reach the conclusion 
that the concept of agency is capable of generating abstract norms.124  
A final and connected objection might be raised  by Korsgaard, based on the 
ascription of universal scope to the moral principles thus identified. 
Universalisability can only demonstrate that what is rational for me is to be self-
interested, and that subsequently I must agree that you must also view the pursuit 
of self-interest as rational. Such a connection is incapable of generating the 
normativity that has been claimed here.125 Such a claim, however, appears to be 
grounded on the assumption that the claims being made regarding the respect 
of other agents are not necessary, but somehow optional. This is not the case. 
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The PGC demonstrates that it is necessary for all agents to respect the Generic 
Conditions of Agency possessed by other agents, at risk of contradiction. Such 
a claim is coherent with the instrumental rationality principle defended in section 
3.1 of this chapter, which Korsgaard concedes is capable of generating norms in 
the way she seeks to deny in this objection. We should therefore dismiss the 
objection as being grounded in a misunderstanding of the argument of the PGC; 
Korsgaard is happy to ground the moral permissibility of acts through a test of 
universalisation on the same source as the general requirement of following 
instrumental hypothetical imperatives.126 Since this is the foundation of the 
PGC, she should accept it as a source of norms. The Kantian notion of agency 
upon which the PGC is built holds that agents are able to ‘transform contingent 
values into necessary ones by valuing the humanity that is their source.’127 Since 
the PGC provides a dialectically necessary reason to do just this, our conclusions 
as to its universal applicability as a moral standard – and our subsequent 
conclusions as to the impact of this acceptance on juridical rules – are sound.  
 
4 Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has sought to establish the ability of the Principle Generic 
Consistency to meet the two necessary requirements for any Natural Law theory; 
that moral truths exist, and that they are rationally identifiable. It has been shown 
that an inescapable Kantian conception of the person is the foundation on which 
the instrumental reasons to act which are the starting point of the PGC are 
universalisable to the point where they impose normative obligations to comply 
with its requirement to respect the Generic Conditions of Agency necessarily 
claimed by all agents as rights. The next chapter will seek to defend this principle 
against common attacks made against its validity; a necessary step if its validity 
and the claimed necessary connection to law is to be upheld.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Defending the Necessary Connection.  
 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency has been shown to be categorically 
binding on all agents, in that it operates via a dialectically necessary argument to 
provide an instrumental reason that all agents are required to accept at the risk 
of contradicting their own agency. It has been demonstrated to be founded on 
an equally irrefutable foundation of practical reasoning in the Kantian tradition. 
As law and morality are both part of the same unified concept of practical 
reasoning, the PGC must necessarily override contradictory legal reasons for 
action due to its functioning as a categorical imperative to action. It must 
therefore be the case that where contradictory legal and moral obligations exist, 
it is a logical necessity that (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ). An essential normative link 
between law and morality has therefore been established.  
 
This is a bold claim, and not one that is universally accepted. This chapter will 
therefore be dedicated to rebutting common objections to this conclusion, 
expanding on the numerous attempts to defend the PGC which have already 
been made,1 and will be comprised of two parts. It will firstly address some 
philosophical concerns regarding the validity of the PGC itself. Thinkers that 
will be engaged with directly can broadly be categorised as being from the 
sceptical tradition; Williams, Leiter, Foot and Nietzsche will be introduced, and 
their rebuttals will be assessed for their success in defeating the PGC. The 
writing of David Enoch will also be considered; Enoch simply argues that the 
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penalty of contradiction is not one that ought to trouble an agent who decides 
that they should not be bound by the PGC. This is a troubling line of argument 
for Ethical Rationalism, but it is hoped that the analysis to follow will 
demonstrate that Enoch’s attack does not hit its target. 
 
The chapter will then move on to rebut some classical positivist arguments 
against the claim that Gewirth’s moral theory is directly relevant to identifying a 
rational normative grounding for any successful legal system. Firstly, Hans 
Kelsen’s ‘Pure Theory of Law’2 will be considered, a theory first developed in 1934 
but significantly expanded upon in the 1960 second edition. Of particular 
interest to the argument is Kelsen’s concept of the ‘Basic Norm,’ which will be 
critiqued in detail. Secondly, H.L.A. Hart’s 1961 work ‘The Concept of Law’3 will 
be introduced, with his central notion of the ‘Rule of Recognition’ being 
compared to Kelsen’s ‘Basic Norm’. It is hoped that it will be demonstrated that 
both theories fail on two accounts. Firstly, they do not provide an adequate 
explanation of the source of their own normative claims; secondly, they are 
unable to satisfactorily rebut the connection between law and morality required 
by the dialectically necessary argument for the PGC. 4 Such an argument was 
introduced in the previous chapter, and will be shown to be equally resistant to 
the philosophical challenges to its validity to be presented here.  
 
2 Philosophical Criticisms of the PGC 
 
Moral claims grounded in conventional morality are, by their nature, 
controversial. Yet this thesis is concerned with critical morality; those moral 
principles which can be demonstrated to be philosophically sound regardless of 
their acceptance by a population. The two may overlap, but it is only the latter 
which is capable of generating the normativity required for moral and, it is 
contended, legal authority. Yet within critical morality too, claims to have 
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identified a moral principle which is universal in its scope are many. We must 
therefore justify why we seek to identify the PGC as our preferred point of moral 
reference rather than any number of competing theories. A good place to begin 
would be with the claim that the PGC operates on an argument which is 
dialectically necessary for all agents based on the fact of bare agency. Given the 
character of the argument and the incontrovertible fact of noumenal agency, it 
is contended that the principle should be seen to be valid unless it can be proved 
to be false. The first section of this chapter will therefore be an exploration of 
various theories which could be used to attack the validity of the claim to 
dialectical necessity made by the PGC. It is hoped that analysis will show that 
none are capable of rebutting the claim, and that the PGC should therefore be 
accepted as the supreme moral principle and a valid source of normative claims.  
 
2.1  Bernard Williams 
 
The first thinker upon whom our spotlight will turn will be Bernard Williams. 
Williams is well known for reviving Aristotelian conceptions of the good life in 
modern analytic philosophy, and his belief that the only ethical belief that might 
survive the challenge of reflective endorsement put forward in our previous 
chapter would be the relatively empty claim that ‘that a certain kind of life was 
the best for human beings.’5 Such a claim is empty by his own concession, in 
that it is devoid of any substantive direction as to what content of the life in 
question would, in fact, make it the best for human beings. He would therefore 
undoubtedly be sceptical of the claim to universality present within the PGC. 
This is not to say that Williams is dismissive of claims of moral truth; to the 
contrary, he believes that the very fact of moral disagreement presupposes that 
a correct answer to moral problems does exist. Were there no correct answer, 
he suggests a moral disagreement would be exactly the same as two men on a 
boat – one of whom is seasick and one who isn’t – disagreeing as to the merits 
of ocean travel. The fact that moral statements necessarily contain a truth claim 
and do not merely reflect the speaker’s own attitude sets them apart from 
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subjective perceptions such as this. 6 Williams’ position should therefore be seen 
as one which recognises that morality exists, but that it would be practically 
impossible to discern its requirements to a degree where they were seen as 
uncontroversial. It is for this reason that he would be inclined to subject the 
PGC to scrutiny. 
 
Williams’ first objection might be to criticise the Kantian foundations of the 
PGC. He might argue that the level of abstraction taking place in the application 
of a categorical imperative robs the agent to whom it should apply of their 
subjective features which are necessary for a meaningful standard of moral 
deliberation. A formal, impartial principle is too impersonal, and is therefore 
unrealistic given the personal interaction necessary for moral deliberation to raise 
its head:7 
Of course, in general a man does not have one separable project which 
plays this ground role: rather, there is a nexus of projects, related to his 
condition of life, and it would be the loss of all or most of them that 
would remove meaning.8 
In removing these multiple projects from deliberation and replacing them with 
the abstract idea of ‘action’, we are preventing recognisable moral deliberation 
from taking place. The project must be grounded so as to give meaning to life, 
and must therefore necessarily reflect the lived experience;9 abstracting morality 
to Kantian notions of practical rationality precludes this, and therefore 
undermines the project. To give an example, Williams suggests that it is an 
incontrovertible fact that individuals gain attachments to other agents over the 
course of their lives, and that it is therefore absurd to suggest that moral 
deliberation would take place on an impartial footing given the unavoidability of 
interpersonal relations. It seems natural that one would be inclined to behave 
more sympathetically to a close friend or family member than to somebody seen 
in a neutral or negative light. To deny this, Williams argues, denies any value in 
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human existence and should therefore be rejected.10 Williams’ argument is one 
which doubtless will resonate amongst those who come across it, but it does not 
engage on a substantive level with the normative argument present within the 
PGC. It should be seen as predominantly descriptive of what was earlier 
characterised as collective morality; how agents interact with one another based 
on their subjective preferences, and therefore a standard which cannot be 
assessed for its normative validity. Williams might contend that this is exactly 
the point – that morality is not something which lends itself well to critical 
analysis such as that which forms the basis of the Kantian project.  
 
Yet it is difficult to see how this rejection can be reconciled with Williams’ own 
observation that moral disagreement is suggestive of moral truth;11 if moral truth 
is something which exists, then a tool must exist for its identification. Such a 
tool must necessarily be impartial in order to be universally acceptable to all, 
necessitating the level of agential abstraction employed by Kant and, by 
extension, the bare agency which forms the foundation from which the PGC is 
discerned. Reasons provided by such an identifier need to be internalised by the 
agent in order to provide a reason for them to act,12 requiring its application 
against a particular motivation to act.13 Since the PGC is grounded in the fact of 
bare agency, definitionally internalised for all agents, then its dialectically 
necessary conclusions must also be internalised through the undertaking of any 
and all action. The internalisation required in order for a principle to exert 
reason-giving force on an individual that Williams requires is therefore achieved 
through deliberative reasoning on how to act, therefore meeting his own 
requirements for the internalisation of any reason.14 Williams’ concerns about 
the falsehood of the reason to follow the PGC can also be rebutted; he believes 
an internal statement is falsified by ‘the absence of an appropriate element from 
[the agent’s motivation]’, 15 but as the dialectically necessary reason to comply 
with the PGC is contained in the bare fact of action, it is impossible to such an 
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ascription of falseness to apply without action failing to take place. This, too, is 
compliant with Williams’ own conception of action – reasons for which must be 
internal or no action would take place.16 In thus locating action on the internal 
plane, Williams is bound to accept the rules of deliberative rationality that this 
internalisation requires. He is thus bound to acknowledge the operation of the 
PGC, or else he misunderstands the nature of action itself.   
 
Williams might assert that this is a neat sidestep of the argument he originally 
raised; that any principles which derive from the abstract level are too imprecise 
to be applied to moral dilemmas in the real world, and therefore of no real use 
to the resolution of moral conflict. In locating morality at the level of practical 
reason, Gewirth’s formula is limited to the production of ‘general and formal 
principles to regulate the shape of relations between rational agents’17, and such 
unmediated categorical imperatives impose demands which are unrealistic in 
their rigidity.18 Such a claim has already been dismissed as being too closely 
associated with conventional as opposed to critical morality, but we should treat 
Williams’ criticism even more sceptically; such a claim would actually contradict 
his own characterisation of action and the location of value within it. This 
contradiction begins in Williams’ concession that all agents necessarily possess a 
general desire not to have their freedom frustrated in that they place desire on 
the outcome of their actions; without this desire, they would possess no reason 
to act. As Williams puts it, , ‘[O]mne appetitum appetitur sub specie boni’; everything 
pursued is pursued as something by dint of the agent’s perception of it as 
desirable.19 Desire is therefore the locus of all action, necessitating a legitimate 
claim to non-interference.20 This is the statement made by the dialectically 
necessary step between the first two stages of the PGC outlined by Beyleveld in 
section 2.1 of the third chapter of this thesis, putting Williams’ understanding of 
action on a level with that of Gewirth. Since Williams makes a general claim that 
applies to all agents, he must necessarily believe in the universalisation of the 
rights claim and must therefore have a reason to perceive this universalisation as 
                                                          
16 ibid 107-111 
17 Williams (n 5) 54 
18 ibid 55 
19 ibid 58 
20 ibid 56 
112 
 
both necessary and true.21 Williams suggests that the problem which must be 
addressed therefore is the agent’s claim to a right to non-interference in his ends; 
if this prescription is reasonable, it must be reasonable for all agents thus 
necessitating a universal principle of non-interference in others’ freedom to act.22 
Williams’ problem is that Agent A’s self-interest gives him no reason to respect 
Agent B’s self-interest, and without this there is no claim to prescription of 
interference.23 Such maxims can therefore be seen as empty in that their 
formalism means they lack the ability to provide a reason to respect others’ 
claims to non-interference.  
 
Yet Williams does not give an adequate reason for rejecting the PGC. He would 
accept that all three steps are valid, including the principle of universalisation. 
He simply disagrees that the fact all agents necessarily claim a right to freedom 
gives a reason for agents to respect one another’s rights. Such a claim is puzzling, 
as the logical implication of this is that Williams sees that other agents would 
also not possess a reason to not interfere with his own rights – thus necessitating 
the conclusion that he would not mind if his will were constantly frustrated. He 
holds that this is not his position, arguing that his lack of proscription should 
not be seen as permission to interfere, but merely as silence on the matter. 24 This 
argument is, however, far from satisfactory, and can be rejected on two 
interlinked grounds. Firstly, in claiming that lack of proscription is not analogous 
to permission, it shifts the burden of legitimising the decision of whether or not 
to interfere back to the interfering agent; it thus presumes that agent whose 
actions may be interfered with does not care about their outcome. This 
contradicts Williams’ earlier maxim of omnia appetitum appetitur sub specie boni; 
action stems from desire, and desire from a perception that the end will be 
beneficial for the agent acting to achieve it. The agent will therefore naturally be 
aggrieved if their ends are frustrated against their will, which is why Williams 
suggest agents claim a right to non-interference in the first instance. In claiming 
an agent shouldn’t care if their ends are frustrated, Williams must abandon his 
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theory of motivation for action – and, in doing so, shows that his objection to 
universalisation based on impartiality of agents is founded on a 
mischaracterisation of action.  
Secondly, we can reject Williams argument in its relocation of the ultimate 
decision of whether or not to interfere. Let us grant that an agent can be 
disinterested in their ends and that a lack of proscription is not analogous to 
permission; this merely shifts the burden of the decision back to the potential 
interfering agent. A decision still has to be made as to whether or not 
interference should be carried out, requiring rational deliberation on the part of 
the potential interfering agent. Two outcomes of this deliberation are possible. 
If they do decide to interfere, they abandon their own claim to non-interference. 
If they decide not to interfere, they recognise that the other agent is claiming a 
right to non-interference which must be respected. The PGC is therefore again 
at play, and rationally must be respected in order for action to take place. 
Williams’ objection can therefore be seen as not addressing the substantive 
content of Gewirth’s argument as, if it did, Williams would be forced to agree 
with the conclusion that the PGC imposes legitimate restrictions on the course 
of our action. 
 
Such a conclusion would still be likely to be rejected by Williams. His recognition 
that moral conflict is indicative of moral truth is one that has already  been 
mentioned,25 but it is tempered by his continued scepticism as to the possibility 
of resolving the debate. For he also is committed to the following 
characterisation of moral deliberation, a conclusion he sees as to be necessarily 
entailed by the possibility of moral conflict: 
a) There cannot be one acceptable currency for value-conflict 
resolution; 
b) It is not true that external values can always be applied as resolution; 
c) It is not true that value can be rationally appealed to as resolution; 
d) Therefore no conflict can be rationally resolved.26 
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Such a conclusion flows naturally from Williams’ scepticism that rationalism can 
provide an answer to ethical dilemmas. Perceived moral obligations frequently 
do conflict;27 the perceived conflict must be grounded in equally valid options 
or it would not exist,28 therefore necessitating a degree of moral relativism.29 If 
true, then the categorical imperative on all action provided by the PGC 
necessarily fails; we must therefore dig deeper into Williams’ rationale in order 
to see whether the foundations of this conclusion can adequately disprove the 
legitimacy of the PGC.  
 
Williams’ scepticism appears to be rooted in his belief that practical reasoning 
cannot provide a normative foundation for moral principles. This scepticism is 
in turn founded in Williams’ denial that acts can ever be concretely linked to a 
given end due to the inherent uncertainty which exists in the world. It therefore 
appears to be a scepticism grounded in a denial of causation. Williams believes 
that luck inevitably plays a role in the execution of the will and must therefore 
be accounted for in any account of practical rationality. Yet as individuals have 
no control over intrinsic luck, it cannot be adequately planned for in the 
execution of our actions.30 This introduces a level of arbitrariness and 
indeterminacy in all action, which in turn makes deliberation ultimately arbitrary 
and indeterminate itself. Such principles are incapable of being the foundation 
of normativity. Williams would here find an ally in Hannah Arendt, who similarly 
argues that the unknowability of whether or not our ends will ultimately be 
attained renders our desires imprecise and uncertain, and therefore incapable of 
possessing the authority required to generate normative claims.31 These 
statements are both seemingly sound, but misunderstand the foundation of the 
PGC. The argument does not begin at the execution stage, as these objections 
may suggest, but instead begins with deliberative rationality itself. The moral 
requirements are therefore dialectically necessary not on the execution of the 
will, but from its conception. It applies to agents based on their capacity to 
formulate a desire to act, not the carrying out of the action in turn. Since Arendt 
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and Williams both accept that deliberative rationality must exist in order for 
them to conceptualise the execution of the will, they therefore agree that the 
PGC’s starting point is valid. They must therefore accept the argument, as their 
rebuttals do not damage its integrity.  
 
The above section has aimed to demonstrate that Williams’ criticisms that 
rationality is incapable of providing an applicable moral principle are founded 
on a mischaracterisation of the arguments that they do, or a reliance on a 
differing understanding of what morality is. None, therefore, go any way to 
undermining the reasons we have to accept the PGC as binding. He ought 
therefore to accept the requirements it imposes, for he accepts that his 
scepticism is concerned with matters of doubt.32 Having addressed these doubts, 
a rational agent should see the PGC as valid; it meets the criteria for the 
generation of normativity in that it is about ultimate justification, is rationally 
inescapable, is practically relevant and is justified. 33 It should be therefore viewed 
as inescapably valid by Williams’ own definition of the property: ‘[A] demand 
will be inescapable in the required sense if it is one that a rational agent must 
accept if he is to be a rational agent.’34 
 
2.2  Nietzsche  
 
Having addressed the twentieth century scepticism of Bernard Williams, this 
chapter now moves to the more complicated task of addressing objections to 
the PGC which might arise from the writings of Nietzsche. His writings are 
renowned for having turned the field of ethics somewhat on its head, leading 
many to regard him as the ultimate moral sceptic. It is for this reason that we 
will address his concerns here.  
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Nietzsche appears to begin from an essentially subjective conception of the 
good, arguing that values themselves are only good insofar as they allow us to 
preserve a certain type of life.35 As such, morality – in that it directly reflects this 
subjective idea of value – must also be a concept whose essence is subjective, in 
that values are inescapably shaped by external factors which serve to shape an 
individual’s personhood: ‘[A person’s] morality which provides decidedly and 
decisively who he is – that is, in what hierarchy the innermost drives of his nature 
are arranged.’36 Morality therefore reflects a person’s subjective priorities which 
arise from his lived experience. Such subjectivism, if true, would be fatal to the 
universal claim made to the PGC as subjective ethics is clearly in 
 with a principle which claims to be both moral and universal in its application. 
A knock on effect of the subjectivism espoused by Nietzsche is that he also 
rejects that obedience to moral requirements is not something which is, of itself, 
of prima facie value. The idea of a categorical imperative as espoused by Kant is 
therefore to be rejected, in that obedience should only be required if to do so 
would further the subjective interests of the agent in question.37 Again, this 
conclusion is directly contradictory to the claim to universal application made by 
the PGC. It is, however, contended that the PGC is – surprisingly – fully 
compatible with Nietzsche’s ethical writings.  
 
In order to see this compatibility, we should realise that Nietzsche is best 
regarded as an ethical naturalist; he holds that moral principles can be identified 
iff they are correlated to pre-ethical facts of those who espouse them.38 The PGC 
does this in grounding its own moral principle in noumenal agency, a pre-ethical 
and amoral fact necessary for any action to be undertaken. If something can be 
proved to be essential for any form of human flourishing then it can therefore 
be seen to possess universal value and, for Nietzsche, can legitimately be used 
to justify the suppression of other interests.39 It follows that the PGC, grounded 
in the necessity of human agency and protecting the conditions essential for the 
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will to be exercised, possesses universal value. It can therefore legitimately 
preclude action contrary to its own requirements. Such a conclusion is essential 
if Nietzsche’s own unified conception of will and action is to be accepted.40 If a 
person’s values are limited by what kind of person he is,41  yet some 
characteristics are essential for all persons, then these universal characteristics 
can impose universal requirements in a way which, whilst maintaining the value 
pluralism at the heart of Nietzsche’s project, precludes activity which would 
contradict there essential nature. Nietzsche’s conception of value pluralism in 
and of itself does not, therefore, damage the validity of the PGC.  
 
Nietzsche may object to this conflation in that it places excessive importance on 
an essentially formalistic and impersonal application of practical reasoning. For 
whilst essential, Nietzsche dismisses reasoning as being fundamentally unsound 
in that it is reducible to an interpretation ‘according to a scheme that we cannot 
throw off’.42 Yet this riposte does not characterise our insistence on the necessity 
of the PGC. Firstly, we can object on Nietzsche’s own contradictions. If 
rationality is only an interpretation and, as such, cannot be used to justify the 
claim that the results of deliberative rationality should be seen as possessing 
truth-claims, then Nietzsche’s own project necessarily fails. Since we can 
presume that in writing his theses that Nietzsche was concerned with discerning 
and communicating concepts which he believed to be true, otherwise he would 
not be undertaking the action, Nietzsche is undertaking an exercise which relies 
on the rational justification of his claims.43 If rationality is merely an 
interpretation possessing no independent value or truth claim in its conclusions, 
then Nietzsche’s project can itself be dismissed as a paradox. Secondly, even the 
product of rational deliberation could only be seen as an interpretation lacking 
truth-claims, the criticism would still not damage the PGC. The principle is not 
to be seen as constructed on a particular rational outcome, but on an inescapable 
fact of noumenal agency. Nietzsche accepts that agents necessarily undertake 
deliberative reasoning with regards to practical rationality; since the dialectically 
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necessary argument stems from this inescapable fact, the conclusions of the 
PGC must be sound.   
 
2.3  Other arguments from Scepticism 
 
Having discussed and rejected criticisms against the validity of the PGC which 
might be raised by Williams and Nietzsche, this chapter moves on to consider 
further arguments against Gewirth’s position. We will first discuss a general 
criticism of the structure of the dialectical argument of the PGC as presented by 
Richard Friedman, before moving to address substantive criticisms that might 
be raised by Philippa Foot and Brian Leiter. 
 
First though, the structural critique. Friedman raises several problems with the 
PGC, but the most jarring for him is the claim that the argument mistakenly 
conflates an argument based on dialectical necessity with one of rational choice.44 
He argues that the mere dialectical necessity of an argument does not lead to the 
conclusion that it is one which a rational agent would accept. Why should an 
agent claim his rights are grounded in the logical necessity of an argument rather 
than other grounds?45 This is an argument which fails on its own terms. Firstly, 
it seems axiomatic that an agent should stake his claim to rights in an argument 
which is logically necessary; if the argument were otherwise then it could be 
disregarded with no implications. Since he necessarily values his rights this 
conclusion would be one he should be motivated to avoid at all costs, as to do 
so undermines the rights-claim he seeks to impose. Any successful rights claim 
must therefore be a logical necessity or it will fail. Secondly, the argument fails 
for a misunderstanding of the scope of the PGC. An agent could conclude that 
the dialectically necessary argument is not one he wishes to accept, and therefore 
concede that he does not desire a sound foundation to his rights. Yet agential 
will is not itself enough to deny the truism that these rights remain necessary for 
                                                          
44 Richard B. Friedman, ‘The Basis of Human Rights: A Criticism of Gewirth’s Theory’ in J. 
Roland Pennock and John W Chapman (eds), Human Rights – Nomos XXIII (New York 
University Press 1981) 150 
45 ibid 152-153 
119 
 
his status as an agent. This is the starting point of the PGC which Friedman does 
not address; in thus rejecting the dialectically necessary argument the agent is 
using the agency whose importance he seeks to deny. The claim is therefore 
inherently contradictory, and should be recognised as failing accordingly. 
 
Having addressed a methodological concern, we may now move on to address 
the first of our two remaining sceptics by examining a potential objection from 
Philippa Foot regarding the existence of a categorical imperative on action. 
Before we address Foot’s objection, we should begin with her characterisation 
of the location of moral principles: 
[T]he moral character of an action is on occasion affected by the position 
of the agent on the causal nexus; by the fact that he is on the one hand 
the initiating agent of a sequence or happening, or by contrast merely 
one who does not intervene.46 
 
Foot hereby states that the moral character of an action is determined in its 
entirety in the circumstances of action itself. In this claim she allows discussions 
relating to moral permissibility to concern not just action itself, also the 
deliberative process leading to the execution of a given act: 
[T]here is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what 
we allow to happen, [and secondly] that there is a similarly relevant 
distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as the result of 
what we do.47 
The distinction here raised is one that does not engage directly in a challenge to 
the PGC’s unified conception of reason and action. The point we should take 
from these excerpts is a simple one; that Foot believes that moral normativity is 
one which is located firmly in deliberative rationality and its resultant actions. 
Her objection would be in categorising the imperative found in the PGC as one 
which is categorical in nature rather than merely hypothetical. For to jump from 
a hypothetical to a categorical imperative requires proof of overriding constraint. 
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In order to demonstrate the difficulty in establishing such a normative claim, 
Foot uses the example of rules of etiquette;48 we use similar normative language 
when discussing such demands, yet the bindingness remains hypothetical in that 
it is contingent on us wishing to be seen as being in compliance.49 Moral claims, 
she argues, behave in a similar way – their claims only possess normative 
character insofar as we care about being moral agents:  
The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason 
to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. 
Nor will his action necessarily be irrational.’50 
This is a claim which is similar to that raised by David Enoch in s.2.4 below, so 
the full range of objections which can be made against Foot will not be explored 
here. Instead, it will merely be pointed out that the PGC is characterisable as an 
example of dialectically necessary instrumental reasoning. We necessarily care 
about our agency, otherwise we would not be attempting to act – to claim 
otherwise contradicts this point, leading to an irrational outcome. To say that 
this is something an agent might not care about does not undermine the validity 
of the conclusion that they necessarily do. The objection is therefore grounded 
on a mischaracterisation of the argumentative structure of the PGC, and should 
be rejected as invalid.  
 
Lastly, we turn our attention to the scepticism of Brian Leiter. The claim assessed 
for its validity here will be his scepticism not of the moral, but the jurisprudential 
project of determining the necessary features of a concept of law. His focus is 
on the validity of what he refers to as the demarcation problem – how and if the 
normative systems of both law and morality can be seen to be separable.51 It is 
therefore the enterprise, rather than the substantive conclusion, which Leiter 
believes to be unsound.  Fatal to the exercise is positive law’s nature as a human 
artefact, in that it is cannot exist without being the product of human action.52  
                                                          
48 Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” (1972) 81(3) The 
Philosophical Review 305, 308 
49 ibid 309 
50 ibid 310 
51 Brian Leiter, “The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism” 
(2011) 31(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 663, 633 
52 ibid 666 
121 
 
The necessary variance in the purpose and application of human constructs over 
time means their essential attributes are notoriously difficult to identify, if they 
exist at all.53 It therefore follows: 
If, in the history of philosophy, there is not a single successful analysis 
of the ‘necessary’ or ‘essential’ properties of a human artefact, why 
should we think law will be different? 54 
Leiter’s scepticism is misplaced for several reasons. Firstly, we shall return to his 
claim that artefacts’ purpose and application necessarily vary over time. He 
claims this is true of all artefacts, suggesting that ‘Because human ends and 
purposes shift, the concept of ‘chair’ has no essential attributes.’ 55 This claim is 
unfounded; it is simply untrue to claim that the concept of a chair has no 
essential attributes. Although its form may vary over time – some may have three 
legs, some four and some even more – their fundamental purpose remains the 
same. A chair which is incapable of fulfilling the purpose of providing a 
supported surface on which a person can sit fails to be a chair, thus constituting 
a constant purpose regardless of form. This discussion may seem tangential, but 
the point being made is that artefacts should be judged by their form only to the 
extent that that form is capable of meeting the requirements of their purpose. 
The fact that an artefact’s form can vary over time is a factor independent to its 
purpose, and therefore the scepticism Leiter proposes is grounded on a mistaken 
conflation of form and purpose. There is therefore no reason to presume that 
the purposive requirements necessary for a system of law should not be equally 
constant throughout time.  
 
 
Secondly, we can reject Leiter’s implicit claim that the difficulty of the enterprise 
is one which should preclude us from undertaking it. Such a claim, taken to its 
conclusion, would preclude vast swathes of human knowledge. Let us not forget 
that many scientists would claim that their enquiry is not one that could be 
proven beyond all doubt, and that scientific enquiry is merely a logical statement 
based on a rational assessment of the evidence that we have. Leiter would surely 
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be disinclined to state that research into the nature of the universe or the 
prevention of disease is doomed to failure as scientific enquiry is a human 
artefact; it is therefore unclear why the objection should be raised against 
inquiries into the nature of law. Leiter’s scepticism of jurisprudence, whilst 
healthy, should therefore not be seen to preclude the possibility of the enterprise.  
 
2.4  Enoch 
 
The final PGC sceptic to be addressed in this part of the chapter will be David 
Enoch. His main criticism of the PGC, as has been alluded to in the previous 
section, is that it presumes that an agent should care about his agential status. Its 
requirements can therefore be dismissed if an agent simply does not care that 
the result of this non-compliance will be his denial of his own agential status. It 
will be argued that the argument is misguided, but before it is examined in detail 
we must first address Enoch’s own conception of the nature of morality. 
 
Enoch is a moral realist, in that he believes that certain moral disagreements 
require us to behave in a certain way and reject behaviour contrary to the 
requirements of morality.56 He also believes that it is our ability to deliberate on 
such moral dilemmas which justifies our belief in normative facts,57 and that such 
facts rest on an epistemic justifications which themselves are ultimately 
grounded in our basic belief-forming capacities.58 It is therefore safe to say that 
Enoch locates the creation of norms within deliberative reasoning, making a 
direct comparison of his conception of morality and that of Gewirth an 
enterprise which is possible to undertake. For, like Gewirth, Enoch also sees 
moral commitments as non-optional as a result of their grounding in rationality: 
Now, the pragmatic account invokes the non-optionality of the relevant 
project in order to block the second disjunct, thus leaving only the first: 
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if discarding the project is not a rationally acceptable option, then 
employing the relevant method is the only rationally open option.’59 
Since reasoning itself is unavoidable, another point on which he and Gewirth 
would agree, Enoch argues that moral discourse is inescapable: 
A thinker T is prima facie epistemically justified in employing a belief-forming method 
M as basic if there is for T a rationally non-optional project P such that it is 
(pragmatically-relevantly) possible for T to succeed in engaging in P using M, and it 
is (pragmatically-relevantly) impossible for T to succeed in engaging in P without using 
M.60  
By undertaking deliberation, an agent therefore commits themselves to the belief 
that there are normative reasons which bear on that deliberation; and as 
deliberation is inescapable, all agents are therefore committed to behaving in 
accordance with the normative principles which they are committed to believing 
as necessary. To argue otherwise would be prima facie irrational along the 
following reasoning:  
(1) If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically 
indispensable project, then we are (epistemically) justified (for that very 
reason) in believing that that thing exists.  
(2) The deliberative project is intrinsically indispensable.  
(3) Irreducibly normative truths are instrumentally indispensable to the 
deliberative project.  
(4) Therefore, we are epistemically justified in believing that there are 
irreducibly normative truths.61 
Enoch, to this point, appears to be writing in a way which is entirely consistent 
with Gewirth’s PGC and its Kantian foundations; the inescapability of agency 
leads to the conclusion that agents are committed to recognising that there are 
irreducibly normative truths which should operate so as to restrict the scope of 
action available to us in any situation. The difference is first indicated in his claim 
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that some categorical imperatives would be improperly classed as moral, and that 
behaving rationally is one of these.62 As compliance with the PGC is essentially 
a rational requirement for all agents, then Enoch would be loath to concede that 
its requirements are properly categorised as moral. It is difficult to see why this 
is the case. The four steps identified above which Enoch believes demonstrate 
a necessary connection between deliberation on action and morality apply to the 
PGC; to claim otherwise would be contrarian at best. 
 
His earlier enterprise in dismissing agency as the foundation of normativity 
therefore appears to completely contradict his later work. This dismissal is at the 
core of the argument in his article Agency, Shmagency, a critique of which will 
be the purpose of the remainder of this section. He begins from the same starting 
point as his later work, arguing that desire for self-knowledge through action is 
an inescapable condition of agency, and that the reasons that derive from it are 
a-priori universal as opposed to dependent on subjective desires.63 So far so 
good. But Enoch’s point is that this is something which should not bother an 
agent – he asks whether an agent should be relieved to hear that they are acting 
in a way which is consistent with their own agency, or whether they would 
change their mind about the morality of an action after reading Korsgaard and 
realising that they would cease to be a rational agent if they did not?64 
However strong or weak the reasons that apply to him and require that 
he be moral, surely they do not become stronger when he realizes that 
unless he complies with morality his bodily movements would not be 
adequately described as actions.65 
Enoch therefore appears to be arguing that the label of ‘agent’ is one which is 
ultimately arbitrary, and makes no practical difference to the agent’s ability to 
deliberate. To claim to act contrary to a moral principle would therefore defeat 
the agency of an individual is an empty claim which would not make an agent 
feel obliged to follow its requirements, as the change in status would make no 
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practical difference to their life. A preliminary objection could be raised here that 
Enoch’s characterisation of breaching moral codes grounded in rationality could 
equally be applied to all moral codes. It is not the practical difference that 
breaching a moral code has on an individual that should be seen to coerce them 
into following a moral principle, it is the exclusionary reason provided by the 
principle itself. Enoch is therefore artificially conflating a moral principle’s 
existence with the consequences that might arise from breaching it, and in doing 
so dodges the implications of normative obligations that he himself agrees must 
be grounded in rational deliberation.  
 
This contradiction is on an objection which Enoch believes can be made against 
his criticism, however. He does raise three which he believes might be raised 
before rebutting them in turn. We will here demonstrate why each of Enoch’s 
replies to his critics fails. Firstly, he postulates a defence which argues that the 
moral principles’ status as being constitutive of agency renders them non-
arbitrary, and therefore normatively vindicated. This is, in essence, the claim 
being made by the PGC – the fact that our General Conditions of Agency are 
necessary for our action generates normative force through the fact that we must 
see them as rights. His response is to simply ask why their being constitutive of 
agency should render them non-arbitrary.66 His dismissal is notable for not 
engaging with the normative issue raised by the PGC; he simply repeats his 
objection as if the answer had not being given. The reason why these things 
possess normative value and should therefore be seen to be non-arbitrary is 
because the are essential for the undertaking of any action. They are constitutive 
of us as agents in that they are necessary for any deliberative or practical 
reasoning. Since Enoch himself in his later work argues that deliberative 
reasoning is capable of producing normative claims, he appears to endorse such 
reasoning himself. His objection is therefore unfounded, and can be dismissed.   
 
The second hypothetical objection raised by Enoch is the claim that we should 
care if we act in a way which rejects the importance of our own conditions of 
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agency, as it is axiomatic that they do matter to us. This claim is again one which 
is central to the PGC, and is dismissed by Enoch by the claim that it is not clear 
that we do value these conditions.67 This rejection is incredibly weak, in that it 
can be demonstrated to be false by any action that an agent chooses to 
undertake. In choosing to act an agent necessarily must value the conditions 
which allow him to do so as, without these conditions, he would be unable to 
act. Since he values his end, he must value the means that allow him to attain it. 
Enoch’s objection is therefore shown to be false.  
 
The last objection Enoch suggests could be made to his conclusions is connected 
to the second, in that it claims that agency is self-vindicating. Reason is 
unavoidable, and therefore necessarily important – another claim central to the 
internal logic of the PGC. Enoch suggests this is again not obvious, and that a 
sceptic is entitled to use logic to deny logic because it is legitimate for him to do 
so.68 The claim is absurd, in that it is analogous to a painter using paint to 
demonstrate that paint is not essential for the task of painting. The same paradox 
exists in Enoch’s writing, and should be rejected for this reason.  
 
Enoch does not leave his argument here, however. He attempts to demonstrate 
that the requirements of a principle like the PGC not be seen as categorical in 
their application, but contingent in their acceptance in the same was as the rules 
of a game of chess are only accepted by those who play the game. As you only 
have a reason to win a game of chess if you have a reason to play chess, you only 
need to value your Generic Conditions of Agency if you have an adequate reason 
to be an agent. The necessity of the situation is irrelevant, as – as one could play 
chess disinterestedly and not care about the pursuit being undertaken, one could 
equally be a disinterested agent.69 The analogy fails for three reasons, however. 
Firstly, Enoch’s disinterested chess player must presumably still have a reason 
to play chess otherwise the activity would not be being undertaken; the same 
cannot be true of agency, which is unavoidable. The PGC is similarly 
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unavoidable, and cannot be avoided by the fact that one does not have a reason 
to comply; the reason is necessarily present in the dialectical argument from 
noumenal agency. Secondly Enoch suggests that as one could be a disinterested 
chess player, one could be a disinterested agent. This argument misses the point, 
in that even a disinterested agent is necessarily an agent who is committed to 
valuing their Generic Conditions of Agency. Even if we were to take Enoch’s 
disinterested agent as being one who no longer wished to be an agent and wished 
to commit suicide, their Generic Conditions of Agency would still be necessary 
for this end to be attained. One cannot therefore be a fully disinterested agent 
in the way Enoch suggests. Lastly, Enoch suggests that one could simply 
concede that, in breaching the PGC, one contradicts ones agency – but this does 
not matter, because an individual could re-categorise themselves as a ‘shmagent’ 
and thus avoid their agential duties. This objection also fails for semantic 
reasons. The concept being conveyed by the terms agent and shmagent is 
essentially the same, and the linguistic shift does nothing to change this. As ‘The 
snow is white’ has the same meaning as ‘der Schnee ist weiß’, so an agent is 
conceptually the same as the shmagent Enoch introduces. This claim follows 
from our discussion of linguistic normativity in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
 
Enoch’s denial that the PGC, in grounding morality in practical rationality, is 
incapable of providing moral norms has therefore been demonstrated to be false. 
It contradicts his own location of moral norms in reason, and fails to understand 
the operation of the PGC in its attacks. In the absence of any reason to disregard 
its requirements, the PGC should therefore be seen to be valid. This chapter will 
therefore move on to demonstrate how a necessary link between law and 
morality must exist if two classical positivist theories of law are to produce a 
coherent explanation of legal normativity. 
 
3 Objections from Classical Positivism 
 
Ehrenberg correctly states that law itself is a human creation, yet he also 
recognises it as a necessary feature of legal systems that they presents themselves 
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as a system of norms.70 Whilst Natural Lawyers can ascribe the existence of legal 
normativity to a necessary moral foundation, this is an option which legal 
positivists would reject. To allow a necessary moral explanation of legal 
normativity would, for them, open law up to what Rodriguez-Blanco 
characterises as the paradox of intentionality:  
If we follow legal rules intentionally, then legal rules cannot be 
exclusionary reasons. If we do not follow legal rules intentionally, then 
legal rules do not have a reason giving character. Therefore, either legal 
rules cannot be exclusionary reasons or legal rules do not have a reason-
giving character.71 
Put another way, if the law perfectly mirrors our moral obligations then it is 
unable to claim to claim practical authority over us, as we already have a reason 
to act. This argument is similar to the ‘Practical Difference Thesis’, which will 
be addressed directly in chapters five and six of this thesis. For the time being 
though, we will concede that the above description of law is problematic, in that 
to thus connect law and morality seems to strip law of its reason-giving character. 
It is this problem that positivists aim to address when seeking an alternate 
explanation of legal normativity. Two classical examples of twentieth century 
positivism will be examined here to see whether or not they succeed in this task. 
We will first examine the success of Kelsen’s conception of a ‘Basic Norm’, 
before moving on to consider Hart’s idea of ‘Secondary Rules of Recognition’. 
It is hoped that this analysis will demonstrate that both theories fail to adequately 
locate a normative source for the obligations that they seek to create, and that 
the PGC is capable of filling the gaps identified in the way identified by Beyleveld 
and Brownsword’s application of the PGC in Law as a Moral Judgment.72  
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3.1 Hans Kelsen 
 
Kelsen began his career in legal theory at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
believing that the theories of his contemporaries were too impure to adequately 
address the question of the normative force of law. According to Kelsen, the 
nineteenth century had contaminated jurisprudential enquiry by introducing 
elements of political ideology or natural and social sciences, thus requiring a 
complete reformulation – a ‘pure’ theory of law which would avoid such 
reductionism. At the heart of this was a recognition that ‘[t]here is no kind of 
human behaviour that, because of its nature, could not be made into a legal duty 
corresponding to a legal right.’73 As such, it is important to state at the beginning 
of this analysis that, for Kelsen, all concepts of law have orders of human 
behaviour as their object: 
An “order” is a system of norms whose unity is constituted by the fact 
that they all have the same reason for their validity; and the reason for 
the validity of a normative order is a basic norm – as we shall see – from 
which the validity of all norms of the order are derived. A single norm is 
a valid legal norm, if it corresponds to the concept of “law” and is part 
of a legal order; and it is part of a legal order, if its validity is based on 
the basic norm of that order.74 
It is this concept of a ‘Basic Norm’ constituting the validity of all subsequent 
norms which stem from it which forms the foundation of Kelsen’s theory, and 
which – in the following analysis – will be demonstrated to be unsatisfactory in 
attaining this objective.  
 
3.1.1  The Pure Theory of Law 
 
Firstly, it is worth noting the assumptions made by Kelsen and the limits he 
places upon his theory in order to fully understand the emergent features he 
identifies. Kelsen begins his discussion with a statement of intent; his theory is 
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not to be seen as an interpretation of a specific legal system, but as a theory of 
the general nature of law itself. Its purpose is an attempt ‘to answer the question 
of what and how the law is, not how it ought to be.’ 75, the latter part of this 
distinction being something he believes to be a separate question mistakenly 
viewed as synonymous with the first by many adherents of natural law theories. 
For Kelsen, the task can be reduced through the observation that ‘The 
judgement that an act of human behaviour, performed in time and space, is 
“legal” (or “illegal”) is the result of a specific, namely normative, interpretation.’76  
Such an endeavour requires Kelsen to define what he means when he speaks of 
‘law’ or ‘legal’. In doing so, he confines his definition to that expressed by the 
German word ‘Recht’ and its respective equivalents in French and Italian (‘droit’ 
and ‘diritto’). 77 This is a narrow definition which may raise eyebrows in the 
English speaking world; the three languages identified above all have very 
different concepts of ‘law’ in a legal sense and ‘law’ which may concern nature 
and justice, and, as such, use different terminology for these concepts – a 
distinction we do not have in English.78 To what extent, then, is this assimilation 
of concepts which are not directly equivalent79 the root of the disagreement 
between followers of Kelsen and those who reject him? This is a discussion 
which will be considered later in this chapter and which, for the time being, will 
remain untouched in order to allow a fuller exposition of Kelsen’s work. 
Kelsen’s identification of law describes a legal system as an order which is 
coercive in nature through the use of socially imminent, as opposed to 
transcendental, sanctions.80 It should be noted however that:   
The law is not a coercive order in the sense that it exerts a psychic 
coercion; but in the sense that it prescribes coercive acts, namely the 
forcible deprivation of life, freedom, economic and other values as a 
consequence of certain conditions.81 
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Any psychic coercion which does emerge from a legal system then, ‘is not a 
characteristic that distinguishes law from other social orders.’ such as moral 
obligations to undertake X,82 as such orders also impose a psychic coercion on 
those individuals who subscribe to it. Instead, law should be viewed as imposing 
two specific types of coercive act – sanctions and other forms of coercion (such 
as sectioning the mentally ill) 83 – in a manner authorised by a social norm 
imposing such coercive acts on opposite behaviour. Such a limitation is not a 
moral fact, in that it applies only to legal norms. 84  
Kelsen views it as axiomatic that any series of norms which seek to be seen as 
legal in character should be viewed as totally distinct from any attempt to 
categorise them as moral or ethical in nature: 
The methodological parity of the science of law is jeopardised not only 
because the bar that separates it from natural science is ignored, but even 
more so because  the science of law is not (or not clearly enough) 
separated from ethics – that no clear distinction is made between law 
and morals.85 
Morals should be viewed as entirely non-legal norms regulating men’s behaviour 
to each other. This is not to say that law and morality might not be indirectly 
linked; for, according to Kelsen, if justice is a postulate of morals then the 
relationship of justice and law must also be subject to moral standards. But the 
law itself should remain entirely separate from this comparison, as there is no 
requirement that the law itself should subscribe to any standard of justice.86 
Neither, according to Kelsen, can morality be said to have a necessary 
connection with a legal order because the standards of objectivity involved. For 
him, morality is only objective because of reference to some form of faith or 
religion, whereas legal objectivity rests on the existence of a readily identifiable 
legal coercive sanction.87  
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A further way in which Kelsen seeks to differentiate legal and moral systems for 
definitional purposes within his theory is by addressing the issue of factual 
causation. For him, it does not make sense to speak of causation between action 
A and sanction B within a legal setting, as causation has no fixed end point; 
further things may flow from it. He instead introduces the concept of imputation 
– a term he feels to be superior in that it has the fixed end point identifiable 
within a sanction which cannot be located in terms of causation.88 From this 
shift in terminology, Kelsen is able to further distance law and morality. For if a 
moral norm is categorical, he argues it is impossible to link cause and 
consequences via the language of imputation due to the inherent nature of 
positive norms; for Kelsen, they cannot be categorical as action is only possible 
under certain conditions, a restriction which may also be placed on negative 
norms which impose conditions under which restraint should be exercised by 
other parties.89  
Kelsen thus identifies a clear object of his theory, a set of norms governing 
human interaction which are enforced through coercive sanctions justified 
through a relationship of imputation between Action A and Sanction B. In doing 
so, he aims to clearly separate law and morality, and – by his definition – he 
partially succeeds. However, using his own terminology, his identification of his 
object remains partial. Firstly, it is descriptive of what he labels a ‘Static Theory 
of Law’ – namely, law as a system of valid norms; as such it fails to address the 
why the law possesses normative force, which is the question that Kelsen’s 
theory is ultimately designed to answer more convincingly than those put 
forward by Natural Law theories. Kelsen claims that this is not problematic, as 
such normative force should be addressed by a ‘Dynamic Theory of Law’ – one 
which is concerned with the process by which law is created and applied.90 
Kelsen here introduces the locus of his Pure Theory, that of the Basic Norm in 
reference to which all legal norms should be viewed. 
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3.1.2  The Basic Norm 
 
Kelsen suggests his Pure Theory addresses head-on the difficulty of answering 
the question of how a non-legal set of norms should attain legal character: 
[T]he Pure Theory of Law asks: ‘How is it possible to interpret without 
recourse to meta-legal authorities, like God or nature, the subjective 
meaning of certain facts as a system of objectively valid legal norms 
describable in rules of law?’91 
He argues that the answer is simple. In order for the law to attain normative 
force, we must formulate a Dynamic Theory of Law which makes reference to 
a presupposed ‘Basic Norm’ from which all other legal norms gain validity.92 
Such a norm ‘contains nothing but the determination of a norm-creating 
fact’,93and all legal norms are only valid because their creation complied with the 
basic norm.94 
Kelsen believes it to be vital that such a basic norm should not refer to moral 
claims in its operation for reasons identified above.95 Instead, a purely legal chain 
must be acknowledged, whereby ‘The norm which confers upon an act the 
meaning of legality or illegality is itself created by an act, which, in turn receives 
its legal character from yet another norm.’96 For example, an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament such as the Licencing (Scotland) Act 2005, only attains its legal force 
as it was enacted via the appropriate legislative process established as required 
for the creation of an Act of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament 
derives its authority to create such legislation from a higher norm, namely the 
Scotland Act 1998. This Act is valid via reference to a higher norm, namely that 
it was created in accordance with the procedure required for the creation of an 
Act of the Westminster Parliament. The Westminster Parliament in turn derives 
its authority to create such legislation for a yet higher norm, that of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty – the legal (if politically constrained) ability of Parliament to pass 
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any legislation it sees fit. For Kelsen, this would be the ‘Basic Norm’ of a 
Dynamic Theory of Law applied to the United Kingdom and, as such, requires 
no further justification.97 Its existence should be presupposed, and accepted as a 
prima facie fact. 
Kelsen argues that chains of legal validity would necessarily always reach such 
an end point, whether in domestic law or, should we wish to expand our search, 
in the norm of International Law that states should have legal and political 
control over their own territories.98 To ask why such a norm is valid is to confuse 
‘is’ and ‘ought’; is a norm efficacious in being followed by those whose legal 
system is guided by it versus the question of whether a norm ought to be 
followed.99 To ask the latter of these two questions is to introduce a moral 
element to the Pure Theory of Law, and therefore to take into account an 
irrelevant consideration in a Dynamic Theory of Law.  
This does not appear to be a satisfactory answer to the question of where a Basic 
Norm derives its normative validity. Firstly, what if the majority of the 
population in question would reject the Basic Norm on the basis that it creates 
unjust law that they do not feel bound to follow? If a legal system is not followed 
by those living under it, it seems nonsensical to continue to insist that creates 
valid norms. Kelsen in part acknowledges this, claiming that a ‘minimum 
effectiveness is a condition of validity.’ 100 Yet in this acknowledgement, Kelsen 
question begs – if efficacy is required for the validity of a legal system, by what 
standard should individuals judge a Basic Norm in order to acknowledge 
whether or not they feel bound to follow it and the legal system it produces? It 
is this question which demonstrates the flaw in Kelsen’s argument; if efficacy is 
required for validity, a test for efficacy is also required. The easiest way for 
efficacy to be attained by a legal system would be for its requirements to be prima 
facie acceptable to all of its subjects as individual legal norms. It is suggested that 
such a test for the acceptability of individual norms may be provided by the 
dialectically necessary argument put forward by Gewirth’s Principle of Generic 
Consistency. 
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3.1.3  Problems of Definition 
 
By establishing a ‘Pure Theory of Law’, Kelsen attempts to put forward a 
positivist explanation of the normative grounding of law. Such a theory should 
be completely independent of any moral or religious justification for the 
normative force of law. He ultimately rests his theory of a ‘Basic Norm’ – a 
presupposed norm (which generally takes the form of a constitution or similar 
document) from which any legal system gains its ability to legislate. To ask why 
such a norm should be obeyed is possible, but should not be confused with the 
non-legal question of whether it should be obeyed.101 Indeed, the very opening 
sentence of ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ is ‘The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of 
positive law.’ 102 Yet, as suggested above, in conceding that a minimum level of 
acceptance (‘efficacy’) by a population is a prerequisite for the Basic Norm’s 
validity, Kelsen begs the question by what standard a Basic Norm should be 
judged as effective. It makes no sense to judge it according to its own standards, 
as this would yield no result. Yet to take into account an external consideration 
such as morality or religion would, in Kelsen’s view, go against the positivist 
account which his theory is intended to produce. Doing neither is not an option, 
as the efficacy of a Basic Norm is the means by which law is differentiated from 
a pure threat. Law states that an evil ought be inflicted under certain 
circumstances as prescribed by a Basic Norm accepted by society; a threat merely 
states that an evil will take place under certain circumstances. The legal ‘ought’ 
gains objective nature from the widely accepted Basic Norm, the threat is seen 
as an imposition merely because it lacks this grounding. 103 In order to identify 
whether accepting the Basic Norm or looking beyond it for its normative status 
appears the most attractive, it is worth looking further into how Kelsen views 
the nature of laws. 
Firstly, we should look to the nature of the orders placed on us by the law. In 
not prohibiting a certain action, it is not the case that the law automatically 
commands the opposite behaviour. As such, the law can be seen as imposing 
both positive and negative liberties on individuals – the freedom to perform X 
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and the freedom against having Y inflicted upon oneself. This, Kelsen might 
argue, differs from moral codes whose commands are generally negative in 
character. Beyond being characterised as providing both positive and negative 
liberty, Kelsen argues that there need not be any common features between legal 
systems whatsoever – although he does identify that one generally prohibited act 
is to interfere with another’s ability to perform an undertaking which is not 
specifically prohibited by law.104 Yet in making this claim, Kelsen again begs the 
question of why such a norm can be identified as common to most, if not all, 
legal systems. This question can be answered with reference to morality and, 
specifically, Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency;105 such a feature is 
common because it corresponds to a rationally identifiable universal moral 
principle which applies independently of subjective concerns.  
Such an answer would be rejected by Kelsen in that introduces a non-positivist 
aspect to his theory – although, as will be discussed later in this piece, the reason 
for which this is a bad thing is not immediately clear. For the present however, 
we will accept Kelsen’s comparison with the Natural Law proposed by St. 
Augustine in Civitas Dei; that law is a just coercive order only because of the 
justice of its content. Kelsen suggests that reference to a principle with moral 
content, such as justice, makes reference to a subjective concern which – in St. 
Augustine’s case – creates a justice which is expressly Judeo-Christian in nature. 
Such a conception by definition excludes all non-Judeo-Christian law, and ‘A 
concept of law with such consequences is unacceptable by a positivist legal 
science.’ 106 Whilst such a rejection may be true for a subjective moral code 
anticipated by Kelsen, the objection does not immediately carry to a moral 
principle that can rationally be proved to be universal in its application by a 
dialectically necessary foundation.  
A second definitional difficulty faced by Kelsen is in identifying subjects who 
may be subject to his Pure Theory. He suggests that law tends to ascribe 
universal legal capacity to all individuals despite the fact that not all individuals 
possess the real capacity to act– thus necessitating statutory representation. 
Kelsen suggests that this distinction is neither beneficial nor complete, 
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highlighting that should somebody who suffers from a mental deficiency fail to 
pay their taxes, their lack of actual capacity will not necessary be enough to 
overcome their legal obligations as it would do under criminal law.107  At the 
same time, bodies (such as corporations) are granted legal personhood – a clear 
fiction with no real grounding in reality. As such, he claims that ‘The juristic 
person is neither a social reality nor, as is sometimes assumed, a creation of the 
law’; they are mainly constructions of legal science. 108 Such a problem of 
identifying those subject to the legal obligations established with reference to the 
Basic Norm could again be easily overcome by introducing a definition of the 
legal subject into the Basic Norm itself. This problem is again overcome by 
adopting the PGC as the norm by which legal validity is judged.  
 
3.2 H.L.A. Hart and the Secondary Rule of 
Recognition 
 
A second broadly positivist justification for the normative basis of law was 
presented by the Oxford Professor of Jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart, who felt that 
classical positivism, which took as its central tenet that a sufficient and necessary 
condition of law was one of a sovereign authority supported by threats, failed to 
address some of the nuances presented by a system of law: ‘[L]aw surely is not 
the gunman situation writ large, and legal order is surely not to be thus simply 
identified with compulsion.’ 109 Thus, similarly to Kelsen, he attempts to move 
his positivist definition of law beyond one which is comparable to a mere threat. 
In order to move beyond this conception, Hart introduced a distinction between 
two essential rules which, when in operation together, he argues are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a legal system. These are Primary Rules, which 
create a duty or obligation, and Secondary Rules, which establish how Primary 
Rules are recognised and can be changed over time. It is the application of such 
Secondary Rules to Primary Rules, according to Hart, which is the step from a 
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primitive, pre-legal state of affairs to a recognisable legal system.110 In this sense 
he moves away from the Kelsenian stance that law should not be seen as a 
prohibition of certain action but merely the justification that circumstance X 
authorises sanction Y,111 and closer towards a statement of the operation of law 
which would be more recognisable and acceptable to his opponents: ‘The most 
prominent general feature of law at all times and places is that its existence means 
that certain times of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense 
obligatory.’112 At the same time however, the distinction drawn should be noted 
for its similarity with Kelsen’s distinction between Static and Dynamic Theories 
of Law. With this feature accepted by Hart, I will use this section of this chapter 
to establish exactly how his doctrine operates, before highlighting some key 
problems with the operation of his theory which – as with Kelsen – can be 
resolved by integration of the PGC into Hart’s writing. 
 
3.2.1 The Purpose of the Doctrine 
 
Hart is of the belief that the majority of historical difficulties relating to 
understanding the fundamental nature of law can be resolved through the 
differentiation of two different types of rules, the interplay between which is 
where the majority of disagreements arise. Once this interplay is understood, 
then we can have a clearer insight into exactly how law operates as a concept. 113 
The two types of rule, whose interplay Hart suggests provide necessary and 
sufficient grounding for a system of law, are identified as follows: 
i) Primary Rules of Obligation. These are imposed from an internal 
point of view, in that individuals who live under a system of rules 
accept them as binding as a guide to their conduct. It would be 
difficult for a system of law to be comprised entirely of primary 
rules however as they would be unable to satisfactorily evolve 
over time. It would also be extremely difficult to resolve disputes 
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as to what a Primary Rule of Obligation requires under such an 
internally operative system of law. 
ii) Secondary Rules of Recognition. Such rules establish the means 
by which a Primary Rule of Obligation is identified, and help us 
to overcome the difficulties of identification, adjudication and 
evolution which surround a system compised entirely of such 
Primary Rules. 114 
These two rules, as suggested in the introduction to this section, can be made 
analogous with Kelsen’s concept of Static and Dynamic Theories of Law, in that 
the former identifies which laws should be obeyed as valid norms and the latter 
attempts to legitimise the process by which they are validated.115 The important 
feature of such a Secondary Rule of Recognition for this paper is its 
indispensability in identifying what we should view as law. Their status is 
invaluable; according to Hart, such rules ‘…will specify some feature or features 
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative 
indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it 
exerts.’ 116 Therefore, whilst Hart never explicitly locates the source of legal 
normativity within such Rules of Recognition, I am inclined to agree with those 
who suggest that such a claim is implicit within the operation of a Rule of 
Recognition as such defined. 117 
Hart suggests that it is a ‘perfectly correct appreciation [that] where there is law, 
there human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory.’118 If we 
accept that the purpose of Rules of Recognition is to assist us in our 
identification of which Primary Rules of Obligation should be seen to have the 
status of law, we must view them as providing the reason as to why we should 
see our compliance with such rules as an obligation.  
I suggest that such a claim is fairly uncontroversial. Hart himself deliberately 
distinguishes his use of the word ‘obligatory’ in the quote at the beginning of the 
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previous paragraph from the relation notion of ‘being obliged’; the latter, he 
suggests, can apply to a situation where a victim, suffering a threat, hands his 
goods over to a robber. For Hart, law should be viewed as more than this.119 His 
Rule of Recognition operates so as to grant legitimacy to the means by which 
Primary Rules are identified, thus tempering the excesses which may arise from 
a system of law comprised solely of a sovereign authority backed by threat.120 It 
follows that, if the purpose of such a Rule is to grant legitimacy to Sovereign 
Authority, then such legitimacy must be accepted on an internal point of view 
by those living underneath such a system. As summarised by Leslie Green in the 
third edition of Hart’s Concept of Law, the role of a legal system is to aid people 
in conforming to what they have a reason to do. Such a reason must necessarily 
be objective and intelligible, rather than being merely a perceived reason or 
grounded in self-interest.121  
The problem therefore arises that, viewed as phrased by Hart – namely as a 
standalone principle which has no necessarily moral aspect to it – this 
internalised legitimacy which is crucial to the operation of a Secondary Rule of 
Recognition fails on its own terms. Individuals must have intelligible and 
objectively grounded reasons to accept the content of such a rule; if such reasons 
are absent, then the Primary Rules of Obligation governed by the Secondary 
Rule regress to the status of a sovereign command backed by threat. This is 
something Hart himself suggests is not on its own sufficient for a successful legal 
system. I am of the belief that the introduction of a moral component to the 
Rule of Recognition is the only way of overcoming such a difficulty. This is 
something with which Hart would disagree, so before I discuss in greater detail 
why I belief Hart’s rebuttal to be false, it is worth spending some time discussing 
Hart’s own views on the interplay between Law and Morality further. 
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3.2.2 Morality and Law in Hart 
 
Hart writes from the classical positivist viewpoint that there is no necessary 
connection between Law and Morality. He holds that there are four central 
features to any code which is able to be classified as moral which can be 
juxtaposed against features which are necessarily present in any legal system. 
These are as follows:  
i) The Importance of Moral Rules. Such rules must be valued as of 
supreme importance by those who accept them on an internal 
point of view in that moral obligations are prioritised despite the 
burdens they may place upon the individual. It is therefore vital 
that such rules be retained. Conversely it is not an essential 
feature of a legal rule that it be retained; if the community wishes 
to dispose of a law then it may do so according to the procedures 
laid out in its Secondary Rule of Recognition, but the law would 
remain valid and enforceable until a repeal following the 
established procedure took place. 
ii) Moral Rules’ Immunity from Deliberate Change. It is a central 
feature of a legal system that new laws can be introduced and 
obsolete ones may be repealed. No such procedure for deliberate 
change can be said to exist in a moral code. 
iii) The Voluntary Character of Moral Offences. If a moral rule is 
breached by an individual who has done so either accidentally or 
unintentionally, then no moral blame can be attributed to them. 
This is not always true of legal rules, as demonstrated by the 
existence of legislation which operates on the basis of strict 
liability.  
iv) The Specific Form of Moral Pressure. Appeals made against 
conduct would breach a moral code are generally grounded in a 
warning of the immoral nature of the act itself. This can be 
contrasted with the warnings which generally surround conduct 
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which is categorised as illegal, which general takes the form of 
highlighting the sanctions enforced against such behaviour.122 
In thus defining the specific features of a moral code, Hart hopes to differentiate 
them from those features which are commonly present within legal systems. He 
does, however, concede that the operation of both moral and legal obligations 
can share a common purpose: 
Characteristically, moral obligation and duty, like many legal rules, 
concern what is to be done or not to be done in circumstances constantly 
recurring in the life of the group, rather than in rare or intermittent 
activities on deliberately selected occasions.123 
In addition to making this concession, Hart also suggests that a narrower 
component of morality, Justice, is somehow intertwined within our idea of law. 
To help shed light on this connection, Hart defines Justice as having a dual 
aspect. Firstly, a constant feature which holds that all like cases should be treated 
alike, and secondly a more fluid notion that criteria must exist by which it can 
be decided which cases are and are not alike.124 He suggests that the second 
notion is often present within legal systems in addition to the first, which allows 
us to apply laws in certain situations but not others whilst retaining an overall 
just result: 
Laws which exclude from the franchise, or withhold the power to make 
wills or contracts from children, or the insane, are regarded as just 
because such persons lack the capacity, which sane adults are presumed 
to have, to make rational use of these facilities.125 
Laws which have historically been discriminatory against a certain class also 
grounded this discrimination in the perceived inability of said class to possess an 
equal capacity to make decisions than that required to legitimately attain the 
desired outcome. Therefore, ‘…equal capacity for a particular function is the 
criterion of justice in the case of such law…’126 He therefore limits the moral 
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scope of justice to ‘one segment of morality primarily concerned not with 
individual conduct, but with the ways in which classes of individuals are 
treated.’127 
It is initially unclear why Hart attempts to limit the moral content of a perception 
of Justice in this way. Such a principle of treating like cases alike may be equally 
phrased in terms of non-discrimination, a concept which itself fits an analysis of 
the effect of moral duties given by Hart later in the same book; ‘It seems clear 
that the sacrifice of personal interest which some rules demand is the price which 
must be paid in a world such as ours for living with others.’128 To attempt to 
understand why Hart sought to so limit the moral scope of Justice, it may be 
beneficial to remind ourselves of what Hart believes the principles upon which 
a Natural Law position which believes the concepts of Law and Morality are 
fundamentally intertwined would be: 
i) Human vulnerability. Of primary concern is the idea that, unless 
basic prohibitions exist which restrict our ability to harm others, 
no action would be possible. If people are harmed, they are 
unable to act; restrictions are therefore justified.  
ii) The Approximate Equality of Individuals. 
iii) Limited Altruism amongst Individuals. 
iv) Limited Resources available to Individuals. 
v) Individuals’ limited understanding of all outcomes of action and 
a flawed strength of will necessitates voluntary cooperation in a 
coercive system.129 
This list of explanations which a Natural Law system may give for justifying the 
connection between law and morality deserves close attention. For reasons of 
space however, I am limiting myself to a brief discussion of two of these criteria. 
Firstly, I wish to make it explicit that his second criterion matches his definition 
of the purpose of a sense of Justice within a positivist legal system; it cannot 
therefore be said to exclusive to Natural Law positions. Secondly, criterion five 
looks remarkably similar to what our earlier discussion discerns as necessary for 
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the acceptance of a Rule of Recognition, namely that it should be popularly 
accepted in order to temper the excesses of sovereign authority backed by 
threat.130 It too, therefore, is not exclusive to the Natural Law position. 
Hart, as previously discussed, would claim that this criterion for accepting a Rule 
of Recognition need not be moral. Such a claim may be supported by the 
discussion of the essential features of morality listed at the beginning of this 
section – but this list is something to which we should return. After laying out 
these essential features, Hart tells us that he has deliberately excluded a fifth 
feature commonly claimed by other theorists – that moral claims must survive 
rational criticism in order to constitute an obligation. He justifies this exclusion 
with the claim that moral claims frequently fail such a test, yet are still internally 
accepted as morally binding by those who accept them. To identify an objective 
moral standard which can survive rational criticism is impossible in a pluralistic 
world, and therefore should not be viewed as an essential feature of morality.131  
 
In making this claim, Hart shows that his definition of morality is one which is 
collective, rather than critical in nature; he holds that a rule’s observance is the 
key to its status as moral, as opposed to its philosophical validity. He thus has a 
very different conception of morality to that which has been put forward by 
Gewirth at the beginning of this chapter. In order to demonstrate the superiority 
of the Gewirthian account, we must therefore demonstrate why Hart’s account 
is deficient and should be rejected. To do this, let us return to the claim in 
question – that practice is essential for moral validity, as opposed to rational 
identification. Such a claim is clearly nonsense, as will be demonstrated. Firstly, 
if true, the proposition requires that the concept of moral disapproval be one 
which could not exist; the adoption of a particular practice by the majority of a 
population should be enough to answer the question of whether it were morally 
permissible. It seems unlikely that Hart would endorse a practice as moral if it 
required the slaughter of all blue-eyed babies at birth, so we might reasonably 
discard this interpretation. Yet this rejection is impossible without recognising a 
normative element to moral obligation; one ought not to endorse this 
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proposition, therefore a higher normative claim must exist which overrides it. 
This observation precludes the location of moral normativity in the collective 
practice of a norm, shifting its foundation to one of critical reflection and 
rational identification. This simple use of logic demonstrates that Hart’s opening 
commitment to collective morality is too sweeping in its rejection of critical 
morality, and does not constitute a real engagement with the issue of whether or 
not an objective and categorically binding moral principle such as that identified 
by Gewirth  may exist. Hart would, of course, claim that to impose such a moral 
criterion in a legal sphere would not correspond to legal reality: 
It seems clear that nothing is to be gained in the theoretical or scientific 
study of law as a social phenomenon by adopting the narrower concept, 
as it would lead us to exclude certain rules even though they exhibit all 
the other complex characteristics of law.132 
Yet again however, such a claim fails to fully engage with the possibility that an 
objective and categorically binding moral criterion has been identified in the 
PGC. Should such a principle exist, there seems no reason as to why it should 
be limited merely to the spheres of morality and Natural Law. Indeed, it can be 
argued that such a principle would function precisely as the Rule of Recognition 
within a legal system – thus endorsing the claim made by Beyleveld and 
Brownsword in Chapter Three.133 For if both law and morality seek to restrict 
human conduct, laws must subscribe to a Rule of Recognition to temper their 
content from abuse by absolute sovereign power backed by threat, and those 
living under a Rule of Recognition must have a valid reason for following it 
beyond mere coercion, a categorically binding moral reason would provide just 
such a reason. Hart would, of course, disagree, arguing that this would limit 
unrealistically limit law to a narrow sphere which is not representative of its 
operation in the real world. The next section will attempt to establish that such 
a view is founded on Hart’s reliance on a purely positivist definition of law as 
opposed to one which is truly neutral.  
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3.2.3  A Circular Definition 
 
Let us recap with a restatement of what Hart holds are the two minimum 
necessary and sufficient conditions required for the existence of a legal system: 
 On the one hand, those rules of behaviour which are valid according to 
the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, 
on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal 
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively 
accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its 
officials.134  
As I have suggested in the previous two sub-sections, this definition appears to 
be incomplete. Hart simultaneously suggests that a Rule of Recognition should 
be accepted as common public standards of public behaviour by the officials 
within a given system without identifying any reasons for which such standards 
should be accepted. If the purpose of such a rule is to provide a reason for 
popular acceptance of Primary Rules, we can infer that the reasons identified by 
a system’s officials for following Rule of Recognition must themselves be 
accepted by the population subject to the Primary Rules in question; without 
this, they would not serve their function of tempering the excesses of sovereign 
authority backed by threats. By failing to provide such a reason for acceptance 
of the Rule of Recognition, Hart therefore introduces a circular definition to his 
argument which is skewed in favour of the positivist conception of law. 
Let us expand upon this criticism with an identification of what form such a 
Rule of Recognition may take. Green summarises Hart’s position that in the 
United Kingdom, the Rule of Recognition may take the form that whatever the 
Queen in Parliament enacts is law, but acknowledges that such a rule would 
differ from system to system. Significantly, he goes on to suggest that such rules 
may not be accepted purely by historical convention, but on a belief that it is 
central to our culture or serves a higher purpose such as democracy. 135 This 
exposes clearly exposes the flaw in Hart’s definition, as appeals to such higher 
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purposes presupposes that they themselves hold normative importance as 
goods. This point is argued forcefully by Fuller, who holds that the Rule of 
Recognition must contain a moral standard, as its efficacy requires it to be 
derived from ‘a general acceptance, which in turn rests ultimately on a perception 
that [it is] right and necessary.’136 
Hart would, of course, deny this necessary connection. Such a moral content 
would be possible, but not essential, to the valid operation of a Rule of 
Recognition. Indeed, the only circumstances in which a moral core would be 
present within such a Rule would be if the Rule itself stated such a connection 
was required. 137 Yet this does not address the central problem raised within the 
idea, that a positivist conception of law fails to give a normative reason as to why 
a such a Rule should be accepted beyond that of coercion. If we accept that 
Primary Rules of Obligation form an essential part of law, then we accept that a 
purpose of law is to control individual action. If nobody feels an obligation to 
follow such primary rules then, to use Kelsen’s terminology, they lack efficacy. 
What, then, is the point of claiming that a law exists when nobody follows it due 
to a lack of efficacy? Hart would claim that we should differentiate the inefficacy 
of a law from general disregard, but it is unclear what criteria he would take into 
account in making such a distinction.138  It appears that any attempt to make 
such a distinction takes as its starting point a positivist definition of law, one 
which therefore means that the presuppositions upon which Hart establishes his 
theory are those which he hopes his theory will prove. The circularity of his 
argument is therefore evident. 
Another reading of Hart is possible, however. He comments on his idea of Rule 
of Recognition that: 
In a modern legal system where there are a variety of ‘sources’ of law, 
the rule of recognition is correspondingly more complex [than sovereign 
authority backed by threat]: the criteria for identifying the law are 
multiple and commonly include a written constitution, enactment by a 
legislature, and judicial precedents. In most cases, provision is made for 
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possible conflict by ranking these criteria in an order of relative 
subordination and primacy.139 
In acknowledging that a normative hierarchy of sources may exist, Hart 
therefore presupposes that criteria must exist by which such a hierarchy may be 
established. He further backs up this assertion with his claim that the Rule of 
Recognition in any system is rarely expressed in a single and concrete rule, and 
that the use of such unstated Rules by, for example, Courts, is typical of the 
internal viewpoint necessary to feel bound to follow the law.140 Again, by 
introducing the Internal aspect to the Rule of Recognition, Hart appears to 
presupposing shared norms on the part of Officials against which such decisions 
can be subjected. As previously suggested, Hart would argue that this connection 
may exist, but is not necessary for a Rule of Recognition to apply. I hope 
however that it has been established that it is not merely the application of a 
Rule of Recognition which Hart should aim to demonstrate, but its efficacy – 
and his theory has failed to demonstrate this on its own terms. The efficacy of 
the Rule of Recognition is, again, only ensured by its being complaint with the 
PGC. 
 
4 Conclusion. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold; to defend the PGC against 
philosophical attacks against its validity and to demonstrate that it necessarily 
operates as the normative source in two classical positivist accounts of the 
concept of law. It began by considering the sceptical positions taken by Bernard 
Williams, concluding that his scepticism as to the validity of the principle is 
misguided and based on mischaracterisations of the dialectically necessary 
argument. The same has been shown to be true for Nietzsche, Freidman, Foot, 
Leiter and Enoch. In the absence of any valid philosophical objections to the 
contrary, the PGC should therefore be seen to be valid. We should therefore see 
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the PGC as providing a categorically binding exclusionary reason for us to act, 
necessitating that the statement (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ) must be true.  
This chapter then attempted to identify the failures present in the theories of 
both Kelsen and Hart; namely, that their respective concepts of the Basic Norm 
and Secondary Rule of Recognition fail to provide a real normative reason as to 
why individuals should accept them as binding upon their conduct. Both rely on 
a circular, positivist definition of law, and therefore operationally rely on the 
separation of law and morality they later seek to prove. Should the PGC be 
identified as a supreme constitutional principle by which the validity of laws 
should be assessed, obeying a law which is compliant with its requirements 
becomes a rational obligation on the individual,141  especially if such a system is 
legitimised through the electoral process envisaged by Gewirth.142 
Such a principle becomes categorically binding on the individual through its 
reliance on reason rather than a subjectively identified supreme source. For 
Gewirth, this reliance on reason is irrefutable; for even if it is to be rejected by 
or checked for its validity against a subjective source such as religious faith, 
reason is still used in this process. The agent therefore still employs their agency, 
leading to the dialectically necessary argument contained within the PGC that 
the ‘ought’ is derived from the normative necessity of agency.143 Only by 
reference to a dialectically necessary and categorically binding principle of 
morality can a truly universal normative foundation be identified in which the 
validity of law can be assessed regardless of the system being subjected to 
analysis. The PGC therefore should be seen as the plug in Kelsen and Hart’s 
theories which legitimises the Basic Norm and Secondary Rule of Recognition 
for those who seek reasons for compliance with the Static Theory of Law or 
Primary Rules of Obligation. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Reasons, Law and all that Raz. 
 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
No critique of contemporary jurisprudence would be complete without paying 
attention to the work of Joseph Raz. His writing has been hugely influential in 
the field, in a large part due to its almost all-encompassing scope – very few legal 
philosophers have paid as much attention to the entire breadth of legal enterprise 
as he has over the course of his long career. It is this very breadth that makes an 
overview of Raz’s work all the more pertinent in the current project as, like 
Gewirth, Raz has also seen the axiomatic connection between law and agency as 
one which has been overlooked in the traditional dichotomy between Legal 
Positivists and Natural Lawyers.  
 
The present chapter will therefore be less concerned with where on this 
spectrum Raz’s theorising falls; indeed, due to the scope of his writing it would 
be incredibly difficult to thus categorise him – something he would undoubtedly 
be pleased with given his own irritation with the persistent urge of authors to 
categorise all jurisprudential theories as belonging wholly to one or the other 
camp. Instead, the focus of this section will be to explore Raz’s work from the 
bottom up. It will begin by examining his multiple writings on the nature of 
reasons for action. It will firstly explore Raz’s ideas of what it means to undertake 
action and what reasons can influence us, as agents, in our decisions on what 
course of action to undertake. This will lead us to a discussion of Raz’s 
conception of normativity, and to what extent normative reasons differ from 
non-normative reasons in our deliberations on action. Once any differences in 
the reasons thus described have been identified, the first part of this chapter will 
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conclude with an overview of Raz’s beliefs on how reasons for action interact 
with one-another. Of particular interest in this last section will be the 
introduction of moral norms and the effect that they have on an agent’s ability 
to choose multiple courses of action. Throughout this section on reasons, Raz’s 
theories will be assessed for their conformity with the PGC as outlined in 
previous chapters. Should Raz’s writings prove to be non-compliant with the 
PGC then these conflicts shall be identified and, where possible, remedied in 
order to ensure that Razian Reasoning (and any conflicts present within it) can 
operate in full compliance with the PGC.  
 
Having established a PGC compliant explanation of reasons for action in the 
Razian tradition, we will have presented a unified conception of reasons for 
action in opposition to the distinct legal and moral reasons presumed by Raz. 
The second half of the chapter will, upon this unification, move to discuss the 
impact of this on Raz’s writings on law with the aim of demonstrating that Raz’s 
theories are, on a sympathetic reading, more consistent with Inclusive Positivism 
than the Exclusive Positivist tradition with which they are more closely 
associated.  Conscious of the fact that Beyleveld and Brownsword have already 
dedicated time to a Gewirthian analysis of Raz’s Theory of Law as expressed in 
his earlier work,1 the main focus of this work will be on Raz’s works which were 
published after Law as a Moral Judgment. Firstly, it will examine Raz’s writings on 
the Nature of Law itself and how the concept, for him, interacts with that of 
Morality.  This will lead into a critical view of Raz’s focus on the importance of 
the Legal Point of View for any coherent theory of the nature of law – this point 
in particular will be critiqued with reference to the previous analysis of Raz’s 
work on reasons as modified to be compliant with Gewirthian moral theory. An 
overview of Raz’s conception of legal normativity will follow this critique, and 
will itself be assessed for its compliance with the requirements of the PGC. Once 
this conflation has taken place the chapter will move on to discuss the 
importance Raz places on Legal Systems and whether this can sidestep the 
Gewirthian critiques outlined in the previous section, before closing with a 
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discussion on whether such a modified theory would give rise to any prima facie 
obligation to follow the law. 
 
It should be noted at the outset of this chapter that Raz has attempted to dismiss 
Gewirthian conceptions of legal validity,2 but that his reasons for this rejection 
should not be considered to be a serious attempt to engage with the normative 
issue which forms the basis of the contention between Natural Lawyers and 
Legal Positivists. Raz begins by noting his scepticism of Gewirth’s project to 
justify the existence of human rights, commenting that Gewirth’s claim that we 
possess human rights by our status as human has ‘long been recognised to be 
logically flawed.’ 3 Yet Raz’s hostility should be countered for two reasons. 
Firstly, Raz takes Gewirth’s statement out of the context in which it was written, 
framing the quote as a given facet of Gewirthian theory rather than the question 
Gewirth originally posed it as. The true quote is merely a preface to Chapter One 
of Gewirth’s Human Rights, and reads as follows: 
We may assume, as true by definition, that human rights are rights that 
all persons have simply insofar as they are human. But are there any such 
rights? How, if at all, do we know what they are? What is their scope or 
content, and how are they related to one another? Are any of them 
absolute, or may each of them be overridden in certain circumstances? 4 
Secondly, even had the statement been one which Gewirth did hold himself to, 
Raz does not give any reasons as to why he believes it to be logically flawed – he 
merely states that it is. Nowhere in the essay does Raz engage with the 
substantive argument put forward by Gewirth in Reason and Morality, 
subsequently developed by Beyleveld and laid out in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
Instead, Raz merely criticises general features he believes traditional theories 
justifying the existence of Human Rights can be seen to possess: 
1. Human Rights are derived from a basic feature possessed by humans 
which is necessary to all value in human life; 
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2. Human Rights claim to be basic moral rights; 
3. Traditional theories pay too little attention to the difference between 
the status of a claim as being valuable and its being a right; and 
4. Traditional theories are individualistic in nature, and pay too little 
attention to the existence of community rights. 5 
Raz goes on to explain that he feels such theories necessarily fail because of a 
central misconception of the relationship between what it is to value something 
and to claim it as a right.6 He suggests that he believes that Gewirth ‘ignores 
possibility of believing that certain conditions are essential to our life, and even 
of striving to secure such conditions, without either claiming or having a right 
to them.’ 7 Unhelpfully for his argument, he does not provide examples of what 
such conditions might be. In the absence of a concrete example to the contrary 
we must acknowledge that the dialectically necessary argument proposed by 
Gewirth remains intact; that the fact of our agency requires us to claim our 
GCAs as rights. Instead of addressing this issue, Raz instead moves on to attack 
the GCAs Gewirth identifies – suggesting that the fact that slaves are still capable 
of exercising agency through performing actions is evidence that freedom is not 
a necessary condition of human purposive action.8 Such a proposition again 
either misses its target or attacks a deliberately erected straw man, and fails for 
two reasons. Firstly, Raz ignores the purposiveness required by an agent for full 
exercise of their freedom; he therefore does not address the fact that a slave 
would not be able to truly engage in human purposive action, and is therefore 
not free in any meaningful sense of the term. Secondly, if Raz were to dispute 
this narrower conception of freedom, then his own statement must be taken to 
its logical conclusion; this would hold that, were freedom a necessary element of 
human purposive action, then the practice of slavery would be one that would 
not exist. Yet nowhere is this an argument that Gewirth has proposed; Gewirth 
is attempting to demonstrate that, in denying freedom to agents, the practice of 
slavery is one that should be regarded as morally impermissible were it to be 
practiced.  
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Having demonstrated that Raz’s failure to engage substantively with the PGC 
requires us to disregard his criticism of Gewirthian theory, this chapter can 
continue on the assumption that Raz has not made a serious attempt to disprove 
the dialectical necessity of the PGC. It should therefore be seen to be valid unless 
Raz can demonstrate otherwise. 
 
2 Raz on Reasons 
 
Previous sections of this thesis have already highlighted the centrality of action 
to any successful theory of law. Gewirth’s PGC itself chooses this as its starting 
point because of the centrality of agency and action to all aspects of life. If then, 
as Gewirthian theory claims, the simple statement of ‘I do X for purpose E’9 can 
be the foundation of a categorically binding limitation on action, then any theory 
of action must allow within it this same formulation. The starting point of our 
discussion of Raz will therefore focus on this same starting point; if an agent 
acts in order to attain a purpose E, what reasons can influence his right to attain 
E in the first place? More importantly, does an agent need to reason in a 
particular way in order to attain a given end; put differently, what is the 
connection between reason and rationality? And what impact, if any, does this 
connection have on any theory of action which either considers itself to be 
limited, or is necessarily limited, by the PGC? The former issues are ones which 
Raz tackles directly in his writing and will be outlined below, with comments 
made as the theories progress with regards to their compatibility with the PGC.  
 
2.1   On the Nature of Reasons 
 
Raz, as has been mentioned above, is particularly of interest to the Gewirthian 
project given the extensive writing he has undertaken on the idea of reasons for 
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action. In his early work he stated correctly that, in ordinary conversation, a 
single reason is very rarely provided for a course of action and, if it is, it itself 
rarely is the only reason on which we act; we more regularly only state some, as 
opposed to all reasons we have to act in a given way, dictated by pragmatic 
considerations such as the nature and scope of the conversation in question. 10 
A complete reason for agent p to x would, he suggests, only exist if R(Φ)p, x 
also entailed R(Φ)q, y – or if the same reason to act (R(Φ)) exists for both p and 
q to attain end goal x and y, a perfect and complete reason exists.11 Yet such 
perfect reasons are rare if not impossible, as even those reasons which would 
trump all others definitionally need to conflict with opposing reasons in order 
to come out on top. Reasons then, for Raz, are not clear cut and necessarily 
come into conflict with one another.   
 
Following this scepticism to its conclusion, we may infer that Raz may also be 
sceptical of the simplicity of the first step of the dialectically necessary 
Gewirthian argument that an agent must X for purpose E; the very fact that the 
agent desires E being the reason for him to X. If Raz’s scepticism to this point 
holds, then Gewirth’s argument fails. Section 2.1 of this chapter will therefore 
examine Raz’s writings on the nature of reasons. It will firstly consider the 
problem of false beliefs, and whether these are capable of being valid reasons 
for action. It will then move on to discuss the conflict which Raz places on 
differing types of reasons to ask whether such a conflict is problematic for the 
Gewirthian project. Lastly, Raz’s work on Exclusive Reasons for Action will be 
considered in light of the identified conflicts, in order to identify the logical 
foundations of Raz’s thoughts on Normative Reasons to be discussed in section 
2.2.  
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2.1 .1  Reasons founded on false belief 
 
Bruno Celano asks us to consider the following question: ‘If John takes an 
umbrella because he believes it will rain, is the reason for his taking it his belief 
it will rain or the fact it will rain?’12 Put another way, when we act upon a belief 
as opposed to a fact, does this affect the validity of the reason for which we act? 
Raz suggests that this may affect the validity of the reason for action, arguing 
that ‘If p is the case, then the fact I do not believe that p does not establish that 
p is not a reason for me to perform some action. The fact that I am not aware 
of any reason does not show that there is none.’13 Yet Celano suggests here that 
in claiming that an objective fact would trump a mistaken belief as a reason even 
if the agent were unaware of the truism in question, Raz mischaracterises how 
agents normally behave. He claims that such objectivism cannot account for 
relations between reason statements (There is a reason for X to Φ) and 
judgements of practical rationality (Given the circumstances, X’s Φ -ing was 
rational). As such, Celano holds that beliefs to circumstances are more often 
motivations to action than are facts, and as such are more compelling reasons 
for action. 14 
 
This certainly appears to be a more accurate description of how agents behave 
than Raz’s alternative; that an agent may be unaware of a reason to behave in a 
certain way, or be mistaken in his belief that a reason exists for him to behave in 
a particular way, but this does not mean an objective reason does not exist which 
provides a reason which overrides the unawareness of the agent or the mistaken 
belief he possesses.15 Celano observes that such a characterisation suggests that 
practical rationality should not be assessed internally from the agent’s 
perspective, but against an external and objective standpoint. 16 Yet this is not 
how agents behave; Celano claims that, should an agent be asked whether they 
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Φ because of a belief in p or the fact that p exists, most would choose the former. 
The reason suggested is that expression of a belief in something necessarily 
contains a claim that our belief is true and that we view it as an objective fact; 
were this not the case, we would not hold it as a belief. 17 
 
Such a claim as to the validity of statements founded on a false belief is more 
satisfactory to a Gewirthian than Raz’s insistence on a difference in the validity 
of the two; the first step of the PGC, that I do X for purpose E, makes no 
reference to the validity of the reason as to why the agent wishes to undertake 
E. As such, the truth or falsehood of the motivation bears no relation on the 
desire the agent to undertake the action in question. All that this first step of the 
dialectically necessary argument requires is that an agent is motivated, for 
whatever reason, to undertake a given action for the pursuit of a given end. Were 
Celano to be able to prove his assertion that this element of Raz’s theory was 
founded on a mischaracterisation of agency, then this would be beneficial.  
 
This is something which he attempts to do by identifying three hypothetical 
scenarios to demonstrate the link between reason statements and practical 
rationality – something he believes Raz’s characterisation fails to account for: 
1. X has no reason to Φ, he believes he has one, and he Φ -s 
2. X has a reason to Φ, he believes he has that reason, and he Φ -s 
3. X has a reason to Φ, he doesn’t believe he has one, and he Φ –s      
18 
Celano claims that hypotheses 1 and 2 both demonstrate how an agent would 
behave. The first demonstrates an agent acting on a false belief for a certain end. 
Such a statement should be read in light of Celano’s earlier observation that a 
claim to belief necessarily contains a truth-claim; since the agent therefore 
believes he has a reason to Φ then it would still be rational for him to act upon 
it regardless of the reason proving to be false. The second claim demonstrates 
that if an agent holds a true belief then it too would be a rational reason to Φ. 
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The third and final hypothesis is a statement of Raz’s theory that an objective, 
true reason to Φ should override the false belief which the agent has that he has 
no reason to Φ, meaning the agent Φ -s despite not believing he has a reason to 
do so. In demonstrating this, Celano thus identifies a flaw in Raz’s argument that 
beliefs are not necessarily reasons for action. Mistaken beliefs, holds Celano, can 
still be reasonably held – it therefore follows that an agent who performs Φ on 
a mistaken belief was acting rationally.19  This is something which Raz would 
reject in that it ignores the objective nature of reasons. 
 
This disagreement between Raz and Celano is therefore one which is of 
relevance to the Gewirthian project. Given that the PGC claims to provide an 
objective framework against which the permissibility of action should be 
assessed then one might expect a Gewirthian to be more sympathetic to the 
objective account of reasons given by Raz. Yet it is difficult to accept this given 
the inherent disconnect between reason statements and practical rationality 
identified by Celano in Raz’s objection. Yet to accept Celano may be seen to 
concede that reasons are inherently subjective and cannot be constrained by an 
objective reason for which the agent is unaware.  A critic may therefore raise an 
objection to the PGC in that, if Celano is correct, then if an agent does not 
believe that he should act in conformity with the PGC despite being obliged to 
do so, then as long as he had a good reason for acting on this belief then he has 
a valid reason to act against its requirements. This argument can be dismissed 
however, on two key misunderstandings of how the PGC operates. Firstly, the 
objection would be correctly directed at a stage of the argument which does not 
require a reason to be assessed for its validity. The first stage of the PGC is 
entirely value-neutral with regards to the action being undertaken; all it requires 
is that a desire exists which an agent acts upon in order for it to be satisfied. Any 
objection based on the rationality or reasonableness of the desire and the truth 
or falsehood of the motivating belief is then, at this stage, redundant – all that 
matters is that the desire exists and is acted upon. Secondly, even were we to 
allow for this misunderstanding and aim the criticism at the entire formulation 
then it would still fail. The objection relies on Celano’s idea that an agent should 
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have a reasonable belief that the PGC does not apply to their action; yet, given 
that the PGC operates on a dialectically necessary argument stemming from a 
value-neutral statement of bare agency, it is impossible that such a belief could 
exist. In undertaking any action an agent is necessarily using their agency; they 
are therefore rationally committed to seeing it as important to them. In acting 
contrary to the PGC they are claiming that their agency is not important – 
something which is patently false as their very attempting to act contrary to the 
PGC entails making the opposite claim. It is therefore logically impossible for 
an agent to act contrary to the PGC based on a belief which is reasonable. We 
can therefore see that Celano’s argument appears to be PGC compliant, and that 
any claim to the otherwise is based on attacking a straw man.   
 
This therefore demonstrates that a Gewirthian can accept Celano’s criticism of 
Raz without damaging the integrity of the PGC. This is important as a key 
problem does exist with Raz’s account of false beliefs. It does not make sense 
to suggest that an agent who does not believe he has a reason to Φ would still 
Φ, therefore creating a link between reason statements and practical rationality. 
Agents act rationally if they believe they have a reason to Φ and Φ, or do not 
believe they have a reason to Φ so do not Φ. All of this can be accounted for by 
the PGC. 
 
2.1 .2  Differing types of Reasons. 
 
Having identified that Raz is incorrect in claiming that there is no connection 
between practical rationality and reason statements, we should now move on to 
consider Raz’s ideas on different types of reasons which might exists. The idea 
of a plurality of reasons is central to Raz’s work. For although he simply defines 
reasons for action as ‘[F]acts that constitute a case for (or against) the 
performance of an action.’20, this definition is prior to the idea that reasons can 
wither be successful or unsuccessful depending on whether or not the agent 
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accepts them as the foundation upon which to Φ. Action is therefore necessarily 
pursued after a process of deliberation during which competing reasons vie with 
one another for primacy. If reasons can compete in this way to be accepted by 
an agent, then it is reasonable to infer that different types of reasons might exist 
– some of which possess more weight than others. Raz believes such reasons 
can be classified in three broad categories:  
1. Conclusive Reasons: p is a conclusive reason for x to Φ iff p is a 
reason for x to Φ (which has not been cancelled) and there is no q 
that overrides p. 
2. Absolute Reasons: p is an absolute reason for x to Φ iff there cannot 
be a q which overrides p 
3. Prima Facie Reasons: Ones which are neither conclusive nor 
absolute21 
These three types of reasons therefore compete against one another until an 
agent chooses to act. Reasons which an agent considers when making this choice 
are labelled by Raz as operative reasons for action. Any reason which is not 
pertinent on their deliberation is held to be auxiliary.  An operative reason 
therefore exists iff a belief in its existence entails having the practical critical 
attitude (defined as the necessary inference that if an agent believes in an ought-
statement p, they necessarily do not believe conflicting beliefs), 22  and auxiliary 
reasons are any which are non-operative. 23  
 
For Raz then, an operative reason is one which an agent considers when 
choosing how to act. These can include ones which are ultimately relied on when 
choosing to act in a given way, such as absolute or conclusive reasons earlier 
described, or can be ones which are discarded as being outweighed by other 
reasons for behaving in the conflicting way.  They can therefore be prima facie, 
normative24 and complete25 in their character (although, as stated at the 
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beginning of section 2.1, such complete reasons are rare). According to Raz, an 
operative reason is only adopted as a course of action if an agent can make the 
following claim of it: ‘It is always the case that one ought, all things considered, 
to act for an undefeated reason.’26 Such a statement encapsulates the conflict of 
reasons for action which Raz claims operates between what he labels first order 
and second order reasons. First order reasons for action are reasons for which 
we undertake a given action; second order reasons are reasons to act or refrain 
from acting on first order reasons.  One should therefore only take up a course 
of action iff it is the case that their primary reasons for undertaking it are 
supported by second order reasons which justify it, and there are no second 
order exclusionary reasons to prevent us from choosing that course of action. 
The form that such exclusionary reasons are considered below in s.2.1.3; for the 
purposes of this section it is enough to simply acknowledge that, should an 
exclusionary reason exist, then it is not only operative on an agent’s choice on 
how to act but should also be viewed as an absolute reason in Raz’s earlier 
tripartite distinction.  
 
In his later work, Raz argues that these conflicting oughts which an agent is 
forced to balance against one another can be generated from a variety of reasons 
which need not be epistemic in nature; empirical reasons can exist which might 
encourage us to behave in a certain way. He gives the example of a right to vote; 
if all citizens are entitled to vote and an agent is a citizen, has a reason to see 
himself as able to vote. Raz claims this reason to behave as though one is able 
to vote is different to one which is epistemic and based entirely on norms.27 This 
further differentiation in reason types is justified by Raz by the types of 
justification which each possesses.  
 
Empirical reasons are self-evident and do not need elucidation. Epistemic 
reasons however, are different; they are governed by one overarching concern 
(whether or not the belief which justifies the concern is true), but the concern 
can be founded on multiple values – friendship, justice and the like. If such 
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epistemic reasons conflict, then if follows that some desire will always be 
unsatisfied. 28 Yet Raz questions whether or not this is a true conflict; for if 
epistemic reasons conflict then the superior reason is the one which should be 
followed, with superiority being assessed by the relative value attached to each 
reason. If a reason of lesser value is discarded then it must be seen to be a 
deficient reason and, therefore, the agent suffers no loss – and may indeed 
benefit - from having this desire left unfulfilled: 29   
[B]ecause there is no possibility that the lesser reason for belief serves a 
concern that is not better served by the better reason there is no 
possibility of preferring to follow what one takes to be the lesser reason 
rather than the better one.  
 
The point being made by Raz here can be summarised more neatly, however. 
Practical reason is, for him, a first order reason. Empirical reasoning therefore 
falls within the realm of practical reason in that is presumptively sufficient on 
determining a course of action in and of itself. Raz outlines presumptive 
sufficiency thus:  
‘[T]here is no other reason for or against so acting than (a) Φ-ing at that 
time is justified, and (b) if the agent rationally believes that the reason 
applies, and that there is no other, then his failing to try to Φ is akratic.’30 
 
 Epistemic reasoning, by contrast, is not presumptively sufficient; it is a second 
order reason which supports or defeats a first order reason. This is because 
coming to a belief based on an epistemic reason may be irrational as, presumably, 
there is no way of testing the validity of the epistemic belief in question. 
 
The distinction made here between the scope of epistemic and empirical reasons 
however is one which should be questioned for its compatibility with Raz’s 
earlier work. Once an agent has balanced operative reasons using his practical 
critical attitude in order to identify a conclusive or absolute reason to Φ, Raz 
                                                          
28 ibid 41 
29 ibid 42 
30 ibid 45 
163 
 
believes they are committed to recognising that this claim is logically equivalent, 
if not entirely synonymous with, a statement to the effect that they ought to Φ.31 
This appears to be an epistemic jump, in that Raz is suggesting that there is 
normative value in successful reasons for action regardless of whether they are 
grounded in empirical or epistemic concerns. This statement appears 
contradictory at first, but a Gewirthian approach may help to resolve the defect 
in the reasoning. For in making this claim, we can conclude then that Raz would 
also be of the opinion that his description of reasoning described above is equally 
logically equivalent to, if not synonymous with, the claim made by the first step 
of the PGC; that if an agent does X for purpose E then they must view X as 
necessary for E. A self-reflexive ought is therefore created where, if an agent 
desires E, they ought to do X.32 Both Raz and Gewirth recognise then that a 
successful reason to undertake an action imposes an ‘ought’ on the agent to 
pursue that course of action. This move from is to ought is one which Raz 
addresses head on, when he states that ‘Statements of facts which are reasons 
for the performance of a certain action by a certain agent are the premises of an 
argument the conclusion of which is that there is reason for the agent to perform 
the action or that he ought to do it.’33  
 
This is itself an epistemic claim, justifying that all reasons based on facts which 
support a course of action create a normative ought. As we established in s.2.1.1, 
such facts include all reasons which an agent believes to be true given the truth-
claim that all belief necessarily entails. This is not to say that Raz’s claims as to 
the deliberative nature of reasoning are false. But once the first step of the PGC 
is established as being equivalent to Raz’s justification for action, the categorical 
imperative provided by Gewirthian ethics can then fulfil the ancillary function 
of providing a normative background against which this balancing of reasons 
for their respective values can take place. Since Raz concedes that both epistemic 
and empirical reasoning are directed towards action, thus engaging the PGC, this 
conflation of reason types is entirely possible. This realisation leads towards the 
conclusion that, whilst the taxonomy of reasons provided by Raz certainly exists, 
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it is a value judgment which is simply not necessary for classifying reasons within 
the bare agency required for action to take place. Its importance for any theory 
of balancing reasons for action and, by extension, the nature of legal restrictions 
on our actions, is subsumed within the bare agency necessary for the PGC to 
operate. For if, as has been established previously in this thesis, the PGC does 
provide a categorical imperative against which the permissibility of all actions 
should be assessed for their permissibility, then the motivation behind choosing 
one reason as more inherently valuable than another is governed by that test and 
not an ultimately arbitrary distinction based on the nature of the reason in 
question. To insist otherwise is to misunderstand and overcomplicate the nature 
of what it is to act. 
 
2.1 .3  Exclusionary Reasons 
 
Having identified so far that to overly distinguish between reasons for action is 
superfluous with regards the noumenal agency required for the PGC to operate, 
we turn now to one specific type of reason which Raz identifies which is highly 
relevant to any reformulation of his theory to be PGC compliant – the category 
of exclusionary reasons. Raz categorises these as a second order reason which 
we can use to discount first order reasons when assessing whether or not to act 
upon them.34 Raz recognises that they may be moral in nature35 and provide a 
prima-facie reason (using his own tripartite classification) to behave in 
accordance with a moral norm. The PGC could therefore be integrated into 
Raz’s work as just such an exclusionary reason - but in his most recent writing 
on normativity he not only fails to endorse a particular moral principle, but also 
does not explore the issue of what form such a moral principle might 
theoretically take. He instead suggests a list of values which he implies are self-
evidently morally valuable – things that are good for people and experiences 
which will improve their lives are but two examples.36 So for Raz, an exclusionary 
reason could be that the proposed course of action would be bad for people; 
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this would then serve to trump all reasons which would contradict the 
exclusionary reason. The problem here is that Raz fails to provide any reason as 
to why agents should accept this particular example as valuable. Whilst we can 
conceptualise the notion of an exclusionary reason, it would be helpful if time 
were devoted to giving examples of an exclusionary reason which would apply 
to all action regardless of the subjective value judgments of the agent in question.  
 
Raz’s reticence here appears to be grounded in his previous distinction between 
first and second order reasons. For Raz an exclusionary reason is definitionally 
a second order reason given that it provides us with an absolute reason to not- 
Φ. If it is to be universal in its application however, Raz believes that an 
epistemic foundation is necessary in order to provide the normative force to act 
as a categorical imperative against which the permissibility of action can be 
assessed. This is something Raz believes normative discourse cannot achieve 
when it directed against providing the justification for practical reasoning, as our 
use of language is too flexible and context-dependent to adequately provide for 
such a universal principle.37 Previous parts of this thesis have been dedicated to 
casting doubt on the idea that semantic vagueness necessarily casts doubt on the 
meaning of words and concepts, so the argument will not be repeated here. 
Instead, the point will be conceded arguendo. Let us assume that Raz is right 
and concede that semantic vagueness is problematic regarding a normative 
justification for practical reasoning. Here, slightly more detail is needed to 
determine exactly what Raz means by the term ‘practical reasoning.’ He appears 
to endorse John Broome’s Aristotelian view:  
Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an 
action. But an action – at least a physical one – requires more than 
reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too. Intending to act is as 
close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical 
reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an intention.38 
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Such a position appears sound for our present purposes. Raz appears to be 
suggesting based on this definition that the formulation of an intention is simply 
too subjective and variable to generate an objective and universal ‘ought’ in that 
we objectively ought to do what we have the best practical reason to do. This 
appears at first to contradict his earlier claim explored in s.2.1.2 that an agent 
recognising absolute or conclusive reasons to Φ is logically consistent to, if not 
synonymous with, the agent recognising that they ought to Φ. Yet Raz attempts 
to circumvent this contradiction by saying that instead of creating an objective 
ought, the best that a practical reason can do is to generate a rational ought – 
that ‘we rationally ought to do what we have best reason to believe we have best 
reason to do.’39 Yet even this is something about which Raz is sceptical, claiming 
that the incommensurability of some reasons means that an ought is sometimes 
impossible. By extension, any normatively justified exclusionary reason which is 
grounded in practical reasoning also cannot be universal, as reasons’ 
incommensurability must also mean that in some situations a deliberation on 
reasons would remain balanced and no one course of action is preferable to 
another.  
 
Such an argument against normative obligations arising from practical reason 
grounded on incommensurability and semantic vagueness again fails on two 
counts. Firstly, on a practical level, the incommensurability described by Raz 
simply does not fit with how agents act. He gives the example of ‘Jackson 
Cases’40  or the more easily relatable problem of having to choose between 
identical cans of soup as an instance of incommensurability, as there is no reason 
to choose one more than the others. Yet if this were true then an agent would 
be stuck in a soup-based limbo, unable to decide which one to choose. When an 
agent is faced with this situation however, this is not what occurs – they generally 
do pick a can. It may be the closest can, the one on a higher or lower shelf or 
one chosen at random. Yet in picking one up an agent simply must have had a 
reason to choose that over the others (even if the reason was subsumed into a 
secondary bout of reasoning concluding in a decision to choose a random can), 
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otherwise they would still be in front of the shelf or would have walked away 
soupless. And if an agent does the latter, they are presumably doing so because 
the equilibrium provided by incommensurable reasons becomes an exclusionary 
reason against acting arbitrarily, thus breaking the claim of incommensurability 
in any case. The same can be said of incommensurability of reasons generally; if 
reasons were truly incommensurable then action would be impossible. The fact 
that we do act suggests Raz’s observation is founded on a false premise. Yet 
even were we to concede the point of incommensurability, a second reason for 
rejecting Raz’s conclusions exists in the observation that it appears to be 
founded on a misunderstanding of what an exclusionary reason grounded in a 
categorical imperative is designed to do. The PGC in particular is not designed 
to provide a reason to act in a certain way, but to refrain from certain types of 
impermissible behaviour. Framing the PGC as providing a negative duty means 
that, when presented with incommensurable reasons that are permissible, then 
it simply does not matter which course of action is chosen. There does not, 
therefore, appear to be a valid reason to agree with Raz that practical reasoning 
is too context dependent to provide a normative basis for an exclusionary reason 
for action. This conclusion is only reinforced when the principle in question is 
one which is dialectically necessary from the position of bare agency prior to the 
attachment of any value to the reasons in question, as is the case with the PGC. 
 
Having established that incommensurability of reasons is no barrier to the PGC 
acting as a valid exclusionary reason applicable to all occasions of practical 
reasoning, let us turn again to the question of whether the universal ought it 
creates is commensurable with the remainder of Raz’s work. It has previously 
been stated that, for Raz, it is axiomatic that exclusionary principles are second-
order reasons. He therefore believes that they are only of value when applied to 
a first-order reason; put another way, such exclusionary reasons only possess 
instrumental value. Such an exclusionary reason engages with a principle named 
by Raz ‘the facilitative principle’. This holds that ‘[W]hen there is an undefeated 
reason to perform an action there is also a reason to facilitate its performance.’41 
Put differently, if a conclusive reason for action is not contradictory to an 
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exclusionary reason, then a reason exists to facilitate that action. Note that this 
again a weaker claim then the earlier statement that an agent’s recognising 
absolute or conclusive reasons to Φ is logically consistent to, if not synonymous 
with, the agent recognising that they ought to Φ. It does, however, again echo 
an element of the PGC – namely that, if an agent does wish to attain end E and 
X is the means by which E is attained, then the agent is logically committed to 
viewing X as being as valuable to them as E. They must therefore value their 
Generic Conditions of Agency equally, as without these they could not perform 
X and, by extension, attain E. This Gewirthian claim as to the value agents 
should place is normative in that it obliges agents to value their Generic 
Conditions of Agency if they value E, and is therefore stronger than Raz’s claim 
that facilitative reasons are not necessarily absolute and instead only possess 
value when directed to a specified end. Raz suggests his facilitative reasons are 
analogous to Gewirth’s Generic Conditions of Agency when he makes the claim 
that: 
To have an end involves believing that it is worth having (at least other 
things being equal). That belief explains why people pursue ends. They 
take what they believe to be reasons for the ends as reasons to pursue 
the ends, and, as explained by the facilitative principle, to take steps to 
facilitate them.42  
He develops this reasoning into a stronger claim that agents are obliged to do X 
for E only when to not do X would be irrational.43 In stating this, he concludes 
that such facilitative reasoning at the normative level is subject to the same rules 
of rationality as all other normative claims.44 This claim commits Raz to 
endorsing the PGC as non-compliance with its dialectically necessary 
requirements would be the very definition of irrationality. 
Raz is therefore committed to the idea that exclusionary reasons fall within the 
sphere of practical rationality in the same way as all other reasons for action. 
They are absolute reasons, in that they trump all other courses of action which 
are contradictory. This commits the Razian agent to accepting that the 
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exclusionary reason not to act contrary to the PGC applies equally to all reasons 
under their deliberation.  
 
2.2   Normativity and Reasoning 
 
Section 2.1 has established several problems with Raz’s theories when viewed 
alongside the PGC. Some of these have been reconciled, some have been shown 
to be incompatible and yet more have been shown to be logically equivalent in 
their operation. It has been shown that all reasons, whether or not they are 
founded in a true or false belief, are all equally valid reasons for action as all 
beliefs necessarily contain truth-claims when made from the internal viewpoint 
of the agent. To categorise reasons as being normatively different depending on 
their empirical or epistemic foundation is to overcomplicate the fact of 
noumenal agency, as this is the exclusionary reason which Raz commits himself 
to recognising due to the overlap between his facilitative principle and 
recognising Generic Conditions of Agency as necessary for action as per the 
requirements of the PGC. These latter points show us that any conflict between 
reasons therefore takes place at the nexus between reasons for bare agency and 
any exclusionary reasons which might prohibit them. The second part of this 
section will therefore explore this nexus in greater detail, examining the how the 
oughts produced by reasons for action attain normative value and can therefore 
become true exclusionary reasons. 
 
Let us first return to an idea from Raz which was mentioned in s.2.1.2 – that 
reasons necessarily conflict with one another. This implies a normative hierarchy 
of reasons whereby whichever reason you have the strongest reason to act on is 
the one you ought to pursue.45 The question then arises – which reason should 
be followed in the event of a conflict? For Raz, the answer is whichever reason 
is seen to be objectively stronger than another.46 Such a test must necessarily be 
objective as, as has been previously seen, the same rules of practical reason must 
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apply equally to all agents; the reasons which an individual may believe to be the 
most important could potentially be overruled by an exclusionary reason if 
certain circumstances apply.47  
 
Such a claim opens practical reasoning to mandatory normative claims. We 
might therefore engage in a semantic shift, as normative reasons contain a claim 
that they might legitimately be used to direct behaviour away from that which is 
provided for by other reasons. They therefore constitute an ‘ought’ which might 
be appropriately labelled a rule rather than a bare reason. This is a point which 
will not be stressed at this stage as differing rules carry different normative 
weight thus rendering the semantic shift obfuscatory at this stage, yet the idea is 
worth mentioning nonetheless. What is not obfuscatory is that the idea of an 
‘ought’ is a special type of reason which merits a more in-depth discussion. Much 
has been made in s.2.1 of the fact that Raz believes that an ‘ought’ is a spectral 
presence in any kind of reasoning, in that if an agent has an absolute reason to 
Φ, Raz believes they are committed to recognising that this claim is logically 
equivalent, if not entirely synonymous with, a statement to the effect that they 
ought to Φ.48  Norms are therefore omnipresent within reasoning.   
 
Before this connection is detailed further, we must ascertain what is meant by 
the term normativity in Raz’s work. For him, the following definition applies: 
Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their 
existence constitute reasons for persons, that is, ground which make 
certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions, or actions appropriate 
or inappropriate.49 
Such a definition of normativity is incredibly broad – Raz appears to be stating 
here that he believes all reasons are normative in that they make a claim to truth 
which is capable of directing an agent to one course of action over another. 
Explaining the concept of normativity is therefore the practice of explaining 
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what it is to be a reason for action.50 The true depth of this statement is even 
greater for Raz, however – he defines rationality as the ability to recognise and 
respond to such normative demands, and furthermore holds that rationality is 
the very foundation of personhood.51 It is worth highlighting at this point that 
this appears to introduce one more similarity between Raz and Gewirth – both 
appear to hold that rationality expressed through agency is the foundation of a 
special status which distinguishes us from those beings which are not capable of 
responding to rational demands. Both perceive that a necessary connection 
exists between the capacity for rationality and normativity. 
 
Raz claims that there are four main observations which can link capacity 
rationality with normativity. Firstly Raz claims that we need capacities which do 
not directly contribute to rationality in order to act upon our rational decisions 
- he gives the examples of Perceptual Ability and the ability to control our 
movement at a bare minimum level. Secondly, he holds that the idea of 
rationality is more than an ability to reason but to understand inferences and 
premises as reasons for action in an abstract sense. Thirdly, rationality goes 
beyond our ability to engage in deliberative reason and applies reasoning to all 
functions which we undertake. Lastly, Raz believes that rationality is a unified 
concept which is identical in its operation regardless of whether it is directed 
towards practice, theory, substantive or procedural ends.52 Before we continue 
with our discussion, two things here should be examined. The first is that, in his 
primary observation, Raz seems to be continuing to agree with Gewirth that 
agency and normativity are intertwined, as the examples of capacities which are 
necessary for rational action without directly contributing to it appear to be 
categorizable as Generic Conditions of Agency which all agents are committed 
to recognising as necessary for action. The second is that Raz’s unified theory of 
rationality is not universally accepted. Derek Parfit, for one, argues that a large 
difference exists between substantive and procedural rationality; the former 
requires us to rationally desire certain things (such as our own wellbeing), 
whereas the latter merely obliges us to follow certain methods of reasoning 
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whereas our end goal is irrelevant.53 A Gewirthian should reject such a 
separation, however. For in separating reasoning thus, Parfit suggests that it 
would be rational for an agent to deny the importance of his own wellbeing in 
choosing to act. Yet a core facet of action is that all action is impossible without 
a minimum level of agential wellbeing; without this no action can take place. All 
agents are therefore committed to a minimum level of substantive rationality 
which preserves this wellbeing, at least until the action they are undertaking has 
been completed. If this minimum level of substance is always necessary, then 
Parfit’s distinction can be seen to be flawed. Raz defends his unified rationality 
thesis in what is, again, a remarkably Gewirthian sounding manner – he claims 
that rational beliefs can be identified by their opposite component of irrational 
beliefs, itself definable as existing ‘if and only if holding [such beliefs] displays 
lack of care and diligence in one’s own epistemic conduct.’54  This sounds 
logically similar to Gewirth’s claim that an agent should not act so as to 
contradict the necessity of their own agency, as to do so would be irrational – 
the only difference being that Gewirth builds this claim upwards using a 
dialectically necessary argument from bare agency whereas Raz makes a weaker 
claim of self-evidence.  
 
This conception of rationality is tied to normativity simply – if reasons are 
normative aspects of the world, rationality thus described is conceptually linked 
with how an agent responds to these reasons.55 Reasons stemming from 
emotion, desire, intention or belief can be rational, for Raz, iff they belong to 
rational agent, they are under the control of that agent and they are appropriate 
and intelligible given the reasons for and against them as perceived by the agent.56 
As was concluded in s.2.1.3, incommensurability of these reasons is no bar to 
them holding normative force – all reasons should be seen as operating on the 
same plane of rationality. All reasons then are sources of normativity in that they 
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motivate us to act according to a given directive. Thus the link between 
rationality and normativity has, for Raz, been established.57 
 
Yet if all reasons are normative in that they are action focussed, we may question 
how they may carry differing strengths. How can exclusionary reasons discussed 
above overrule other reasons if all get their normative force from the same idea 
of bare agency? How can two oughts originating from the same nexus override 
one another? Here, Raz turns to John Broome to highlight another 
categorisation of reasons beyond his original tripartite classification of 
conclusive, absolute and prima facie. Broome suggests two types of reasons 
exist. Firstly:   
[A] perfect reason for you to Φ is…a fact that explains why you ought 
to do Φ.’ Other reasons are pro tanto reasons: ‘A pro tanto reason for you 
to Φ is a fact that plays the for- Φ role in a potential or actual weighing 
explanation of why you ought to Φ, or in a potential or actual weighing 
explanation of why it is not the case that you ought to Φ and not the 
case that you ought not to Φ. 58 
Broome suggests that these reasons are respectively explanatory and normative, 
and that normative pro tanto reasons cannot exist independently of a specific 
desired outcome. Raz endorses this distinction – only with reference to a specific 
outcome can a balancing act of reasons truly take place. 59 These normative 
reasons for and against the action in question outweigh one another, in case of 
conflict, by simple mathematics: 
[T]here are reasons for you to Φ and reasons for you not to Φ. Each 
reason is associated with a number that represents its weight. The 
numbers associated with the reasons to Φ add up to more than the 
numbers associated with the reasons not to Φ. That is why you ought to 
Φ.60 
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This should be questioned for two reasons. Firstly, the operative distinction 
between epistemic and empirical reasoning put forward by Raz has already been 
called into question in s.2.1.2. Since it is not immediately obvious how Broome’s 
distinction between perfect and pro tanto reasons differs from Raz’s as previously 
discussed, we should reject it for the same reasons. Secondly, it is not 
immediately apparent how Broome proposes the relative value weightings to his 
pro tanto reasons are assigned. If, as his distinction suggests, these reasons are 
only conceptually sound when proffered with regards to a specific end, then are 
they to be judged by reference to this end? If so, then what measure is being 
used to assess the desirability of the end in question? Value is therefore either 
presupposed by Broome as self-evident, or a reference point for normative value 
external to the distinction is necessary. To identify what this might be, we should 
look back to Raz to ask whether any absolute oughts are capable of existing. He 
suggests there are only two – definitionally conceptual truths and absolute moral 
truths. 61 Raz here welcomes that an absolute moral truth, if identifiable, could 
act as such a reference point against which such pro tanto reasons could be 
assessed for their validity. For our purposes then, we have found yet another 
example of where the PGC could be successfully integrated into Raz’s theories 
of reasons and rationality in order to provide value to the reasons considered by 
agents in their deliberations. This must feed into the normative/explanatory 
nexus as an explanatory feature which is recognised by the agent as a reason for 
thus acting.62 
 
To summarise so far, Raz holds that normative reasons are ones which guide 
agents’ actions. He does not, however, believe that normativity and rationality 
are necessarily linked as he holds there is no reason to act rationally.63 This seems 
odd in light of the discussion which has taken place so far. To demonstrate why 
this premise is not one which we should necessarily accept, the opposite position 
shall be put forward here with reference to Raz’s writings with the aim of 
demonstrating that Raz’s writings should in fact recognise a normative reason to 
act rationally in order to remain logically consistent.  A good point to begin an 
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examination of the claim that normative reasons are connected with rationality 
is to suggest that, in order to be a strong motivational factor a normative reason 
must be rational as central to the idea of the rationality of the motivating factor 
is that the agent recognises the motivational force inherent in the norm.64 In 
order for a normative reason to motivate us to action then, agents must be 
imbued with reason to recognise that the norm provides a reason for action. 65 
Reason and rationality are therefore conceptually linked. Raz partially accepts 
the definition of reason provided by Paul Grice to arrive at this conclusion: 
No less intuitive than the idea of thinking of reason as the faculty which 
equip us to recognize and operate with reasons is the idea of thinking of 
it as the faculty which empowers us to engage in reasoning… Indeed if 
reasoning should be characterizable as the occurrence or production of 
a chain of inferences, and if such chains consist in (sequentially) arriving 
at conclusions which are derivable from some initial set of premises, and 
for the acceptance of which, therefore, these premises are, or are thought 
to be, reasons, the connection between these two ideas is not 
accidental.66 
Reasoning is therefore necessary for reasons to be recognised as having 
normative force and for it to be viewed as rational to follow them. Indeed, Raz 
defines irrationality thus: ‘[W]hen and because one non-accidentally fails to 
respond appropriately to reasons, and the failure is, is due to, a failure or 
malfunction of one’s rational powers.’67 Some may criticise this idea of 
irrationality as being derivative from external stimuli, so to remove this potential 
ambiguity Raz further defines non-derivative irrationality as existing when: 
People who recognize a conclusive reason to Φ…and who fail to 
respond to it at all, fail … to form an intention to Φ, have no positive 
attitude at all towards Φ-ing, do not respond appropriately to other 
people Φ-ing, e.t.c., are non-derivatively irrational.68 
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Such a failure to respond to reasons takes place on the plane of reasoning, and 
is therefore within the realm of reason rather than derivative of a value ascribed 
to an end. Yet Raz would claim that such a connection of non-derivative 
irrationality (and by extension non-derivative rationality) is applicable to norms, 
thus proving the starting point of this admittedly long paragraph - that rationality 
and normativity are not necessarily connected. This is because he believes that 
norms can only be conditionally valuable in that they provide a justification to 
pursue a specific course of action – they are simply incapable of possessing 
independent value.  
 
Such a conclusion presupposes however that this is the only way in which 
normativity and rationality can be connected by necessity. Raz does not consider 
a second means – that the two might be linked if all action, regardless of the 
specific aim being pursued, is governed by a single norm. Such would be the 
function of a categorical imperative. The existence of such absolute moral truths 
is alluded to by Raz, yet he does not endorse a principle as demonstrably fulfilling 
this function. Yet he has conceded that, should one be identified, it would be an 
absolute ought.69 If such an absolute ought could be identified that would 
therefore apply to all action regardless of the specific end being pursued, then 
Raz would be forced to do one of two things in order to maintain the validity of 
his argument: establish that to ignore the requirements of the categorical 
imperative would not be definitionally irrational, or concede that a necessary 
connection does indeed exist between normativity and rationality. Since the 
PGC has already been suggested as a standard which provides such a categorical 
imperative, then we can conclude that the first of these two options is closed to 
Raz as it has already been established that for an agent to act contrary to the 
requirements of the PGC would be to deny the importance of their own agency, 
which is prima facie irrational. This is something which Raz would be forced to 
accept given his prior acknowledgement that some capacities are necessary for 
us to act upon our rational desires, and that we have seen that these are broadly 
analogous to Gewirth’s Generic Conditions of Agency. The consistency of his 
argument on rationality therefore logically requires him to drop his objection 
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that there is no necessary connection between normativity and rationality; his 
argument rests on a presupposition that there is no necessary reason to act 
rationally,70 yet given the PGC provides just such an exclusionary reason then 
this foundation is not sound.  
 
Having established that, if the PGC is valid, a necessary link between rationality 
and normativity exists, this one last characterisation of normative reasons 
remains to be explored before this part of the chapter moves on to its concluding 
section on how competing reasons for action are resolved – that is Raz’s 
distinction between non-mandatory and mandatory norms. These are broadly 
analogous to conclusive and absolute reasons respectively as per Raz’s previous 
categorisations, or – since his theories have been modified to be PGC compliant 
– second order conclusive and absolute exclusionary reasons. Since the PGC 
acts as a second order absolute exclusionary norm, it is this category which will 
be briefly analysed before we conclude our discussion on the link between 
reasoning and normativity. 
 
Mandatory norms, for Raz, must possess four elements. They must be a deontic 
operator which directs a subject towards a given act under certain 
circumstances.71 Mandatory norms are more appropriately labelled rules due to 
these characteristics, thus providing our semantic shift alluded to earlier. These 
are different to normal reasons in that they compromise an exclusionary reason 
which exists independently of it being followed.72 This is not to say that Raz 
believes all mandatory norms, as he includes some seemingly odd caveats to his 
categorisation. In order to be valid, it must be issued or supported by an 
authority which lends it its exclusionary force.73 Additionally, they must also be 
successful in order to be viewed as valid. Therefore: 
A person follows a mandatory norm only if he believes that the norm is 
a valid reason for him to do the norm act when the conditions for 
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application obtain and that it is a valid reason for disregarding conflicting 
reasons, and if he acts on those beliefs.74 
The quote from Raz here could simply be read as claiming that mandatory norms 
only apply when the circumstances under which they should be followed pertain. 
This is axiomatic in the definition of such mandatory norms however, and it 
seems unusual that Raz should have included this statement were it only 
expressing a mere tautology. The other way of reading the claim is to see it as 
introducing an odd contradiction in Raz’s work – that a mandatory norm 
possesses its mandatory character independently of whether or not it is 
observed, but that it still need only be treated by agents as possessing 
exclusionary force it they see a valid reason for them to follow it and go on to 
act upon it.  This therefore suggests that mandatory norms are themselves still 
subject to practical reason; agents can recognise them as valid yet still rationally 
choose to ignore them without damaging their status as mandatory norms. It is 
suggested however that, were an agent to do this, the norm in question would 
either not be appropriately classed as a mandatory norm or would not apply in 
the given situation. An example here could again be the normative guidance 
provided by the PGC. This norm is mandatory in that it applies to all action; an 
agent could therefore not rationally choose to not apply it to their undertakings. 
It is therefore unclear what Raz intends by introducing this analysis of mandatory 
norms. This thesis will therefore disregard the dichotomy as not being logically 
consistent with the operation of a true mandatory norm.   
 
2.3  Resolving Conflicts within Reasons for 
Action 
 
Having established that there is a necessary connection between normativity, 
reason and rationality and that some norms are capable of possessing mandatory 
character, the final part of s.2 will discuss something which has so far been 
alluded to but not engaged with directly. This is Raz’s claim that reasons for 
action are inherently pluralistic and may require opposing course of action; 
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therefore when an agent chooses to act for a certain reason, he chooses to act 
on certain reasons and discards others. This suggests that a hierarchy of reasons 
exists within which differing reasons possess differing weights, and those which 
possess the greatest weight will be accepted by the agent at the expense of those 
seen to be inferior. The purpose of s.2.3 is therefore to establish what kinds of 
reasons necessarily form the top of this hierarchy and act so as to exclude all 
other reasons, taking into account the previous discussions around the 
connection between reasons and normativity. This will allow us to create a 
benchmark against which we can assess the competing normative claim provided 
by legal obligations to assess whether or not they are able to surpass other 
normative obligations as reasons for action.    
The starting point for this discussion will therefore be what Raz calls the Basic 
Belief – he holds it axiomatic to agency that such a competing range of reasons 
exists and that an agent chooses which to act upon based on a rational process 
of elimination. Raz argues that it would not be outside the realm of reason to 
reject any of these reasons75 yet, as was established at the end of s.2.2, this 
appears to be founded on an incorrect belief that it is not prima facie irrational 
to reject a mandatory norm when it ought to apply. This claim has been 
demonstrated to be implausible due to the fact that it is axiomatic that mandatory 
norms should always be followed and, as was demonstrated by the example of 
the PGC, to act against them is prima facie irrational. Raz’s theories of action 
therefore should be modified to recognise that his account of the basic belief, 
while being descriptive of how agents do act, does not describe how agents 
rationally should act. A rational agent would be incapable of acting in a way 
which saw all reasons as prima facie equal in weight, as irrational considerations 
should be rejected before the process of reasoning takes place. Having 
established this, we are able to examine the four main groups of normative and 
evaluative propositions which Raz believes exist: 
 
1. Φ is good simpliciter; 
2. Φ is good for someone, thus a sufficient reason to Φ exists; 
3. Someone has an appropriate reason to act in a certain way 
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4. If an agent must do Φ and is acting irrationally if they do not, a 
conclusive reason to Φ  exists.76 
The first of these suggests that an end is prima facie good. Since the PGC holds 
that all GCAs are necessarily viewed as prima facie goods due to their necessity 
for agency, this fist part of this discussion will focus on how Raz treats such 
moral truths – a discussion which will also encompass the fourth type of 
evaluative position based on rationality. The second of his evaluative positions 
is based on a subjective good of perceived value, an analysis of which will be 
provided in second part of this section. The last section will be a discussion of 
authority, which for ease will be conflated with the third idea that agents are 
given an appropriate reason to behave in a certain way. The section will conclude 
by revisiting the idea of incommensurability of reasons previously identified in 
order to establish how these evaluative propositions can compete so as to defeat 
one another as possible courses of action. 
 
2.3 .1 Reasons based on Morality 
 
We have already identified that Raz fails to endorse a specific system of moral 
principles based around the idea of a categorical imperative. He also rejects any 
system of morality which is grounded in the idea of inalienable rights. This is 
based on his belief that such systems prioritise individual action over the 
collective and that they presuppose a common global culture which plays a 
constitutive role in their formulation.77 Such beliefs appear to be grounded in 
empirical observation; collective rights are often as important as individual 
rights, and a common culture cannot be identified on which such individual 
rights can be maintained. He instead endorses a humanistic principle, that 
goodness derives from the consequences of action and its contribution to the 
quality of human life.78 Yet central to the idea of Gewirthian ethics is the idea 
that all agents are rationally committed to making rights-claims on their Generic 
Conditions of Agency based on their status as noumenal agents. We therefore 
appear to have reached an impasse. Yet several of the comments made by Raz 
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in justification of his humanistic approach appear to operate on a similar logical 
framework to the PGC. This overview of the role of reasons based on morality 
will therefore explore these similarities and aim to demonstrate that Raz commits 
himself to recognising that the PGC does exist as a supreme moral principle. 
This will be established by examining more closely his rationale for endorsing 
the humanistic principle, firstly exploring his justification for the existence of 
collective rights before moving on to discuss his objections to the existence of a 
common culture based on individual respect. 
 
As has been alluded to, Raz rejects rights based theories of morality for their 
individualistic focus and claims that they necessarily only see collective goods as 
having instrumental value.79 This contingency in the value of collective rights is, 
for Raz, a statement which is not true. For him it is self-evident that collective 
rights exist independently of individual rights if the following three conditions 
are met: 
1. An aspect of the interest of human beings justifies holding some 
person(s) to a duty; 
2. The interests in question are of individuals as members of a group 
in a public good and the public good serves their interest as members 
of group; and 
3. The interest of no single member is good sufficient to create duty in 
itself. 80 
 
Such a definition itself appears circular however – Raz merely presupposes that 
it is possible that a situation is possible where criterion number three is present 
without devoting time to justify how such a circumstance could be possible. It 
may therefore be countered that Raz should instead try and justify why he holds 
that individual interests are not always sufficient of themselves for the creation 
of rights based norms. This may be difficult for him to do given that we 
established in s.2.2 that several of Raz’s thoughts on individual rationality and 
reasoning only operate when integrated with the PGC. To this point Raz 
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counters that ‘It is difficult to imagine a successful argument imposing a duty to 
provide a collective good on the ground that it will serve the interests of one 
individual.’81 
 
Just such a justification can be provided from Raz’s concession that our ability 
to recognise reasons as reasons for action is what gives us our rationality and 
therefore sets us apart as beings deserving of a special status. This is an individual 
reference point which is broadly similar to Gewirth’s starting point for his 
discussions of bare agency – that to claim that I do X for purpose E requires an 
agent to view their Generic Conditions of Agency as necessary to fulfilling their 
desires, and to therefore value them to the point where they make a claim that 
they are indeed rights. In making the claim that individuals possess a special 
status by dint of their ability to reason, Raz therefore commits himself to 
recognising that intrinsic value necessarily exists on an individual level. Moral 
subjects are therefore necessarily individuals, and any collective moral rights and 
duties must also respect the rights of individuals. Such a requirement arises from 
the dialectically necessary argument of the PGC whereby to act contrariwise 
would be to deny the importance of one’s one agency. To therefore claim that a 
collective right can exist prior to an individual right ignores this claim – a point 
Raz commits himself to recognising when he concedes that individuals possess 
moral value through their agency. Collective rights then can only be good if they 
are also good for the individuals which make up the collective. This is not to say 
that they cannot better achieve that good by operating on the level of the 
collective, but the good necessarily exists prior to the collective in that it is also 
of benefit to the individual. This is a starting point which Raz accepts to a certain 
extent when he claims that some collective goods are only desirable if personal 
autonomy is intrinsically desirable.82  
 
The claim being defended by this thesis is a stronger one, however – that such a 
claim cannot operate on a contingent level, but must operate as a dialectically 
necessary precondition. Collective rights must be in conformity with individual 
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rights. Raz appears to suggest that the opposite is true and that collective goods 
are necessary for autonomy.83 Yet as was alluded to this is not the case – goods 
might be ameliorated on the collective level, but cannot exist without recognising 
their importance to individual action. Raz may again object and claim that such 
an individualistic claim incorrectly conflates an ought and a duty, in that it relies 
on a claim that we ought to do what we have a duty to do as leading us to believe 
we therefore have a duty to do what we ought to do. 84  If we have a duty to 
respect rights then we ought to do this, but it does not necessarily follow that 
because we ought to respect rights (as to do so is in the interest of the rights 
bearer) that we have a correlative duty to do this. But this does not dismiss a 
claim to rights which originates from the PGC – this is because the ought created 
by the PGC rests on a self-reflexive foundation. One ought to respect the rights 
of others as they are claimed on the same foundation as an agent makes claims 
to their own rights. One has a duty to oneself to protect ones own Generic 
Conditions of Agency as to do otherwise would be to deny the importance of 
ones own agency; therefore one cannot deny rights to others without equally 
denying the importance of ones own agency. The duty we owe to ourselves is 
therefore universalised to all agents. 
 
This is not to say that Raz would believe that individuals are not worthy of 
respect – it is just that he does not necessarily believe that such respect can be 
grounded in a theory based on individual rights. This scepticism has been seen 
to be unfounded in the above analysis, but Raz’s reasoning for giving respect to 
individuals will still be considered in order to see whether it remains compliant 
with a grounding in the PGC. We shall begin with an analysis of Raz’s reasons 
for seeing those capable of valuing others – for our purposes, agents capable of 
undertaking action based on reason – are valuable in and of themselves. His 
argument has three main steps, the first of which suggests that there is a mutual 
yet asymmetric dependence between things which are intrinsically good in that 
they can be used for a given end, and those which are unconditionally good. 
Intrinsic good can only be released by those who area capable of reasoning and 
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therefore engaging with the object in the correct way – Raz provides the example 
of oranges, which are only perceived to be of value if they are eaten. If an object 
is capable of possessing value via a process of recognition, then it follows that 
there are things which a valuer must necessarily perceive as good. In order to 
demonstrate that a valuer is capable of possessing value in themselves then they 
must be able to be valuable regardless of being good for another agent, and this 
unconditional good is, according to Raz’s second step, evidenced by their ability 
to create intrinsic value in another object external to themselves. The third step 
needs to assess why this stage makes valuers valuable. At this point Raz claims 
the argument is axiomatic – something must possess value in order to be able to 
relate to value. Our very ability to reason and perceive value therefore singles us 
out as being of special concern.85 This is a conclusion which a Gewirthian ought 
to accept, allowing us to move onto Raz’s subsequent discussion of why we 
ought to respect others who we recognise as possessing this unconditional 
good.86 Sadly here the argument somewhat loses its force, with Raz locating this 
step that the unconditional value is worthy of respect. – he draws the analogy of 
a painting, which can be recognised as valuable without being fully engaged 
with.87 Whilst somebody who possesses unconditional value would undoubtedly 
endorse this conclusion, it is not immediately apparent why this circular move 
requires an agent to respect something which possesses value. An agent can 
appreciate that a painting possesses aesthetic value and yet still wish to destroy 
it. Here Raz’s theory can be rescued with reference back to the PGC, which does 
provide a framework for this step of recognising and respecting value – for the 
value which Raz is describing appears to be analogous to the bare agency from 
which Gewirth builds his rights based moral theory. 
 
Since Raz’s attitude to respecting individuals as possessing moral value can be 
rescued with reference to the PGC, we can thus see that reasons based morality 
should be seen to be a high-order reason – to adopt Raz’s previous 
nomenclature, an absolute exclusionary reason. To act contrary to the moral 
principle of the PGC is prima facie irrational as it includes the claim that an agent 
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does not value their own agency – a statement which is paradoxical as it entails 
them using their agency to make it. The high value ascribed to moral reasoning 
is therefore guaranteed by Raz’s writing. 
 
2.3 .2 Reasons based on Personal Interest 
 
A second category of reasons which Raz describes as extant in his hierarchy 
would be those motivated by subjective value perceived in an object. It is worth 
noting at this stage that this heading is again similar to intrinsic value described 
above in s.2.3.1, and is therefore covered by the PGC’s starting point of bare 
agency. The subjectivity of the end is therefore not immediately relevant at this 
stage as the PGC applies to all action regardless of the value of the end being 
pursued. Nevertheless, personal wellbeing is highlighted by Raz as being an end 
of particular importance to an individual from his own perspective. This section 
will first discuss this concept as a personal motivator for action, before moving 
on to discuss other things in which an agent may perceive value. 
 
Personal wellbeing for Raz should be assessed by judging the success or failure 
of an agent’s life as opposed to assessing the means by which that success or 
failure is reached. 88 The things which contribute to a person’s wellbeing are 
therefore relevant, but separable from the overall success or failure. Raz claims 
that ‘[A] person is better off when well fed, in moderate temperature, with 
sufficient sensory stimulation, in good health, etc., whether he adopts these as 
his goals or not.’89 These are seen to be criteria which are necessary for a life to 
be pursued at all, and – if they are present to an adequate extent, can greatly 
increase an agent’s ability to pursue whatever goals he wishes to attain. Raz is 
deliberately open about what he means by the term ‘goal’, defining it thus:  
In these initial clarifications, ‘goals’ is used so broadly that if a person 
wants something then it is his goal to get it. But the result of these 
clarifications is that the term is used more in keeping with its 
ordinary implication of a longer-term objective. Goals are not 
                                                          
88 Raz (n 77) 289 
89 ibid 290 
186 
 
necessarily desirable or desired for themselves. But they are nested 
in larger goals, or are larger goals themselves. At no point do I wish 
to suggest that the fact that a person wants something is in and 
by itself a reason for action either for him or for others. 90 
 
The long quotation here is provided to establish a point which over which Raz’s 
theory again appears confused. The criteria which a person needs listed above 
this definition appear to be broadly similar to the Generic Conditions of Agency 
upon which the PGC relies. It therefore seems odd that Raz should suggest that 
these are helpful to attain a goal, but that agential desire is not itself a sufficient 
reason to motivate an agent to act. Indeed, earlier in the same text during a 
discussion on the four conditions of wellbeing, Raz holds that the only reason 
for goals to be adopted is because they possess independent value,91 value which 
is presumably desired by the agent. If these conditions are beneficial for an agent 
to undertake action, then they must necessarily be of value to the agent in order 
to achieve his desires. If he values these conditions as an intrinsic good which 
can help to attain a further desire, it is axiomatic that the agent must also desire 
the outcome being pursued and the obtaining of which these conditions 
facilitate. Such is the nature of agency. It does not matter whether or not the end 
desired is objectively desirable or of value; all that matters is that the agent 
perceives it as valuable. It is compatible with the theory that this belief is false, 
as, as was established in s.2.1.1, such expressions of belief necessarily contain 
truth claims. We can therefore see that all desires based on a perceived personal 
interest must be seen as an adequate reason for the agent to act to attain that 
end. The pursuit of the goods described by Raz is just one example of things 
that there is a reason to pursue. 
 
This difficulty is something which Raz attempts to reconcile in his later work 
without making the above concession, in claiming that the formula that 
‘[V]aluable aspects of the world constitute reasons.’ constitutes what he calls the 
‘Classical Approach’ to reason – an approach he believes to be flawed in that it 
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falsely claims a necessary connection between reasons and value.92 A Gewirthian 
would need to reject this criticism as itself flawed, as the PGC is grounded in the 
Classical Approach in holding that an agent perceives value in his ends and, by 
extension, the circumstances necessary to obtain them. Raz holds, then, that we 
ought to distinguish between features that show an act to be a choice and ones 
that show it to be of value. Reasons, he believes, are part of the former category 
of choice rather than one of value. He gives the example of an agent doing 
something which is designed specifically to hurt or damage another, claiming 
that this can be a reason for action but that it would be incorrect to describe it 
as possessing value – thus demonstrating that a connection is not necessary.93 
Yet this statement conflates value for the agent in question with an objective, 
measurable value – something that is not necessary for action. Murderers, for 
example, might be motivated by revenge in targeting a particular victim. The 
satisfaction of this desire is certainly of value to the person committing the act; 
otherwise, they would not be seeking to act upon it in light of other reasons that 
might exist to not murder. It is therefore unnecessary to prove that an act must 
be objectively valuable in order to provide an agent with a reason to act – all that 
is required is that an agent either perceives it to be of subjective value or that 
they falsely believe it to be of objective value. It is this perceived value that the 
agent necessarily uses as one of the reasons upon which he bases his choices; 
value is therefore essential for an action to be desirable for an agent and, by 
extension, for it to be chosen as a course of action. This is something that Raz’s 
differentiation between different approaches to reason fails to circumvent; 
reasons based on personal interest are required for action to occur, thus 
requiring only the bare agency upon which the PGC is grounded.  
 
2.3 .3 Reasons based on the Recognition of 
Authority 
 
The third type of reason that Raz attempts to demarcate is the category of 
reasons based on the recognition of authority. Raz argues that deference to 
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authority, in many circumstances, is the best way to maximise our own personal 
interests. This is because a coordinating authority is often better placed to 
coordinate the activities of multiple individual agents, thus minimising the 
potential for conflict and maximising the overall good that can be achieved.94 
The authority in question must be de facto authority in order to effectively 
coordinate the actions of those living underneath it and therefore generates a 
duty to be obeyed95 but de facto authority need not be legitimate. Legitimate de 
facto authority is a special kind of authority that can be appropriately described 
as serving those living underneath it. This is something Raz labels the ‘Service 
Conception’ of authority, yet it is a view of authority which he concedes suffers 
from both theoretical and moral problems.96 On the theoretical level Raz 
question show a duty to obey an authority can exist if based entirely on the will 
of another, 97 and on the moral level, he asks how submission to authority can 
be valid should it circumvent our own independent capacity for moral 
reasoning.98 Helpfully for our purposes, he believes he has identified answers to 
these concerns – their success can be dealt with in turn. 
 
Firstly, he believes his theoretical objections can be answered with sufficient 
reference to reasons; for a duty to follow an authority to exist there must be 
sufficient reasons to submit to it.99 Yet such a piece of reasoning is, at best, 
circular – amounting to a statement that one needs a reason to do something. 
Such a statement is one of bare agency and can be applied to any action which 
an agent may wish to undertake; it does not give an adequate explanation of why 
one ought to submit to the will of another. This problem is similar to those 
highlighted in the previous discussion of Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm of Hart’s 
Secondary Rule of Recognition100 – to say a reason exists to follow an authority 
merely shifts the normative question upwards to one of why this reason is one 
which an agent should accept. Raz does not deal with this question directly, yet 
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it is immediately obvious why such a theoretical justification for submission to 
an authority should be of interest in any complete discussion of the nature of 
law. The claimed solution to the second moral objection fails for a similar reason; 
Raz suggests this problem can be circumvented if an agent would better comply 
with reasons which already apply to him by following the directive of an 
authority, and it would be better for him to reason to follow the authority than 
to reason independently.101 Such a description again begs the question of why 
one ought to accept that reasons can be better complied with by following a 
directive.  It does not explain why to abandon moral reasoning might be a 
derogation of one’s responsibilities as a moral agent. 
 
This failure appears to be founded partially on Raz’s characterisation of reasons 
that stem from Authority. For he argues that  it should be seen as ‘[N]ot a denial 
of people’s capacity for rational action, but simply one device, one method, 
through the use of which people can achieve the goal (telos) of their capacity for 
rational action, albeit not through its direct use.’ 102 This suggests that Raz sees 
reasons based upon authority as conclusive at best, as they can provide a good 
reason for behaving in a certain way but should not be seen as exclusionary. Yet 
this characterisation does not sit well with his claims that authority must be de 
facto in order to be valid. For Raz is correct in suggesting that, in order merit the 
label, authority must be de facto in that it makes a claim that it ought to be obeyed 
– yet this ought is somewhat undermined if Raz concedes that it is not an 
exclusionary ought which agents can choose to obey or ignore as they see fit. 
How then, can these two contradictory statements be reconciled? The simplest 
way of doing this would be to claim that authority can only be legitimate if it 
conforms with an external means against which it can be assessed as legitimate. 
Put another way, if it is not exclusionary in itself, then can an external source be 
located which grants authority legitimacy and, by extension, provides the 
exclusionary normative reason needed to enable it to claim to be de facto. Such 
legitimisation can be found in the moral realm. An authority can be said to be 
legitimate if it fulfils Raz’s earlier requirements and does not contradict the 
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requirements of the PGC. Any proclamations of the authority are therefore 
morally permissible and, by extension, possess the external legitimisation 
required for an authority to be acceptable to those against whom it is directed. 
Raz may attempt to claim that such a moral rule, grounded as it is in logic, is 
merely constitutive in that it only applies to those situations where logic apply.103 
Such a criticism can again be attributed to a misapprehension of the PGC – it is 
contingent in that it only applies to action, yet since action is the foundation of 
all human activity then it applies universally to the acts of all agents. It is 
therefore somewhat in accurate to describe it as truly contingent if its scope is 
categorical. We can therefore see that Raz’s ‘Service Conception’ of legitimate 
authority can be seen to be present if it is issued in compliance with the PGC. 
Any authority which acts otherwise would not be making exclusionary claims on 
its subjects, and therefore would fail as a de facto authority in suggesting that its 
requirements are able to be rejected. 
 
2.3 .4 Incommensurability Revisited 
 
The three previous subsections have each concluded that the reason concerned 
– based in morality, in personal interest or in authority – are only necessary and 
sufficient reasons if they can possess some kind of moral foundation which 
grants them legitimacy. Yet, as Raz points out, it is difficult to see how rules 
grounded in the same justification can be seen to exclude others with the same 
grounding.104 It is therefore worth briefly revisiting the problem of 
incommensurability of reasons previously discussed, before we move in section 
three to apply our amended Razian theories of reason and rationality to his 
theory of law. The idea of incommensurability of reasons was briefly explored 
in section 2.1.3, but will here be laid out in more detail. Raz holds that it is an 
inescapable fact of human agency that there is widespread incommensurability 
of options.105 Consequently, if reasons are incapable of supplanting one-another 
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due to their incommensurability, how is it possible that an agent can choose one 
course of action over another based on reason alone?106 
 
Such scepticism is grounded in what Raz perceives to be the connection between 
value and action. Since the potential incommensurability of reasons currently 
being considered is of that between competing permissible actions according to 
the PGC, the following analysis of the validity of the connection Raz traces will 
also need to be PGC compliant or it will fall below the standard required and be 
incapable or providing a reason of the same level. It will therefore be assessed 
for this compliance during the course of this analysis.  For Raz then, it is the 
ultimate paradigm that action must be aimed at achieving some good or averting 
some bad: 
The capacity for human action is … the capacity to act knowing what 
one is doing and doing so because something in one’s situation 
makes this action a reasonable, or a good or the right thing to do.107 
Raz’s starting point in linking value and action is identical to that of the PGC in 
that it claims that an agent acts in order to attain an end which he has reasons to 
attempt to attain – values therefore control reasons in that they only hold if the 
end under consideration can produce something the agent perceives as good or 
avert something which they perceive as bad. 108 Yet here Raz departs, suggesting 
it is false that human agency is so easily definable. Instead he suggests two 
competing conceptions, Rationalist and Classical. According to the Rationalist 
conception, action takes place because, of all the options available, an agent 
believes they have the strongest reason to Φ. The Classical approach, by 
contrast, states that of all the options available to them an agent simply chooses 
to Φ. The difference here is not immediately obvious, but Raz locates what he 
perceives to be three key differentiations: 
1. Rationalism holds that a reason is needed in order to require an 
action; the Classical Approach holds a reason merely renders an 
option eligible to be chosen. 
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2. Rationalism holds agential desire to be a reason; the Classical 
Approach holds will to be an independent factor. 
3. Rationalism is committed to the claim that incommensurability is 
very rare, if not impossible; the Classical approach presupposes 
widespread incommensurable reasons.109 
In holding that widespread incommensurability of reasons is an axiomatic truth, 
Raz commits himself to a classical conception of agency; by extension he must 
also accept the claims that reasons are not needed to require an action and that 
agential will is not in itself a true reason for action. Based on the discussion of 
the nature of reasons already present in this chapter, the validity of these latter 
claims should be questioned. In order to explain why they should be rejected, let 
us return to Raz’s previous example discussed in s.2.1.3 of choosing between 
identical cans of soup in a shop. It has been claimed that an agent must rationally 
prefer one over the others in order to act, otherwise the agent would either 
abandon the choice or be stuck in front of the shelf unable to choose which can 
to take to the cashier. Raz however would contest this, arguing that rather than 
choosing a particular can for a given reason, it is more appropriate to believe 
that the agent is choosing to simply give the other cans up in favour of the one 
they ultimately decide to purchase. The reason for acting is thus independent 
from the desire for a can of soup, in that my action is to discard whereas my 
intention is to acquire. In thus reversing the rationalisation, Raz suggests that 
action can still take place in light of incommensurable reasons, as reasons are 
separate from action.110 Yet, as has been previously stated, this is an account of 
agency which Gewirthians, committed to Rationalism, must reject – Raz puts 
the point well when he summarises that, for the rationalist, 
‘[I]ncommensurability is inconsistent with the fact that intentional actions are 
under the control of the agents, that they are determined by their choices.’111 
 
In order to overcome Raz’s objection to this rationalist conception of agency, 
we must first delve deeper into understanding why he raises his objection to 
begin with. Firstly, he holds that – as reasons are multiple and competing – it is 
simply not the case to claim, as a rationalist does, the only reason an agent has 
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with regards to action is to do what will satisfy his brute desires.112 This simple 
view of agency holds that only desire can be a reason for action, but Raz observes 
that this does not account for conflicting desires where an agent may want 
several inconsistent outcomes. A rationalist might claim that this is an 
obfuscatory account of reasoning; competing reasons have already been weighed 
against one another before an agent has decided which one they desire the most 
and this is the one upon which they decide to act. Yet Raz rejects this as artificial, 
claiming that the thought of people deliberating what they would like the most 
out of several desirable outcomes is itself peculiar.113 Such scepticism arises in 
turn from his conception of desires as only possessing value due to their being 
contingent on a particular end as opposed to being valuable in and of themselves. 
And as the value of a desire is contingent on the end which it is directed towards, 
they presuppose a normative value external to the fact that people desire to 
pursue them.114 It is at this point that Raz’s argument demonstrates its 
weaknesses. Such a conception of agency relies on objective value being the only 
thing capable of motivating an agent to act. To demonstrate this is incorrect, it 
must be demonstrated that an agent can act to attain something which does not 
possess objective value. Let us return to the example posited by Celano in s.2.1.1 
of agents acting on a false belief, and hypothesise a situation where an agent 
believes that an end is of value to them but this belief is false. Raz would be 
forced to argue in this situation that the agent has no reason to act to try to attain 
the end goal, yet – as was concluded supra – this seems to be a false description 
of how agents act. For in making a claim to believe that an item is of value to 
them, even if this belief is false, the agent still believes it to be true as such truth-
statements are implicit in the nature of belief. The agent therefore only needs to 
perceive subjective value in the end in order to see it as valuable enough to 
motivate action. Therefore bare desire itself can motivate an agent to act 
independent of whether or not the end in question possesses objective value. In 
re-establishing that desire possesses subjective value to an agent we therefore 
reject Raz’s claim that agential desire cannot be itself a reason for action and 
return to the starting point of the PGC that I do X for purpose E.  
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Having rejected the second of Raz’s justifications for a Classical Conception of 
agency, we can turn our attention to the first – that a reason need only render a 
desire eligible to be chosen and need not necessitate action as a rationalist would 
hold. Such a claim appears to be a mischaracterisation of rationalism, which does 
not hold that all reasons should be acted upon but that any reason which 
corresponds to an agent’s desires provides a reason to act upon them. This does 
not exclude the possibility of a hierarchy of desires, but merely holds that the 
desire which comes out on top following a weighing of these desires necessarily 
contains a claim there is a reason for an agent to pursue it by dint of its 
outweighing of all other reasons. Raz alludes to this fact when he concedes later 
that, if desires are reasons, then a rational agent – when faced with 
incommensurate reasons – follow the desire which corresponds to the most 
stringent reason.115 This latter term for Raz should be defined as the reason that 
possesses the most weight, presupposing an external measure against which the 
desire should be assessed for its stringency.116 The desire therefore only 
possesses contingent value and cannot require an action for which it is 
contingent. This statement however seems to be founded on a misinterpretation 
of what reasons are. Returning to our example of soup, when an agent chooses 
one from many similar cans they must have a reason for doing so or they would 
be unable to act. The fact they do suggests that they have a reason for choosing 
one over the others – such a connection is simply axiomatic in that all action is 
connected to a purpose that an agent necessarily desires and, as has been shown, 
desire is a reason for action in itself. If desire is a prerequisite for all action and 
can constitute a reason for action, a reason based on desire is also a prerequisite 
for all action. This is a point which Raz rejects, but claims that there is not 
enough room in the volume which addresses the issue to justify why he holds 
this belief.117 Since the assertion is unsupported and the counterpoint appears 
grounded in the axiomatic starting point of bare agency, a rationalist should 
prefer the latter evidenced point over an unsupported assertion. We can 
therefore reject Raz’s primary distinction that reasons are not a prerequisite for 
action.  
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Having established that reasons are necessarily linked to desire and that agential 
desire is itself sufficient reason for action, we can come back to our starting point 
of incommensurability. Should reasons compete with one another for primacy 
when an agent is deliberating action, we can indeed assume that the weightiest 
reason is the one upon which the agent should act upon. Such a statement 
requires an external reference point against which an agent can assess the validity 
of their options as being good or bad respectively.118 Should this reference point 
exist, it would allow us to sidestep the problem of incommensurability discussed 
above. It will be of no surprise at this point that the PGC is suggested as a 
dialectically necessary reference point against which reasons can be thus judged 
for their validity. As has been established throughout this first half of the 
chapter, it applies equally to all steps of Raz’s writing on reasons equally, and can 
provide a solid foundation for all reasons for action – whether based on morality, 
personal interest or authority. All such reasons are only valid if they are not 
excluded by the exclusionary reason provided by the PGC. Beyond this, 
incommensurability is not problematic as all actions are permissible within these 
confines.  
 
3 Raz on Law 
 
The first half of this chapter has attempted to demonstrate several things with 
reference to the writings of Joseph Raz on the subject of reasons for action. Such 
a discussion is necessary as the PGC being defended in this thesis claims to be 
what Raz would label an exclusionary reason for action, in that it claims to 
overrule all reasons which do not conform with its requirements. Such is the 
nature of any categorical imperative. In order to show that the PGC can 
withstand the scepticism implicit in Raz’s philosophy, it has therefore been 
necessary to demonstrate that there are flaws in his conception of the very nature 
of reasons. Having highlighted in s.2.1 where these inaccuracies can be found, 
the section moved on to highlight the normative nature of reasons in s.2.2 
before, in s.2.3, moving on to demonstrate how different reasons can motivate 
                                                          
118 ibid 65 
196 
 
agents in different ways. It concluded with a discussion of Raz’s idea of 
incommensurability, arguing that the PGC should be used as an external 
reference point against which reasons should be assessed in order to side-step 
the problem which Raz believes exists. Yet if we accept that the categorical 
imperative provided by the PGC acts as an absolute exclusionary reason, we 
should now move into the second part of this chapter. This section will discuss 
how the PGC can interact with Raz’s writings on Law, which – for Raz – also 
claims to be an absolute exclusionary reason on action. The purpose of this 
section will therefore be to demonstrate that Raz is incorrect in his belief that 
the PGC should not override legal obligations. 
 
Helpfully, Raz provides a guideline for Natural Lawyers to follow when arguing 
against positivist conceptions of law. He suggests that any successful theory of 
natural law needs not to disprove the separation thesis – the claim that law and 
morality are necessarily separate realms – but to disprove the contingency thesis. 
The latter holds that a connection between morality and law conceptually exists, 
but that is merely contingent as opposed to necessary in all instances.119 Raz 
therefore somewhat defines himself as an inclusive positivist, and therefore 
condones the school that this thesis is attempting to demonstrate is a logically 
inconsistent standpoint, holding that the central theme of positivism which he 
believes to be correct is the statement that ‘[D]etermining what the law is does 
not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative 
considerations about what the law ought to be in the relevant circumstances.’120 
This is therefore the central idea which this part of this thesis will attempt to 
disprove. In attempting to do so Raz suggests that it will definitionally fail to be 
a coherent theory of law; for in proving a necessary link between morality and 
law Raz suggests that the theory becomes ‘[A] general thesis about intentional 
actions and their products, thus denying that it says anything special about the 
law.’ 121 Such a statement is made from the starting point of positivism however, 
and does not adequately engage with the normative requirements of any 
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necessary connection. Should a connection prove necessary therefore, this 
secondary objection can be dismissed as question begging. 
 
Before the substantive form of the chapter is outlined, it would be beneficial 
here to outline Raz’s conception of what a legal system necessarily is in order to 
ensure that our starting point is one upon which we agree: 
The three most general features of the law are that it is normative, 
institutionalized, and coercive. It is normative in that it serves, and is 
meant to serve, as a guide for human behaviour. It is institutionalized in 
that its application and modification are to a large extent performed or 
regulated by institutions. And it is coercive in that obedience to it, and 
its application, are internally guaranteed, ultimately, by the use of 
force…Naturally, ever theory of legal system [sic] must be compatible 
with an explanation of these features. 122 
This quote neatly outlines the three features which must necessarily exist within 
any legal system and is a definition which this chapter of the thesis will adopt as 
the foundation of its critique of Raz’s theory of law.  It will firstly examine Raz’s 
conception of what law is – what sets law apart from other obligatory systems 
and how, if at all, legal reasoning can be said to differ from other forms of 
reasoning which have discussed in the first half of this chapter. Secondly, we will 
explore the importance which Raz places on the ‘Points of View’ argument and 
ascertain whether or not the ‘Legal Point of View’ upon which his theory of law 
rests merits a separate status from other forms of reasoning. This will lead into 
a discussion of the status of legal normativity and how such normativity interacts 
with other normative claims, before turning to the importance of the systemic 
nature of legal claims. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of Raz’s 
thoughts on whether or not law truly claims to be an exclusionary reason by 
critiquing his thoughts on whether or not a prima facie obligation to obey law truly 
exists. As has been the case throughout this chapter so far, when Raz’s theories 
diverge from the PGC this divergence will be explored and ascertained for its 
validity. The chapter hopes to demonstrate that Raz’s position does not 
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adequately engage with the normative requirements of the PGC, with the hope 
of proving that Raz does not adequately explain away the necessary connection 
between law and morality which the PGC logically requires. 
 
3.1  On the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning 
 
It is worth noting at the outset of any examination of Raz’s writings on law that 
he would reject the previous categorisation of himself as an inclusive positivist, 
as he believes that the traditional dichotomy between natural law and positivism 
is unhelpful and overblown. For despite spending the majority of his career 
arguing for the sources thesis, an inherently positivist idea, he nonetheless 
believes that three obvious connections between law and morality can be 
identified: 
1. That no legal system can be stable without attempting to adequately 
protect life and/or property; 
2. Acts contrary to bodily integrity (such as rape) cannot be committed by 
law or by legal institutions; and 
3. The fact of value pluralism renders it impossible for a state to manifest 
either virtue or vice to the highest possible degree.123 
Given that Raz does not provide a sound moral foundation for these assertions 
it is not immediately clear why he believes such conditions to be either moral or 
necessary features of legal systems, but the very statement is indicative that he 
believes the complex relationship between law and morality is not one that can 
be easily resolved. Nonetheless, he does believe that the natural law position that 
law and morality are necessarily connected across all levels to be conflating the 
issue of what law is with what it ought to be; in this sense, his outlook should 
certainly be judged as being grounded in a positivist separation of law and 
morals. 124 At best, he sees the purpose of law to be one of good maximisation; 
to ‘[S]ecure a situation whereby moral goals which, given the current social 
situation in the country whose law it is, would be unlikely to be achieved without 
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it, and whose achievement by the law is not counter-productive, are realised.’125 
The veracity of this claim will be examined first with reference to an expanded 
account of Raz’s writing on the possibility of adequately describing the nature 
of legal authority, followed by an exposition of his thoughts on the nature of 
legal reasoning.  
 
3.1 .1 The Nature of Legal Authority 
 
It should first be noted that Raz fundamentally rejects any idea that theories of 
law can be purely semantic in nature; rather than being directed at the meaning 
of the word ‘law’, any jurisprudential enquiry should instead be focussed at 
explaining the nature of law and of legal institutions and practices.126 As has been 
noted previously in this thesis such a distinction is not immediately apparent, as 
the word ‘law’ necessarily conveys a particular concept – we should therefore 
see any conceptual definition as being grounded in a particular semantic 
quandary.127 Unless we accept this, then any theory as to the meaning of law as 
a concept could be rejected on the basis of being founded in a different meaning 
of the word ‘law’. Conceptual arguments necessarily explain a semantic meaning. 
Yet this is an argument of secondary importance – one can attempt to explain 
the concept of law without agreeing to this claim. A good explanation of a 
concept, for Raz, ‘[C]onsists of true propositions that meet the concerns and the 
puzzles that led to it, and that are within the grasp of the people to whom it is 
(implicitly or explicitly) addressed.’128 Unusually, Raz doubts this is possible for 
law. He has instead suggested that there can be a large number of correct 
alternative explanations for the concept,129 a claim which – if true – would make 
the task of this thesis exceptionally difficult. Yet for the semantic reasons alluded 
to already, that the concept necessarily is contained within the meaning of the 
word law, we will assume that the word ‘law’ does have a single conceptual 
meaning. Our evidence for this will be the impossibility of communication about 
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the topic without such a unified foundation, an impossibility which we can reject 
given Raz’s own extensive writing on the concept in question. We might reject 
this simple dismissal by asking who may benefit from such a precise definition 
of the nature of law; Raz himself expresses scepticism that such a definition 
would be of use to the legal institutions whose role it is to apply the law on a day 
to day basis.130 Yet this scepticism too should be rejected; it does not make sense 
to state that courts, for example, should not take in interest in the nature of the 
societal role in which they are engaging. At the very least they should be 
interested in the sources of the law which they are applying, and how to properly 
extend or introduce principles in order to deal with lacunae which arise within 
disputes upon which they are adjudicating. Thus they can be demonstrated to 
having an interest in being aware of what the boundaries of law are in order to 
satisfactorily fulfil their function. 
 
Having established that establishing the nature of law is itself a valuable 
enterprise which is not only possible but necessary for the correct and consistent 
application of the law, we can begin to ask which is the best approach to take to 
achieve this end. Raz identifies three main approaches. The first is linguistic131 – 
which is valuable, but necessarily must entail a conceptual analysis to be 
meaningful. Secondly we can approach the problem from the Lawyer’s 
Perspective, whose starting point Raz labels the Basic Intuition – that the law is 
concerned with that ‘[W]hich it is appropriate for courts to rely on in justifying 
their decisions.’ 132 This approach does not, at this stage, tell us very much 
however – it is as acceptable to Natural Lawyers as it is to Positivists in that it 
merely shifts the question of what law is one step upwards. Thirdly, Raz suggests 
the Institutional Approach, whereby the law is what legal professionals believe 
it to be when they apply it. The focus on the profession rather the concept itself 
can be justified as they are the ones who govern how the concept interacts with 
the rest of society. The latter two criteria significantly overlap, focussing as they 
do on legal practice, so central to any analysis of these approaches favoured by 
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Raz is a definition of what legal institutions, namely, the courts, actually do. He 
claims their role is threefold: 
1. They deal with disputes with the aim of resolving them. 
2. They issue authoritative rulings which decide these disputes. 
3. In their activities they are bound to be guided, at least partly, 
by positivist authoritative considerations.133 
By positivist in this sense Raz does not mean a positivist conception of law per 
se, but merely that the law being considered has been passed through the proper 
legislative procedure of the system in question. A Natural Lawyer need not reject 
this definition then, as, as was explored previously in our analysis of Hart and 
Kelsen,134 the nexus between law and morality can be located at this legislative 
stage. It is of note however that Raz concedes that the extent to which the courts 
are bound by positivist considerations is only partial. Firstly, this leaves open the 
possibility that the courts may use non-legal moral reasoning when they 
adjudicate legal disputes – particularly where a lacuna is present. This is conceded 
by Raz, who claims that all theories of adjudication are moral in nature, as it does 
not damage his overall stance as an inclusive positivist.135 Secondly, and more 
pertinent for our purposes, is his affirmation that the positivist considerations 
applied by the courts must be authoritative in nature. This raises the question of 
what grants these positivist considerations the authority which they need to be 
accepted by the courts; what point of reference should be used in order to assess 
whether the claim to authority is one which is legitimate or misplaced?  
 
We have discussed in s.2.3.3 that authority must be de facto in order to provide a 
sufficient reason to guide conduct, but that only legitimate de facto authority can 
fulfil the ‘Service Conception’ required by Raz to be fully accepted by those 
against whom it is addressed. It was concluded that an external reference point 
is therefore needed to assess whether or not the authority in question is 
legitimate, otherwise no reason exists for an individual to submit to it, and that 
conformity with the PGC can provide this legitimacy. Since Raz claims that all 
law must definitionally be legitimate in order to succeed in its claim to 
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authority,136  we can commit Raz to recognising that all law must be passed in 
conformity with the PGC in order to possess the legitimate authority necessary 
for it to be viewed as an authoritative positivist consideration which can be 
considered by the courts. Such a conflation would have the effect of creating a 
necessary link between law and morality, so it should not be of surprise that it is 
a legitimisation of authority which Raz might be surprised to find himself 
committed to. Instead, he would argue that practical authority can be legitimised 
as law by three main theses. These are the Dependence Thesis, the Normal 
Justification Thesis and the Pre-emption thesis,137 and each will be analysed in 
turn for their necessary conformity with the PGC as per s.2.3.3.  
 
Firstly, the Dependence Thesis holds that directives should be based on reasons 
which apply to those subjects to whom they are addressed and bear on 
circumstances covered by the directive in question. This thesis necessarily must 
incorporate the PGC, as the PGC – being grounded in bare agency – is 
applicable to all actions which agents might undertake. In that it acts as a 
categorical imperative it is necessarily an absolute exclusionary reason which 
overrules all competing reasons whose outcomes would not be in conformity 
with its requirements. Directives should therefore be based on reasons which 
are in conformity with the requirements of the PGC otherwise they are 
necessarily supplanted by its requirements and cannot be seen to impose a 
legitimate claim on an agent’s behaviour. Such legitimacy is required by law, 
therefore any directive based on non-PGC compliant reasons cannot be viewed 
as law in that it would lack legitimate authority. 
 
Secondly, the Normal Justification Thesis rests on efficacy, arguing that an 
authority is legitimate iff an agent to whom its directives are addressed would be 
more likely to comply with the reasons which apply to him already if he were to 
accept the authority as binding and as providing a reason superior to his own. 
As with Raz’s first thesis, this conception of authority must also necessarily 
incorporate the PGC in order to succeed. As was established in s.2.3.3, in order 
to circumvent the theoretical and moral concerns which Raz raises with the 
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nature of authority then any authority must issue directives in order to be 
accepted as providing a reason superior to that an agent is capable of formulating 
himself. To argue otherwise is to misunderstand the absolute exclusionary nature 
of the imperative provided by the PGC. In order to ensure than an agent is more 
likely to comply with his pre-existing obligations therefore, any encouragement 
must be PGC compliant. 
 
Lastly, the Pre-emption Thesis argues that directives of an authority must be 
accepted because they necessarily replace all other reasons for action. This claim 
again fails in that it does not adequately account for the absolute exclusionary 
reason provided by the PGC. A directive can only be accepted if it is in 
compliance with these requirements, as it is axiomatic that a reason prohibited 
by a categorical imperative cannot be overridden by a contradictory reason. We 
can therefore see that, despite objections he might raise, Raz cannot circumvent 
the requirements of the PGC in attempting to explain the legitimate authority 
which positivist law necessarily claims. This is not to say that his Sources Thesis 
is not one which should be outright rejected; it merely requires that all law passed 
according to the legislative processes of a legal system must be in compliance 
with the PGC in order to possess the legitimate authority axiomatic in the nature 
of law. 
 
This is the only way in which the law can be said to possess the legitimate moral 
authority it claims in binding its subjects, and therefore justify the shared 
terminology present in both law and moral considerations.138 Before our section 
moves on to consider the nature of legal reasoning in light of this necessary 
moral connection however, we must first address the objection which might still 
be raised that the terminology which is shared by both law and morality is one 
which is aspirational, in that it is aimed not at what the law is but at what it 
aspires to be:139 
[F]or the law to be able to fulfil its function, and therefore be capable of 
enjoying moral authority, it must be capable of being identified without 
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reference to the moral questions which it pre-empts, i.e. the moral 
questions on which it is meant to adjudicate.140 
Such a statement is misguided. If moral questions are the subject of adjudication, 
then an identifiable moral content must be required in order to add value to the 
adjudicative process or to remove the possibility of any harm from arising as a 
result of non-compliance with the moral requirements of the legitimate authority 
claimed by law. The law must therefore be operatively moral, and take account 
of this moral reference point in all its deliberations. The PGC is therefore not 
merely an aspiration for law to reach, but a necessary condition for its authority. 
Here Raz might object along the lines of his Sources Thesis, holding that this 
means that law is no different to morality. If the content of law is dictated by a 
moral reference point then law cannot be seen as possessing an additional 
independent level of authority. Since we generally perceive that law does possess 
this independent authority, it cannot depend on morality. This objection should 
be rejected in turn for two reasons. Firstly, the PGC does not dictate the content 
of law per se. It makes no claims on what specific form the law should take. It 
merely requires that laws which are passed have a content which does not 
contradict its requirements. Beyond this, there is enormous scope for legal 
pluralism, allowing the law to take a distinctive form independent of a specific 
moral requirement. Secondly, the objection again fails to understand the 
categorical nature of the PGC. If it applies to all action, and law is a means of 
guiding action, then it too must be in conformity with the requirements of the 
PGC. Such an all-encompassing scope is axiomatic to the nature of a categorical 
imperative, and to claim that a particular type of action cannot be incorporated 
within it is to misunderstand what a categorical imperative requires. A theory of 
legal authority which incorporates the necessary moral component of the PGC 
is therefore compliant with Raz’s sources thesis. 
 
Raz may finally attempt to object to this necessary connection by highlighting 
the idea of moral pluralism and variance; moral standards fluctuate over time 
and these changes can be unpredictable. Such a necessary connection is therefore 
unsuitable for a legal standard which is necessarily stable and predictable so as 
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to allow people to plan their lives according to it.141  This objection again fails 
for the reasons outlined above. The PGC provides an objective and fixed moral 
reference point which does not fluctuate over time, based as it is on a dialectically 
necessary argument build from the constant fact of the noumenal agency of 
those to whom it is addressed. It also allows for a level of value pluralism which 
can reflect the varying social norms of the society whose legal system it 
underpins, in that it tests for permissibility rather than a single rigid set of legal 
rules which should exist regardless of social norms. Such a viewpoint is therefore 
consistent with the Sources Thesis and with Raz’s general assertion that changes 
and developments in the law necessarily require input form sources external to 
legal institutions;142 the moral standard of the PGC can provide this very 
reference point to guide developments so that they retain the claim to legitimate 
authority axiomatic to legal norms. 
 
3.1 .2 Legal Reasoning 
 
It has been established in the preceding subsection that law necessarily makes a 
claim to legitimacy, and that it can only possess legitimate authority if its 
directives are not contrary to the requirements of the PGC. This necessary 
connection between law and morality at the legislative stage has implications not 
just for the nature of legal authority, but also for legal reasoning. Raz claims that 
such a general theory of legal authority cannot succeed due to the complex 
nature of moral reasoning that this would require: 
The main reason why there cannot be a general theory of legal 
interpretation is, however, different. It results from the fact that there 
cannot be a moral theory capable of stating in specific terms which do 
not depend on a very developed moral judgement for their correct 
application what is to be done in all the situations possible in a particular 
society.143  
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Yet as has been demonstrated in the preceding subsection, such scepticism can 
be rejected on two accounts. Firstly, the PGC provides a simple test for moral 
permissibility which can be applied equally to all legal authority; the claim to 
complexity of moral reasoning does not apply here. Secondly, even were the 
point of moral complexity to be conceded to Raz, this criticism does not 
adequately address the normative issue that is being raised. Complexity is not a 
binding reason to reject a valid argument. We would question the rationale 
behind the rejection of a scientific theorem based entirely on its complexity if 
the theorem could be proven to be true. The same scepticism should be applied 
to this rejection; if a connection between morality and legal authority can be 
established as necessarily true, then to reject it as being too complicated is to fail 
to appropriately engage with the issues raised. 
 
We should therefore accept that the link should be seen as necessary unless it 
can be normatively disproved and, as has been demonstrated so far, Raz’s 
writings on both reasoning and the nature of law fail to circumvent the necessary 
connection between law and morality inherent within the PGC. Such a 
connection can therefore be applied to legal reasoning in addition to legal 
authority, as Raz believes that there is no special species of logic inherent in the 
enterprise. For him, legal reasoning is reasoning either about what the law is or 
how disputes should be settled, and is therefore subject to the same rules of 
reasoning as other enquiries or disputes.144 He disputes, however, that it is 
analogous to claim that it is reducible to a type of moral reasoning aimed at 
addressing the concerns of how one should act.145 Such a distinction can be 
highlighted by the example of civil disobedience, where the question ‘[H]ow 
should a case be decided according to the law?’ could have a different outcome 
to the question ‘[H]ow should be [sic] case be decided, all things considered?’ 146 
Legal Reasoning must, Raz claims, take place from a particular starting point of 
a ‘Legal Point of View’, whereas morality can only be one of the factors we 
should consider when engaging in such reasoning. The exclusionary claims made 
by law therefore should override exclusionary moral claims.147 This is evidenced 
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by the fact that the law necessarily comprises conflicting values, goals and aims, 
whereas moral claims are necessarily universally consistent in their scope.148  
 
This observation does not hold. As has been stated repeatedly, it is the nature of 
a categorical imperative that it is exclusionary to all action, and overrides all other 
reasons which contradict it. Legal reasoning is no different. Such a claim 
becomes stronger if, as has been established already, the incorporation of the 
PGC into the law is necessary due to the claim to legitimate authority inherent 
with in legal norms. Raz’s distinguishing how cases should be decided according 
to law and how they should be decided all things considered does not account 
for this necessary connection. This is because the claim that we should separate 
reasoning about law and reasoning according to law rests on the positivist 
assumption that the sources thesis should be distinguished from moral 
reasoning. 149 As was discussed in s.2 of this chapter, such a distinction between 
types of reasoning fails due to the categorical nature of moral imperatives; they 
exclusionary to all forms of action, including law. The civil disobedience Raz 
introduces should therefore be seen as more legitimate than the law should the 
law in question not conform with the PGC. Indeed, if the law in question fails 
the test for permissibility presented by the PGC, it necessarily lacks the ability to 
claim legitimate authority Raz believes to be inherent in the concept of law and, 
by his own test, cannot be considered to be law in the true sense of the concept.  
 
This conclusion is necessary by Raz’s own writing on the subject. He claims that 
courts are able to have discretion to modify legal rules and that they ‘[O]ught to 
resort to moral reasoning to decide whether to use [their discretion] and how.’150 
This ought is not absolute for Raz however, as he claims that morality can be 
too vague to give an answer or to be of use in settling a bilateral dispute. This 
suggests that legal reasoning should instead be viewed as somehow independent 
to morality and not bound to its requirements:151  
Doctrinal reasons, reasons of system, local simplicity and local 
coherence, should always give way to moral considerations when they 
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conflict with them. But they have  role to play when natural reason runs 
out.152 
He gives the example of laws concerning emigration, suggesting that it would be 
unusual to hold that moral reasoning should play a decisive role in any decision 
on this topic that was the subject of adjudication by the courts. 153  It should be 
countered however that this characterisation of legal reasoning misrepresents 
the nature of moral claims. It is perfectly sensible to say that morality should 
form the foundation of all legal disputes in that it sets a boundary beyond which 
decisions lack legitimate authority. The courts are still able to engage in doctrinal 
reasoning within the realms of the pluralistic moral permissibility which is 
enabled by the PGC. To deny this would again claim that the courts can issue 
doctrinal interpretations which, if contrary to the PGC’s requirements, lack the 
legitimate authority axiomatic to law and therefore cannot be seen as belonging 
to a coherent concept of law at all. 
 
3.2  The Importance of Points of View 
 
At this point, the chapter should move on to discuss in more detail exactly what 
Raz means by his previous assertion that what separates Legal Reasoning from 
moral reasoning is that it must necessarily begin from the starting point of a 
‘Legal Point of View.’ This concept requires that the law be seen and analysed 
as it is perceived by legal practitioners and institutions. Inherent here is Raz’s 
view that judges necessarily view legal rules that they lay down become morally 
binding as a result of their being thus proclaimed. The importance of this 
concept to his overall views on the concept of law require necessitate an 
admittedly long quotation: 
[R]ules telling other people what they ought to do can only be justified by 
their self-interest or by moral considerations. My self-interest cannot 
explain why they ought to do one thing or another except if one assumes 
that they have a moral duty to protect my interest, or that it is in their 
                                                          
152 ibid 339-340 
153 ibid 335 - 336 
209 
 
interest to do so. While a person’s self-interest can justify saying that he 
ought to act in a certain way, it cannot justify a duty to act in any way 
except if one assumes that he has a moral reason to protect this interest 
of his. Therefore, it seems to follow that I cannot accept rules imposing 
duties on other people except, if I am sincere, for moral reasons. Judges 
who accept the rule of recognition accept a rule which requires them to 
accept other rules imposing obligations on other people. They, therefore, 
accept a rule that can only be accepted in good faith for moral reasons. 
They, therefore, either accept it for moral reasons or at least pretend to 
do so.154  
A legal point of view therefore must necessarily be based on moral reasoning as 
this is a claim which judges, in adjudicating decisions, believe the law makes on 
those to whom their decisions are addressed. McBride helpfully breaks down the 
argument thus: 
1. Judges accept their legal system’s rule of recognition. 
2. If judges accept a rule of recognition, those judges accept rules imposing 
obligations on other people. 
3. If one accepts rules imposing obligations on other people, some or all of 
one’s reasons for doing so are moral.  
4. Therefore [from (1), (2), and (3)]: Judges accept rules imposing 
obligations on other people, and some or all of their reasons for doing 
so are moral. 
5. Therefore: Judges accept the rule of recognition, and some or all of their 
reasons for doing so are moral.155 
McBride perceives difficulty in this argument. He accepts that the second step, 
what he labels ‘Acceptance Closure’ – that ‘If one accepts Φ and Φ validates Ψ, 
then for every Ψ one accepts Ψ (or for most instantiations of Ψ one accepts 
Ψ).’156 is valid as a general statement of logic, and this is a claim that we are able 
to accept in light of the PGC compliant account of reasons as discussed in s.2 
of this chapter. What he disputes is the generalisation which occurs to step 5 - 
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‘Reverse Closure: If one accepts Ψ for reason-type R, and one accepts Φ, and Φ 
validates Ψ, then one accepts Φ for reason-type R.’157 Such a claim, for McBride, 
only accounts for single reasons to influence decision making, whereas judges 
often balance doctrinal and moral claims in making decisions; it cannot 
adequately explain a judicial decision which considers both moral reason R and 
doctrinal reason R2. 158  
 
This criticism can be rebutted however if it can be established doctrinal reason 
R2 as necessarily incorporating moral reason R. This has been the argument put 
forward in s.3.1 of this chapter – that if Raz is committed to holding that law 
necessarily makes a claim to legitimate authority, this legitimacy can only be 
provided by the law being created in conformity with the PGC. The Legal Point 
of View therefore holds judges too must deliberate in accordance with this moral 
foundation, otherwise their judgments could make no legitimate claim upon 
those to whom it is directed. The legal point of view is therefore committed to 
holding that moral obligations created by law only exist if the law is legitimate, 
in that it conforms to the requirements of the PGC. The legal point of view 
proposed by Raz as being of central importance can therefore be seen to be 
hollow without this moral justification, casting doubt on the separateness of 
normative systems which Raz believes exists due to the differing view points 
required by each.159 It is because of this moral legitimacy that courts are able to 
view themselves as exclusionary as Raz believes that they do.160  
 
3.3  Legal Normativity. 
 
Much has been made so far of Raz’s claim that law necessarily possesses 
legitimate authority – without this it would be incapable of making claims on the 
behaviour of its subjects that they would treat as valid and therefore choose to 
follow. This claim relies on a normative foundation – that the law is constructed 
around a series of exclusionary ‘oughts’ which are designed to guide the conduct 
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of its subjects. It is the intertwined nature of the legitimate authority that is 
necessary for legal normativity to be a coherent force that will be examined here. 
We will first examine how legal normativity might be derived from the PGC, 
before discussing Raz’s own Sources thesis in light of this analysis.  
 
3.3.1  Legal Normativity from the PGC. 
 
As has been cursorily mentioned in ss. 2 and 3.1, Raz believes that the idea of 
authority appears to be paradoxical in nature: 
To be subjected to authority, it is argued , is incompatible with reason, 
for reason requires that one should always act on the balance of reasons 
of which one is aware. It is of the nature of authority that it requires 
submission even when one thinks that what is required is against reason. 
Therefore, submission to autonomy is irrational. Similarly, the principle 
of autonomy entails action on one’s own judgment on all moral 
questions. Since authority sometimes requires action against one’s own 
judgment, it requires abandoning one’s moral autonomy. Since all 
practical questions may involve moral considerations, all practical 
authority denies moral autonomy and is consequently immoral.161 
By extension, we can infer that if Raz believes that an authority always acts in 
conformity with the demands of morality, then it is not a true authority – in 
limiting its ability to make demands only in line with moral reasoning, it has 
ceded its exclusionary power and cannot be truly said to be an authority. Such a 
claim would mean that the account of legitimate legal authority thus developed 
is not an account of authority at all. In order to prove that this is not an accurate 
conclusion, we must explore in further detail Raz’s account of four common 
methods of explaining of how authority can be said to exist. Firstly, an 
explanation can attempt to specify the conditions necessary or sufficient for 
effective, de facto  authority – a method he rejects as being purely descriptive of 
why authority is possessed as opposed to what authority actually is.162 Secondly, 
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an account could specify the conditions for legitimate, de jure authority – an 
account Raz also rejects at it fails to account for what one has when one has 
authority.163 Third would be an account that equates de facto authority with having 
power over people, power which – if legitimate – is also de jure. This account is 
rejected as all de facto authority necessarily claims legitimacy, as without this it 
would be unable to influence its subjects. 164 Lastly, an authority can exist because 
it is conferred by a system of rules – an explanation which again conflates 
possession of authority with what it is to have authority. It does not provide a 
means of telling which rules are capable of conferring authority to the body in 
question.165  
 
Having rejected these four common explanations of authority, Raz needs to find 
an alternative means of justifying how authority arises. To do this he turns to the 
simple explanation offered by John Lucas, that ‘A man, or body of men, has 
authority if it follows from his saying “Let X happen”, that X ought to happen.’166 
To clarify that authority must necessarily be over others, this statement is 
modified to become ‘X has authority over Y if his saying ‘Let Y Φ’, is a reason 
for Y to Φ.’ 167 Such a statement is, for Raz, correct in its main insight that to 
possess authority is to have the power to change reasons for action – but lacks 
the normative explanation as to how this change can occur.168 Raz suggests any 
such normative power must be directed at special types of reasons he labels 
‘Protected Reasons for Action’, which he characterises as a combined reason for 
action and an exclusionary reason to disregard all other reasons against it. 
Normative Reasons therefore possess two characteristics: 
1. There is reason for regarding them as a protected reason or as 
cancelling a protected reason; AND 
2. The reason is that that it is desirable to enable people to change 
protected reasons by such acts, if they wish to do so. 169 
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As reasons which are made from positions of authority claim both these 
characteristics, they therefore possess normative character. Raz is therefore able 
to define X has authority to Φ as entailing that there is some Y and some Z such 
that: 
1. Y permitted X to Φ or gave him power to do so; 
2. Y has power to do so; 
3. X’s Φ-ing will affect the interests of Z and Y has authority over Z’170 
To apply this to legal authority: 
1. Y permits a law maker to make law or gives him power to do so; 
2. Y has power to do so; 
3. A law maker’s making of a law will affect the interests of a subject 
of the law, and Y has authority over the subject of the law. 
Our enquiry must therefore be directed to the nature of Y – what can 
simultaneously enable a law-maker to make law whilst also possessing an 
authority over the subjects of law prior to the law-making taking place? The 
classical response from positivism here would be that Y is a norm generator 
which gives the bodies it applies to the power to make law. It could be the Basic 
Norm proposed by Kelsen, or the Secondary Rule of Recognition proposed by 
Hart. These are social facts which possess this power and need no further 
legitimation. The satisfactoriness of this claim has been disputed in earlier 
chapters as merely question begging, however; what gives such a norm-creator 
the power to create norms itself? Put another way, if law makes a claim to 
legitimate authority, what is it that legitimises the norm-creator?  
 
Raz partially addresses this concern in recognising that law can never be fully 
isolated from other disciplines – his inclusive positivism allows for an overlap 
with morality, for example, as a means of generating the necessary normative 
foundation of law. 171 Law makes direct normative statements which create 
oughts and duties upon those to whom they are addressed.172 A legal system 
must therefore be comprised of these normative statements of the general form 
                                                          
170 ibid 20 
171 Raz (n 122) 44 
172 ibid 49 
214 
 
that ‘p ought to be the case, and that it is true if, and only if, there is, in a certain 
normative system, a norm to the effect that p ought to be the case.’ 173 Normative 
statements must rest on a justificatory norm, so legal norms must also rest on a 
legitimising norm in order to be valid. The simplest way of locating such a norm 
would be for it to be a pure norm, the existence of which is itself enough to 
make it true.174 Such a pure norm can be found with the PGC, in that the ought 
which stems from it exists by the bare fact of agency. Any legal system thus 
founded on the normative system provided by the PGC can channel this 
normative force into individually, legally binding norms. 
 
Positivists may here argue along a similar line as Jules Coleman, and propose the 
Practical Difference Thesis to reject such a foundation. This thesis holds that to 
claim that legal normativity is provided by a moral foundation is to 
mischaracterise the claims made on us by law. Law is an exclusionary reason in 
itself, and its claim to authority presupposes that it overrides all considerations 
capable of being made by an agent individually – including moral reasoning.175 
If the law makes no difference to how people would act, then it is not capable 
of acting as an authority which people would defer to.176 This argument will be 
considered in more detail later.177 Instead, we will here respond to an argument 
that we have previously discussed in Raz’s ‘Normal Justification Thesis’, which 
claims that authority is legitimate if its subjects are more likely to comply with 
reasons that already ought to justify their behaviour if they follow the authority, 
than if they were to act independently. 178 We have already established that in 
order for this to be possible this requires the authority to not act contrary to the 
reasons which the agent possesses independently and, since the PGC offers a 
foundational moral principle which applies to all reasons an agent might possess, 
any legitimate authority must also be PGC compliant. In doing so it also 
addresses the problem of social coordination,179 in providing space for a plurality 
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of legal solutions which are acceptable to all regardless of their subjective 
concerns by providing a universally acceptable moral foundation upon which 
society can function. It thus enables a normative framework in allowing an 
orderly community to exist which respects legitimate differences of opinion: 
The point is that an orderly community can exist only if it shares many 
practices, and that in all modern pluralistic societies a great measure of 
toleration of vastly different outlooks is made possible by the fact that 
many of them enable the vast majority of the population to accept 
common standards of conduct.180 
By reflecting shared practices in a morally grounded normative framework 
guaranteed by law, the PGC thus enables the law to claim legitimate authority. 
Such coordination is necessary for law to possess efficacy and be accepted by 
those to whom it is addressed. For, as has been asserted previously, every de facto 
claim to authority necessarily includes a claim that it is also de jure legitimate, 181 
and the simplest way for an authority to make claims to both statuses is for it to 
meet the requirements of both. This can be achieved through conformity with 
the PGC. Such legitimate status can be enjoyed by all forms of law – customary, 
statutory and common – provided that all are compliant with this requirement.182 
PGC compliant law then, no matter what its source, should be seen as possessing 
a legitimate authority. The very fact of its validity provides us with a reason to 
follow it – something which Raz would readily admit.183 Yet we would still 
express doubts that Natural Law can adequately justify legal validity in that it 
views a valid rule as one that its subjects are ‘[R]equired to observe and endorse.’ 
prior to it becoming law.184 This is a mischaracterisation of the PGC compliant 
legal normativity which has been outlined here. Law which is PGC compliant 
can still give rise to additional legal obligations given that the PGC is not a 
method for creating obligations, but for assessing the permissibility of maxims. 
It provides normative force to rules which are permissible, rather than requiring 
specific sets of rules be in force. In this sense, the theory thus presented 
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conforms entirely with Raz’s description of a valid legal rule as being ‘[O]ne 
which has the normative effects (in law) which it claims to have.’185 
 
Before we move on to apply this normative grounding to Raz’s own ideas on 
the sources of law, some final clarifications must be made. Firstly, we should 
note that Raz remains committed to the claim that law is necessary a higher 
exclusionary force than all other considerations.186 He suggests that this is self-
evident in that we can imagine a situation whereby neither a citizen nor a judge 
want to conform to a particular rule, but must do so because that is what the law 
requires.187  He recognises that it is a moral defect in the law that such a situation 
might occur, but argues that it is an inevitable defect due to the fact that ‘[I]t is 
practically impossible for the law to recognize all the considerations relevant to 
the cases which it applies.’ due to the fact that legal certainty requires legal rules 
to be general, rather than specific, in their  application.188 Such an argument may 
seem appealing, but can be dismissed in that it again mischaracterises the theory 
of legal normativity outlined above. The fact the PGC provides a point of 
reference to assess the validity of rules allows for the generality which Raz 
suggests any moral foundation would preclude. It is therefore not a necessary 
feature of a legal system that a judge and subject may be faced with a situation 
where they do not want to conform to a particular rule but must do so because 
the law requires it. If this situation were to arise, several rebuttals could again be 
made. Should the judge and subject wish to act contrary to a PGC compliant law 
but feel unable to do so, we can reject their scepticism as not being morally 
grounded. It might be a pragmatic concern, but it is paradoxical to suggest that 
a moral reason can exist for not applying a morally permissible rule.  
Alternatively it might be the case that the judge and subject wish to act in a PGC 
compliant way which the law forbids, and they choose to follow the law because 
of its overarching exclusionary nature. This again would be irrational and 
contrary to the nature of legal normativity outlined above. If it is axiomatic that 
legal normativity can only exist if it can be viewed as a legitimate authority, and 
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that the concept of legitimate authority incorporates compliance with the PGC, 
it is again paradoxical to suggest that a non-PGC compliant rule can possess 
legal normativity. There is therefore no valid legal reason for the judge and 
subject to feel bound to follow the non-PGC compliant rule as it does not meet 
the legal criterion of being a legitimate authority. One final objection could be 
raised here from Raz’s writing, in that he could claim the above argument 
conflates the existence of a legal rule, which is an exclusionary reason to abide 
by it, with the claim that the law requires conformity ‘motivated by recognition 
of the binding force, the validity of the law.’ 189 Yet it is not obvious how this 
differentiation can be supported should we accept Raz’s earlier insistence that a 
legally valid rule must claim legitimate authority. Assessing whether a legal rule 
possesses such legitimate authority necessarily entails assessing its binding force 
and validity, thus allowing us to discard this distinction as oxymoronic when 
viewed alongside his earlier claims.  
 
3.3.2 PGC Compliant Normativity and the 
Sources Thesis 
 
 
Having established that legal normativity, should it possess legitimate authority, 
must be in conformity with the requirements of the PGC, we can now move on 
to defend this characterisation against Raz’s central theories on the sources of 
law. These theories would form the largest, and as yet unaddressed, objection 
which Raz would raise against the necessary connection between law and 
morality outlined above, namely that he believes that law is necessarily a social 
fact as opposed to being a creature of morality or metaphysics. He believes this 
is a necessary foundation due to the law requiring both efficacy and in that it 
possesses a positive source and positive means of removing its own legal 
authority. 190 
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This claim is central to Raz’s Social Thesis. If law can only exist as law due to its 
being created by an appropriate source, then any moral connection that exists 
can only be contingent in character and any semantic similarities, such as 
emphasis on rights and duties, are not identical in nature in both spheres.191 Raz 
characterises his sources thesis as a strong variant of the social thesis – that: 
 
A jurisprudential theory is acceptable only if its test for identifying the 
content of the law and determining its existence depend exclusively on 
facts of human behaviour capable of being described in value-neutral 
terms, and applied without reason to moral argument.192 
 
In order to fully explore Raz’s claim here, we will ignore for the time being the 
fact that this definition includes a positivist assumption without attempting to 
justify the exclusion of morality as a viable source of legal norms. We will instead 
examine why Raz believes this definition is one we should accept beyond this 
definitional problem, a belief that rests on the fact that it is inescapable that law 
is a social phenomenon.  This claim can be supported by the joint tests of 
efficacy, institutional character and sources. Raz holds, like Kelsen, that law can 
only truly exist where it possesses efficacy on a systemic level. These systems are 
comprised of standards which are connected to adjudicative institutions whose 
purpose it is to resolve disputes as to how they are applied, and the standards 
which are subject to adjudication must have the relevant institutional connection 
to a source which is capable of producing them.193   
 
It is this final step which demonstrates, for Raz, the positivist nature of law. 
Without being properly enacted or otherwise given legal status by a body capable 
of doing so, any rule or standard can possess neither legal efficacy nor be subject 
to legal adjudication. As such, it is the primary tenet of any account of why norms 
possess legal character. Raz’s own formulation of the Sources Thesis holds that 
‘A law has a source if its contents and existence can be determined without using 
moral arguments…The sources of law are those facts by virtue of which it is 
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valid and which identify its content.’ 194 This is a definition Raz believes we 
should accept because it adequately reflects and explicates our conception of 
what law is, and there are sound reasons to believe this is so,195 namely:  
It is an essential of law in society to mark the point at which a private 
view of members of the society, or of influential sections or powerful 
groups within it, ceases to be their private view and becomes… a view 
binding on all members notwithstanding their disagreement with it. It 
does so and can only do so by providing publicly ascertainable ways of 
guiding behaviour and regulating aspects of social life.196 
Such sources cannot contain moral foundations because the law necessarily 
possesses its own exclusionary character. Raz suggests that this character 
necessitates that the law must be clearly and totally identifiable without reference 
to further justificatory argument.197 A counter which is regularly made at this 
stage to such arguments is that this appears to be a reductionist statement which 
holds that law is nothing but an expression of power and of the will of certain 
individuals in society. This is particularly true of situations where courts are 
obliged to rule on disputes where the law does not provide a solution, and as 
such are forced to fill a lacuna by their judgment. Such an argument rests on the 
premise that a legal proposition is only a proposition because it stems from a 
recognised source: ⊢ p ↔ S(p). To avoid this reductionism, this formula is one 
that the Sources Thesis must guard against. A simple way to do this would be to 
reject Raz’s previous insistence that sources must be free of moral considerations 
as a circular definition relying on an as yet unproven positivist assumption. 
Section 3.3.1 has argued that legal normativity is guaranteed by an incorporation 
of the PGC as the justification for the legitimate authority to which the law 
makes a claim. Should we therefore accept that legal sources, including courts, 
are bound to follow the PGC to guarantee the legitimate authority required by 
exclusionary claim inherent in law, the reductionist argument can be rejected. 
Yet this is not a step which Raz would endorse, as he rejects the argument that 
– should courts rely on moral considerations in forming their judgments – moral 
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considerations are not law at the point at which they are incorporated into the 
legal system. They only possess legal character once a law-creating source has 
confirmed that they do. Such sources are therefore not obliged to apply a non-
legal consideration, but are able to do so at their own discretion. 
 
Instead, Raz attempts to circumvent the reductionist argument by positing the 
situation where two laws which are valid according to the sources thesis 
contradict one another, thus creating the legal gap in question.198 Such a 
statement is said to contain a contradiction – two laws, each of which possess 
normative exclusionary character, cannot both be valid as two exclusionary 
reasons cannot operate in contradiction of one another: ⊢ -(Rc x, Φ & Rc x, - 
Φ).199 Neither can the formulation (Rc x, Φ) v (Rc x, - Φ) hold, as the extent of R 
must be different in each of these situations in order to avoid the paradox of 
contradictory exclusionary reasons.200 Instead, the Sources Thesis holds that it 
must be true that ‘Statements of the form p LR x, Φ are true only if statements 
of social facts specifiable without recourse to moral argument are substituted for 
p.’201 Since these statements of social facts must be specific in nature, this 
circumvents the possibility of conflicting exclusionary reasons. This argument 
would still be equally valid however if the term ‘without recourse to moral 
argument were removed’, meaning that the Sources Thesis cannot exclude 
morality stemming from the PGC in this formulation. Raz might argue that the 
rejection of the PGC is axiomatic, believing as he does that it is impossible that 
a source can exist for a negative statement such as -LR x, Φ.202 Since the PGC 
operates on a basis of permissibility rather than committing an agent to a specific 
end, it cannot be said to be a source of positive obligations. Whilst this statement 
appears to hold, it can be shown to rest on a mischaracterisation of the principle. 
If the courts are able to incorporate non-legal considerations at their discretion, 
then Raz has already suggested that the sources of law may feel themselves to 
be bound by non-legal considerations when declaring what the law is. In doing 
so, he renders the Sources Thesis to be a statement of Inclusive Positivism which 
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may take the PGC to be a relevant factor in creating law or filling legal gaps if it 
feels it is appropriate to do so. If this is true, then Raz allows sources to consider 
a Categorical Imperative as a factor which can shape the development of the 
law. Once this concession has been made, the nature of a Categorical Imperative 
renders adherence to it not just discretionary, but necessary. It is therefore 
axiomatic that legal sources, if they are able to incorporate the PGC into the law, 
must do so. To claim otherwise is to misunderstand the nature of how a 
Categorical Imperative operates. 
 
This argument has sought to demonstrate that, should the possibility of 
incorporating moral principles into law through the Sources Thesis be conceded, 
the nature of the PGC requires that incorporation be a necessary feature of any 
legal system in order to provide the legitimate authority which law necessarily 
claims. Such a claim is axiomatic in Raz’s earlier observation that two 
contradictory legal principles cannot exist. Similarly, if the law requires moral 
content in order to claim legitimate authority, then it cannot be true that a legal 
reason X requiring Φ can exist if a moral reason based on the PGC X requires 
us to not Φ. Thus the statement ⊢ - (RL x, Φ & RM x, - Φ) is true. The absolute 
exclusionary reason inherent within the nature of a categorical imperative 
requires statement RM x, - Φ to take primacy. It is therefore necessary that (RM 
x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ). This argument is also alluded to by Raz, if not expressly 
endorsed, in his claim that – due to the fact that morality, unlike law, has no 
jurisdiction, it applies to legal institutions and practitioners in their actions 
equally to those of all agents who are aware of their existence.203 Yet this step, 
put by Raz as the belief that the principles which establish the legitimacy of 
governments and positive law are moral,204 leads to a paradox of incorporation. 
If ‘[M]an-made legal duties bind their subjects only if moral principles of 
legitimacy make them so binding.’205 then we are led to question what the process 
of legal incorporation adds if judges, as agents, are already bound to act 
according to moral requirements.206 Raz partly answers this question himself, 
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establishing that the institutionalisation provided by law advances moral 
concerns by enabling their adjudication and enforcement.207 Yet the objection is 
partly founded in a mischaracterisation of the nature of the moral requirement 
proposed by the PGC and by categorical imperatives more generally. Legal 
systems get their validity from these principles, but this is not to say that these 
principles prescribe that the law needs to take a definite and specific form. Legal 
Pluralism is permitted insofar as the specific rules claiming the status of law do 
not contradict the principles contained within the moral principle. This leaves 
scope for a variety of legal norms to exist. Law can therefore be seen as a system 
of norms resting on a moral foundation, but with scope for its own distinct 
content within these foundational constraints.  
 
3.4  Systemic Functionality 
 
Another central idea which is fundamental to the nature of law is that it exists 
on a systemic level. It would be unusual to claim that a law can exist in isolation; 
they instead exist as part of a system of creation, adjudication, enforcement and 
repeal. The systemic nature of law has therefore led some theorists to suggest 
that legal normativity, and therefore validity, exists at a systemic level rather than 
being depended on the validity of individual legal norms which make up the 
system. The purpose of this section is to assess the validity of claims to systemic 
normativity. 
 
Our starting point in the discussion will be Raz’s belief that it is not necessary 
that all individual laws are norms. For him, all legal philosophy is ‘[N]othing but 
practical philosophy applied to one social institution.’ 208 This insight goes some 
way to explaining his hostility to the idea of any necessary connection between 
law and morality, as such claims tend to operate on a presumption to the 
opposite. He argues that legal normativity is provided by the system as a whole: 
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[T]he law is normative because its function is to guide human behaviour, 
and that it guides human behaviour in two ways: either by affecting the 
consequences of a certain course of conduct in a way which constitutes 
a standard reason for avoiding that course of conduct, or by affecting 
the consequences of a certain course of conduct in a way which 
constitutes a reason for pursuing or avoiding it, depending upon one’s 
wishes.209 
Such a reading that normativity exists on a systemic level appears to fit well with 
his Sources Thesis which, in turn, is heavily influenced by Hart’s concept of a 
Secondary Rule of Recognition. These theses hold that individuals do not 
regularly engage in legal reasoning about whether or not a law should apply to 
them in a given circumstance. Instead, the applicability of legal rules to a given 
situation is decided by the officials whose job it is to adjudicate upon and enforce 
them. Since the ultimate arbiters of legal validity are working within the system 
rather than representing individual norms, claims to legal validity are grounded 
in their understanding of the law and, by extension, must also be systemic.210 
Whether or not a norm ought to be followed by dint of its legal nature can 
therefore only be assessed with reference to its systemic validity.211 
 
Such a view is also supported by two features Raz claims law necessarily 
possesses – efficacy and institutions capable of adjudicating and of enforcing 
their decisions with sanctions.212 Each of these features will be assessed in turn 
with the aim of establishing whether their existence evidences the claim that legal 
normativity exists on the systemic level. Before a discussion of efficacy can take 
place, it is worth reminding ourselves that Raz begins from the starting point 
that Inclusive Positivism is a fundamental tenet of the Sources Thesis. The 
existence of legal reasons, and therefore of legal normativity, can be established 
by social fact alone; there is no need for morality to be the foundation of such 
legal normativity. 213 As such, law can only exist in a society which recognises 
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that, when they decide how to act, individuals necessarily engage in two stages 
of reasoning. Firstly, they deliberate between the competing reasons they have 
to either Φ or not Φ. Secondly, they decide which reason is the strongest before 
utilising it to justify Φ-ing. In this latter executive stage of action, no further 
deliberative assessment takes place; the agent merely acts according the to the 
reason they have decided is the strongest reason to act based on their prior 
deliberation.214 For Raz, moral reasons are necessarily present at the deliberative 
stage in that they can be used to justify a decision to either Φ or not Φ. Legal 
reasons are necessarily different in that they direct an individual agent away from 
deliberation, but instead act as authority to dictate to them which course of 
action is required. They should therefore be seen as being located at the 
executive stage of action rather than the deliberative.215 Courts, in adjudication, 
are able to engage in moral reasoning at their deliberative stage of determining 
the content of a legal rule, yet it only gains legal authority at the executive stage.216 
When agents grant law efficacy therefore, they must do so at the systemic level 
due to legal authority being present at the executive stage as opposed to the 
deliberative. 
 
Such an argument does not flow naturally from the rest of Raz’s writings on 
reasons as explored in s.2 of this chapter. It was ascertained supra that legal 
reasoning should be viewed as no different to other types of reasons. It is 
therefore safe to assume that legal reasons should be viewed as existing at the 
deliberative stage of when an agent chooses whether or not they wish to either 
Φ or not Φ. To suggest that an agent considers whether or not to submit to a 
legal system after they have already decided what course of action they have a 
reason to undertake seems strained and artificial; it makes more sense to see a 
legal reason as one which forms part of their general deliberation on action. If 
this is the case, it seems equally strained to suggest that the legal reason being 
deliberated upon should be whether to submit to the authority of a system. 
Action is by definition aimed at specific goals and objectives, meaning that the 
legal reason under deliberation must also be an individual norm aimed at a 
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specific type of conduct which is the goal of the agent. Should this be the case, 
then we can hypothesise a situation where a reason which claims to be law, and 
therefore claims to possess exclusionary force, might conflict with a moral 
reason which also claims the same exclusionary force. Such a conflict re-
introduces the paradoxical formulation raised in s.3.3.2, that - (RL x, Φ & RM x, 
- Φ). Since the moral foundation of all reasons and actions is necessarily the 
categorical imperative provided by the PGC and categorical imperatives by their 
nature apply to all action, including action, then the conclusion that (RM x, - Φ) 
> (RL x, Φ) again necessarily follows. It therefore follows that an agent, in 
deciding whether or not a legal norm possesses exclusionary force over a moral 
consideration, is deliberating over a specific action. This assessment takes the 
shape of a deliberation of whether or not the individual norm possesses 
legitimate authority, meaning that agents make decisions relating to legal efficacy 
must also take place with regards to individual norms. Systemic efficacy could 
therefore only exist if the individual legal norms within them possess the 
legitimate authority required to provide an exclusionary reason to act in a certain 
way.  
 
Having established that the necessary fact of efficacy is not proof that legal 
systems possess normative force through their systemic nature, we shall move 
on to consider whether or not the existence of institutions whose role it is to 
adjudicate upon disputes and apply sanctions to enforce compliance is evidence 
of systemic normativity. Raz begins his thoughts on the subject by attempting 
to distinguish sanctions from force. Sanctions need not be forceful in 
themselves, yet force can be used to ensure a sanction is carried out. It is this 
claim to legitimately regulate force which he suggests is necessarily claimed by 
all legal systems; at the very minimum they would prohibit violence against legal 
officials in the undertaking of their duties and would allow force to allow enforce 
compliance with sanctions. Force should therefore be seen as a tool with which 
ensures that sanctions will be complied with. The necessary link between force 
and sanctions therefore requires us to accept that all legal systems are capable of 
providing sanctions for intentional violations of rules which are addressed to 
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ordinary individuals.217 Interestingly, Raz concedes that this leaves open the 
theoretical possibility that sanctions are not necessary for a legal system to 
function effectively if it possesses complete efficacy. He concludes however that 
it would be impossible for such a wholly efficacious system to exist in practice, 
meaning that any working system must necessarily resort to sanctions to ensure 
compliance. Yet this conclusion raises interesting questions. The foremost of 
these is linked to a secondary claim of Raz’s that sanctions are, at best, auxiliary 
reasons for compliance rather than primary reasons. 218 We must assume that the 
primary reason for compliance is the normative foundation of the rule resting 
on its legitimate authority. Should sanctions be an auxiliary reason, then the rule 
under consideration must not possess true legitimate authority as, if it did, then 
would be an absolute exclusionary reason which did not need an auxiliary reason 
for compliance. The reason they would provide would amount to a tautology. 
In presenting this paradox, we aim to again shift the justification for legal 
sanctions away from the systemic level to that of individual norms. A sanction 
could only serve as a reason for compliance with a norm if the norm to which it 
is attached is imperfect. It is therefore incorrect to describe them as operating 
on a systemic level if they provide an auxiliary reason to follow an individual 
legal norm. 
This discussion has attempted to demonstrate that the systemic requirements of 
efficacy and institutional adjudication operate on the level of individual norms 
in that they are fundamentally linked to providing individuals with reasons for 
compliance with rules governing specific acts. It is their operation at this level 
which allows a legal system to claim legitimate authority as a whole. Yet Raz may 
still object and claim that it is simply inaccurate to describe the law as only 
possessing authority in this way. Their role as a social institution requires that 
they be viewed as a whole rather than a collection of individual norms.219 If we 
view law in this way, then Raz holds that three characteristics become apparent. 
Firstly, that law claims to be comprehensive in that systems claim the legitimate 
authority to regulate any and all behaviour. Secondly, they make a claim to 
supremacy in that they claim to be an absolute exclusionary reason. Lastly, they 
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are necessarily open in that they can give binding force to non-legal norms by 
including them at the systemic level.220 Since the coherence of the legal system is 
the basis of Raz’s claim to systemic normativity, the final part of this section will 
be focussed on his account of legal adjudication. It is hoped that this will 
demonstrate that the legitimate authority of a system can only be generated 
should the individual norms contained within it themselves possess legitimate 
authority, and that systemic authority cannot provide a reason for compliance 
with an illegitimate norm.  
 
We will begin by outlining some general characteristics of interpretation of any 
kind before moving on to apply these characteristics to Raz’s account of how 
the courts interpret legal norms. Raz believes that any interpretation requires 
four key features in order to be successful: an original object must be the subject 
of the interpretation; the interpretation must demonstrate the meaning of the 
original object; the interpretation itself is subject to an assessment as to its 
correctness; and interpretations must be a deliberate enterprise.221 The primary 
feature that will be considered here will be the third, namely that any 
interpretation must be able to be assessed for its correctness. Raz labels this 
aspect of interpretation the ‘Intention Thesis’; that any interpretation can only 
be viewed as valid if it correctly captures the intention of the author of the 
original.222 Raz moves on to question whether this observation can apply to legal 
considerations, noting that it is not immediately apparent that judicial practices 
and legal doctrine which develop over the years can be attributed to a single 
author in the way that this account requires. Assuming for the time being that 
such an author can be located however, he proposes a modification of the 
Intention Thesis which can apply to legal interpretation. He calls this maxim the 
Radical Intention Thesis, which holds that ‘An interpretation [of a legal 
principle] is correct in law if and only if it reflects the author’s intention.’223 This, 
for Raz, is an adequate description of how legal interpretation operates. 
Nevertheless, he suggests three objections which might plausibly be raised to 
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this account. The first is that no reason exists to base an interpretation on the 
author’s intention. Tied into this is a secondary objection initially raised earlier, 
that it is not always possible to establish authorial intent for a legal doctrine 
which been developed by several different institutions.224 Raz rejects these 
conjoined objections as being nonsensical. Since the Sources Thesis holds that 
all law making power rests with legal institutions, these institutions are 
necessarily authors of the law. As authors, they cannot create legal norms 
without intending to do so, thus demonstrating that an intention exists. The third 
objection hypothesised by Raz addresses this rejection of the previous two, 
holding that legal institutions themselves do not always seek to establish the 
authorial intent of the principles which they establish or apply; they are merely 
applied as they exist.225 Yet this is also dismissed for the same reasons; that 
principles necessarily contain authorial intent as they are applied, in that the 
authors intend them to possess binding authority. This is Raz’s Authoritative 
Intention Thesis. The law must be intelligible in the authoritative claims that it 
makes on its subjects. 
This generalized argument for The Authoritative Intention Thesis is 
an example of an argument with significant results for the 
understanding of the law which makes no stronger assumption than 
that the law is morally intelligible – that is, that people’s attitude to 
the law is morally ineligible, that it is intelligible that they believe the 
law to be morally binding.226 
 
This, for Raz, must be the authorial intention underpinning all legal 
interpretation and, by extension, adjudication. He holds that the normative force 
that is intended is still claimed by law even when the individual norm is morally 
defective as a result of the efficacy of the system as a whole. 227 He therefore 
appears to be claiming that authors can intend that a law can be morally deficient 
yet still possess legitimate authority due to systemic efficacy. Such a conclusion 
fails for two reasons. Firstly, it relies on a description of efficacy which has been 
demonstrated supra to be misguided. The formula (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ) 
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demonstrates that assessments of efficacy take place at the level of the legitimate 
authority possessed by individual norms as opposed to being made against the 
system of which they are part. Even if this were not the case, systemic efficacy 
itself can only arise based on the efficacy of individual norms within the system 
in question. Secondly, the account requires authors to intend to act in a way 
which they recognise that the norm they are attempting to create would not 
possess legitimate authority. Since Raz holds that all legal norms necessarily must 
possess legitimate authority, this requires the authors to be acting prima facie 
irrationally. It is paradoxical to suggest a legal institution would intend to create 
a rule which claims to possess legitimate legal authority to control the actions of 
those to whom it is addressed without imbuing that same norm with the 
legitimate authority it requires to do so. These claims demonstrate that legal 
intention itself cannot be described without reference to the legitimate authority 
which it intends to create, and therefore that all legislative intent must be passed 
in accordance with the requirements of the PGC in order to possess legal effect. 
 
3.5  An Obligation to Obey the Law? 
 
The final subsection of this chapter is designed to address a curious element of 
Raz’s account of law; namely his belief that there is no prima facie obligation to 
submit to obey the law:228 Raz defines an obligation to obey the law thus: 
[An obligation to obey the law] includes admission that the reasons to 
obey have the weight and implications which the law determines for 
them. In other words, it entails a reason to obey in all circumstances 
defeated only by the considerations which are legally recognised as 
excusing from prosecution or conviction. 229 
It may be surprising that this is not a principle he would accept given his previous 
suggestions that the law’s recourse to normative language itself implies that the 
validity and bindingness of legal rules is something that should be accepted.230 
Yet to characterise the law this is to conflate the normative reason which it 
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provides; any duty to obey, for him, conflates exclusionary and absolute 
reasons.231 To say that an obligation to follow the law exists is to say that the rule 
in question is itself justified by reference to a higher principle; if this is the case, 
then it is this higher reason which one has a reason to obey rather than the law 
itself.232 In order to demonstrate this objection, Raz hypothesis an obligation to 
keep rivers clean. He says such an obligation exists iff the obligation is one which 
is already accepted by the majority of the population, and that if ‘[M]ost people 
pollute them and they are badly polluted there is normally no reason why I 
should refrain from polluting them myself.233 
 
In providing this example, Raz appears to suggest that his rejection of an 
obligation to follow the law rests on the efficacy of the norm in question. If the 
rule is one which the population rejects then an agent has no reason to follow it 
himself. It is difficult to reconcile this view of efficacy with the one established 
in s.3.4, however. In order to possess efficacy then a rule must be perceived 
being a legitimate authority. For this to be the case it cannot operate contrary to 
the moral principle contained within the PGC, as a law creating institution must 
incorporate this into the rule in question as rules which do not possess legitimate 
authority are incapable of behaving as binding reasons. This fact is 
acknowledged when Raz claims that all law necessarily is a legitimate authority. 
It is therefore irrational for an agent to perceive a rule possessing legitimate 
authority as an exclusionary reason as one which they should not follow. Raz 
would here raise the objection that if, as has been suggested, all law is necessarily 
morally perfect then the obligation is again not a legal one but a moral one. To 
claim the law has its own obligatory force is a tautology.234 He concedes that in 
certain situations the law does create an obligation to be obeyed, but that any 
general obligation to obey would vary from person to person: 
1. A duty exists to comply with Health and Safety Regulations. These 
possess legitimate authority in that they are designed by experts who 
possess more knowledge than the layman as to how to work safely. 
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Submission to this authority would therefore better enable an agent 
to pursue his goal of working safely than he may do were he to 
reason independently. 
2. A regulation designed to reduce specific examples of pollution. The 
example given would ban barbecues from being used in the 
countryside in all but a few designated areas. Since this would reduce 
overall environmental degradation more effectively than individuals’ 
own reasoning, a reason exits to obey the rule. by banning bbqs in 
all but a few areas. Would reduce damage, should follow. 
3. Should the government have a policy to construct nuclear power 
stations that an agent disagrees with, the agent should still not engage 
in Civil Disobedience. To do so would encourage others to do the 
same when they disagree with another government policy, meaning 
that it would be impossible for the government to function 
effectively. It is therefore in my interests to obey this rule in order 
for social institutions generally to continue to function. 235 
 
The last of these three examples stands out as worth of attention, as taken to its 
logical extent it could be read as being an example of the general obligation to 
follow the law which Raz is attempting to disprove. If an obligation exists to not 
protest against a law which is perceived as illegitimate, it is true that an obligation 
exists to respect that law. This point is itself made by Raz in other writings, where 
he claims that the Rule of Law necessitates the claim people should obey the law 
and consent to be ruled by it by virtue of its status as law. 236 He supports this 
claim by contrasting the Rule of Law with the exercise of arbitrary power, which 
he defines as: ‘[Power which is exercised] with indifference as to whether it will 
serve the purposes which alone can justify use of that power or with belief that 
it will not serve them.’237 If we accept Raz’s earlier idea that law necessarily is a 
legitimate authority, and define legitimate authority as one which does not 
contradict the requirements of the PGC, then arbitrary power becomes the 
imposition of rules which are contrary to the requirements of the PGC in that 
such rules cannot serve the purposes which justify the power’s existence. The 
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Rule of Law then must necessarily comprise of power to the opposite – a series 
of rules in conformity with the PGC which should be followed by dint of their 
possession of legitimate authority. Raz claims the Rule of Law necessitates this 
obligation on a pragmatic foundation rather than a moral one however; it exists 
purely to allow for stable social relations and allow individuals to plan their 
lives.238 This further allows the law to better respect Human Dignity by allowing 
such planning to take place.  
 
By thus connecting the Rule of Law with the value of Human Dignity, Raz 
introduces a moral element beyond the pragmatism which he relied on 
previously. This again allows the PGC to be introduced as a test for the moral 
permissibility of the actions. As a dialectically necessary obligation exists for all 
agents to follow the requirements of the PGC, this obligation can be transferred 
to law which possesses legitimate authority in its concurrence to the PGC. This 
statement is entailed in the following quote from Smith on when an obligation 
to follow the law exists, where X represents an obligation to follow the law: 
I shall say that a person S has a prima facie obligation to do an act X if, 
and only if, there is a moral reason for S to do X which is such that, 
unless he has a moral reason not to do X at least as strong as his reason 
to do X, S's failure to do X is wrong.239 
Since the absolute and exclusionary nature of the PGC precludes the possibility 
of a moral reason to not conform with its requirements, evidence exists to 
suggest that there is a prima facie obligation to follow law which, through its 
own compliance with the PGC, possesses the legitimate authority to claim this 
status. 
 
4 Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has been ambitious in its primary aim of scrutinising the coherence 
of the writings Joseph Raz pertinent to the concept of law. Since the overall aim 
of this thesis is to demonstrate that Inclusive Positivism fails to provide a 
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satisfactory account of legal normativity in light of the categorical imperative 
provided by Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, this chapter has split 
Raz’s writings into two distinct parts. Given the PGC operates on a foundation 
of rational action, an analysis of Raz’s own conceptions of reasons and rationality 
was required in order to assess whether his account of agency, and therefore of 
the nature of agents who are subject to the law, was itself logically consistent. It 
was found to be lacking for several reasons. Central to this was the 
mischaracterisation of moral reasoning prevalent throughout Raz’s own 
thoughts on the nature of exclusionary reasons. The chapter has shown that, 
once Raz’s writings take account of the reasons for action inherent within the 
first stage of the PGC, he must accept it as being an absolute and exclusionary 
reason to not act contrary to its requirements. To do so would be prima facie 
irrational and, as agents are committed to acting in what they perceive to be their 
own interests (whether or not this is founded on a false belief), they have no 
valid reason to act in an irrational manner. In his writings on reasons it has thus 
been demonstrated that Raz has provided no valid reason which would allow an 
agent to disregard the PGC and, in the absence of such a rebuttal, should 
acknowledge its status as a categorical imperative which takes normative 
superiority over all other norms which may exist within an agent’s deliberative 
reasoning.  
 
The second half of the chapter has taken this conclusion and applied it to Raz’s 
writings on the nature of law. Raz’s Sources Thesis holds that, as a social fact, 
legal status is only attained by a norm being created by a body capable of doing 
so. This body is able to incorporate moral principles into the law if it feels it 
should do so, but is under no obligation to thus act. This statement has been 
shown to be deficient if the moral norm in question is one that has been proven 
to act as a categorical imperative to all action. Since Raz has provided no 
evidence to rebut the PGC it should be accepted as operating as such. The 
distinction between legal and moral points of view introduced by Raz therefore 
fails in that it does not acknowledge the axiom that, as agents, members of legal 
institutions which create and enforce the law are also bound to follow the PGC 
as a result of their status as agents. Following from this, if Raz’s claim that all 
law is necessarily a legitimate authority is true, it becomes necessary to see that 
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this statement is synonymous with the claim that all law must be compliant with 
the PGC. Rules which are not PGC compliant are definitionally irrational. We 
must therefore conclude that, if law is necessarily a legitimate authority which is 
created by a law making body, and that this law making body is comprised of 
moral agents who are subject to the PGC’s requirements, these agents are not 
simply permitted to incorporate the PGC into the law which they create but are 
in fact obliged to do so. A necessary connection between law and morality has 
therefore been established in that the PGC necessarily possesses a higher 
normative force than all other norms, including the law. It therefore cannot be 
true that (RL x, Φ & RM x, - Φ). Since this formula operates with reference to 
individual legal norms as opposed to the system as a whole, it also follows that 
efficacy as a necessary condition of a legal system must also be located at the 
level of individual legal rules as opposed to with reference to the system as a 
whole. Legal systems can therefore only be accepted as possessing legitimate 
authority if they individual norms they contain are PGC compliant, and – by 
extension – the Sources Thesis itself can only remain intact if the option to 
incorporate moral principles into the law is replaced with an obligation on the 
part of law-creating institutions to do so.  
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Accepting the Trojan Horse: The Necessary Collapse 
of Inclusive Legal Positivism 
 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
This thesis has already considered in depth the writings of  several prominent 
legal philosophers who may all be broadly categorised as Positivists, in that they 
all – for several reasons – deny the necessary connection which exists between 
Law and Morality. Working on the assumption that the PGC does provide a 
Categorical Imperative which applies equally to all action, an assumption which 
has been robustly defended in Chapter Three,1 the canonical positivist theories 
of Kelsen and Hart have both been shown to be incapable of rebutting a claim 
that law, in any meaningful sense of the word, need not incorporate the moral 
requirements of the PGC.2 The argument then moved on to contemporary 
theory by analysing the writings of Joseph Raz.3 It was concluded that the 
characterisation of his work as being in the Exclusive Positivist tradition, that it 
is conceptually impossible for any connection between law and morality to be 
possible, is grossly overstated; his claim that law necessarily possesses legitimate 
authority can only be possible should the rules being considered for legal validity 
be justified according to a moral stand-point, as opposed to the Legal Point of 
View he defends. Once this step has been taken, Raz’s Exclusive Positivism 
becomes, at a sympathetic reading a variety of Inclusive Positivism. This is 
something Raz would reject, as a central tenet of this branch of positivism is that 
it is entirely plausible that law might rest on a moral foundation – but that this 
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relationship is entirely contingent, and not something which is axiomatic to our 
understanding of the abstract concept of law.  
 
Inclusive Legal Positivism is itself a diverse field of scholarship. This chapter will 
examine the extent to which modifying the positivist claim to allow for a 
contingent relationship between law and morality can prove that no connection 
is, in fact, necessary. Three particular theorists will be considered in turn in order 
to demonstrate the breadth of the field, and the plurality of viewpoints contained 
within it. Firstly, the Formalism discussed extensively by David Lyons will be 
placed under the microscope. The commitment to procedural formalism is one 
which is often viewed as necessary in a legal system, and this claim will be 
examined for its normative justification  before the section moves on to consider 
what Lyons calls his ‘Minimal Separation Thesis’.  
 
Secondly, this chapter will move on to examine the inclusive positivist theory of 
Jules Coleman. This will form the large bulk of the chapter given that Coleman 
himself, for reasons which will be explained during the course of the section 
devoted to his writings, rejects the label of ‘Inclusive Positivism’ in favour of 
what he calls ‘Incorporationism.’ The section will begin by exploring a famous 
distinction in Coleman’s writing, which he believes justifies his Incorporationist 
approach, between Negative and Positive Positivism. Having established where 
Coleman believes the foundations of a theory of law are necessarily located, the 
section will move on to discuss his ideas around Law as an essentially economic 
theory and the location of concepts of wrongfulness contained within it. The 
section will close with a critique of Coleman’s conceptions of legal authority built 
from these foundations, a discussion of the importance he places on the Practical 
Difference Theory and a critique of whether or not his theory is ultimately 
successful in explaining the concept of law. 
 
The third and final section of this chapter will be dedicated to a critique of the 
writings of one of the most spirited defenders of contemporary positivism, 
Matthew Kramer. Kramer characterises himself as a Moderate Incorporationist, 
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and founds his theory on extensive writings on moral and political theory. These 
writings will therefore form the foundation of the first part of the analysis, where 
they will be assessed for their normative validity. The section will then move on 
to Kramer’s writings on the nature of law. He famously holds that moral-political 
foundations of legal writing should be seen as inferior to his own  theoretical-
explanatory approach.4 This is a puzzling claim for a writer who grounds himself 
firmly in the Natural Law tradition, and will be assessed for its validity when seen 
in the light of Kramer’s on writings on the nature of morality. The conclusions 
of this comparison will then form the foundation of a critique of Kramer’s 
commitment to a contingent link between Law and Morality. 
 
The critique of these three conceptions of inclusive positivism will, naturally, be 
grounded in the belief that the PGC is itself capable of providing a categorically 
binding restriction on the permissibility of all agents. Of the theories being 
considered, only Kramer explicitly references his reasons for rejecting 
Gewirthian theory; Lyons and Coleman do not expressly confront the logical 
necessity of the PGC in rejecting a necessary connection between it and the 
concept of law. As has been alluded to above, this thesis has attempted to 
demonstrate that none of the critics so far discussed have managed to give a 
satisfactory account of why the PGC should not provide this necessary 
foundation. The discussions taking place in this chapter will therefore rest on 
the same assumption of the PGC’s validity, and will address any challenges to its 
necessary presence in the law as and when they arise.  
 
2 David Lyons and Formalism 
 
Central to any understanding of the formalism which forms the large part of the 
writing of David Lyons is a central underpinning of his idea of law. Lyons does 
not reject any assertion that the law is morally infallible, and instead believes that 
law must earn the respect which it demands. This conclusion seems unusual to 
ascribe to somebody whose writings are usually placed in the positivist canon, 
                                                          
4 Matthew Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet (OUP 2008) 156-157 
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yet it becomes more coherent when viewed alongside the key role which Lyons 
ascribes to adjudication; a thorough understanding of adjudication is something 
Lyons holds to be central to any understanding of the concept of law. This is 
because of the nature of the adjudicatory process itself, which Lyons believes 
necessarily requires an interpretation of the rules being adjudicated upon. It is 
the outcome of this deliberative process which he holds justifies the obligations 
which arise from it.  
 
He therefore draws a distinction which may confuse lawyers who believe a 
necessary connection between law and morality exists in order to justify the 
normative force of legal obligations. Law can be unjust, and indeed the outcome 
of judicial deliberation can be unjust. This gives rise to the following claim: 
An unjust law is like counterfeit currency, which causes trouble because 
it so closely resembles and may be taken for the real thing. But unjust 
law is not genuine law. And thus it deserves no respect.5 
Yet at no point does this prevent the law whose injustice renders it deficient 
from making the claim to be law; it merely means that those to whom it is 
addressed need not give it respect. It remains law, it is just bad law. Lyons 
believes such normative judgments can be made of law, but are not necessary 
for a rule’s status as law. Standards for validity proposed by Natural Lawyers 
therefore need not be rejected outright; they can be modified as a tool against 
which to assess the success of a legal rule in making its claim to legitimacy.6 A 
parallel can therefore be drawn between Lyons’ conception of law as possessing 
merit of a varying scale, and the claim made by Coleman in s.3 that law should 
be seen as a success term. This will be discussed later, but the conclusion reached 
by Lyons is that the lack of merit possessed by a given rule should not necessarily 
mean that no legal obligation exists to follow it. Such a claim is in direct 
opposition to the Natural Lawyer’s belief that a morally unjust rule cannot 
possess binding legal force. This opposition will therefore be the starting point 
for our analysis of Lyons’ writing. In order to understand the distinction as he 
                                                          
5 David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory: Essays on Law, Justice, and Political 
Responsibility (CUP 1993) 1 
6 ibid 2 
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views it, we will begin by discussing the Formalist approach undertaken by 
Lyons. The second half of this section will place this formalism in the setting of 
what Lyons calls his ‘Minimal Separation Thesis’, before assessing the extent to 
which the thesis can survive intact when assessed for its moral validity by 
subjecting it to the test contained within the PGC. 
 
2.1   Formalism Explored. 
 
The central claim of formalism rests on the empirical starting point that a system 
of law is something that exists, and is often the source of disputes as to its 
content. In adjudicating these disputes, it is therefore pragmatically desirable that 
the rules be enforced in a consistent manner with one another, and that 
precedents set are followed when similar situations arise in the future. Lyons 
hold this formalism is necessary for any conception of law, as the outcome of 
adjudication is always to be characterised as either a restatement of the existing 
law in a given area, a declaration of new law to be applied in a given area or a 
combination of the two. As such, judicial or other official statements which arise 
as a result of the deliberative process should be viewed as law. From this, Lyons 
concludes that ‘[A]n injustice is done whenever an official fails to act within the 
law, regardless of the circumstances.’7 This conclusion presumably arises from 
the axiomatic claim that law makes on its subjects to direct their behaviour in 
accordance with its specifications. We can also imply that for Lyons, the 
existence of a legal system is enough to make its authoritative claim to do so 
prima facie and de facto legitimate, meaning that any deviation from its standards is 
in breach of its own pre-existing rules. For a system to contradict its own rules 
would therefore be irrational and, therefore, unjust. For Lyons, this argument 
would follow regardless on the substantive content of the rules resulting from 
adjudication and being adjudicated upon; it is therefore content-neutral, in that 
value is placed on existing legal rules regardless of the moral status of those 
rules.8 In this sense, the formalism described by Lyons is positivist in character; 
rules being applied may be morally good or bad – any potential injustice that 
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may occur arises through their application, and is therefore independent of the 
character of the individual rules. Moral judgements are therefore levied at the 
conduct of officials independently of the rules being applied; formal justice 
therefore requires us to prima facie ensure that officials engaged in adjudication 
apply legal rules consistently. 
 
Recognition of this commitment to formal justice is something which Lyons 
believes exists to varying extents in legal systems and is a necessary function of 
their operation. He points to the familiar example that law should be applied 
impartially by those engaged in adjudicative practices,9 and concludes that this 
view is consistent with positivism’s claim that the substance of law need not 
necessarily incorporate moral principles itself. Natural Lawyers are therefore 
mistaken in critiquing substance when the real moral nexus of law is in its 
application. Lyons holds that officials themselves may be in a position to 
disagree with the moral substance of the law and can exercise their discretion to 
depart from laws they see as unjust or morally deficient, but that this itself would 
be a departure from the starting point of legal consistency. Departure from the 
substantive requirements of a given rule may be morally or otherwise justifiable, 
but it remains itself a form of injustice by dint of it breaching the formalist 
principle of consistency. 10  
 
This claim is worth examining in further detail, as it appears to be where the 
Natural Lawyer would depart from the formalist approach thus outlined. We will 
begin by once more stating the categorically binding nature of the PGC as has 
been outlined in previously.11 The principle has been shown to be capable of 
withstanding normative critiques as to its ability to provide a normative basis for 
action. It has also been shown to survive criticisms which hold that it does not, 
as it claims, proceed on a dialectically necessary basis in providing a categorical 
imperative not to act in an non-compliant manner. We should therefore 
presume, since no valid argument has been presented to the contrary, that the 
PGC itself does act as a Categorical Imperative which does apply to all forms of 
action, and therefore provides an absolute and exclusionary reason not to behave 
                                                          
9 ibid 16 
10 ibid 20 
11 Chapter Three 
241 
 
in a way which disregards its content. We should also note that, in shifting the 
moral nexus of the law away from substantive content and into the realm of 
adjudication, Lyons has attempted to circumvent rejection of the law’s content 
on moral grounds. Yet adjudication is itself a form of action performed by 
officials within a system; such officials are necessarily agents for the purposes of 
the PGC in that they are performing an action that cannot be described as a 
reflex or natural impulse. They are therefore subject to the requirements of the 
PGC in their adjudication, and cannot act in a way that condones a law that, 
when itself assessed for its PGC compatibility, proves itself to be morally 
deficient. They would therefore be bound to depart from the deficient law. 
Lyons suggests a formalist would have no objection to this, and could 
‘[A]cknowledge other moral factors which have a bearing upon official conduct 
maintain that those [reasons] favouring deviation may outweigh those favouring 
adherence…in specific cases.’ 12  Such a departure may be warranted, in that 
‘[F]ailure to follow an unjust law may also result in less injustice than adherence 
to it, and might therefore be justified.’ But he adds that this departure would still 
in itself be properly classified as an injustice as opposed to a just departure. 13  
 
It is difficult to see how such a conclusion could be sound if the PGC is accepted 
as the moral determinant of the substantive content of the rule being departed 
from. It is in the nature of a Categorical Imperative that it excludes the 
permissibility of conduct contrary to its specifications in an absolute manner. 
The official hypothesised by Lyons who departs from a rule deemed 
substantively immoral by reference to the PGC would therefore, if he chose to 
depart from the rule, be committing a justified injustice. This statement is 
paradoxical, meaning that the conclusion to Lyons’ argument must be unsound. 
The PGC necessarily produces an outcome which is morally permissible which 
rationally is prioritised over those judgments which are morally impermissible. 
Therefore, a judgment which disregards a non-PGC compliant law should be 
seen as prima facie just as opposed to unjust, as Lyons suggests. This is not to 
dismiss Lyons’ statement that an element of injustice may be committed in the 
departure from the unjust rule in question; but the injustice is morally necessary. 
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It is therefore improper to characterise it as injustice in the way which Lyons 
appears to endorse, as to do so introduces the paradox of an unjust justice which 
was outlined above.  
 
We ought therefore to reject the formalism outlined by Lyons in this piece as 
being non-compliant with the PGC. Formalism as a doctrine is only morally 
coherent if the substantive rules being applied are themselves PGC compliant. 
Non-PGC compliant rules not only provide no normative basis on which 
officials can justify following them; they run contrary to an exclusionary 
normative reason to not follow them. Since it cannot be the case that (RL x, Φ 
& RM x, - Φ), it must be true that (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ) for all agents acting as 
legal officials who are presented with the problem laid out in the former formula. 
We are forced to conclude that formalism can only be accepted as a legal ideal if 
we abandon Lyons’ transferral of the moral nexus away from substance to 
adjudication., thereby abandoning the contingent claim to moral content and 
replacing it with a necessary moral foundation. To do contrariwise would 
irrational, and therefore any such promulgations are incapable of possessing the 
legitimate authority which Lyons suggests is ascribed to these norms through the 
inclusive-positivist formalism he describes.  
 
2.2   The Minimal Separation Thesis 
 
The second part of this section will move away from the formalism which Lyons 
himself recognises as being a controversial doctrine, and to one which he 
believes to be less contentious. This is connected with his endorsement of what 
he refers to as the ‘Minimal Separation Thesis’,14 a thesis which he believes can 
be used to demonstrate the necessary connection between law and critical 
morality outlined above is, at most, merely a contingent relationship. This should 
be distinguished from the Separation Thesis as normally understood, which 
holds simply that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. 
Lyons rejects this as being vague and equally acceptable to both Natural Lawyers 
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and Positivists.15 He therefore prefers a new, Minimal formulation, to which he 
ascribes the following content: 
Law is subject to moral appraisal and does not automatically satisfy 
whatever standards may properly be used in its appraisal.16 
 
We might contend that this statement is uncontentious, and it is indeed one 
which many Natural Lawyers would endorse. The problem is therefore not one 
of content, but the opposite. The statement begins with the word ‘Law’, and 
therefore presupposes that a definition has been made in favour of inclusive 
positivism. Thus, the statement can be shown to shed no light on the topic that 
is meant to address, namely, whether or not law necessarily possesses moral 
content. On a kind reading, we could perhaps suggest that Lyons here is referring 
to ‘The Law’ of a particular legal system, rather than the abstract concept of 
‘Law’ that is usually the focus of jurisprudential enquiry. For the purposes of this 
section, this is a concession that will be made; yet this does not render the 
statement unproblematic. For even if the subject of the Minimal Separation 
Thesis is the law of a particular state, we still have no hint from Lyons as to what 
the outcome of a moral inquiry as to the permissibility of a law would be should 
the analysis demonstrate the law to be substantively immoral. The thesis implies 
that if a test for moral permissibility is failed then the rule in question is somehow 
deficient; yet it also suggests that it would be improper to say that the rule cannot 
be correctly classified as law. Can it still be described as valid law, but one which 
– after appraisal – is objectively deficient? If so, how does the deficiency affect 
its status as law? It seems odd to argue that something which is deficient in some 
respect should possess the same characteristics as a perfect example of the same 
commodity. If the deficiency is acknowledged, then how deficient does the rule 
need to be, and against what criteria, to cease being law? Or could a hypothetical 
morally deficient law still possess the same legal bindingness as a one which is 
perfect in its moral compliance? These are all questions which the Minimal 
Separation Thesis completely fails to address. It should therefore be seen to be 
                                                          
15 David Lyons, ‘Moral Aspects of Legal Theory’ (1982) 7 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 223, 
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of minimum utility in any enterprise where the essence of law is the object of 
enquiry as it is incapable of answering fundamental questions as to the outcome 
of the moral appraisal it suggests. 
 
Yet Lyons clearly believes it can shed light on the disagreement and, as such, we 
shall address his justifications in turn. Before we do this, it is worth noting that 
Lyons does attempt to shed light on the standard of assessment to be used in 
the Minimum Separation Thesis. He holds that no adjudicatory decision can be 
morally neutral in its outcome, and that the appropriate standard of assessment 
should be one which appraises the justice or injustice of the decision in light of 
the moral standard being applied.17 In light of the conclusion reached in the 
previous section concerning his previous writing on Formal Justice, we can reject 
here any attempt to ground the conception of justice he describes on a purely 
procedural formalism. This standpoint has been shown to be inherently 
paradoxical when viewed in conjunction with the moral principle contained 
within the PGC. Any conception which Lyons refers to must therefore be seen 
as possessing that substantive element of PGC permissibility.  
 
Lyons himself would object at this stage that justice may only be located at the 
level of the substantive content of the rules themselves. He concedes that this is 
one element, and rejects Raz’s Sources Thesis for not addressing the connection 
between social facts and moral value which he believes is necessary for a 
successful appraisal of justice.18 Instead, he identifies three loci which each could 
be subject to moral appraisal. Substantive quality is but one of these; the others 
are the procedural quality of the law, and the interaction between the legal 
subject to the legal system - namely, whether the undertaking of the subject to 
obey the law one which is freely determined.19 It is this separation of places for 
moral appraisal which Lyons believes justifies the vagueness of the Minimal 
Separation Thesis, and he holds that there is no good reason which exists to 
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reject it.20 This challenge is met here, in that Lyons’ tripartite separation of moral 
focus does not circumvent the PGC-buttressed conception of justice which has 
previously been shown to be necessary for any formal conception of justice. 
Substantive justice has been shown to be necessary for procedural justice to exist 
without regressing into a paradoxical system capable of producing judgments 
which are incommensurably both just and unjust in equal measure. Similarly, the 
third locus of moral assessment, the interaction between a legal subject and legal 
system, is firmly located within the realms of practical rationality. Interaction 
between a subject and the legal system which purports to govern them rests 
wholly on the subject perceiving the system as capable of possessing the 
authority over them which is necessary for it to successfully guide their action. 
A valid reason is therefore needed to justify why the subject should thus perceive 
the system. As was established in the discussion of Raz’s deficient account of 
reasons in the previous chapter, the PGC is crucial to accepting any claim to 
authority from the subject’s internal point of view. As the PGC provides an 
absolute exclusionary reason to behave in accordance with its content, any and 
all contradictory authority must be rejected as not possessing the legitimacy 
required to be a true reason for action. The substantive content of a rule has 
again been demonstrated to be of vital importance for the third moral nexus 
identified by Lyons. 
 
Lyons’ motivation for moving away from classical formulations of the 
Separation Thesis to his Minimal Separation was due to his belief that the former 
was ambiguous and rested on unclear foundations. As such, it was an unreliable 
test for the categorisation of theories of law as either Natural Law or Positivist 
in nature as it could be accepted equally by both. 21 The above analysis has 
demonstrated that his Minimal Separation Thesis does succeed in overcoming 
this ambiguity, but not in the way he might expect. Instead of supporting in 
Inclusive Positivist reading of the contingent relationship between law and moral 
standards, proper application of the PGC has shown that the thesis can only 
avoid non-contradiction by recognising a necessary moral link between the two. 
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Its coherence therefore relies on us rejecting the separation element of the thesis. 
It should therefore be seen to be unable to provide a sound argument in favour 
of a positivist theory of law. 
 
3 Incorporationism and Jules Coleman 
 
Having established that formalism is doctrinally incoherent as a positivist theory, 
this chapter now moves on to discuss the influential work of Jules Coleman. 
Coleman only grudgingly refers to his work as being in the Inclusive Positivist 
canon, preferring to refer to the doctrine as ‘Incorporationism’. He believes this 
terminology more accurately captures the essence of his theory; that morality 
can only form part of a system of legal norms if purposefully incorporated into 
that system through the appropriate law-creating mechanisms. The default 
position is that law and morality are not connected by necessity; any laws which 
do correspond to moral norms do so only to the contingent extent that the moral 
principles in question have been deliberately incorporated as law. In this sense, 
the substance of Coleman’s writing is appropriately recognised as being a form 
of inclusive positivism; the difference here is one of terminology only. 
 
Coleman is committed to the contingent nature of any connection from the 
outset:  
However we disambiguate the expression, restricting law to norms that 
bind the conscience involves departing from the ordinary concept of 
law... [I]t is neither essential to the concept nor is it entailed by anything 
that is.22 
Yet this claim is hardly true. If the ordinary concept of law were one which was 
settled, then this thesis – and indeed, Coleman’s own writing – would be 
redundant. The fact that the work exists at all suggests that the claim is not 
apodictic as he suggests. This lack of clarity is also one which appears to pervade 
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the usage of the term even outside the realms of jurisprudence. Many people ask 
themselves how they would behave were they confronted with an obligation 
stemming from a morally repugnant law such as the genocidal laws which existed 
in Nazi Germany, and the dilemma is also one which judges themselves have 
frequently grappled with.23 Does the legal obligation imposed by such laws 
prevent an individual from refusing to follow the law on moral grounds?  
 
The scepticism introduced here is one which Coleman acknowledges, albeit 
implicitly, some pages after this claim is made. He comments that law should be 
correctly be seen as a ‘success-term’ in that it can only succeed as a concept if it 
succeeds in binding the consciences of its subjects.24 This is, he suggests, a result 
of its being a social construct. Law is made with the purpose of guiding action, 
so it must therefore be successful in doing this in order to be worthy of the 
label.25  Yet he dismisses this as being an artificial usage of the term ‘law’, 
designed by natural lawyers in order to avoid the ordinary and settled meaning 
of the word. Immoral law has historically been followed, thus confirming 
Coleman’s initial claim that, in ordinary usage, law and morality are not 
connected by necessity. 26  We should reject this identification of the ordinary 
concept of law as settled. If we accept Coleman’s assertion, then his account is 
rendered purely descriptive; it cannot engage with the normative objections 
raised by natural law theorists without abandoning the preliminary objection. 
This is something that this thesis will assume to be necessary, given that the 
canon of Coleman’s writing is consistent with a belief that there is a genuine 
normative dispute as to the distinctive content of ‘governance by law’ which 
exists between Incorporationism and theories grounded in the natural law 
tradition.27 Given Coleman holds that legal statements are capable of being either 
true or false,28  this is a dispute which he must believe can be settled with 
appropriate enquiry into the subject.  
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It is in this spirit that this section of the chapter will explore Coleman’s 
arguments to see whether he is capable of rebutting the necessary link between 
law and morality that demonstrably exists if the PGC is considered valid.  The 
discussion will begin by exploring Coleman’s writings on the nature of positivism 
in his famous essay ‘Negative and Positive Positivism’, with particular emphasis 
on his Conventionality Thesis, before moving on to consider whether Coleman’s 
characterisation of Law as an essentially economic doctrine has implications for 
the debate between Positivists and Natural Law theorists. The place of the 
concept of wrongfulness will then be examined in light of the conclusions which 
have been drawn to date, drawing to a close the analysis of the theoretical 
framework which Coleman employs in his writing. The conclusions drawn from 
this theoretical underpinning will be applied to Coleman’s beliefs on the nature 
of law in the final part of the section, with particular emphasis on the focus 
placed by Coleman on the authority of law and any necessary commitment to 
the Practical Difference Thesis.  
 
3.1 Positive Positivism and the Conventionality 
Thesis 
 
One of Coleman’s most celebrated pieces of writing holds that a valuable 
distinction which should take place when categorising the varying doctrines of 
Legal Positivism is between what he labels Negative or Positive Legal Positivism. 
Negative Positivism is, for him, a theory in which commitment to the Separation 
Thesis - that there is no necessary connection between law and morality – 
constrains any potential Rule of Recognition which might exist.29 Coleman 
claims that such conceptions are vulnerable to criticism, in that only one legal 
system in which conformity with moral standards is a necessary precondition of 
legality need be identified in order to completely undermine the validity of the 
doctrine. 30  
Coleman instead proposes a theory of Positive Positivism. Instead of being a 
negative theory highlighting elements a Rule of Recognition cannot contain, 
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such theories are instead characterised as establishing what features are 
universally necessary within a system. The necessary feature upon which 
Coleman constructs his theory is that ‘[L] aw is ultimately conventional: that the 
authority of law is a matter of its acceptance by officials.’ 31 Coleman calls this 
conception ‘The Conventionality Thesis’. The merits of this assertion will be 
assessed later in this section, but it is worth emphasising that such a theory is 
one that is concretely inclusive-positivist in nature. This feature is something 
Coleman feels is preferable to Exclusive Positivism, as he believes there are 
several examples of legal systems that do incorporate moral standards within 
them; to deny this is, for him, fallacious. Yet this thesis is not seeking to defend 
the exclusive positivist canon, so we shall instead consider why he believes such 
an approach is preferable to one that claims a necessary link between law and 
morality. The reason given is that moral standards are incapable of being a 
necessary component of legal validity as a reliable and uncontroversial test 
cannot be identified by which they can be proven to be valid. Since law requires 
such a test for its validity, in that either it exists or it does not, Coleman concludes 
the two concepts are not prima facie compatible.32  
 
Yet, as has previously been mentioned, Coleman believes that it is a truism that 
some laws fundamentally do possess a moral foundation. They enjoy their status 
as law however not because of their status as a moral truth, but because a Rule 
of Recognition within the legal system has recognised that they should possess 
legal status. In order to justify this, Coleman argues that we need to distinguish 
between the grounds and the content of the Rule of Recognition. There is 
nothing, Coleman argues, to preclude a Rule of Recognition from containing a 
moral content – yet the grounds upon which the Rule of Recognition itself must 
be constructed upon cannot me moral in nature. The grounding of the rule is 
the social fact of its acceptance by officials in the system, through the 
Conventionality Thesis.33 The position can be summarised thus: 
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[T]he inclusive legal positivist holds that whether or not morality is a condition 
of legality in a particular legal system depends on a social or conventional rule, namely 
the Rule of Recognition. 34 
This formulation is supposed to circumvent the necessity of any moral 
grounding for a Rule of Recognition, whilst recognising the social fact that such 
a rule may possess moral content. So to what extent has Coleman succeeded 
here in his attempt to forge a middle-way between Exclusive Positivism and 
Natural Law? In order to establish this, let us address one of the criticisms 
Coleman himself believes would necessarily be addressed to him from both 
schools concerning his characterisation of the nature of morality. We have 
already seen that Coleman believes that morality is too vague a concept to 
provide a valid foundation for legal obligation, as this is his reason for rejecting 
Natural Law theories outright. Yet by permitting a Rule of Recognition to 
possess moral content, albeit on a conventional grounding, Coleman opens his 
theory to the same problem. If the purpose of a Rule of Recognition is to resolve 
dissensus around the validity of a rule, then to permit necessarily vague content 
to these same rules circumvents the whole purpose of the Rule of Recognition 
itself.35 Coleman rejects the criticism on two grounds. Firstly, he argues that the 
criticism is itself an incorrect formulation of his position, in that recognising a 
moral principle as having legal force through a Rule of Recognition allows the 
matter to be arbitrated upon by legal institutions, thus providing an avenue 
through which dissensus can be resolved.36 This argument is supported by a 
secondary rebuttal of the criticism, namely scepticism as to the characterisation 
of purpose of the Rule of Recognition as being one of dispute resolution. 
Coleman suggests that it is conceivable that a society might exist in which there 
was no moral dissensus, but in which individuals may still wish for formalisation 
of these principles in a concretised legal structure. The Rule of Recognition 
could therefore still exist in the absence of dissensus around the content of the 
rules it establishes.37  
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This second argument from Coleman is one which requires analysis. Let us 
imagine the society he paints, in which moral precepts were universally accepted 
by all citizens, with no dissensus as to their applicability or bindingness. It is 
difficult to see why citizens in this society would wish for a formal adjudicatory 
structure to be put in place. After all, if there is universal consensus as to the 
content, applicability and bindingness of all moral claims then it follows that the 
possibility that these claims would not be followed is zero. This would be 
inconceivable in the society thus outlined. If citizens wished for a formal 
adjudicatory structure to be put in place to resolve potential disputes, this would 
only be a reasonable step to take if the same citizens could conceive that, either 
now or at some point in the future, the moral principles might not be followed 
and that the legal institutions they desire would be put to use. In conceiving of 
this possibility, they are suggesting that dissensus is also something which would 
be rationally possible. And in recognising the rational possibility of dissensus, 
they necessarily claim that the moral principles upon which they supposedly 
agree are not as uncontroversial as Coleman would have us believe. In 
recognising the rationality of dissenting views, they are recognising the existence 
of dissent itself. Dissensus is therefore not absent, as Coleman suggests, meaning 
that the society he describes is not one which is conceivable in the manner that 
he suggests.  
 
This leads us to a criticism of Coleman’s primary objection to his own detractors. 
If we want to hypothesise the society that Coleman describes in which moral 
precepts are universally accepted, then we must also conceive of the fact that all 
competing conceptions of moral content have been rejected by that society in 
favour of the standards that were ultimately accepted. This uncontroversial 
statement suggests that a test as to the validity and content of moral standards is 
something that this society has located prior to their decision to concretise these 
standards as law. This logical inconsistency in Coleman’s rebuttals has the 
unintended effect of removing the main justification he proposes for rejecting 
theories of Natural Law stated earlier in the section, namely the necessary 
vagueness and incommensurability of morality. This thesis has argued that such 
a test for the validity of moral content has been identified in the PGC, whose 
dialectically necessary argument all agents are rationally compelled to comply 
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with. In hypothesising the society he describes, Coleman appears to be 
conceding that his society has also identified such a principle. There is therefore 
no prima facie reason for Coleman to see moral principles as incommensurable 
and, by extension, to reject any necessary connection between law and morality 
on this basis.  
 
This conclusion brings us to a secondary reason upon which Coleman bases his 
rejection of a necessary connection between law and morality, namely the 
exclusionary force of law. This objection is connected to the Practical Difference 
Thesis, the validity of which will be discussed in detail later in this section. For 
the time being, we will presume Coleman’s understanding to be sound - that law 
must be capable of featuring in an individual’s practical reasoning and therefore 
must be capable of acting as an exclusionary reason which obligates an individual 
to comply with its demands to the expense of all other reasons.38 Such force 
again should, Coleman suggests, be seen to originate with the Rule of 
Recognition operating within the Conventionality Thesis – and need not be 
moral in content. For he holds quite plainly that ‘[T]he evaluative considerations that 
go to the legality of a rule need not coincide with those that go to the merits of the rule.’39 Yet 
in order to fulfil this requirement, law must possess a form of normative 
authority which is identifiable without moral recourse. 40  Coleman must 
therefore adequately locate a source of normativity which derives from the 
conventional grounding of any Rule of Recognition in order to adequately 
explain why the content of primary rules deriving from it should be seen as 
possessing strong normative reasons for compliance.  
 
Before we consider the source identified by Coleman, it is worth revisiting his 
reasons for locating normativity in conventionality as opposed to morality. We 
have already considered the commitment to the Practical Difference Thesis 
apparent in his claim that law purports to govern our conduct by dint of its status 
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as law as opposed to an analogous moral claim.41 This gives rise to the following 
formulation of the Conventionality Thesis which, Coleman suggests, recognises 
the normative character of law whilst maintain its necessary character as a social 
fact: 
‘[T]he possibility of legal authority is to be explained in terms of a 
conventional social practice, namely, the adherence by officials to a rule of 
recognition that imposes a duty on them to apply all and only those rules 
valid under it.’ 42 
Coleman arrives at this formulation by clarifying the conditions he believes 
pertain between any conventionally grounded Rule of Recognition and the 
officials who operate underneath it. His starting point is the truism that a Rule 
of Recognition can only exist if officials do practice it, making adherence an 
existence condition for such a rule. This serves as a differentiation feature 
between Rules of Recognition and Primary Rules, which are held to exist even 
if they are not practiced due to their authority being derived from the Secondary 
Rule which is.43 Like Hart then, Coleman believes that the normative force of 
law is located at the level of Secondary Rules which require both a convergence 
of behaviour amongst officials and an acceptance of that convergence to exist.44 
The normativity of the law can therefore, for Coleman, be explained through 
the internal viewpoint adopted whereby a convergent practice is accepted by 
officials who have a reason to do so. This location of normativity within practical 
reason amongst officials is a point to which we will return in due course but, for 
the moment, Coleman’s argument will continue to be laid out so as to ensure 
any criticism is directed appropriately.  
 
In contrast to both Hart and Raz, neither of whom believe that a Rule of 
Recognition can impose duties or obligations of officials to observe its 
requirements, Coleman has no difficulty in ascribing one particular duty to 
officials – to ‘[E]valuate conduct [for its legality] by appealing to all and only 
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those norms that are valid under the rule.’ 45 If duties can arise from a social fact, 
Coleman must justify why he believes this independent of a moral foundation. 
Such a foundation in critical morality is, for Coleman, incompatible with the 
nature of a Rule of Recognition; this is because moral rules, like primary rules, 
exist regardless of their being practiced. Yet if Rules of Recognition are social 
facts whose existence depends on their being practiced, they cannot be founded 
on an authority which precedes their existence otherwise they would be a mere 
tautology.46 The answer, for Coleman, is one of psychological origin. He believes 
that the Internal Point of View is capable of generating norms, as human beings 
possess a basic psychological capacity to adopt social practices as rules 
possessing normative force.47 No further source or philosophical justification is 
required beyond the claim that a norm has been created because the officials 
have decided that a particular standard should be accepted as one.48 This 
assumption is founded, for the most part, on the theory of Shared Intention 
proposed by Michael Bratman and defined thus: 
[S]hared intention, as I understand it, is not an attitude in any mind. It is 
not an attitude in the mind of some fused agent, for there is no such 
mind; and it is not an attitude in the mind or minds of either or both 
participants. Rather, it is a state of affairs that consists primarily in 
attitudes (none of which are themselves shared intentions) of the 
participants and interrelations between those attitudes.49 
Such a shared intention can form the foundation of Shared Cooperative Agency, 
which itself consists of three tenets: 
1. Mutual Responsiveness: Agents must be aware of the intentions and 
actions of other agents with whom they cooperate; 
2. Commitment to the joint activity; and 
3. Commitment to mutual support through joint pursuance of shared 
activity.50 
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Coleman suggests that commitment to a Shared Cooperative Activity is apparent 
in judicial action. Judges commit to adjudicating by certain rules as per Bratman’s 
three principles. They do so from the Internal Point of View, but the normative 
obligation arises from the structure of the practice of cooperation. In condoning 
a Rule of Recognition within a system, they therefore acknowledge that the rule 
gives rise to a ‘system of interdependent and reciprocal expectations.’ 51 These 
expectations give rise to the duty Coleman believes exists to appeal to all and 
only norms which are valid under the rule, and it is this duty which creates the 
normative force of primary rules passed accordingly.  
 
Having established Coleman’s explanation of legal normativity, two objections 
can be made. The first is one raised by Coleman himself. He suggests that this 
argument is somewhat circular – the creation of the Rule of Recognition through 
Shared Cooperative Agency itself presupposes that officials exist who are in a 
position to cooperate in an official capacity. Law has therefore been explained 
on the understanding that legal recognition of official capacity already exists. Yet 
Coleman believes this is a straw man, and that at the nascence of a legal system 
creators of the Rule of Recognition ascribe the conditions necessary for 
officialdom through their Shared Cooperative Agency. These conditions are 
then passed down through the Rule of Recognition to all officials who follow, 
but at some point in history individuals must have decided to grant themselves 
the status of officials. Officialdom is therefore also explained by 
conventionality.52  
 
This point will be granted for the consistency of Coleman’s position. Yet the 
second objection to be raised at this point is a criticism from the PGC. This 
criticism itself can be separated into two distinct objections to the hypothesis 
Coleman has painstakingly constructed. Firstly, we should examine the claim 
that officialdom was created in some proto-legal system by a group of people 
decided to see themselves as officials who were in a position to establish both a 
Rule of Recognition and their own status as officials capable of determining the 
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content of primary rules by reference to the secondary rule of their own creation. 
This account presented by Coleman possesses little in the way of justification as 
to why those members of society who were not granted the status of Official in 
the system should accept the Shared Intention of those who were. Let us imagine 
a situation where my colleagues and I declare ourselves to be officials in a new 
legal system which, by our Shared Intention, we seek to establish across the 
United Kingdom at the expense of the legal system currently in existence. Our 
endeavour would be unlikely to be successful on two grounds. Firstly, we would 
be unlikely to persuade the majority of those we claim to be subject to our new 
legal order that we are in a position of sufficient authority to do so. Secondly, 
we would likely face active resistance from those officials whose duty it is to 
enforce the current legal system. We would therefore only be able to bring our 
shared intention to fruition by one of two means; either imposition by force, or 
by convincing the majority of our claimed legal subjects that we are in a position 
which possesses a more legitimate claim to authority than that which is currently 
in place. Which of these two options would Coleman be more likely to endorse 
as an appropriate course of action for his hypothesised ur-officials? The former 
route, imposition of their will by power, does not fit neatly with the normative 
enterprise which Coleman is at pains to establish; for if legal authority could be 
explained in terms of the imposition of the sovereign’s will through power then 
no normative force need be present in the law being applied.53 It would be more 
likely, then, that Coleman would prefer his officials to possess a claim to 
legitimacy in establishing their Rule of Recognition and their own officialdom; a 
legitimacy superior to those which existed prior to the rule. Without this, the 
legal system would be likely to be rejected before it was in a position to be 
recognised as law by those to whom it is addressed. 
 
A necessary claim to legitimacy raises our secondary objection to Coleman’s 
project. If an ur-legal system founded on the basis of normative obligations must 
be seen as legitimate to be accepted as a de facto authority over whatever system 
for dispute resolution existed before, we are forced to ask which standards of 
legitimacy we are assessing the system against. Such standards must themselves 
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be normative in order to justify a normative system, and must be present within 
the system seeking to establish itself as law. Morality on Coleman’s own terms 
has a role to play in providing this normative justification for legitimacy, in that 
legitimacy presupposes that the officials in question are bound by conscience to 
accept a certain system. For if Coleman’s ur-officials are responsible for the 
creation of a Rule of Recognition which creates primary rules which are 
conceived as legitimate by those to whom they are addressed, this criterion of 
legitimacy which binds them in conscience must necessarily be present in the 
Rule of Recognition itself. The PGC is not only capable of, but necessarily must, 
provide this role in that, if it is seen to provide a supreme moral principle, it 
necessarily – in Coleman’s words - binds all agents’ consciences through its 
dialectical necessity. For if Coleman concedes that ur-officials are responsible 
for the creation of a Rule of Recognition, he acknowledges that such officials 
are employing their agency to do so. In thus locating the creation of legal 
normativity within practical reason, we can see that the agents responsible for 
this undertaking are bound by the PGC to create a Rule of Recognition which is 
incapable of breaching the PGC. To do otherwise would be to act contrary to 
the requirements of the categorical imperative contained within the principle 
itself, which acts as an absolute and exclusionary reason to bind said officials in 
conscience to its requirements. In locating this shared cooperative agency prior 
to the existence of a legal system, in that it is prima facie necessary to create the 
system, this statement is immune from the positivist charge that a legal reason is 
hypothetically capable of overriding it. Such a statement would itself be false, 
but it cannot even be levelled at this argument since Coleman concedes that it is 
taking place prior to the creation of any primary rules capable of doing so. By 
grounding the normative force of subsequent primary rules in the Shared 
Cooperative Agency of ur-officials responsible for the creation of a legal system, 
Coleman therefore commits them to acting in accordance with the moral 
requirements of the categorical imperative of the PGC; a necessary connection 
between law and morality has therefore been established, thus collapsing the 
Conventionality Thesis from a proposition of inclusive positivism to one of 
Natural Law.   
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3.2  Wrongfulness and Law as Economic Rights 
 
Having demonstrated that Coleman’s Conventionality Thesis would fail to 
create a legal system without convergence with the PGC at the creation of the 
legal system in question, thus necessitating a link between law and ‘norms that 
bind the conscience’ in a way Coleman seeks to avoid, this thesis moves on to 
discuss Coleman’s other significant contribution to legal theory – the 
characterisation of Law as an economic undertaking – with the aim of analysing 
whether this reframing of the concept can provide any significant contribution 
to the debate surrounding the necessity of a moral foundation to law. It will then 
move on to do assess the role of wrongfulness in Coleman’s theoretical 
framework. This task will be undertaken in the acceptance of the necessary link 
between the Conventionality Thesis and the PGC, as has been demonstrated in 
the previous pages.  
 
In a way that connects him more to the Gewirthian project than he might expect, 
Coleman characterises law as being a means of resolving disputes that might 
broadly characterised as economic in nature. Any such underpinning of legal 
duties therefore depends on an understanding of economic claims being made 
in the form of perceived rights-possession, an idea that Coleman believes 
requires two rules in order to meaningfully exist: 
1. Rights are allocated ‘under conditions of rational cooperation, full 
information and zero transaction costs.’ Create conditions under 
which mutually advantageous bargaining can take place. 
2. Procedures must be in place for remedying when these conditions 
are not satisfied.54 
 
Coleman thus characterises all social interaction as being similar in nature to 
bargaining in the marking place, in that it is essentially reciprocal in nature. Rules 
governing the oversight of such reciprocal exchanges can therefore look to the 
example of the market for their inspiration. Of course, for a market to operate 
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efficiently, conditions under which the bargaining can take place must be 
established in advance. If a perfect set of conditions for bargaining to take place 
cannot exist, then it is up to the courts to imagine what would have been 
achieved in a hypothetical perfect market and work from there.55 The analogy 
here can be drawn with the PGC in that, for any form of action to occur, agents 
must agree that their Generic Conditions of Agency are respected by all other 
agents. Coleman would therefore agree that, for bargaining to take place on the 
model he has presented, all participants in the market he describes must 
necessarily possess the same level of freedom and wellbeing as one another for 
optimum market efficiency. He concedes that an explanation of the foundation 
of these rights is essential for any system of institutional rights to exist,56  and 
this thesis will argue that the PGC is capable of providing this theoretical 
justification.  
 
 
Where this thesis and Coleman would prima facie disagree is in the distinction that 
he believes necessary between the logical form and content of these rights. For 
whereas Coleman argues that the content of these facts is a matter of contingent 
fact dependent on the provisions which exist in each legal system,57 this thesis is 
committed to the viewpoint that the content of these rights is, to some extent, 
constrained by the dialectically necessary constraints imposed on all agents by 
the PGC. Coleman should recognise this constraint as being necessary for two 
reasons. This claim is supported firstly by Coleman’s own characterisation of 
rights as ‘conceptual markers’ or ‘place holders’ which demonstrate that an 
interest is something that should be protected by law.58 Concepts of property, 
liability and inalienability should form any subsequent content of these right – 
yet Coleman offers no justification as to why these conceptions should be 
accepted as fulfilling this role. Examples of societies exist which possess very 
different conceptions of property and ownership to our own, so for these 
devices to be acceptable we must demonstrate why they should be accepted. The 
PGC is capable of fulfilling this theoretical gap within Coleman’s framework, 
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but since it is a framework which must necessarily be accepted by all agents, 
Coleman is required to abandon his claim to the absolute contingency of the 
content of the rights which could exist. The second reason that the PGC should 
be accepted as the underpinning of Coleman’s economic rights is that it has 
already been demonstrated that his Conventionality Thesis also requires 
acceptance as the PGC as necessary for the creation of any legal system. Since 
Coleman believes an arbitration system is necessary in any framework of rights, 
and he holds the Conventionality Thesis as central for the creation of such a 
system, the PGC is again necessary for the existence of the rights framework he 
proposes in any meaningful sense.  The specific content of the rights within each 
legal system can diverge to some extent depending on the contingent facts which 
exist within legal systems, provided that these rights do not stray beyond the 
requirements necessitated by the PGC. Should they do so, then the legal system, 
by Coleman’s own theory, could not establish itself amongst a given population.  
 
This is concession which Coleman inadvertently condones in his closing analysis, 
where he makes two connected claims about the purpose of such a system. 
Firstly, he argues: “For ease of exposition, let us assume that the purpose of a 
system of institutional rights is to maximize net welfare.”59 This is a statement 
which requires some development, as the focus of the claim is one which is not 
immediately clear. Is the purpose of such a system of economic rights the 
maximisation of net welfare of individuals within the system, or of the society in 
which it operates as a whole? Given the analysis of the previous paragraph 
demonstrates that Coleman is committed to recognising that the PGC must 
form the theoretical justification for the rights which he seeks to establish, we 
can presume that the individual must be of some concern to him in making this 
claim. For the maximisation of net-welfare, we must see that each interaction 
within the hypothetical market framework as being between individuals, each of 
whom must feel that they get some benefit from the agreements which they 
make within it; without such an assumption, the individuals would possess no 
reason to undertake the bargaining exercise. Coleman makes a similar claim 
when he suggests that there would be no rational reason for an agent to 
participate in bargaining if the outcome of the transaction would leave them 
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worse off. 60 Since practical reasons are within the realm of the PGC, we must 
therefore assume that any maximisation of net-welfare must operate of the 
consent of the individuals who are participating with in the system – who are 
themselves rationally bound to act in accordance with the PGC itself. 
Maximisation of net-welfare could therefore not occur without a necessary level 
of PGC compliance within the sphere of bargaining.  
 
This conclusion feeds into Coleman’s second inadvertent acceptance of the 
PGC, contained in his recognition that the freedom to bargain is essential for 
any hypothetical bargain and therefore ought to be protected by the officials 
overseeing the transactions in question. He concludes:  “The rule of liberty of 
transfer is thus a normative, not an analytic, one supportable, if at all, by substantive 
argument, not linguistic convention.”61  In granting that the area is one grounded 
in normativity, Coleman is tasked with finding a suitable explanation for how 
such normativity arises – this is something which he does not go on to address 
directly, requiring us to fill the lacuna on his behalf. He gives us an insight into 
what may prove acceptable to him when he suggests that, as the market paradigm 
is necessarily founded in rationality, no concepts of justice or fairness can 
provide normative grounding unless they are themselves grounded in a theory 
of rational choice. 62 It is suggested that the PGC is once again not only capable 
of, but by its categorical scope necessarily must provide this role. As was 
discussed in previous areas of this thesis,63 no reason presented to date has 
explained why we should not view the PGC as categorically binding. Its necessity 
should therefore be accepted until an argument against it can be shown to 
succeed. Coleman should accept this conclusion given his commitment to the 
claim that political morality can only be productive if it provides systemic pareto 
optimality and is individually rational.64 The PGC necessarily provides both, and 
legitimises the coercive authority of the state which Coleman holds necessary for 
the correction of such wrongs.65 Such coercive authority is only legitimate for 
Coleman if a sound argument exists which legitimises such authority, or it can 
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be proven that it is in an agent’s best interests to otherwise submit to it.66 The 
PGC, as previously defended, can fulfil both of these criteria.  
 
Having established that Coleman’s characterisation of Law along an economic 
model requires integration of the PGC in order to be accepted as legitimate, we 
can spend time addressing how Coleman conceives the concept of wrongfulness 
within such a normative system. He holds that wrongfulness is grounded is 
grounded in the idea of wrongdoing, which itself can be described as consisting 
‘[in] the unjustifiable or otherwise impermissible injuring of others’ legitimate 
interests.’67 Such legitimate interests are themselves characterised as those in 
conformity with protected rights. A wrong is therefore conduct ‘which is 
invasive of a right’, and the same conditions of agency which justify wrongs as 
being in opposition to rights necessarily comply to the same normative 
framework.68 Wrongs which are remediable for Coleman are therefore those 
which breach the rights which have already been shown to be necessary in a 
successful characterisation of law along the economic model he prefers. 
Coleman again attempts to distinguish between the form and content of rights, 
developing his argument more than in his previous work. We will therefore 
examine whether this expanded theory can overrule the necessary connection 
between such rights and the PGC that has been previously  demonstrated. 
 
Coleman believes that the syntax, or form, of rights should be seen as describing 
their nature and meaning and can be demonstrated to be true analytically. This 
should be distinguished from their semantics, or content, which can never be a 
priori necessary in character; such content is necessarily derivative from the 
analytical norms that prescribe their form, and must therefore be contingent on 
the particular domain to which they are addressed.69 In an economic model of 
law, such content is governed by the normative conditions of liability and 
property rules and it is these conditions that must be satisfied in order to avoid 
the commission of a remediable wrong.70 Coleman therefore argues that if 
somebody possesses a property right, then they have a valid claim that those 
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who seek their resources must seek their consent. They have a corresponding 
liability-right, which holds a valid claim to compensation arises if another secures 
their resources without having secured their consent. He concludes that the 
content of rights must therefore be secure by the interrelation between the rules 
governing the ownership of property and liability issues which arise from this 
ownership.71 It is contended that this justification for rights, and therefore the 
identifiability and correction of wrongs, merely begs the question in that it 
presupposes the legitimacy of property rights within a legal system. Coleman 
would undoubtedly return to the Conventionality Thesis here and claim that 
such property rights are valid if recognised as such by primary rules stemming 
from a Rule of Recognition legitimised through the Shared Cooperative Agency 
of a proto-system’s ur-officals. This argument has therefore already been 
demonstrated to be incapable of generating normative rules unless the original 
shared intention rests on an acceptance of the PGC, and the Rule of Recognition 
which arises also generates primary rules which themselves by necessity comply 
with the PGC in turn. If this argument is accepted, then it follows that the 
independence of form and content which Coleman requires for his theory to be 
seen as positivist in nature is rationally impossible. It must therefore be rejected, 
and the PGC must instead must necessarily justify any property and subsequent 
liability rights within a system for it to be accepted by its subjects. Contingency 
of content is therefore only possible beyond the necessary constraints imposed 
by the PGC. 
 
3.3  Legal Authority and the Practical Difference 
Thesis 
 
Having demonstrated that Coleman’s Economic portrait of law must also 
necessarily make reference to the PGC in order to provide a valid foundation 
for rights and coercive authority, we turn to a third aspect of his writing. This 
final part of our analysis of Coleman will consider his conception of legal 
authority, and the commitment to the Practical Difference Thesis which such 
authority must necessarily contain. This conception will be assessed for its 
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compatibility with the PGC-compliant reformulation of the Conventionality 
Thesis that has been developed in the proceeding sections.  As has been noted, 
Coleman attempts to outline an explanation of legal authority founded in legal 
positivism. But he acknowledges several extant instances of a law expressly 
referencing moral principles; he therefore establishes a doctrine known as 
Incorporationism, in which substantive moral principles are capable of acting as 
law, but only if deliberately incorporated according to proper law-making 
procedure in accordance with a Rule of Recognition: 
Incorporationism allows that substantive moral principles can count as 
part of a community’s binding law in virtue of their status as moral 
principles provided the relevant rule of recognition includes a provision 
to that effect.72 
Many of Coleman’s defences of his theory are, curiously, aimed not at theories 
grounded in Natural Law but at Exclusive Positivism. Yet given that this thesis 
aims to defend the former, Exclusive Positivist critiques of incorporationist 
conceptions of authority will not be considered here. We will instead examine 
the idea of authority that Coleman argues that Incorporationist theories must 
account for, and examine whether such claims are truly positivist in nature.  
Coleman correctly acknowledges that authority possesses components which 
can be described as both analytic and normative; the former discusses the 
different types of authority which may make claims on an individual, and the 
latter addresses the legitimacy of the claims to authority being made. 73  The 
validity of this claim has, however, been cast into doubt in s.3.1 of this chapter. 
For if Coleman maintains that convergent behaviour is the key to the normative 
claim of law,74 then we have demonstrated that this behaviour must be PGC 
compliant. This blurs the normative and analytic distinction thus raised by 
Coleman, in that it suggests that any analytic definition of a valid legal authority 
must necessarily comply with specified normative content. Without the 
distinction however, positivist conceptions of legal authority are impossible – 
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Coleman is therefore committed to an attempt to refute the PGC-compliant 
Conventionality Thesis which this thesis holds is necessary.  
 
He may attempt to do so by doubling-down on his previous attempts to 
categorise legal reasoning as somehow distinct from moral reasoning. Although 
we have already refuted this claim in establishing that the establishing of a legal 
system requires PGC-compliant pre-legal reasoning in order to succeed, and that 
this reasoning necessarily must result in a PGC compliant system, we will explore 
Coleman’s objection arguendo. He suggests that it is incorrect to state that legal 
authority can only be explained with reference to reasons and rationality. A 
natural law position which claims that law must be justified with reference to 
reason, such as the one defenced by this thesis, would argue that ‘If law leads 
agents away from reason, and, therefore, away from what they ought to do, 
agents moved by reason cannot accept law as an authority over them.’ This is 
something that Coleman suggests provides an implausible conclusion, in that 
law is rendered either irrational or otiose.75 It either possesses no authority, or 
makes no difference to the likelihood that its subjects will comply with its 
requirements in that it merely reflects the reasons that its subjects would already 
act upon. In putting forward this objection, Coleman shows himself to be 
committed to the Practical Difference Thesis – that law’s authority necessarily 
claims to override all other reasons for action, and it therefore belongs to a 
separate normative regime. Put more simply, law must be capable of changing 
the behaviour of those to whom it is addressed.  
 
This is a conclusion which any successful theory grounded in natural law must 
reject. A good place to begin would be with an objection proposed by Coleman 
himself. The purpose of a legal system is to provide a series of rules under which 
individuals can act. These rules therefore benefit those individuals to whom they 
are addressed in allowing them to exercise their right reason in situations not 
prohibited by law. If law therefore allows us to follow right reason and right 
reason entails moral claims, then the law too must require moral compatibility 
in order to provide a reason for compliance.76 Unsurprisingly, Coleman rejects 
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this conclusion. He argues that right reason is applicable to human agents, and 
since legal authority stems from beyond human reasoning it need not be in 
compliance with it.77 In doing this he adopts a Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis, 
contending that Law’s authority should be seen as efficacious in its nature as 
opposed to one of utility with reference to right reason.78 Yet this conclusion is 
itself unsound on Coleman’s own previous reasoning. His commitment to the 
Conventionality Thesis requires recognition of the moral content of the Rule of 
Recognition, thereby returning us to the unavoidable conclusion that law may 
definitionally be either irrational or otiose. Yet this dichotomy is not necessarily 
accurate for two reasons. Firstly, it ignores the moral claim made by the PGC, 
which is one of permissibility. Rather than specifying a correct set of universal 
legal rules, it specifies that law must not contradict its requirements; it therefore 
allows for legal pluralism and for legal systems to each require different conduct, 
provided that the conduct itself does not breach the PGC. Secondly, to hold that 
law that reflects the moral content of the PGC is otiose presumes that all legal 
subjects would act in PGC compliant ways. We know that they do not. The law 
can therefore circumvent the objections raised by the Practical Difference Thesis 
by claiming to act according to Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis; it provides a 
means by which individuals can better attain those ends that they already have a 
reason to do. 
 
Yet even were these rejections of the irrational/otiose dichotomy themselves 
rejected, this does not itself provide a reason for rejecting the claim of a 
necessary link between law and morality. This thesis has yet to locate an 
objection to the validity of the PGC which survives proper scrutiny, and 
therefore holds that the principle is valid and should be accepted.  If the purpose 
of jurisprudence is to locate a factual and rationally coherent explanation of the 
concept of law, then it is nonsensical to reject a sound argument in favour of an 
unproven prior commitment which holds the contrary. Such a claim has several 
implications for the survival of the Practical Difference Thesis. This 
confrontational claim is one which Coleman himself makes, directing it at 
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Exclusive positivists such as Raz. Such theorists claim that Inclusive Positivism 
should be rejected for its non-compliance with the Practical Difference Thesis; 
Coleman argues the opposite, that the Practical Difference Thesis should be 
rejected given the logical necessity of his incorporationist argument.79 Such logic 
is axiomatic, he claims, in that, because of incorporationism:  
Positivism can allow [for moral adjudication within the law] without 
abandoning anything of importance just as long as the criteria of validity 
are criteria of membership in virtue of the practice among officials.80 
Thus, Coleman abandons the strong claim of the Practical Difference Thesis 
that law necessarily must make a practical difference to our behaviour in favour 
of a weaker claim; that it must be capable of doing so.81 It is this concession that 
ultimately undermines Coleman’s Incorporationism. For in doing so, PGC 
compliant law as described in the previous paragraph is perfectly compatible 
with the thesis thus presented – it is capable of making a practical difference to 
our behaviour. Coleman can therefore no longer use the Practical Difference 
Thesis as a grounds upon which to reject our previous modification of his 
Conventionality Thesis to demonstrate that any possibility of incorporating the 
PGC into law becomes an obligation to do so by necessity.  
 
Two final recourses are open to Coleman in an attempt to circumvent the 
requirements of the PGC; the first being to find an alternative means of 
demonstrating that the reasoning implicit within the PGC is different to that 
employed by law. He attempts to do this in claiming that a valuable difference 
exists between something being a reason for a subject to act and actually being 
a reason on which a subject acts.82 He hypothesises an situation where A 
promises to meet B at noon. A forgets that this promise has been made, but 
nonetheless meets B at noon as a new reason emerged to do so. The promise 
was therefore not the reason to act, whilst remaining a reason for action. Reasons 
for action therefore need not be causal, but can warrant or justify action in that 
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they create grounds to act. 83 In this sense Law is correctly characterisable as a 
reason for action, rather than being the reason on which an agent actually acts.84 
Its authority therefore stems in its ability to increase the likelihood that an agent 
will act upon reasons they already possess, as with Raz’s Normal Justification 
Thesis. Yet it is not immediately obvious how this characterisation aids Coleman 
in dismissing the normative obligations imposed by the PGC, in that the same 
characterisation  could me made of moral requirements. In locating law and 
morality at the same nexus of reasoning, Coleman again opens us up to the 
paradox which has become central in this thesis, that it is impossible for (RL x, 
Φ & RM x, - Φ). Given the dialectical necessity that all agents act according to 
the PGC, the statement (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ) must be true. The distinction 
between reasons for action and reasons to act therefore does nothing to support 
Coleman’s rejection of the PGC as necessary for the success of the 
Conventionality Thesis.   
 
The second is to challenge the methodology of the argument for the PGC as 
being incompatible with legal theory. Coleman introduces this critique to some 
extent in his recognition that Hart held his writing to be primarily descriptive in 
character, in opposition to the normative methodology employed by his critics 
from the Natural Law tradition. Coleman suggests the latter is problematic for 
law, in that it cannot account for a plurality of theories; a moral-political 
understanding of law necessitates the invalidity of all positivist reasoning.85 Such 
a statement is true, but it is not obvious why a theory should allow for the 
existence of directly contradictory theories within it. It is axiomatic in their 
nature that they make a claim to their own truth at the expense of contradictory 
claims. This is the very nature of the debate in which this thesis is engaged. Yet 
Coleman suggests a plurality of theories is valuable, meaning that this claim must 
be examined for its validity. Since all theories accept that law must be internally 
accepted by its officials, Coleman uses this as a starting point to justify theoretical 
pluralism.86 This acceptance entails a further claim: 
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[W]herever we have law, it must be the case that the law of that 
community must be at least prima facie legitimate – because its 
practitioners necessarily see it that way. And thus we must engage in 
moral argument to determine whether a community has law in the 
relevant sense. Jurisprudence must be normative. 87  
Coleman suggests that this description oversimplifies how law operates, as the 
circumstance may arise where the belief of the practitioners in the legitimacy of 
the system is false? This argument can be dismissed with reference to the 
argument presented on the status of false beliefs in a previous chapter.88 All 
beliefs, including false beliefs, necessarily contain a truth claim – they are 
therefore normative in character, and their falsehood does not affect their 
location on the normative level. A practitioner’s mistaken belief as to the 
legitimacy of their system is therefore as normative in content as a correct claim 
to legitimacy. The argument is therefore one which must necessarily be located 
in political morality rather than in descriptive analysis, as the latter cannot 
adequately explore the normative claim which is necessarily being made. 
 
Coleman attempts to circumvent this problem by searching for a moral property 
which is simultaneously strong enough to create a normative justification for 
legal claims, but which is weak enough to not necessitate the connection between 
legality and legitimacy. Such a step is essential if we are to refute the natural claim 
that law must necessarily be connected to morality to be viewed as legitimate, 
and therefore to exist as law. 89 He believes such a property does exist, and is 
linked to law’s being a ‘predicate of commendation’. Law possesses a status 
which makes it morally preferable to rule by military occupation or alternative 
forms of government.  
Any plausible account of law must not only make plain the differences 
among these forms of governance, it must do so in a way that explains 
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– or enables us to explain – why we believe legal governance is morally 
attractive.90 
Such a commendation must allow for the plausibility of morally illegitimate law 
in order to allow for the theoretical pluralism which Coleman is attempting to 
defend as valuable.91 This is, for Coleman, founded in pragmatism. Agents can 
better attain their goals in the stability afforded by a legal system. He thus 
attempts to demonstrate that law need not be grounded on a purely moral basis; 
that norms are capable of being ‘pragmatic, theoretical, epistemic, and most 
importantly, discursive.’ 92 An Ethical Rationalist committed to the PGC could 
dismiss this fairly quickly as simply begging the question. As all of these 
foundations of normativity are grounded in action, they themselves can only 
possess normativity if they are in compliance with the PGC. The necessary 
connection cannot therefore be avoided, and Incorporationism has been 
demonstrated to be incapable of explaining away its own reliance on the PGC 
for a satisfactory explanation of legal normativity. It, too, necessarily becomes a 
theory of natural law based on the dialectical necessity of accepting the PGC. 
 
4 The Moderate Incorporationism of Matthew Kramer 
 
Of all contemporary defenders of inclusive positivism, few can be said to be as 
ferocious in their defence of the doctrine as Matthew Kramer. It is therefore 
with some trepidation that this section of the thesis commences. Kramer usually 
characterises himself as being an inclusive positivist, although he sometimes 
describes himself as a moderate Incorporationist to encapsulate his approval of 
the basic tenets of Coleman’s take on the doctrine. Nevertheless, his starting 
point is the same – he holds that the strict separability of law and morality is an 
essential feature of any theory of law.93 This standpoint differs from Lyons’ 
Minimal Separation Thesis as discussed above,94 in that it holds any criticism of 
law based on a moral assessment cannot affect the validity of the rule under any 
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circumstance. Law and morality can converge, but any such convergence is 
purely contingent and does not affect the status of the unjust rule as law. In 
being stricter, Kramer hopes that the thesis will be better able to resist any claims 
of a necessary connection between morality and law that ultimately undermined 
Lyons’ formalism.  
 
The validity of Kramer’s commitment to the Separation Thesis will be examined 
in the latter half of this section. The first half will be devoted to a brief discussion 
of Kramer’s views on the nature of morality itself. This is essential as, as has 
already been stated, Kramer is the only one of the three authors being examined 
in this chapter who directly addresses the Gewirthian project. It is one which he 
does not believe provides an adequate explanation of moral normativity; any 
subsequent assessment of his theory of law based on the PGC must therefore 
first overcome the objections which he raises to the moral content of the 
principle.  
 
4.1  Kramer’s rejection of Ethical Rationalism 
 
Ethics, for Kramer, is a vast scope of enquiry. Even a narrow enquiry of the 
substantive merits of a particular action necessarily must comprise of 
conclusions on various other abstract propositions and problems. Any such 
substantive ethical enquiry must ‘[Embrace] all the standards and normative 
implications articulable in statements that apply ethical predicates to objects of 
ethical assessment.’95 
 
The first such normative implication can be found in what Kramer terms the 
mind-independence of morality. He holds that ‘[T]heir continued existence as 
correct principles of morality does not depend on the continuation of the mental 
functioning of any people individually or collectively.’96 Put differently, moral 
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standards are things that exist. They do not depend on either their recognition 
or acceptance by their subjects for their existence.97 In this sense, they can be 
distinguished from other normative systems such as law, which is held by some 
theorists to require a degree of systemic efficacy in order to be said to exist.98 
Moral principles are stable, objective and do not need to be accepted by a subject 
in order to exert legitimate authority over him. This is a widely accepted 
statement as to the status of moral norms, and is one which does not impugn 
the validity of the PGC. Still some clarification as to why this is the case is worth 
establishing, as for some, the fit between Kramer’s insistence that morality need 
not be internalised and Gewirth’s argument that the PGC should be accepted by 
all agents could appear uncomfortable at best. This is not something that should 
be of concern once the true nature of the Gewirthian argument is restated. The 
PGC operates on a dialectically necessary argument which holds that all agent 
are rationally committed to recognising its validity as a matter of necessity. 
Kramer, by contrast, makes a claim that moral principles’ acceptance is not 
necessary for their validity. He does not assert that the internalisation of the 
moral principle can never be achieved; merely that it need not be to be valid. 
The acceptance of a moral standard therefore does not serve to negate its 
validity, provided it can be proved to be a valid rather than a mistaken moral 
standard. This claim is one which adequately describes the operation of the PGC; 
should an agent choose to act in a way which is not PGC compliant, then they 
are in breach of the moral principle which it contains. Their failure to internalise 
the principle does not damage its legitimacy; it serves as the basis for the moral 
judgment which follows, thus demonstrating the PGC need not be internalised 
by a particular agent in order to be valid. It merely requires the existence of an 
agent in order to proceed on a dialectically necessary basis to its moral 
conclusion. There is therefore no dissonance here between Gewirth and Kramer 
in their differing views on the necessity of the internalisation of a moral principle; 
the disagreement rests in the content or validity of the PGC, Kramer’s 
arguments against which will be considered below.  
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The second predicate which needs to be established before we address Kramer’s 
concerns about the validity of the PGC is the determinate-correctness of moral 
standards. He holds that ‘[t]he extent to which there are determinately correct 
answers to moral questions is inversely proportional to the extent of the leeway 
enjoyed by anybody who confronts those questions.’99 On this understanding, 
Kramer is holding that moral standards are obligatory by degree. Weak moral 
propositions could be validly overridden. Strong moral reasons, such as an 
absolute exclusionary reason provided by a categorical imperative, are obligatory 
and should be followed. Moral subjects possess no discretion in their ability to 
circumvent the requirements of such a principle. Disagreements as to the level 
of moral-bindingness possessed by a principle should be seen not as evidence 
that the problem is incommensurable; the mind-separateness of moral standards 
suggests that the principle’s status can be identified with an increased 
understanding of both the principle itself and the circumstances against which it 
is being applied.100 In making these claims, Kramer therefore accepts the logical 
possibility that a categorical imperative might exist, and that it would fully bind 
its subjects to act in compliance with its requirements. Moreover, his 
commitment to the predicate of determinate-correctness suggests he would also 
accept that any disagreement to the bindingness of a moral principle is 
something that has the potential to be resolved.  
 
It is against this backdrop that we turn our attention to Kramer’s objections to 
Gewirthian Ethical Rationalism. The objections are not as rigorous as one might 
expect given Kramer’s usual fastidiousness in his writing. His rejection has been 
stated at length,101 but can be summarised thus: 
What is so objectionable about the efforts to assimilate moral obligatoriness 
to logical requisiteness…is that they evince a dearth of trust in the solidity 
for moral principles and moral requirements.102 
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This statement is equivalent to a claim which follows soon after, that moral 
principles need not rest on foundations of rationality and logic. They should 
instead be able to be seen as valid without need for further justification on the 
grounds of rationality and consistency. 103 This claim is one which does not fit 
well with Kramer’s earlier insistence on the determinate-correctness of moral 
standards. He has previously committed himself to the view that disagreements 
as to the moral status of a rule can be resolved with greater empirical knowledge 
of the rule itself and the circumstances against which it is being applied. In 
creating a dialectically necessary argument for the PGC, Gewirth is merely acting 
to evidence the validity of the moral content of the principle as Kramer suggests 
is not only desirable, but necessary to properly discern moral content. Kramer 
has therefore unwittingly caught himself in a logical contradiction – stating that 
ethical rationalism should be rejected on the one hand given that moral facts do 
not need evidence to demonstrate their existence, whilst simultaneously claiming 
disagreement as to the validity or scope of moral truths can be identifiable once 
an adequate amount of information is made available to an agent.  It seems that 
two courses of action are available to Kramer here; he can either abandon his 
objection to ethical rationalism, or he can abandon his claim to the determinate-
correctness of moral standards. These are the only options available for the 
resolution of the contradiction he has established.  
 
 
Kramer’s writing on the whole suggests that his inclination would be towards 
the latter, his denial of ethical rationalism forms a large part of his analysis of 
moral truth. For example, in refuting rationality as a source of ethical principles, 
he argues that:  
Moral principles are of course in conformity with the laws of logic, but 
their distinctively moral force is not a species of logical necessity, and 
that force is in no way tarnished or diminished by not being such a 
species.104 
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Yet even this rebuttal concedes that moral principles must be in conformity with 
the laws of logic. Kramer would likely argue that this is not the point he is making 
here; he would have no problem with the moral truths being subject to the laws 
of logic, but instead has difficulty in accepting that rationality is the normative 
source of these moral truths. He claims that moral truths need not be thus 
created: 
In being morally necessary rather than logically necessary – that is, in 
obtaining by dint of the logical form of any proposition that rightly 
affirms their existence – they do not fall short in any way as moral 
requirements.105 
Yet it is difficult to accept why this distinction should be accepted. If a moral 
concept should be in conformity with the laws of logic as Kramer contends supra, 
this suggests that a moral principle which is not in conformity with the laws of 
logic is not a true moral principle; it cannot simultaneously possess normative 
moral force and be prima facie irrational. A link has therefore been established 
between the ability of a norm to possess moral normativity and the rationality 
with which it is applied. To see moral normativity and rationality is interlinked 
is therefore not as heinous a statement as Kramer originally suggests; indeed, his 
own writing on dismissing a necessary connection actually suggests that one does 
exist. Kramer does not suggest why this jump is incorrect, instead choosing to 
rely on the apparent self-evidence of moral principles.  
 
Even should we concede the point that moral norms cannot be identified by 
recourse to rational argument to Kramer, a further problem raises its head. This 
is the problem of moral incommensurability. It has been noted supra that Kramer 
believes in the mind-independence of moral principles; they exist regardless of 
whether or not they are actually followed. Yet we know that disagreements exist 
as to which moral truths are actually valid and which are founded on mistaken 
assumptions and falsehoods. In denying that such moral truths only can be 
identified rationally, Kramer is holding that mind-independent truths cannot be 
rationally discerned. The self-evident truths he alludes to therefore collapse into 
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nothing more than a contingent theory of pragmatism. Yet this is not the picture 
of morality which Kramer paints for us. He believes that certain moral truths 
not only exist, but are identifiable to the point where moral judgements based 
on critical as opposed to popular or collective morality are something which is 
conceptually possible. How does he explain the validity of the truths being 
applied in these situations without being able to justify them on a rational basis? 
In claiming that logical inconsistencies are capable of existing within moral 
norms,106 Kramer appears mistaken. For if logical inconsistencies can exist 
within moral norms, agents would be unsure as to how and when they should 
be applied. It does not seem like a falsehood to suggest that irrational mind-
independent moral standards would lack the clear determinate-correctness in 
order to properly guide the conduct of those against whom they are addressed. 
This would lead to the widespread incommensurability of moral claims, and 
preclude any rational justification for favouring one as being morally true and 
rejecting others as making false claims to their legitimacy. The moral project 
would inevitably stall.  
A neater solution to resolve the contradiction apparent in Kramer’s rebuttal of 
Ethical Rationalism would be for the objection to be reversed. Rejecting the 
claim that rationality can play a role in the identification of moral truths would 
mean abandoning any serious claim to the determinate-correctness of moral 
standards, leading to the widespread incommensurability of claims of mind-
independent moral truths whose legitimacy can be neither proven nor disproven. 
This is an undesirable, and indeed irrational position for Kramer to commit 
himself to. A better route to take would be to reconsider his objections to ethical 
rationalism. This thesis has already defended the ability of the PGC to generate 
binding moral norms.107 For Kramer to object in a serious manner to the 
conclusions thus reached, he would need to argue against the conclusions 
entailed by the argument of the PGC rather than merely claim that to claim moral 
norms need not be supported by rationality.  
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This section has so far attempted to demonstrate that Kramer’s hostility to the 
PGC is not founded on a serious engagement with the dialectically necessary 
argument for its existence, but instead with an unproven objection to the role of 
rationality in moral discourse. This stance has been shown to be problematic for 
Kramer’s own theory in ways that he does not address. The following section of 
analysis will therefore assume that the coherence of Kramer’s understanding of 
morality is better served by dropping this objection. In the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, it will therefore continue to view the PGC as a source of valid 
and categorically binding moral norms which Kramer has failed to adequately 
refute. It is suggested that this is something which ought to be welcomed by 
Kramer. A recent monograph of his contains in its opening pages the grandiose 
claim that ‘[O]ne of the chief messages of this book is that nearly all non-
tautological and non-self-contradictory claims about ethics or morality are 
ethical or moral in content…’108 Ethical Rationalism is neither tautological nor 
self-contradictory in its foundations, and should therefore be accepted by 
Kramer as creating a valuable and necessary foundation to any theory which 
addresses the Separation Thesis.  
 
4.2  Implications for Kramer’s Theory of Law 
 
The second half of this section is dedicated to incorporating the PGC to the 
Separation Thesis advanced by Kramer. The previous section has demonstrated 
that Kramer’s attempts to reject Gewirth would have the effect of collapsing his 
writings on morality into one of inescapable indeterminacy. This analysis will 
therefore assume that the PGC is a valid source of  categorically binding moral 
norms given the absence of any engagement with the theory on Kramer’s part 
which gives us a reason to believe otherwise. We will begin however by 
addressing Kramer’s response to previous attempts to address the necessary 
connection that ethical rationalists have previously claimed exists between law 
and morality.  
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His opposition to such a connection seems to stem from the centrality of 
pragmatism as a motivational factor which influences officials when they are 
charged to employ their discretion during the adjudicatory process. It is for this 
reason that he rejects Beyleveld and Brownsword’s contention that a sound 
moral underpinning is an essential part of the adjudicatory process.109 Giving the 
example of a morally iniquitous legal system, he suggests that officials within it 
might be motivated to act in accordance with seemingly moral precepts such as 
the Rule of Law out of a prudential desire to maintain their own privileged 
position; 110  such prudence is in effect a reason for action, whereas morality may 
be simply a reason to act. He characterises their position thus: 
‘Beyleveld and Brownsword’s case thus hinges on the claim that the 
general capacity of legal obligations to override each person’s self-
interest … is sufficient to warrant an inference that anyone who upholds 
these obligations as such is perforce embracing them on moral 
grounds.’111  
In viewing their argument in these times, Kramer appears to be 
misunderstanding the precise claim being made by Beyleveld and Brownsword. 
He discusses their claim for several pages in his In Defense of Legal Positivism;112 
although it might be more appropriate to characterise this as him engaging what 
he believes their claim to be rather than a sound engagement with what it actually 
is. For notable by its absence in the discussion is any mention of the theoretical 
underpinning of the claim made by Beyleveld and Brownsword, namely the 
PGC. As has been discussed in the previous half of this section, Kramer does 
not believe that Ethical Rationalism is capable of providing a sound foundation 
for moral principles to begin with. Yet he appears to be giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the theory here, as his argument that prudence can be substituted for 
moral concerns does not make sense if the theory he is using as an example of a 
moral standard is something which believes is nothing of the sort. The analysis 
here can then proceed on the conclusions reached with regards to Kramer’s 
views on ethical rationalism; that he should accept the PGC as capable of 
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providing a test for the determinate-correctness of the moral permissibility of 
action.  
 
Kramer believes that this is something which is not necessary. Yet, as has been 
pointed out in the previous paragraph, his repeated claim that the counter-
inclinational role of legal obligations may be grounded in prudence as opposed 
to morality does not engage with the claim being made by Beyleveld and 
Brownsword. Their claim is based on the dialectically necessary argument that 
the PGC applies to all agents in all circumstances which utilise practical 
reasoning. In any form of action, the PGC provides a categorical imperative 
which creates an obligation on all agents to act in conformity with its 
requirements. Its status as a categorical imperative necessitates the claim that all 
statements which attempt to provide a reason for agents to behave contrary to 
the imperative fail in providing a reason to do so, and the behaviour is therefore 
irrational. Once this argument is applied to the situation which Kramer suggests, 
that prudence and not morality can be the primary motivating factor for officials 
in an adjudicatory capacity,113 we can see that the statement is actually neutral as 
to the claim regarding the necessity of the PGC rather than being dismissive of 
it. To demonstrate this neutrality, we will expand Kramer’s hypothesis to 
account for two outcomes to the adjudicatory process in question. Such an 
expansion is necessary as it is the substantive outcome of a decision that is the 
focus of Beyleveld and Brownsword’s theoretical underpinning, whereas 
Kramer’s analysis appears focussed on the procedure of its application and 
therefore misses the point. Firstly, let us conceptualise a situation where judges 
act pragmatically, but the result of this is a judgment which is compliant with the 
requirements of the PGC. Here we in effect have an outcome in which the PGC 
was a reason to act in this way, but as it was not internalised by the judges it 
could not be said to be a reason for action. This situation is perfectly compatible 
with the mind-independence of moral principles, which Kramer accepts must 
be seen to be valid regardless of their acceptance by those to whom they are 
addressed.  The judges ought to be motivated by the PGC, but were not. 
Regardless of this, the judges still acted in a way that was PGC compliant. The 
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PGC has therefore not been breached, and Beyleveld and Brownsword would 
accept that the substantive outcome of the case is in compliance with the 
necessary connection they demand, albeit accidentally so. Kramer’s attack here 
does not actually hit its intended target.  
 
We could, however, conceptualise a secondary outcome to the deliberative 
process; in being motivated by pragmatic rather than moral concerns, the judges 
lay down a judgment whose substantive effects are not PGC compliant. Kramer 
would presumably argue that as the judgment is passed according to valid 
procedure, it should be seen as law and therefore demonstrates that morality is 
not necessarily connected to the law as Beyleveld and Brownsword contend. Yet 
Kramer’s failure to engage substantively with the actual argument being made 
here again means that he misses the point of contention. Ethical Rationalists 
would argue that such a judgment is incapable of possessing force in any sense 
of the word. Kramer accepts that law necessarily imposes an obligation on its 
subjects, and is therefore normative in nature. Yet if the PGC behaves as a 
categorical imperative and holds that all non-compliant action is irrational and 
therefore incapable of possessing a normative reason to thus behave, we are 
forced to conclude that non-PGC compliant law also lacks any normative force 
to oblige obeisance amongst those to whom it is addressed. Such rulings, in 
being devoid of normative content, cannot be categorised as law in any 
meaningful sense of the word. His commitment to positivism prevents Kramer 
for characterising his claims in this manner, yet in the absence of any sound 
arguments as to why the PGC should not be seen as necessitating this claim we 
are forced to reject his commitment as unjustified. We have therefore 
demonstrated that, if Kramer’s objection centred on pragmatism is applied to 
the actual nexus of disagreement rather than where he believes it is located, the 
argument in favour of judicial pragmatism overriding moral concerns can be 
seen to either PGC compliant or missing its intended target. It is straw man and 
should be rejected as unsound.  
 
Having rejected Kramer’s dismissal of the PGC, we can now move on to critique 
his own writings on the nature of law using Gewirthian theory as a point of 
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reference. It has already been established that Kramer sets out to defend the 
inclusive-positivist claim that law and morality should be seen as concepts that 
are entirely separable.114 Moral and legal principles can be connected and are 
capable of entirely overlapping, but any such connections are entirely contingent 
and the moral failings of a given rule are entirely irrelevant considerations when 
assessing its legal validity.115 We will first examine the success of Kramer’s attacks 
on authors who could be characterised as coming from the Natural Law 
tradition, before going on to examine the soundness of his arguments for a 
positivist commitment to the Rule of Law.  
 
As has been common throughout this thesis, the arguments presented against 
Kramer will proceed from the PGC; since no argument which rejects is validity 
has been seen to be successful, it should be seen as sound until it can be proved 
otherwise. As has been shown already, Kramer’s own engagement with 
substantive theories of natural law such as that defenced by this thesis has failed 
to land any problematic blows. The connection is again missed in his more recent 
writing, where such theories are relegated to a mere footnote.116 He appears to 
characterise them later as being based on the mere observation that the shared 
‘deontic terminological structure’ of law and morality,117 which – as has been 
demonstrated already – is not the foundation of the arguments which they 
present. The shallow analogy thus presented would not be endorsed by any 
serious substantive theory as a standalone comment, and – as such – Kramer is 
correct to reject it. Yet central to his overall hostility to such theories is the 
methodological approach that he believes is necessary for the success of any 
theory of law. He believes that the most appropriate approach is one which 
accurately describes legal systems as they exist, and therefore prioritises a 
theoretical-explanatory analysis.118 Sadly, most Natural Law theories are more 
similar to a moral-political approach in their analysis. Such an approach appears 
to be precluded by his own commitment to positivism: 
                                                          
114 ibid 1 
115 ibid 
116 Kramer (n 4) 228, n7 
117 ibid 235 
118 ibid 156-157 
282 
 
Inclusivism and Incorporationism are fully compatible with the existence 
of a regime whose judges do not regard statements of law as authoritative 
unless those statements are ‘supported by a moral theory which justifies 
them’. 119 
Yet this statement demonstrates that Kramer, rather than truly exploring 
whether a moral component is necessary for law to exist, instead simply begs the 
question by beginning from a positivist conception of law. He gives no reason 
to truly prioritise his approach over that taken by the Natural Lawyers whose 
theories he attempts to disprove other than a belief that they are misguided, and 
the blithe claim that the benefits of inclusive or incorporationist positivism 
outweigh the existence of any ‘regrettable moral-political effects’.120 This 
statement proves the fallacy being presented by Kramer, in that instead of 
actively seeking to disprove the claims of substantive natural law theories he is 
merely talking over them. By failing to engage them in a meaningful way, his 
arguments cannot succeed in the task ascribed to them. The two do not connect 
in the way in which Kramer holds that they do; his disinterest in the moral 
arguments raised suggests that he is unwilling to tackle them head on. This 
reticence is to some extent explained by his return to well worn line of positivist 
argument with regards to the possibility of judges employing prudential rather 
than moral reasoning in presenting the outcome of their adjudication: 
Whenever I refer to reasons-for-action in this section, I am focussing 
not only on the considerations to which officials do give weight in 
deciding how they should be have, but also (and even more 
importantly) on the considerations to which they would give weight 
if they grasped the serviceability of those considerations for the 
furtherance of their general aims.121  
 
Put another way, Kramer appears to be arguing that to reduce all adjudication 
to issues of moral concern is to portray a blatant falsehood of how judges 
actively reason. For a Natural Lawyer to insist otherwise would be to fall into 
the trap of describing how law ought to be, whereas the issue which is under 
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debate is to analyse what the law is. If this claim could be ascribed to the 
discussion at hand, then the discussion would indeed be over. Yet it is contended 
that the statement cannot be said to hold true. The theoretical-explanatory 
approach adopted by Kramer means that he does not truly account for the fact 
that substantive natural law theories which posit the existence of a categorical 
imperative on action as being both identifiable, by dint of its existence, providing 
an absolute and exclusionary reason for compliance with its requirements in all 
examples of practical reasoning. Law, being an example of such practical 
reasoning when adjudicated upon by officials, is therefore subject to the 
requirements of a Categorical Imperative; failure to ensure compliance would 
mean that the non-complaint rule is incapable of claiming normative grounding, 
and therefore incapable of acting as a reason to act. Since it is axiomatic that the 
purpose of law is to provide a reason to behave according to its requirements, 
then to deny this claim is to hypothesise that a rule can claim the status of law 
whilst simultaneously being incapable of acting as a reason to conform to it. 
Thus is laid out the paradox implicit in Kramer’s argument. 
 
Kramer attempts to salvage his argument by responding to a similar line of 
reasoning put to him by Dyzenhaus, who holds that the internal perspective to 
which positivism commits itself necessitates recognition of moral consideration 
undertaken by judges; since adjudication is an action which is subject to the 
constraints imposed by a categorical imperative, adjudication cannot take place 
independent of moral concerns. Kramer responds that this may be an adequate 
description of how ‘the law’ of a particular community may behave, but that it 
does not follow that such a conclusion is universalisable to the abstract concept 
of ‘law’ itself.122 We again are forced to conclude that Kramer is missing the point 
of Dyzenhaus’ statement. It is in the nature of a categorical imperative that it 
makes a universal claim applicable to all its subjects. If we accept that the PGC 
can act as such, then the only way in which Kramer’s refutation of Dyzenhaus 
could succeed would be if we could hypothesise a legal system in which neither 
the officials charged with its application nor the subjects who were covered by 
its authority were agents. Such a hypothetical system is paradoxical, given that 
practical rationality is at the heart of all adjudication and that the very purpose 
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of law is to compel its subjects to act in accordance to its requirements. Both 
axiomatic features presuppose the agency of those to whom they apply. 
Kramer’s argument is therefore incapable of presenting a legal system which is 
capable of meeting the demands he places upon it in order for it to refute 
Dyzenhaus’ claim.  
 
Given his zealous commitment to positivism, Kramer is unlikely to agree with 
this conclusion. His objection may therefore shift to one which characterises the 
nature of legal obligations as being substantively different to moral concerns. 
Such a claim is the foundation of his rejection of Lon Fuller’s eight desiderata: 
he dismisses outright any suggestion that the purposiveness of a legal system is 
alone sufficient enough to render a system intrinsically moral, contending that 
systems can exist whose primary purposes could be either amoral or immoral.123 
The moral purposiveness as a system is not necessary for its existence as: 
Legal rules do not normally trade on each citizen’s agency or autonomy 
in the cognitive sense; they normally present requirements and 
prescriptions that are to be heeded by persons who are capable of 
choosing to heed them.124  
In thus characterising legal obligations as somehow different to those required 
by morality and practical rationality, Kramer attempts to justify his theoretical-
explanatory approach. In showing the fallacy of such a contention, we will direct 
the same criticism against the PGC given that this is the substantive theory that 
this thesis is seeking to defend. It has already been demonstrated that the PGC 
is capable of providing a categorical imperative that applies to all agents who 
engage in practical rationality resulting in purposive action. Since law aims to 
direct the behaviour of the agents against whom it is addressed, it is necessarily 
within the realm of practical rationality and therefore is designed to influence 
the purposive action that is covered by the individual rule being applied. There 
is no reason to suggest that this statement does not hold. Since non-compliant 
behaviour would breach the requirements of the principle, any judgment or rule 
that breached the requirements of the principle would be incapable of possessing 
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normative force to guide the actions of those to whom it is addressed. The legal 
procedures that are the focus of official conduct, as examples of purposive 
action themselves, are therefore required to be in compliance with the PGC in 
order to be a valid reason to act – a status which is axiomatic to the idea of law. 
As the necessary moral connection to practical rationality is present and applies 
to the deliberation of officials, Kramer’s insistence that legal rules do not address 
the autonomy of its addressees can be rejected as failing to appreciate the agency 
of the officials responsible for their creation.  
 
Yet again, Kramer would attempt to reject this link between the law recognising 
the agency of its subjects and the necessity that this recognition creates a 
normative obligation. He gives an example of a bank robber, who allows his 
victim to engage their agency to choose whether or not they wish to comply with 
his demands or be shot. Kramer suggests that this does not mean that the 
command possesses normative character in the moral sense, thus proving that 
recognition of the agency of subjects need not necessarily create a normative 
‘ought’. 125 Kramer is correct in suggesting that the commands of the robber in 
this situation do not generate a normative obligation, but is incorrect as to why 
this is the case. The reason why the command fails to possess normative 
character is that it does not, as Kramer believes it does, truly recognise the agency 
of its addressee. True recognition of the agency of an addressee would require 
the substantive content of the command to also be morally permissible, as 
commands are incapable of possessing normative content independently of their 
own moral permissibility. As the situation described would contravene the 
requirements of the PGC, it is therefore not analogous to the claims being made 
by Natural Lawyers and any attempt to characterise it as such should be rejected. 
Kramer’s hostility to Ethical Rationalism remains unsubstantiated. 
 
Once a necessary conceptual link between law and morality has been identified 
in the domain of practical reason, then Kramer’s similar objections to other 
Natural Law theories similarly fail. Take his discussion of Detmold’s 
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characterisation of law as a system of behaviour rather than a static system of 
norms.126 Kramer describes the project as holding law to be an activity where 
decisions are reached, thereby rendering law normative in its application127 – an 
uncontroversial claim. The theory continues to claim that when a judge opts for 
one option or another, they necessarily hold – either implicitly or explicitly – that 
the decision arrived at is morally legitimate. Law is therefore characterisable as 
an array of moral judgments arrived at by its officials.128 Such a claim can be 
supported by ethical rationalists so long as the claim of moral legitimacy made 
in reference to the judgment is grounded in PGC compliance. It therefore 
disappointing for Kramer to simply dismiss the theory once again as ignoring 
that judgments can be prudential as opposed to moral in character.129 For this 
argument has already been demonstrated to be insufficient to defeat Detmold’s 
PGC-buttressed assertions. Natural Lawyers could accept that judgments could 
be pragmatic and still PGC compliant; if a pragmatic judgment is not PGC 
compliant then they would argue that the resultant decision is incapable of 
guiding action due to a lack of normative content, and is therefore unworthy of 
the label ‘law’. Similarly, when Kramer believes he has outflanked Detmold in 
ascribing to him what he believes to be the unsupportable commitment to belief 
that no actions and decisions of legal officials ‘can be devoid of moral concern’130 
he singularly fails to engage with the normative element of the natural law theory 
involved. All practical reasoning is necessarily a moral concern, and there is no 
reason to suggest legal deliberation should not be seen as a form of practical 
reasoning. The argument from the PGC stands. Kramer’s previous commitment 
to the mind-independence of moral principles precludes the claim that a judge 
need to be aware that they are acting in a moral way in order for a moral 
assessment of that decision to be valid, and the location of the source of moral 
normativity in practical reason precludes the exclusion of official action from 
the moral realm. Kramer’s argument does not address this concern, and should 
therefore be rejected.  
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This section will conclude with a surprising statement: that Kramer is, in fact, 
aware of this necessary connection, and it is therefore one that he should be 
willing to accept at the expense of his commitment to the separation thesis. For 
he states in Where Law and Morality Meet: 
[The] moral status of any particular procedural deviation [from the 
requirements of the rule of law] is often a complicated matter which we 
can ascertain only by keeping an eye out for the possible existence of 
several interacting substantive considerations.131  
This claim has vast ramifications for Kramer’s entire project. For in recognising 
that deviation from a fundamental tenet of the rule of law can only be justified 
by reference to substantive considerations, Kramer is conceding that the 
deliberative project must be located in practical reasoning. In introducing a 
hierarchy of norms which must be considered in order to justify deviation, we 
can imply that he would only accept a deviation should it be seen as preferable 
to compliance. In locating the moral status of such a deviation in an assessment 
of the substantive merits of the decision, Kramer may not appear to making a 
controversial claim. Yet in confirming his belief that morality is located at the 
execution of action, he confirms his belief that such judgments are either valid 
or invalid by their link to the reasonableness of their justification. He therefore 
concedes the necessity of a test for their reasonableness. Since he has been 
unable to give a sound reason for his rejection of the PGC, we ought to see this 
as something which can be integrated into the above claim in order to give the 
assessment any objectively identifiable meaning. The PGC’s status as a 
categorical imperative necessitates that it applies necessarily to all such 
judgments, and that reference to it cannot be purely contingent on its acceptance 
by the legal order. This is something Kramer ought to accept given his 
acceptance of the mind-independence of moral standards. In thus conceding 
that it is conceptually possible for deviations from the procedural standards of 
the rule of law to be morally justifiable, Kramer opens the door for this 
contingent link to become one which is necessary by dint of the PGC. Should 
he insist on the contingency of the principle, or claim that a deviation can fail 
but still be seen to be legally valid, he should be seen to be mistaken as to the 
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scope of a categorical claim. His inclusive positivism therefore necessarily 
collapses, as it is forced to recognise that the realm of practical reason is 
governed by the PGC in its entirety. As law is a form of deliberative reason, it 
too is necessarily governed by the principle. 
 
5 Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that inclusive positivism, in allowing for the 
permissibility of a moral foundation of law, concedes a point which is fatal to its 
own coherence. It is in the very nature of a categorical imperative that it applies 
equally to all action and, as has been demonstrated in turn, the theories of Lyons, 
Coleman and Kramer have each been shown to be incapable of avoiding the 
necessary claims of the PGC. 
 
Formalism, it has been shown, is only a coherent explanation of the content of 
law if it rests on legitimate grounds. To hold otherwise would be to introduce 
the paradox of unjust justice into legal discourse, which would be an irrational 
concession to allow. Lyons’ attempt to fortify formalism with his Minimal 
Separation Thesis has similarly been demonstrated to be flawed, in that it can 
only avoid an internal contradiction if the contingent relationship between law 
and morality which it allows for is instead characterised as necessary. A similar 
conclusion must also be reached with Coleman’s Incorporationism resting on 
the Conventionality Thesis; the creation of a legal system necessarily takes place 
in a pre-legal sphere, and therefore cannot rely on exclusionary reasons to reject 
moral compliance. Coleman’s rejection of force as a justification for legal 
authority therefore means that any resultant legal system must be accepted as 
legitimate by its subjects, and, as its creators are bound by the PGC in order to 
act within its constraints, this is only possible if the resulting system is itself 
comprised of PGC compliant primary rules.  The Practical Difference Thesis 
has similarly been shown to be deficient, in that the exclusionary authority it 
ascribes to law is predicated on a misunderstanding of reasons, actions and the 
nature of a categorical imperative to act.  
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Lastly, Kramer’s ‘Moderate Incorporationism’, despite the spiritedness of its 
authorship, similarly fails. Kramer’s own understanding of moral requirements 
precludes him from avoiding a claim if it can be proven to be morally required, 
and his rebuttals of the PGC have been repeatedly been shown to be founded 
on a misunderstanding of Ethical Rationalism. The contingent acceptance of 
moral norms within a legal system has therefore been demonstrated to be the 
Trojan Horse which leads to the downfall of inclusive positivism, which must 
accept the absolute and exclusionary reasons provided by any categorical 
imperative in order to avoid contradicting its own foundational tenets. 
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Conclusion. 
 
 
 
This thesis, it is hoped, has defended a simple claim – that the PGC properly 
understood provides an inescapable reason to view that a necessary connection 
between law and morality exists in the proposition that (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ). 
In making this claim, the thesis builds on the previous work of Beyleveld and 
Brownsword in Law as a Moral Judgment1 by addressing developments within 
inclusive legal positivism which have emerged since its publication. It has done 
so in two parts; the first half of the thesis sought to defend the dialectically 
necessary proposition contained within the PGC from philosophical attacks 
against its validity by demonstrating that they either fail to fully engage with the 
substance of the normative debate in question, or operate on a misunderstanding 
of the claim put forward by the PGC. In light of the rebuttal of these attacks, we 
should accept that the PGC does succeed in the argument it proposes. The 
second half of this thesis has applied the defended PGC against several theories 
that are categorised as belonging to the Inclusive Positivist School, in that they 
recognise that moral principles may be a necessary component of a legal system 
– but only to the extent that the source of the particular system permits them to 
be. Such arguments have been shown to be self-defeating in that a universally 
binding restriction on the permissibility of action cannot exist contingently, and 
must, therefore, necessarily form part of a system’s Rule of Recognition if it can 
be shown to exist. This is concise summary of the steps taken during the course 
of the thesis, and will therefore be expanded on to demonstrate the necessity of 
this conclusion. 
 
The first part of the thesis is comprised of four chapters. Chapter one is included 
as a summary of the ongoing debate between Legal Positivists on the one hand 
and theories of legal validity which may be categorised as founded in a 
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conception of Natural Law on the other. Its purpose was primarily to introduce 
the reader to the central aspects of these two positions in order that the argument 
that followed in subsequent chapters was clearly defined and delineated, with 
reference to both classical and contemporary positions. The chapter 
demonstrated that the key distinction between these theories is the method in 
which they present the normative dimension of legal authority, and introduced 
the claim that the debate should not be one which is reducible to a mere linguistic 
disagreement around the word ‘law’; the concept, it was argued, itself contains a 
normative essence which any successful theory needs to engage with in order to 
provide a satisfactory account of legal authority comes about. This claim was 
explored further in Chapter Two, which sought to justify the reasons for which 
this thesis has limited its application of the PGC to Inclusive, rather than 
Exclusive Positivism. It argued that the normative essence of the word ‘law’ is 
overlooked by the latter for dogmatic rather than philosophically valid reasons, 
and demonstrated that this commitment casts doubt on the validity of the 
reasoning contained within such theories. This conclusion as to the necessary 
normative content of the concept was reached by an engagement with the 
linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein and Kripke, which was used in order to 
show that exclusive positivism cannot adequately explain the normativity of legal 
obligations without accepting the normative content of the words used in its 
creation. Such a unified theory is, by its nature, rejected by these theories – 
rendering them devoid of meaning and incapable of providing a satisfactory 
explanation for the existence of legal authority. They therefore fail on their own 
terms, requiring this thesis to engage with theories that do accept the normative 
content of law whilst denying that legal normativity has a moral source.  
 
Having justified the scope of the argument in which it will engage, the thesis 
moved on in Chapter Three to outline the Principle of Generic Consistency 
which it seeks to defend. The chapter presented the three steps of the 
Gewirthian argument as expanded by Beyleveld as providing an instrumental 
reason to act in accordance with its requirements. By the dialectically necessary 
progression of the argument from an incontrovertible starting point of 
noumenal agency, the PGC necessarily applies universally to all agents capable 
of acting on their will rather than natural impulse or reflex. A sound 
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understanding of the normativity of reasons was here introduced grounded on 
an essentially Kantian conception of practical reason, which demonstrated that 
a hierarchy of norms exists as a unified concept. The point of disagreement 
between positivists and non-positivists has therefore been located here; in order 
to avoid the claim that the dialectically necessary requirements of the PGC that 
apply to all agents override legal obligations that are not compliant with the 
principle, positivists must commit themselves to the claim that legal norms exist 
separately to moral norms. Yet such a claim has been shown, with reference to 
Kant’s own writing and by expansions to his theories provided by Korsgaard, to 
be incompatible with the deliberative reasoning required for practical action. It 
should therefore be seen to be false, necessitating the view that the PGC, if it is 
itself valid, should be seen to operate to all agents in the same way as a 
Categorical Imperative – an absolute and exclusionary reason which necessarily 
precludes all conflicting action, including those which seek justification in 
conflicting rules which claim the status of law.  
 
This claim assumes the validity of the PGC, a validity that was defended against 
philosophical attacks in Chapter Four. The chapter primarily engaged with moral 
philosophers who could broadly be characterised as sceptics, in that they do not 
deny the existence of morality but hold that its principles cannot be rationally 
identifiable or universalisable. As any successful theory proposing a link between 
law and morality must not only demonstrate moral realism but in the rational 
validity of the moral principle on which it relies, sceptical arguments must be 
overcome in order to demonstrate that the PGC is capable of serving as a 
rational moral foundation for legal normativity. The chapter began by examining 
the work of Bernard Williams, whose primary objection is that the level of 
abstraction required for the identification of morality through principles such as 
the PGC means that they ignore the lived experiences of their subjects and the 
necessary importance of interpersonal relationships that they formulate; such 
principles are therefore inapplicable to real-world moral dilemmas. It was argued 
that this attack does nothing to damage the claim to universal applicability made 
by the PGC, and is rendered empty by Williams’ own reliance on a noumenal 
conception of agency in his other moral writings; it should therefore be rejected 
for its contradictory nature. Secondly, it was demonstrated that the subjective 
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morality often attributed to Nietzsche is nothing of the sort, and that his writings 
are in fact compatible limitations on action that are grounded on factors essential 
for universal human flourishing, such as the Generic Conditions of Agency 
which the PGC seeks to defend. Thirdly, the scepticism of Friedman, Foot and 
Leiter were dealt with in turn. Friedman’s argument that the PGC 
mischaracterises the scope of the PGC, and should be rejected accordingly. 
Equally, Foot’s argument that we should reject the PGC moral requirements can 
only exist at the level of a Hypothetical Imperative should be rejected, in that 
the PGC operates as a universally applicable instrumental reason; it is therefore 
compatible with her conception of moral requirements. Lastly, we confronted 
Leiter’s argument that all enquiry into the nature of law is doomed to failure due 
to the fact that law is essentially a human creation, and - as human purposes vary 
over time - human artefacts are incapable of a single definition. This argument 
can be rejected in that it overlooks the central purpose of a legal system – to 
direct the action of its subjects. Having identified a constant purpose of the 
concept of law, the objection that its nature varies is shown to be false.  
 
Our discussion of philosophical objections to the PGC concluded with an 
overview of Enoch’s objections that the PGC does not provide an adequate 
reason to follow its requirements; an agent could simply say that they do not 
care about their agential status and thus justify non-compliance. He continued 
his attack, arguing that even if we did accept that the PGC provided adequate 
reasons for compliance, it would be improper to characterise their requirements 
as moral. Like those presented by previous sceptics, these arguments have also 
been shown to be deficient; the first on a misrepresentation of the claims being 
made by the PGC and the second in that the PGC complies with Enoch’s 
characterisation of the rational justification for moral content in his later writing. 
Having successfully rebutted claims against the validity of the PGC, chapter four 
moved on to demonstrate how the principle should function as a normative 
source in a legal system. It did this with reference to the classical positivist 
theories of Kelsen and Hart, demonstrating that the Basic Norm and Rule of 
Recognition in each theory respectively could only generate normative authority 
if the primary rules they generated were themselves in compliance with the PGC. 
Such secondary rules must therefore contain a requirement that primary rules 
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flowing from them are PGC compliant. The necessary link between law and 
morality has therefore been established; as the PGC exists in a system of 
normativity where legal and moral norms are unified by the common factor of 
practical reason, it follows that (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ). In order to function as 
law and direct agential behaviour, a rule cannot contradict the requirements of 
the PGC.  
 
Having demonstrated the validity of this conclusion through the analysis 
contained in chapters one to four, the thesis moved on to apply the statement 
to contemporary theories that appear to rest on a foundation of Inclusive 
Positivism. Chapter Five first took the necessary connection to Joseph Raz. It is 
worth once more justifying that, although Raz’s Sources Thesis is most 
commonly ascribed the label of Exclusive Positivism, Raz himself is silent on 
the point. An analysis of Raz’s conception of practical reasoning in the first half 
of the chapter has therefore attempted to demonstrate that his own views on 
rationality mean that he would be more appropriately classified as an Inclusive 
Positivist and therefore deserving of the attention of this work. Raz’s own 
writing on the nature of agency and moral reasoning has been demonstrated to 
be deficient in that they do not accurately describe the nature of exclusionary 
reasons for action, such as that contained within the PGC not to act contrary to 
its requirements. Once this discrepancy has been removed, Raz’s account of 
deliberative rationality shows that he must be committed to a unified conception 
of legal and moral normativity on pain of contradicting his own conception of 
practical reason. He ought therefore to accept that the irreducible starting 
premises of the PGC commit an agent to recognising it as an absolute and 
exclusionary reason not to act in contravention of its requirements.  Having 
removed such contradictions from Raz’s conception of deliberative rationality, 
the chapter then applied Raz’s own moral reasoning his writings on the nature 
of a legal system in order assess their compatibility. Of primary interest is his 
‘Sources Thesis’, which holds that law is a social fact and can therefore must 
stem from social sources; morality can influence the creation of law, but must 
do so at the pre-legal stage and should therefore be seen as a separate normative 
hierarchy to legal obligations. Such a claim fails necessarily; if Raz accepts that a 
law-creating body is capable of creating law in compliance with moral 
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requirements, it follows that if a moral principle can be shown to be categorically 
binding for all agents, then the law-creators – in their capacity as agents - are 
obliged to act in compliance with that principle. The law they create must 
therefore also be in compliance with the universally binding moral principle – in 
this case, the PGC. As the first half of chapter five demonstrated that the 
requirements of the PGC are ones that Raz ought to accept, it follows that his 
positivist stance is untenable. This claim is supported by Raz’s further insistence 
that law necessarily claims legitimate authority; as non-PGC compliant rules are 
irrational and therefore prima facie incapable of making claims to legitimacy, law 
must necessarily be PGC compliant. Raz’s further objection that his Sources 
Thesis should be seen to operate on a systemic basis rather than at the level of 
individual norms should be dismissed as incoherent and contradictory for the 
same reason. The only way the Sources Thesis can remain an adequate 
description of the creation of legal norms is for it to be modified to exclude the 
possibility of creating non-PGC compliant rules; Raz’s positivism is therefore 
incapable of surviving the necessary requirements imposed upon it by the PGC. 
Since it cannot be the case that (RL x, Φ & RM x, - Φ), the unified conception of 
authority presented in this thesis necessitates that (RM x, - Φ) > (RL x, Φ). 
 
The final chapter of this thesis continued its critique of Inclusive Positivism, 
further developing point first made in connection to Raz; if a conception of law 
concedes that a law-creating body is capable of integrating moral requirements 
into that system at its discretion, then should a moral principle be identified 
which behaves as a Categorical Imperative on all action, such law-creating bodies 
become obliged to incorporate its requirements into the system they create. This 
statement is apodictic in that law-creating bodies are themselves comprised of 
agents, who are in turn bound by the categorical imperative alluded to. Since the 
PGC operates as an absolute and exclusionary reason in this way, it obliges all 
agents to act in conformity with its requirements. It therefore follows that in 
conceding the possibility of incorporating moral principles into the law, inclusive 
positivism obliges itself to do so when confronted with the PGC which has been 
argued to be valid in this thesis. It is this claim that the theories of Lyons, 
Coleman and Kramer must attempt to circumvent, and chapter six demonstrated 
that they are incapable of doing so. Firstly, Lyons’ formalism – like Raz’s Sources 
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Thesis – requires that law must make a claim to legitimate authority in order to 
survive; the chapter demonstrated that to claim otherwise would introduce a 
paradox into Lyons’ work by which an objectively just act could also be 
substantively unjust in its content. Such a claim is irrational, and therefore should 
be rejected. The Minimal Separation Thesis which Lyons suggests can be used 
to escape this conclusion is itself unsound, and can only survive as a source of 
law which claims authority over our actions if the contingent moral requirements 
to which he alludes are replaced with a necessary compliance with the 
requirements of a supreme moral principle – the PGC. 
 
Coleman’s Conventionality Thesis has also been demonstrated to be incapable 
of creating legal norms that are not PGC compliant. In attempting to locate legal 
normativity in the Shared Cooperative Action of system-creators in a pre-legal 
system of rules, and further recognising that these agents might be influenced by 
moral concerns in concretising their behaviour into law, Coleman depicts a scene 
remarkably similar to that present in Raz’s Sources Thesis. The exercise 
therefore fails for the same reason; as the creators of a legal system are 
necessarily agents, they must necessarily act in accordance with reasons they 
already possess. Since their agency requires them to recognise the PGC as 
imposing valid limits on the scope of their actions, any actions they undertake 
must be PGC compliant. As the creation of a legal system is an action, the system 
they create must also be capable of creating obligations only insofar as these 
obligations are PGC compliant; any contradictory system of norms would be 
incapable of possessing authority over the subjects of the legal system, or capable 
of possessing a reason to be established by the system-creators. The PGC must 
therefore be present in both the secondary rule of recognition in Coleman’s 
system and within the primary rules that system creates; it is therefore the source 
of legal normativity. That this may potentially be in conflict with the Practical 
Difference Thesis is of minimal concern, in that Coleman himself argues that 
the thesis is not central to any conception of positivism; even if it were, the 
objection would rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of exclusionary 
reasons within deliberative reasoning, and still fail.  
The last theories to be subjected to scrutiny from the PGC are the writings of 
Matthew Kramer. Forcefully presented, they are nonetheless shown to be 
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lacking when presented alongside Kramer’s own understanding of morality. He 
commits himself to the position that if a moral action is required then it serves 
as an absolute and exclusionary reason against behaviour to the contrary, and – 
as such – concedes the possibility that a principle could act as a Categorical 
Imperative in this way. His dismissal of the PGC does not, however, directly 
engage in the argument, instead skirting around the requirements by claiming 
that rationalism is incapable of serving as a foundation for moral principles as 
moral principles do not need rational justification. The circularity of this 
argument is obvious, and merely begs the normative question. Indeed, Kramer’s 
own characterisation of the mind-independence of moral principles presupposes 
a test should be necessary for their identification; this in turn presupposes that a 
reason must exist for choosing the acceptability of one test over another, and it 
would be paradoxical to suggest that a test for the validity of a moral principle 
could be prima facie irrational. There is therefore no valid reason for Kramer to 
deny the rational foundation of moral principles; it therefore follows that he 
ought to accept the PGC in the absence of any reason not to. If this argument 
is successful, then, by dint of its Inclusive character, Kramer’s positivism also 
collapses into necessitating the recognition of the PGC within a rule of 
recognition.  
 
It is not anticipated that this thesis will conclusively end the debate as to the 
source of legal normativity. It does, however, go some way to clarifying some 
misconceptions which are present in much of contemporary positivism. It has 
demonstrated that disagreement between positivism and non-positive theories 
is normative through the necessary normative content of the language we use. It 
has further demonstrated that the dialectically necessary argument of the PGC 
is capable of withstanding assaults against it, and should therefore be accepted 
as sound in the absence of a an acceptable rebuttal to the contrary. It has also 
been demonstrated that the universally applicable instrumental reason produced 
by the argument is capable of acting as a categorical imperative, and necessarily 
must do so as part of a unified theory of norms within deliberative reasoning. 
As such, any theory of law which recognises that moral principles are able to be 
incorporated into a legal system is forced, by the categorical nature of the 
argument, to abandon claims to contingent incorporation in favour of a 
298 
 
necessary connection; to claim otherwise would strip non-compliant rules of 
their ability to serve so as to direct action, and thus could not serve as law in any 
meaningful sense of the word.  
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